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Marxism and Nationalism: The Misleading European Heritage 
The aim of the present study on the classical Marxist 
European Heritage on the national question is to establish the 
causes for the recurrent intellectual and political inability of 
this tradition to conceptualise and explain the nature of the na- 
tional phenomenon. 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that there is a recur- 
rent thematic unity between the different European schools of 
Marxism, despite the considerable intellectual and political dif- 
ferences between the different European Marxist traditions. 
This thematic unity is called the Marxist parameters of 
analysis of the national phenomenon, and it consists of the 
theory of the universal evolution of the forces of production, 
the theory of Economic reductionism, and the Eurocentric bias in 
the discussion of the universal process of change. 
The works on the national question of Marx and Engels, 
Luxemburg, Kautsky, Bernstein, Lenin, Stalin, Gramsci and Bauer 
are evaluated in this work to show how this thematic unity 
operates in the various competing Marxist approaches. 
The theories of Antonio Gramsc' and Otto Bauer were found to 
be more sensitive to the multifarious nature of the national 
phenomenon because they are less bound to the above-mentioned 
parameters of analysis. 
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Introduction 
The conceptualisation of the national phenomena presents a 
series of difficulties and contradictions for modern social 
theories. Since the emergence of both Marxism and Sociology the 
concern of theory has been to explain -social phenomena by con- 
stantly refining a universal logic. Slowly but surely, the ap- 
parent mystery of specificities and localisms was to be unraveled 
by the penetrating forces of logically refined and empirically 
tested theories. Their task was supposed to enhance human percep- 
tions of social realities - much in the same way as the theory of 
gravity and the theory of relativity were supposed to enhance the 
understanding of the way in which the universe works. The Tower 
of Pisa and the Newtonian Apple were no longer self contained 
phenomena, but the result of the laws of gravity, an aprioristic 
condition that transcended the immediate existence of the tower 
and the apple. Thus, the modern concept of causality emerged in 
Physics as the at times empirical, at times theoretical, ascer- 
tainable combination of conditions which is usually followed by a 
predictable occurrence which constitutes its effect. 
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This analytical logic has exercised a profound impact in so- 
cial theory. Sociology and Marxism were (and are) unmistakably 
shaped by this form of analysis, the aim of which is to explain 
specific and localised problems in terms of an overall develop- 
mental logic. Specificities and localisms are both anomalies to 
account "f or, and stumbling blocks for the efficient performance 
of those theories. It is, then, no coincidence that Sociology 
and Marxism have little sympathy for any social phenomenon that 
resists being subsumed by an all-inclusive logic of analysis. 
"Evolution", in C. D. Renning (ed) Encyclopaedia of Marxism 
Communism and Western Society, Ney York, Herder & Herder, 1972- 
73. p. 241 
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The resilience of the multi-faceted national phenomenon is per- 
haps one of the most obstinate forms of social relativism; 
nationalism preaches the importance of the specific over the 
general. It provides lengthy justifications for why the national 
movement is "unique", and why it should be considered a special 
case. At the same time, attempts to explain the nature of the 
national phenomenon in universal terms have clashed with a 
diverse reality that resists such monocausal explanations. As in 
the case of classical sociology, it is, then, no coincidence that 
classical Marxism was logically poised to reject the claims to 
specificity and uniqueness of nationalist ideologies. 
The "national question", did not disappear because 
"classical Marxism" wished it to. What really happened was the 
opening of an amazing theoretical gap in the Marxist tradition, a 
gap that was often covered up by invoking insensitive and 
stereotypical formulations that had more to do with a religious 
dogma than with a tradition that claims to "understand" -let 
alone "transform" - the social arena. Marxist discussions of 
nationalism were, with few and relatively unknown exceptions, 
clouded in epiphenomenological terminology. Concrete cases of 
nationalist agitation were to to be explained in terms of the 
class struggle or of a pervasive "false consciousness" that dis- 
tracted the workers from their real aim: the destruction of the 
bourgeois order. 
The purpose of this work is to try to understand and 
evaluate the failures of European Marxism to come to grips with 
the national phenomenon. That the European Marxist tradition 
flourished and developed outside the area of influence of 
European culture, is evident for all to see. As will be shown in 
subsequent chapters, the generalisation and universalisation of a 
developmental logic that has its historical origins in the 
European continent is one of the key components of the Marxist 
failure in conceptualising the multifarious forms of the national 
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phenomenon. It is, therefore 
European Marxist tradition in 
its general validity, but on 
torical specificity, so that 
of generalising on the basis 
successfully avoided. 
essential to understand the 
detail, not in order to ascertain 
the contrary, to discover its his- 
the widespread and pernicious error 
of the European experience is 
The failure of European Marxism to adequately understand and 
conceptualise the national phenomenon is acknowledged by most 
contemporary writers on the subject. The constant repetition of 
stereotyped formulas, and the impossibility of providing an 
adequate conceptual and theoretical analysis of the problem, 
moved Tom Nairn to open the theoretical section of his thought 
provoking book The Break up of Britain, with a statement of 
despair: 
The theory of Nationalism represents Marxism's great 
historical failure. It may have others as well, and 
some of these have been more debated: Marxism's short- 
comings over imperialism, the state, the falling rate 
of profit and the . 
immiseration of the masses are cer- 
tainly old battlefields. Yet none of these is as im- 
portant, as fundamental, as the problem of nationalism, 
either in theory or in political practice. 
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Nairn goes on to argue that this failure was inevitable, but 
that we are now in a position to understand it. However, there 
is nothing inevitable about it - unless the paradigms of 
Eurocentric evolutionism and economic reductionism become the un- 
contested features of Marxist discourse. 
Another widespread and not less influential Marxist argument 
-------------------- 
2. T. Nairn, The Break up of Britain, New Left Books, London 
1977, second expanded edition, 1981, p. 329 
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attempts to show the impossibility of a specific analysis of the 
national question. According to this position, every national 
formation would have its own internal logic which is not trans- 
latable to other situations. The essence of the argument is that 
there is no "National Question" but "national questions". The 
apparent plural relativism of this interpretation is paradoxi- 
cally the result of the deterministic unity of the main theme of 
classical Marxism. This is the depressing argument that social 
classes are the sole and unique agents of social transformation, 
and conequently, the diversity of national question is the ex- 
pression of the impact of this unique and privileged agency in a 
plurality of conjunctural situations. Thus, the impossibility of 
theorizing on the national phenomenon stems from the assertion 
that, ultimately, the national phenomenon has no logic of its 
own, but its transformations are only the reflection of the laws 
of motion of political economy. The superficial plurality and 
flexibility of this analysis appears to be a convenient way of 
hiding and excusing the dogmatic unity of the theoretical stance 
that sustains it. 
The purpose of this work will be to establish that this in- 
terpretation was both intellectually abortive and politically 
disastrous. It caused a theoretical blindness within the main 
stream Marxist tradition that was responsible for many important 
defeats of Marxism in the West. The importance of the national 
question for the socialist movement is dramatically exemplified 
by the fact that the contemporary success of every Marxist move- 
ment in the non European world - and outside the area of in- 
fluence of the Red Army - took place when Marxism operated in 
conjunction with powerful national sentiments and movements. 
In trying to evaluate the significance of Marxism's European 
heritage on the national question, it will first be argued that 
the most influential European discussions on the national 
phenomenon show a recurrent "thematic unity" and a relative 
cohesive line of argument despite important political and intel- 
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lectual differences between them. 
temological basis of this thematic 
xist Parameters of Analysis of t 
parameters are the theory of the 
forces on production, the theory 
the Eurocentric bias in concrete 
process of change. 
The theoretical and epis- 
unity will be called the Mar- 
he National Question. These 
universal evolution of the 
of economic reductionism, and 
discussions of the universal 
Following an account of these parameters, the work of Marx 
and Engels on the national question will be then analysed. Con- 
trary to the generalised opinion that the positions of the found- 
ing fathers of historical materialism on the national question 
were informed by circumstantial events, it will be argued that 
their positions, contained within the above mentioned parameters, 
exhibit a good deal of coherence and unity. This is so despite 
the fact that their positions were never comprehensively stated 
in any single work or sustained argument. 
The work on the national question of the most - influential 
figures of the Second International will be evaluated. Contrary 
to the assertion that at the time of the Second International, 
Marxist theory was not codified as a rigid orthodoxy, it will be 
argued that the main works of the different and conflicting 
traditions were, in various degrees, influenced by the above men- 
tioned parameters of analysis. In all cases they failed to 
adequately conceptualise the national phenomenon. Marxism- 
Leninism had to break with the distortive rigidities of the 
Second International in order to make sense of the diverse Rus- 
sian reality. It will be argued that this partial break sen- 
sitized this tradition to the political dimension of the national 
phenomenon. Marxism-Leninism nevertheless retained a class reduc- 
tionist perspective that severely limited its analytical and 
political ability to come to grips with all aspects of the na- 
tional arena. The work of Antonio Gramsci provided a partial, but 
important break with the parameters of analysis of classical Mar- 
xism. Gramsci's conceptualisation of important aspects of the 
5 
political arena outside the paradigmatic field of class deter- 
mination constitutes a definitive improvement in the ability of 
the Marxist tradition to conceptualise multifarious forms of the 
national existence. But Gramsci remained insensitive to the 
plurality of the national arena, and particularly to the exist- 
ence and development of different ethno-national communities 
within the framework of the same state. Gramsci took for granted 
that states are "national", concealing in this way the 
problematic relation between national community and state. 
But above all, the work of Otto Bauer will be considered as 
providing the most important breakthrough in developing 
categories of analysis located outside the restrictive influence 
of the limiting parameters of analysis of classical Marxism. No- 
tions such as "the community of fate" and the "national 
character", appear to be useful categories of analysis when 
stripped off from the essentialism of the nationalist discourse. 
However, some important aspects of Bauer's work remain trapped in 
the strait jacket of economic reductionism. The class reductionism 
of his historical case studies appears to contradict the richness 
and multidimensionality of his theoretical analysis. In this 
sense "two different Bauers" appear to be writing on the 
"Nationalitätenfrage". The first, the Austro-Marxist intellec- 
tual, fresh out of the environment of fin-de-si8cle Vienna, 
writes with brilliant and innovative ideas matured through his 
debate with Max Adler against the neo-Kantians and classical Mar- 
xism. The second, the party man, is loyal to the dogmas of 
economistic Marxism and is severely restrained by the need to 
demonstrate allegiance to the doctrinal teachings of Marx and En- 
gels. 
The terminology used in the Marxist tradition to refer to 
the "national arena" belongs to a highly contested field. It is, 
therefore, important to clarify the meaning of certain key terms 
used in this work. The term Classical Marxism is used to define a 
tradition which sees social classes as protagonists of the 
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process of social transformation. It also refers to "original" 
theoretical statements of historical materialism. Classical Mar- 
xists referred to the National Question as the totality of 
political, cultural, ideological, economic and legal relations 
within and between national communities. I see no reason not to 
continue using this term, which is interchangeable with national 
phenomenon. Nations are for classical Marxists fully formed na- 
tional communities, usually in possession of a national state. 
Nationalities are national communities not fully developed as na- 
tions. The distinction between these two concepts is ambiguous and 
unclear, so the term national communities will be used instead to 
cover both cases. This term also highlights the cultural and com- 
munitarian aspects of the national phenomenon. A national state 
is the ideal and usually unobtainable synthesis between a com- 
plete national community and a state. Whenever the term "nation" 
is used it will denote a closer connection with the national 
state rather than with the national community. Nationalism is a 
political and ideological movement whose main concern is the 
well-being of the national community - be it real or fictitious. 
Sometimes nationalisms "make" national communities. Nationalism 
was unanimously defined by classical Marxists as a bourgeois 
phenomenon alien to Marxism. 
Many people have helped and supported me during the long a 
drawn-out process of writing this thesis. I am grateful to the 
University of Hull and to the department of Sociology & Social 
Anthropology for granting me the postgraduate scholarship that 
made this thesis possible. My foremost obligations are to my 
teachers. My supervisor Dr. Ivar P. Oxaal who over the last six 
years has provided the right mix of license and discipline, 
friendship and the warmth of his happy family home, combined with 
intellectual rigor and stimulating discussions. Dr. Anthony D. 
Smith first introduced me as an undergraduate student at the 
Hebrew University - by the way of a thought provoking seminar - 
to the paradoxes of the national phenomenon, allowing me to 
translate into sociological concepts deep rooted existential ex- 
7 
periences. At Essex Dr. Maxine Molyneux, having taught me ' as a 
post-graduate, encouraged the development of my thoughts on the 
national question. I have had. the good fortune of being taught by 
one of the outstanding and original intellectual thinkers of con- 
temporary Marxism, Dr. Ernesto Laclau -el maestro- who had 
profound and lasting influence in my intellectual development. 
At Hull, Dr. Talal Asad guided me through the rigors of theoreti- 
cal analysis with his insightful and constructive criticism. His 
tuition and friendship - as that of Dr. Tania Baker - were a 
constant source of encouragement. I am grateful to Martin Shaw's 
illuminating criticism and patient help (as the editor of Mar- 
xist Sociology Revisited), in transforming a collection of ear- 
lier versions of chapters of this thesis into a coherent article. 
The hazards of contemporary academic life pushed me into 
academic nomadism, in the course of which l meet many people who 
have encouraged me to persist in the existential and intellectual 
endeavor of unraveling the problems of the national question. I 
am grateful for the support of my colleague and friend Dr. Aziz 
Heidar, with whom I share, right from the days of our common un- 
dergraduate experiences at the Hebrew University, an existential 
and intellectual interest in the national question. I am also 
grateful for the stimulating discussions on Austro-Marxism with 
my friends Gregoris Ananiadis and Blanca Mur'iz, and the invalu- 
able help of with the German texts of Dr. Gabrielle Mikoleit. I 
wish to express my gratitude to the Dr. Karl-Renner Institut in 
Vienna and to Professor Gerhard Botz of Salzburg University for 
giving me the opportunity to read a paper on the conference on 
the occasion of the centenary of Otto Bauer's birth, on which I 
received interesting and useful comments of particular relevance 
to the thesis, particularly from Genosse Manfred Ackerman. At 
Keele University Professor Emeritus Ronald J. Frankemberg, Dr. 
John Law, Dr. Athar Hussain, Dr. Ursula Sharma and Mr. Gordon 
Fife provided me with stimulating feedbacks over parts of this 
thesis. I am grateful for the friendship and support of the Head 
of the Sociology division at Thames Polytechnic, Dr. Philip 
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Schlesinger with whom I had long and stimulating discussions on 
the national question, as well as for the thought provoking 
debates with Dr. Nira Yuval . Davis - friend, colleague and comrade 
- with whom I share the dearest dream of a Palestine where Is- 
raeli Jews and Palestinian Araos exercise their national rights 
in peace freedom and equality. I wish also to thank Professor 
Bill Brugger head of the Discipline of Politics, at the Flinders 
University of South Australia, for his helpful and stimulating 
comments on various chapters of this thesis. I also have a debt 
of gratitude to Mr. Norman Wintrop, who carefully read an earlier 
draft of this thesis and made perceptive and insightful suggest- 
ions. I am also grateful for the caring support of my friends 
Professor Bryan S. Turner (D. Litt) and Dr. Karen Lane during the 
last and crucial moments of writing this thesis. I am graful to 
Peter Vintila for his help with German texts and for translating 
parts of this thesis into acceptable English. I also wish to 
express my gratitude to the Inter Library Loans staff at Flinders 
University who had uncomplainingly and efficiently pursued my 
idiosyncratic requests for references in German, Spanish, Italian 
and French. 
Typists usually get a brief mention in a works acknow- 
ledgment. It is perhaps a symptomatic expression of the period in 
which we live that my gratitude is to my Personal Computer and 
Word Processor, without which the task of writing up this thesis 
would have been an immensely long and drawn out exercise. It is 
also perhaps an expression of unfixed and contradictory ten- 
dencies of contemporary post industrial capitalism that I have 
great reservations on the political wisdom of the use of new 
technology. I thanK Professor Brugger for introducing me to this 
revolutionary form of writing. 
Adelaide, South Australia, April 1987 
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Chapter 1: The Marxist Parameters on the Analysis of the Na- 
tional Phenomenon 
A social order never perishes before all the productive 
forces for which it is broadly sufficient have been 
developed, and new superior relations of production 
never replace older ones before the mat erial conditions 
for their existence have matured within the womb of the 
old society. 1 
Before attempting to assess the failures and successes of 
the Marxist tradition in evaluating the nature of the national 
phenomenon, a point of departure of the theoretical discussion 
must be established. In proposing that there is a paradigm that 
gives a degree logical coherence and sense of purpose to the 
various Marxist analyses of the national phenomenon, it becomes 
imperative to try and establish the theoretical basis for this 
argument. The paradigm that shapes the analytical premises of 
the Marxist theory of the national phenomenon will be called 
parameters for the analysis of the national phenomenon. The aim 
of this chapter will be to identify and describe these parameters 
and to delimit their influence on the discussions to be reviewed 
in the following chapters. 
The parameters for the discussion of the Marxist theory of 
the National Question, refer to three areas of analysis that are 
widely considered crucial for the nature of Historical 
Materialism: The theory of Evolution, the Theory of The Economic 
Determination of the Forces of Production and a derivative 
1. K. Marx, A contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, 
various editions, published in London in 1859, the same year and 
place where C. Darwin published "The Origin of the Species. 
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category of both, the Eurocentric bias in the analysis of con- 
crete case studies. 
The theory of Evolution, within Marxism refers to an under- 
standing of social transformation as a process which can be 
grasped in universal laws of historical development. History is 
understood as a progressive series of transformations through 
universal and hierarchically defined stages. These stages of 
transformation lead to the classless society of the future. 
There are many variations of this theory, but in broad terms, it 
is accepted by the vast majority of schools that constitute the 
Marxist tradition. 
The second parameter is the theory of the economic deter- 
mination of the forces of production. This theory is a form of 
economic reductionism, because it declares that all meaningful 
changes within the social arena take place in the sphere of 
economic (class) relations. Marx himself expressed this theory 
in terms of his weil known metaphoric distinction between base 
and superstructure. The "base" refered to the sphere of economic 
relations that constituted social classes; the "superstructure" 
designated a residual topographical area in which all other (non- 
class) social processes occured. According to this theory, the 
"superstructure" is shaped and determined, after various stages 
of more or less complex mediations, by the activities and 
processes of change that occur at the level of the "base". This 
conceptualisation of relations of causality has been expressed in 
a variety of ways by different Marxist traditions, and its most 
influential version is the so-called theory of "determination in 
the last instance". A critical review of this theory drawing on 
the seminal works of A. Cutler, B. Hindess, P. Hirst, A. Hussain, 
E. Laclau and C. Mouffe2 follows. 
-------------------- 
2. Marx "Capital" and Capitalism Today, Vol II, Routledge and 
Kegan, London 1978. Mode of Production and Social Formations, 
London MacMillan 1977, Politics and Ideology in the Marxist 
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The third parameter, the Eurocentric bias in concrete case 
studies is, strictly speaking, derived from the two previously 
discussed parameters. It is not a separate analytical category, 
and cannot be understood without reference to economic reduc- 
tionism or the theory of evolution. It warrants separate con- 
sideration however, because of its important methodological con- 
sequences when the Marxist analysis of the national phenomenon 
is applied to the non European world. It will be argued that the 
Marxist tradition is trapped in the paradoxical situation of 
claiming to be a universal theory of social emancipation, while 
it uses an ethnocentric methodology to conceptualise social for- 
mations located outside the area of Western culture. 
Eurocentrism, then, refers to the construction of a model of 
development which universalises empirically observed European 
categories of development: the process of social transformation 
in different societies is understood and conceptualised in terms 
of the Western developmental rationale; the more "advanced" in- 
dustrial society shows to the less developed "The Image of its 
own future". 3 
In the balance of this chapter, this paradigm will be 
described and evaluated so that the subsequent discussion of the 
Marxist Theories of the National Question could be located in the 
context of the parameters that constitute this paradigm. 
Theory, New Left Books, London 1977, Gramsci & Marxist Theory 
Routledge and Kegan 1977 and Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
Verso 1985. 
3. K. Marx, Capita , preface to the first German edition, vol 
p. 19, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1977 
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The Marxist Theory of Evolution 
The concept of "evolution" in the abstract sense is one of 
those rarities in the history of ideas which both, made an enor- 
mous and lasting impact in the different branches of the social 
scienc es, and at the same time provided a very plausible and not 
less influential paradigm in the natural sciences. At first 
sight it seems that the logic that lies behind this widely cur- 
rent concept, realised the long cherished dream of many 
philosophers and scientists to find the organising principle that 
rules both the natural and social worlds. 
Karl Marx was determined to establish that "scientific" and 
"objective" laws of motion were equally applicable to the social 
and natural worlds. He found in the success of the theory of 
evolution in the natural sciences of his days a tangible and a 
"valuable" source of encouragement to his belief that an objec- 
tive and scientific analysis of the process of social transforma- 
tion was both possible and desirable. In considering the 
framework of the process of social transformation, Marx reasoned 
as follows: 
... it is always necessary to distinguish 
between the 
material transformations of the economic conditions of 
production which can be determined with the precision of the 
natural sciences, and the legal, political, religious, ar- 
tistic or philosophic, in short ideological forms... 4 
Consequently, if the process of social transformation could 
be explained and predicted with "the rigor and precision of the 
natural sciences", an overall law of these general process is not 
-------------------- 
4. K. Marx, Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, various editions and publishers 
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only a theoretical possibility but a methodological necessity to 
legitimise the Marxian claim to scientificity. Subjective or 
"individual" explanations are not very important because human 
beings are not always aware of the teleological nature of his- 
torical development. Conjunctural explanations have to be deduced 
from the general model to ga in "scientific validity": 
... just as one does not 
thinks about himself, so 
transformations by its 
this consciousness must 
of material life, from 
forces of production a 
judge an individual by what he 
one cannot judge such an epoch of 
consciousness, but on the contrary, 
be explained from the contradictions 
the existing conflict between social 
nd the relations of production. 5 
If this is the case, then the crucial factor in explaining 
social change is not a heuristic "self explanation" of social 
developments, but the overall universal mechanism that made pos- 
sible the process of social transformation. For Marx, as for 
various subsequent generations of Marxists, the relationship 
"humanity- nature", is at the same time the "natural" history of 
humanity and the very place were "human essence" is constituted 
through the process of labour and production. Consequently 
there is only one universal history, that of human beings in 
relation to nature. T his relation constitutes the locus of the 
history of production, of industry and of science. 6 
For classical Marxism then, the process of human transforma- 
tion neither operates in a vacuum nor it is a random event. It 
it conforms to a certain universal logic, and the center of this 
-------------------- 
5. ibid. 
6. L. Krader, "The 
History of Marxism, 
vol. 1 of op. cit. 
Theory of Evolution" 
London 1982 p. 192. 
Storia del Marxismo 
in E. Hobswbaum (ed. ) 
English translation of 
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logic is located in the dialectical relation humanity-nature. 
This results in a transformative synthesis which is at the very 
heart of the form and direction of the process of change of the 
productive forces. Why are the productive forces given such a 
privileged position?. this is the theme of the next section of 
this chapter. For the moment it will be sufficient to note that 
this constant process of transformation of the productive forces 
is the the causal factor, the "engine" of social change. This 
general process of transformation of the productive forces has a 
universal character, and determines the content of what appears 
to be a conjunctural format. Thus, human history is for classi- 
cal Marxism, a process of hierarchical evolution strictus sensus. 
The contradictions of endogenous forces lead humanity from one 
stage of development to another, creating in this way an unbroken 
hierarchical connection from one level to the next.? 
For classical Marxism, the history of humanity is develop- 
mental by definition owing to two crucial considerations: 
a) human beings emerged out the animal-nature stage of history, 
because of their ability to transform nature through labour. 
b) The process of human labour and the mode of appropriation of 
nature causes the evolution of human history via the process 
of development of the productive forces. 
This notion of development as an evolutionary sequence from 
a lower to a higher stage is not only expressed in the abstract 
prose of Marx's Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, but also finds concrete expression in the 
works of Marx on the European as well as the non-European world. 
It is present in the works of Engels and, as will be shown in the 
following chapters, it is the basis for Kautsky's, Luxemburg's 
7. ibid. P. 19 4 
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and Bernstein's discussions of both, the general analysis of so- 
cial change, and the more concrete discussion of the national 
phenomenon. It was so entrenched in the thoughts of turn of the 
century Marxists and it became the axiomatic point of departure 
of the mechanistic Marxism of the Second International and the 
focus for the theoretical debates between the Second and Third 
international. The works of Marx and Engels show clear examples 
of this analytical logic, which are of great relevance to the on- 
going discussion on the national phenomenon. Thus, in the intro- 
duction to the first volume of Caoital on reads: 
In this worK I have to examine the Capitalist Mode of 
Production and the conditions of production and exchange 
corresponding to that mode. Up to the present time, their 
classic ground is England.... If, however, the German reader 
shrugs his shoulders at the condition of the English in- 
dustrial and agricultural labourers, or in optimist fashion 
comforts himself with the thought that in Germany things are 
not nearly so bad; I must plainly tell him, "De to fabula 
narratur" (it is a tale told for you). Intrinsically, it 
is not a question of the higher or lower degree of develop- 
ment of the social antagonisms that result from the natural 
laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these 
laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron 
necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is 
more developed industrially only shows, to the less 
developed, the image of its own future (emphasis added). 
8 
Also, in that same introduction, in the section in which 
Marx explains the scope and aims of his monumental worK he 
returns to the same theme - this time in way that is directly re- 
lated to the ongoing discussion on the national question: 
-------------------- 
8. K. Marx, Capital, Vol 1, Lawrence & Wishart, London 1977, p 
19. 
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One nation can and should learn from others. And even when a 
society has got upon the right tracK for the discovery of 
the natural laws of its movement- and it is the ultimate aim 
of this work, to lay bare the economic law of motion of 
modern society- it can neither clear by bold leaps nor 
remove by legal enactments, the, obstacles offered by succes- 
sive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten 
and lessen the birth- pangs. (emphasis added)9 
The theory of progress and linear development explicitly 
presented in both the above quotations does not leave any doubt 
as to the meaning and direction of the process of social evolu- 
tion in the work of Marx. This may also explain the sympathy 
that classical Marxists had for Darwin's theories of natural 
evolution. Marx wrote that Darwin provides a "natural 
scientific" basis for the class struggle in history, dealing a 
"death blow" to teleology in natural sciences. 1° From Darwin's 
work, extracted the crucial premise for his own theory of social 
evolution: the unity of natural and human history. In this 
sense, the work of Marx and that of Darwin appear to abide by the 
same methodological principles: it is the universal and orderly 
transformation from one stage to another that defines the 
coherence of the process of evolution. But this should not mean 
Marx's theory of evolution, and Darwin's theory of the evolution 
of the species are reducible to each other. This would be a 
simplification of both influential paradigms. It is important to 
note in relation to the ongoing discussion on the Marxist concep- 
tualisation of the national phenomenon, however, that Marx and 
Darwin shared a set of epistemological premises which provided 
the rationale for a similar methodology, but also that the 
-------------------- 
9. ibid. p. 20 
10. K. Marx in a letter to F. Lassalle, quoted in op. cit. L. 
Krader, "the theory of evolution", p. 196 
17 
theoretical similarities end there. Marx and classical Marxists 
believed that Darwin's theory gave strength to the historical- 
materialist case, because it used a methodology which at the time 
was considered the embodiment of scientificity in the Natural 
Sciences, and consequently, confered upon the methodological 
premises of historical materialism a "scientific" and "objective" 
aura. Classical Marxists believed that the Marxist case was im- 
mensely strengthened by examples from outside the realm of social 
history, and by the works of thinkers, philosophers and natural 
scientists which, while not adhering to the social principles of 
historical materialism, provided scientific examples that jus- 
tified the validity of the theory and method of Historical 
Materialism. Such was for Marx the importance of Darwin's work 
on the evolution of the species, and also, the validity of the 
work of Morgan, a politically conservative American ethnologist. 
Marx and Engels quoted Morgans works on social evolution not be- 
cause they shared in Morgan's ideological positions (which they 
did not), but because he conceptualised a theory of the evolution 
of societies which in their view, justified the central 
hypothesis of historical materialism. In the understanding of 
classical Marxism, Morgan had made an unintended contribution to 
the justification of the validity of the main premises of the 
Marxist theory of social evolution, by providing ethnological ex- 
amples from the study of North American aboriginal societies that 
validated the historical materialist perception of the logic of 
historical evolution. In this sense, Morgan was an "involuntary 
and unconscious agent" in clarifying and understanding "the his- 
torical forces of change". England was in the same way, accord- 
ing to Marx, an "unconscious tool" in bringing about social 
transformation in significant areas of the non European world. 
England it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hin- 
dustan was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was 
stupid in her manner of enforcing them, but that is not the 
question. The question is can mankind fulfill its destiny 
without a fundamental revolution in the social state of 
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Asia?. If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England 
she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about 
that revolution. " 
This notion of "unconscious and unwilling agents" in the 
Process of social transformation denotes the other important in- 
fluence in classical Marxism: the Hegelian theory of social 
evolution. It is worth noting that, the intellectual background 
against wich Marx and Engels developed their theory of evolution 
was greatly influenced by the then fashionable Hegelian 
Philosophy. The epistemological logic inherited by Marxist theory 
from Hegelian political philosophy defines social change as 
caused by a single and universal historical process -which in the 
Marxist case is the development of the forces of* production. This 
process imposes its logic of change independently from the will 
of the participating subjects. For Hegel history is not a mere 
collection of random events. It is the process of development 
(unfolding) from a level of lesser freedom to a level of absolute 
freedom mediated through various intermediate stages which sig- 
nify aa relative improvement on previous levels of development. 
Since for Hegel history is not a mere recording of events, it is 
Possible to read a certain "meaning" or "intention" in the un- 
folding of history. Thus, history is a coherent process of trans- 
formation and it invariably shows a "pattern" of change 
expressed in the "becoming" of the human agency denoted in a 
higher degree of freedom embodied in a more sophisticated state. 
In the Hegelian tradition the stages of evolution towards a 
higher level of freedom can be clearly indicated. Earlier or 
"less developed" civilisations must give way to more "advanced" 
forms of social organisation. The Hegelian agency in this process 
-------------------- 
11. K. Marx, "The parlianentary debate on India", published in 
the New York Daily Tribune on 25 June 1853, reprinted in in S. 
Avineri (ed. ) Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernisation, Anchor 
Books, London 1969, p. 94 
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of unfolding is the Volksgeist, the "spirit" or "genius" of a na- 
tional community. It is only in the context of an "organised 
community" that the higher levels of freedom are achieved. The 
state is the concrete expression of the Volksgeist at any par- 
ticular conjuncture. For Hegel then, world history is a dialecti- 
cal relation between "spirits of peoples" and it is objectivised 
in an orderly universal succession of cultures (Welthistorische 
Voll<geister). This conceptualisation provides the format for the 
Hegelian theory of evolution which implies an orderly and linear 
transformation of humanity from lower to higher stages of 
freedom. In terms of the Hegelian philosophy, the main stages of 
development are: 
Oriental: A static social system 
of the monarch. The only "free" 
Greek: This is the model of city 
people are free but others are 
epitomised by the absolute power 
person is the Despot. 
states in ancient Greece. Some 
not. 
Roman: At this stage the Greek system is universalised through 
the Roman Empire. 
Christianity: Human freedom is guaranteed by the emergence of 
subjective consciousness. From this point onwards a process of 
continuous "unfolding" towards the absolute realisation of the 
ethical idea of freedom follows. 12 
The influence of this analytical logic on Historical 
Materialism is clear. In classical Marxism, the metaphysical no- 
tions of "Volkgeist" and "unfolding of freedom" are replaced as 
-------------------- 
12. H. Raybourn, The Ethical Theory of Hegel, Claredon Press, 
1967., p. 220 If. and S. Avineri Hegel's Theory of the Modern 
State Cambridge 1972, Z. A. Pelczynski (ed. ) The State & Civil 
Society, Cambridge 1984, "Introduction" p. 7 ff. 
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causal explanations for the process of social change, by the 
"materialist" notions of "class consciousness" and the 
"development of the productive forces", but the epistemological 
basis of the argument remains much the same. An ontologically 
privileged agency regulates and determines the process of change 
and no social element can escape this logic of social transforma- 
tion. National communities as well as all other historical ac- 
tors have to be temporally located in this universal continuum 
of social transformation. The classical Marxist assertion that 
the emergence of modern nations must be located within a concrete 
period of development of the productive forces is just one tan- 
gible expression of this linear conceptualisation of social 
change. As it will be shown in the following chapters, in clas- 
sical Marxism the presence of "modern nations" is just a func- 
tional expression of the conjuctural stage in the process of 
development of the productive forces. In this sense, the temporal 
emergence of the "modern nation" is just one indicator of the 
level of development of the productive forces: it is the concrete 
expression of bourgeois hegemony over the political arena. Thus 
national communities and nationalist movements are evaluated not 
in their own specific configuration, but in terms of their 
capacity to "advance" or delay the process of development of the 
productive forces, or at least, the concrete political concrete 
expression of the latter. 
To summarise the argument advanced so far: The classical 
Marxist evaluation of the process of evolution of the forces of 
production implies the following two contentions: 
1) Social Evolution is cumulative and relatively linear. 
2) The major stages of development of the productive forces are 
universal. 
In view of the universality of this process, every concrete 
observable phenomena is required to "fit" within this paradig- 
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matic framework. Thus, the classical Marxist explanation of con- 
crete social phenomena implies a teleological bias, since the 
location of the event under consideration has been parametrically 
decided prior to the evaluation of the event under consideration 
by the universal laws of social transformation. This indeed, as 
it will be shown in the following chapters, has been the fate of 
most classical Marxist conceptualisations of the national arena. 
A discussion of the features of a concrete national community is 
in most cases translated in to the evaluation of the position of 
the concrete national community under consideration within the 
evolving process of transformation of the forces of production. 
This is the essence of the classical Marxist epistemological 
stance. A nation must be located within a developmental process 
and the connection between the concrete national community under 
consideration and the universal process of social transformation 
is never questioned at the level of the analysis of concrete na- 
tional movements. 
A second dimension of the evolutionist parameter relevant to 
the ongoing discussion on the national phenomena is that classi- 
cal Marxism assumes the unity of humanity under a universal form 
of rationality. It implicitly rejects various forms of relativism 
and pluralism by taxing for granted a universal form of human be- 
haviour that results from the same material conditions of produc- 
tion. In other words there is here an underestimation of cultural 
factors since they cannot be easily derived from historical 
materialist categories of analysis. Classical Marxism takes for 
granted the transferability of technocratic rationality and in- 
stitutional models of social organisation in similar material 
conditions. While differences and specificities are - recognised, 
they are not considered essential if they cannot be derived in a 
relation of causality from the most meaningful factors that con- 
figurate the material base. 
The existence of a technological and organisational teleol- 
09Y in models of development is not confined to Marxism alone. 
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The theories of modernisation in sociology suffer from a similar 
bias in the analysis of social change. In this sense it is inter- 
esting to note the common ground of classical marxism and various 
theories of modernisation in conceptualising social evolution as 
universal, cumulative and relatively linear. This significant as- 
sumption is shared but not acknowledged by traditions that other- 
wise provide competing interpretations of the forms of social or- 
ganisation. What is perplexing about this is that classical Mar- 
xism always claims awareness of the historical relativity of 
ideas, particularly those upheld by ruling classes. In this 
sense, classical Marxism will easily recognize the historical 
specificity and teleological bias of dominant ideas derived from 
competing traditions, while being blind to, and unaware of, the 
historical relativity of its own cultural and intellectual 
origins. Marxist epistemology prevents classical Marxism from 
engaging in a "Marxist analysis of Marxist consciousness". It 
prevents Marxism from locating and interpreting it own tradition 
within the cultural and intellectual rationale of a given his- 
torical period. Classical Marxism is blind to the possibility 
that its theory of cumulative, linear and universal evolution was 
the Zeitgeist of a certain historical period which witnessed 
both, the industrial revolution, and the colonial expansion of 
western political power - and their related forms of intellec- 
tual, cultural, and military domination. This acknowledgement 
would have necessitated the recognition of the ideological nature 
of historical materialism, an unthinkable event in the context of 
the epistemological logic of classical Marxism. 
Classical Marxism equated both, its principles of social 
evolution and the principles of "natural" evolution with sound 
criteria of scientificity. Marx saw in the impressive advances of 
the natural science of his time a further justification for the 
logic of historical materialism. He borrowed from the later what 
he considered to be "scientific" criteria of objectivity. In this 
way, classical Marxism failed to understand the specificity an 
non reducibility of the realm of the social, preferring instead 
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to use -a logic of analysis legitimised by the criterion of scien- 
tificity then prevalent in ' the natural sciences. Only those 
Marxist schools that seriously engaged in a debate with the neo- 
Kantian tradition or with this tradition's heirs in the social 
sciences developed some awareness of the problem of the 
specificity of the forms of the social. As will be shown in 
chapters 5 and 7, the Gramscian and Austro-Marxist traditions 
developed a broader sensitivity to the multifarious nature of the 
national phenomenon precisely because they were prepared to 
critically discuss the blind Marxist appropriation of the 
methodological principles of turn of the century natural 
sciences. Peter Worsley makes this point clear with his charac- 
teristicaly unambiguous style: 
The rise of Modern Physics after Marx's death, gave rise to 
much more relativistic conceptions of law than those Marx 
used. And in the social sciences, the Neo Kantian school was 
to argue that social action in any case, was different in 
kind from what went on in nature, since people possessed 
consciousness, both individuals and groups reflected upon 
what they were doing and upon what was happening to them. 
Hence varying interpretations could be put upon the "same" 
situation, drawing upon different cultural resources 
(ideologies, utopias, theories of all kinds). Hence it was 
quite fundamental in analyzing social life, to understand 
these subjective ideas, the "meanings" that informed the be- 
haviour of people, but which were problematic in studying 
Nature, since rocks do not think and electrons do not feel 
frustration. t3 
In subsequent chapters it will be shown how the classical 
Marxist understanding of social evolution in terms of a cumula- 
-------------------- 
13" P. Worsley, Marx and Marxism, Tavistock Publications, London 
1982 p. 71 
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tive, linear and universal process of change, and the related 
need to locate every "superstructural" phenomena within this 
epistemological stance, desensitized the classical Marxist tradi- 
tion to the multidimensionality of the national phenomenon. The 
classical Marxist perception of the linear evolution of the 
forces of production aborted any possibility of understanding the 
specificity of the national arena. The second parameter of 
analysis will be now discussed: Economic reductionism. 
The Question of Economic Determination 
Since the early seventies, a set of seminal works within the 
Marxist tradition have discussed the insurmountable theoretical 
problems that result from the classical Marxist conceptualisation 
of the primacy of the economy in a number of ways. 14 Before this 
period, this argument was not considered problematic, with the 
possible exception of The Frankfurt School, The Austro-Marxist 
tradition, and up to a limited extent, the work of Gramsci. 
This absence of discussion seems bizarre today, particularly when 
the theoretical and methodological difficulties of classical Mar- 
xism in confronting complex social conjuctures - which defy 
monocausal explanations based on unilinear chains of relation- 
ships - are noted. One of these difficulties -perhaps the most 
complex- refers to the ability (or rather, the inability) of Mar- 
xism to explain the existence of Nationalist Movements. In view 
of the difficulties in explaining the existence and political ac- 
tivity of nationalist movements from the point of view of the 
rationale of the evolving forces of production, classical Marxist 
explanations were forced to use a battery of concepts and ideas 
that were at best ingenious theoretical contortions of perceptive 
insights - contorted to comply with the dogmatic dictum of the 
-------------------- 
14. I wish to express my intellectual idebteness to the works of 
op. cit., Laclau, Mouffe, Hirst, Cutler et. al., all of whom in- 
fluenced my critical stance on economism. 
25 Li brur) 
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economic model. 
While Marx and Engels were largely justified in criticising 
the idealist and metaphysical speculations of German Idealism, 
they did not build adequate safeguards into their theory to 
prevent their disciples falling into the mirror image metaphysi- 
cal stance: the mechanistic and reductionist interpretation of 
the process of social change. As a result of this situation, in 
the period that followed the death of the founding fathers of 
Historical Materialism, the main-stream Marxist tradition tilted 
towards a rigid and mechanistic method of analysis, which reached 
its peak around the turn of the century. This was also the period 
in which the national question was of paramount importance for 
the then young European socialist movement. While the Bolshevik 
tradition offered a partial renovation by criticizing the worst 
excesses of the mechanistic Marxism of the Second International, 
the economic reductionist perspective remained in full swing 
within the confines of this tradition. This time it was elevated 
to a category of dogma by political movement that regarded itself 
as the avant-garde of the proletariat, and which dismissed 
criticism with an unique sense of self righteousness unknown 
before within the Marxist tradition. But if the end of Stalinism 
and the subsequent disenchantment with the Soviet system, coupled 
with the identity crisis of the European working class brought 
about more innovative and daring analytical approaches during the 
seventies and eighties, very little of this fruitful innovation 
has been used to revive the ailing Marxist analysis of the na- 
tional question. Undoubtedly there are many reasons for this 
prolonged lack of analytical creativity, but it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that the dogma of economic reductionism has 
been one of the most powerful inhibiting factors in the develop- 
ment of a more imaginative analytical stance on the national 
question. The principal aim of this work will be to indicate the 
devastating effect of economism on a number of Marxist analysis 
of the national phenomenon This is an essential first step for 
the development of a more sensitive theoretical understanding of 
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the multifarious phenomenon under consideration. But before 
this is done, it is essential to indicate what it is meant by the 
terms "Economism" and "Economic Reductionism". 
The terms Economism and Economic Reductionism will be used 
in an interchangeable manner in the ongoing discussion of the na- 
tional phenomenon indicate those aspects of the Marxist theory 
that assert that fundamental causal agencies in the process of 
social transformation are derived from the activities of classes 
and the resulting class relations. Acording to the economistic 
argument, these class relations determine, through a more or less 
complex process of mediations the overall pattern and direction 
of the process of social change. This analytical mode is best ex- 
emplified in Marx's metaphorical division of the arena of the so- 
cial between Base and Superstructure. 
.. the general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once 
reached became the guiding principle of my studies can be 
summarised as follows. In their social production of their 
existence, men enter into definite, necessary relations, 
which are independent of their will, namely, relations of 
production corresponding to a determinate stage of the 
development of their material forces of production. The 
totality of these . relations of production constitute the 
economic structure of society, the real foundation of which 
there arises a legal and political superstructure and to 
which there correspond definite forms of social conscious- 
ness. The mode of production of material life conditions the 
social, political and intellectual life process in general. 
it is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but on the contrary, is their social being that 
determines their consciousness. 15 
------ 
15. K. 
----- 
Marx, 
--------- 
Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy, op. cit p. 3, various editions. 
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As Marx rightly asserts in the above citation, this thesis 
about the determination of the forces of production became a 
guiding principle not only of his own work, but of the mainstream 
Marxist tradition. Thus, the basic tenets of economic reduc- 
tionism could perhaps be summarised in the following postulates: 
The Base (e. i., the determinant element) can be successfully 
differentiated from the Superstructure (the determined 
element) in every social formation. 
2) The essential features of the process of production are en- 
dogenous to the economy. 
3i The economy exercises a relation of determination in the 
last instance over the non economic aspects of the social 
arena. 16 
Implicit in the notion of "determination in the last 
instance" is the idea that the economy can be surgically isolated 
from the rest of the social structure (otherwise it is impossible 
to know what determines what). Classical Marxism begins with the 
assertion that the satisfaction of basic physiological needs is 
the condition "sine qua non" for the existence of any form of so- 
cial organisation. For classical Marxism, socialised human exist- 
ence results from the resolution of the fundamental physiological 
needs for food and shelter, and this the "primary locus" of 
material aetermination. Different ways of organising production 
and their ensuing social formations represent different ways of 
solving the basic biological equation outlined above. The chain 
of causality from the satisfaction of material needs as sketched 
above, to the more "spiritual" aspects of social existence, is 
-------------------- 
16" OP. cit. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and Marx's "Capital" 
and Ca italism Toda 
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best depicted by the other Marxian assertion that being deter- 
mines consciousness and not consciousness determines being. Here 
it is possible to detect the boundary of the materialist 
discourse; the area of the "social" is constructed as a deriva- 
tive residual category of the notion of "being" since the social 
arena is just securing the conditions of existence of the element 
"being". The basic one dimensional simplicity of this process of 
causality cannot be hidden by the construction of the most com- 
plex categories of mediation-17 
The notion of economic determination has however a second 
dimension that completes the privileged position of the forces of 
production. This is the equation of "Material Existence" and the 
"Economy" via the concept of production. The Marxist notion of 
production encapsulates an axiomatic essentiality of human exist- 
ence, the need to obtain food and shelter to secure the condi- 
tions of existence of physiological life. Material existence 
(being) and production are in this way logically unified in an 
indivisible field: "being" cannot exist without securing its con- 
ditions of existence (production) and it is absurd for something 
to secure the conditions of existence of what does not exist. if 
material existence compels production, this compulsion must be 
located outside the area of voluntary action, otherwise the 
"compulsion" does not compel. Thus the area of the economy 
emerges as the realm in which the "dull compulsion of material 
life", produces the laws of motion of material production inde- 
pendently of human will. This justifies for classical Marxism 
the primacy (in terms of existential causality) and the objec- 
tivity (in terms of its independence from human will) of the 
economic realm. 
The abstract nature of the above discursive construction 
-------------------- 
17. Cutler et al. Marx "Capital" and Capitalism Today, Vol II, 
op. cit. p. 207 If. 
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Permits a number of logical permutations, which are connected 
with some of the methodological disputes that plague the Marxist 
tradition. One of the most relevant disputes to the ongoing dis- 
cussion on the national phenomenon is what Chantal Mouffe defined 
in a illuminating article as the difference between 
EPiphenomenality and Class Reductionism. 18 Epiphenomenality and 
Class Reductionism refer to two positions that signify different 
attitudes towards the so called "superstructural" realm. 
Epiphenomenality refers to a situation in which every aspect of 
the so called "superstructural" phenomena is a mere reflection of 
the economic base. In this sense, a correct understanding of the 
dynamic of the economic base is a necessary and sufficient condi- 
tion for a complete explanation of what occurs at the level of 
the superstructure. The transparent relation relation between 
the socio-political and economic spheres does not allow any form 
of autonomy of the former. Every movement of the "superstructure" 
is accounted for as a causal reaction to a change taking place at 
the level of the "base". Thus, the economic relations of produc- 
tion are the unique source of causality. A class reductionist 
approach represents an important shift of emphasis within the 
same conceptual framework. Social classes are considered the 
only possible historical subjects so that ideologies and other 
"superstructural" phenomena (such as nationalism and the national 
arena in general) "belong" to the paradigmatic area of influence 
of a class position. This does not prevent the "superstructural" 
Phenomena to have a certain "relative" autonomy from the economy 
as a whole. While all type of contradictions are "ultimately" 
determined by economic (class) positions, they may not reflect 
transparently the positions of those classes at the economic 
level. Political and other activities may "advance" or "delay" 
(according to the circumstances) the outcome of the relations be- 
-------------------- 
18. C. Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci" in C. Mouffe 
(ed. ) Gramsci and the Marxist Theory, Routledge and Kegan, London 
1979, p. 168 
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tween classes (class struggle). The first form of economic 
reductionism, epiphenomenality, is best represented in the 
mechanistic and oversimplified perception of the works of Marx 
and Engels held mainly by the leading schools of the second in- 
ternational (with the exception of Austro-Marxism). This percep- 
tion had a devastating effect on the Marxist analysis of the na- 
tional question, as will be shown in chapter 3. The second 
position, class reductionism, allows for a limited flexibility in 
the evaluation of the role of the so called "superstructural" 
phenomena. It influenced the positions of the Bolsheviks and the 
Third international as it will be shown in Chapter 4. 
The epiphenomenalist interpretation has deservedly lost 
most of its credibility tod ay, given that the complexity and 
intricacies of contemporary societies defy the validity of 
analytical patterns based on relations of causality determined by 
immutable "iron laws". The epiphenomenalist model is also refuted 
by "invoking the authority" of the "founding fathers" published 
after the heyday of the Second International. 
The class reductionist paradigm has proven to be more 
resilient; a number of contemporary Marxist discussion of the na- 
tional question are still informed by the the class reductionist 
paradigm. 19 in terms of the ongoing discussion on the Marxist 
conceptualisation of the national phenomenon the most resilient 
feature of class reductionism has been the concept of 
"determination in the last instance". The national phenomenon 
(as any other "superstructural" agent) cannot, according to this 
argument, be simply reduced to the effects of economic forces. A 
more or less complex system of intermediate stages defines the 
19. see for example M. Lowy, "Marxism and the National Question", 
New Left Review, 96,1976, pp. 81-100, and T. Nairn, "The Modern 
Janus" in The Break Up of Britain, Verso, second edition London, 
1981 pp. 327-363 
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influence of the economic over the cultural and political levels 
This creates a "delaying effect", that gives to the so called 
"superstructure" a relatively autonomous existence. As will be 
shown in chapter 4, the class reductionist approach displays a 
limited sensitivity to the specificity and the diferential 
development of various national formations. National com- 
munities are not directly subsumed into class ideologies, and may 
even pre-exist a given class configuration. But the social and 
behavioral functions must satisfy and secure the conditions of 
existence of the dominant mode of production. Nationalist move- 
ments may act as catalysts for changes that are about to take 
place or are taking place at the level of the forces of produc- 
tion. As Cutler et al argue with a different example, the non 
correspondence of the nationalist movement with the dominant 
forces in the process of production is self-correcting. 
20 It 
either reflects a contradiction that cannot be solved at the 
present stage of development of the productive forces, or it 
reflects a change that has already taken place in the relations 
of production. In both cases it is self-correcting because it 
tends to bring the national dimension "into line" with the 
paradigmatic field of influence of the productive forces. The 
realm of the "superstructure" corresponds in the "last instance", 
with the essential features of the base. Within the Marxist - 
Leninist tradition, the political presence of a nationalist move- 
ment must represent one of the following situations: 
a) Transition to 
__Capitalism: 
The bourgeoisie has not yet become 
the hegemonic class and the nationalist movement will assist 
by consolidating a national state. 
b) Mature Capitalism: The bourgeoisie has achieved its class 
hegemony and seeks to consolidate political power by 
strengthening the nationalist movement. In this way it con- 
-------------------- 
20" Cutler et al. op. cit. 207 ff. 
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trols the civil society and neutralises the working class. 
c) Colonial Situation: The nationalist movement helps the na- 
tional bourgeoisie to consolidate power in its struggle 
against colonial domination. 
In this situation the existence of a nationalist movement 
only indicates the presence of the bourgeoisie, but it does not 
identify in itself the conjuctural situation or the level 
achieved in the process of development of the productive forces. 
This difference is important because in terms of Marxist Leninist 
revolutionary politics, the stage of development of the produc- 
tive forces indicated through the ability of the bourgeoisie to 
consolidate power signals to the working class and its political 
representatives wether or not the nationalist movement should be 
supported. Using the conceptual framework derived from Cutler 
et. al. it is possible to infer that the presence of the 
nationalist movements represents different positions of the bour- 
geoisie in the economic realm. Those different positions are im- 
portant for "the angle of the working class" because they deter- 
mine wether the nationalist movement should be supported or op- 
posed. However, it is important to note that the two entities, 
the bourgeoisie and its representative, the nationalist movement, 
are not identical - otherwise there could not be a relation of 
representation. Given that these entities are not identical, 
they must be assumed to have a degree of autonomy from each 
other. The relative autonomy of the nationalist movement is epis- 
temologicaly delimited by the parametrical area of influence of 
the bourgeoisie, and this is the meaning of the concept of 
"determination in the last instance". 
Cutler et. al rightly argue that the concept of 
"determination in the last instance", implies an insoluble con- 
tradiction, which in the example of the nationalist movement can 
be conceptualised in the following ways 
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a) The nationalist movement represents the bourgeois class. In 
this case the nationalist movement must be autonomous, since 
the notion of representation suggests the presence of two 
separate entities (the representative and the represented). 
b) The nationalist movement is determined in the last instance 
by the position of the bourgeoisie. In this case the 
nationalist movement is not autonomous, for if it is 
autonomous it cannot be determined by an external entity. 
Cutler et. al. correctly argue that this contradiction is 
irresoluble within the parameters of economic reductionism. 21 
The same applies to the concept of National Culture. If na- 
tional culture is not determined by economic forces it could, un- 
der certain conditions, represent the ideas of the ruling class, 
but this representation is incompatible with the deterministic 
certainty of the concept of determination in the last instance. 
There cannot be an epistemological need for the national culture 
to be determined by the bourgeoisie if it is to represent the 
latter. But if it is accepted that under certain conditions the 
national culture represents the ideology of the bourgeoisie, it 
must be also accepted that there could be other conditions in 
which the national culture does not represent the ideology of the 
bourgeoisie, or indeed any class or economic force. This however 
breaks the epistemological constraints of economic reductionism; 
it implies a more fruitful way at looking at the national ques- 
tion. This point will be further discussed in the last chapter. 
As was shown earlier, the process of production is seen in 
classical Marxism as the constituting element in the economic 
domain. All superstructural phenomena are seen as securing the 
-------------------- 
21. Cutler et. al., op. cit. Vol 2. p. 234 
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conditions of existence of the dominant forces in the process of 
production. In this situation, the economy must be considered a 
separate realm that pre-exists the superstructure since the lat- 
ter is just a supportive element that secures the conditions of 
existence of the productive forces. Given this conceptual con- 
struction, the presence of non economic elements will be always 
understood as securing the conditions of existence of the 
economic elements. For example, the state is perceived as secur- 
ing the conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie, etc. As a 
consequence, the analysis of the state is. constrained by an a 
priori concept of the economy to which it has to "fit". An 
analysis of the state that is not conceptually linked to the need 
of the dominant forces in the process of production - to secure 
their conditions of existence - is, strictly speaking, unthink- 
able within the epistemological parameters of classical Marxism. 
This why Cutler et. al. define the epistemological discourse that 
dominates classical Marxism as "dogmatic" and "constraining". 22 
To make this constrain clear, it becomes necessary to clarify the 
concept of "epistemology" used in this context. 
An epistemology is a form of theoretical discourse which 
posits both a distinction and a correlation between a realm 
of discourse on the one hand and a realm of objects specifi- 
able in discourse on the other. 23 
In other words, an epistemology creates the conditions for 
deducing from a relation between concepts a relation between ob- 
jects. For example, in a functionalist epistemology every single 
element is conceptualised in terms of an hypothetical function so 
that it provides for the coherent functioning of the social 
totality. From here relations between concrete (empirical) so- 
22. ibid. p. 221 
23. Cutler et al. op. cit., Vol 1 p. 211 
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cial objects are considered in terms of their functional con- 
tribution to the existence the social totality. Other considera- 
tions are defined as irrelevant. In the same way, a rationalist 
epistemology conceptually constructs a rational order and deduces 
from this conceptual construction relations between objects 
specified in discourse. 24 Following Cutler et. al. here, it is 
Possible to say that the thesis on "the determination in the last 
instance" implies an epistemological stance that renders invalid 
the object of discourse which is not conceptually determined by a 
set of relations that do not give ultimate preponderance to the 
economy. The thesis on the determination in the last instance 
transposes a set of determinations that are established at the 
conceptual level into a set of objects specified in discourse, 
resulting in a situation in which the actual transference is im- 
mune to questioning. The conceptual relation between the economy 
(relations of production, i. e,, the "base") and its conditions of 
existence (State, nation, national culture, etc. I. e. the 
"superstructure"), is transformed into a relation between objects 
specified in discourse. In the case of the national phenomenon, 
if the presence of a nationalist movement is conceptually defined 
as securing the conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie as a 
class, every concrete nationalist movement must denote the 
Presence of the bourgeoisie, even if this is not clear from the 
conjuctural situation. Once this conceptual relation is estab- 
lished, then every concrete nationalist movement is analysed in 
terms of that conceptual reference. Conceptualised in this way, 
the order of the discourse becomes the order of the "real"25. It 
is in this way that Cutler et. al. argue that the concept of 
determination in "the last instance" transforms a relationship 
between concepts into a relationship between objects specified by 
those concepts. The conceptual construction is designed to 
-------------------- 
24. ibid. 
as. ibid, p. 212-214 
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"match" an a-priori conceptual analysis with the behaviour of 
concrete cases. This is, perhaps, one of the most damaging 
aspects of the economistic model because it tends to define as 
unimportant all those features that cannot be conceptualised as 
deducible from the activity of the economic "base", even if this 
is done through a complex set of mediations. The dogmatic nature 
of this analysis becomes clear in a situation in which the realm 
of concepts establishes a relationship between itself an a realm 
of objects. This situation is then portrayed as a "given" and it 
becomes immune to further questioning. In the case of the na- 
tional question, the concept of determination in the last in- 
stance obscures the multidimensionality of the national 
phenomenon by proposing a chain of causality equally applicable 
to all cases. 
To affirm that all claims to knowledge must be measured 
against discourse of a particular form is in the same move- 
ment to render that form immune to further questioning. 
There can be no demonstration that such- and- such forms of 
discourse are indeed privileged except by means of forms of 
discourse that are themselves held to be privileged. 
26 
This is precisely what happens in the classical Marxist dis- 
course of the national question. The discursive practice of 
economism assumes a set of conceptual relations which are derived 
from the the notion of the economy and imply that national cul- 
ture and/or nationalist movements must play the role of securing 
the conditions of existence of the economic agents that they sup- 
posedly represent. The epistemological basis of this concep- 
tualisation prevents any further questioning of the validity of 
the connection between the economy and the national phenomenon 
proposed by the the discourse of economic reductionism. 
-------------------- 
26" Cutler et. a!. op. cit., Vol 1, p. 215 
37 
But even if classical Marxism sustains a dogmatic epis- 
temological stance, this does not yet conclusively proves its 
falsity for the analysis of the national question. To show how 
economic reductionism obscures rather than illuminates an 
analysis of the national question, it will be assumed for the 
moment that the dominant economic forces determine the national 
dimension. If the economic level, which according to Laclau and 
Mouffe is just a "topographical" notion, is to play a significant 
role in constituting subjects in the national arena it must: 
a) Have its own strictly endogenous laws of motion that exclude 
all forms of indeterminacy resulting from political and cul- 
tural intervention. 
b) The unity and homogeneity that characterizes the economic 
level must result from the laws of motion of that level. 
c) The position of agents in relations of production must endow 
them with "historical interests", so that the presence of 
these agents must be ultimately explained in terms of 
economic interests. 27 
The falsity of this position is almost self-evident, if this 
would have been the case then: 
a) Crucial agencies in the national arena should be clearly 
deducible from the the most meaningful economic forces; 
b) The national community would have been an homogeneous 
category replicating the dominant agency in the process of 
production; 
-------------------- 
27. E. Laclau & C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Verso 
1985, p. 76 
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and, 
C) The laws of motion of the economy would allow the prediction 
of the most meaningful movements taking place in the na- 
tional arena. 
Clearly the different expressions of the national phenomenon 
(national communities, nationalism, etc. ) do not confirm this. To 
sustain these arguments is tantamount to sustaining the 
transparent and epiphenomenal concepts held by the leading 
figures of the Second International. Class reductionism results 
from the theoretical efforts of generations of Marxist thinkers 
to qualify and reform these untenable positions. They however, 
result in a discussion that does not tackle the crucial question 
of economic determination. The debate among the main-stream 
schools in the Marxist tradition have avoided the vexed question 
of economic determination, concentrating instead on the less im- 
portant argument of what weight should be attached to the rela- 
tive autonomy of the superstructures. This debate just went 
round in circles, ameliorating with often ingenious formulae the 
worst excesses of the epiphenomenalist stance, but without ad- 
dressing the fundamental question of th e determinant role of the 
economy. In the area of the national question, this issue stands 
behind the debate between the "center" and "left" of the Second 
International 
and, the subsequent dispute between Kautsky and 
Luxemburg and the Bolsheviks. This will be discussed in chapters 
3 and 4. 
The question of economic reductionism has haunted the Mar- 
xist tradition for generations, seriously undermining its ability 
to understand the nature of what it called "superstructural" 
Phenomena. In subsequent chapters it will be seen how economic 
reductionism has affected the Marxian discussion of the national 
question. In order to overcome the damage inflicted by the 
recurrent use of these paradigms. A dramatic intellectual trans- 
formation is required to regenerate the vitality of the socialist 
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tradition. Within the Marxist tradition, the works of Cutler et 
al. and Laclau and Mouffe provide some critical formulations 
which are an important step towards a more sensitive understand- 
ing of the social arena. The purpose of this work is more 
limited. I hope to discuss the main corpus of the most influen- 
tial European debates of classical Marxism on the national ques- 
tion, and to examine what elements could be freed from the 
paradigmatic trap of economism. The works of Bauer and Gramsci 
appear to have elements salvageable from the economistic dogma. 
Freed from their initial economistic configuration, they could 
become the first step for a more sensitive conceptualisation of 
the multifarious forms of national existence. If a more sensi- 
tive discussion of the national arena is to emerge within the 
Marxist tradition, it must start by completely demolishing the 
worn out building of economic reductionism - from its basic foun- 
dation to its "superstructure". This is not merely an intellec- 
tual exercise: crucial political decisions depend on it! 
The Question of Eurocentrism 
With the possible exception of the "Revisionist" tradition, 
no school of Marxism argued for the explicit superiority and 
hegemony of the European culture over the rest of the world. 
Indeed the notion of the cultural superiority of one society over 
another is clearly an anathema to the universalistic values of 
the Marxist tradition in general. Yet, in spite of its genuine 
universalistic aspirations, the conceptualisation of human 
development 
and the rationale for the emancipation of the human 
species was constructed by the most significant traditions in 
European Marxism, as a form of discursive rationality directly 
derived from the main themes of the European Enlightenment. 
This situation created an intriguing paradox which it is best 
summarised in the following way: Classical Marxism derived its 
evolutionary paradigm from its experience of European historical 
continuity. At the same time, it claimed that the process of 
evolutionary transition from one Mode of Production to another 
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was both universal and inescapable. Classical Marxists were not 
aware of the contradiction implied in this position, since claims 
to "scientificity" put Marxism above any suspicion of cultural 
relativism. A tradition that claimed to have discovered the laws 
of motion of human history and to understand the evolution of the 
forces of production with the precision of the natural sciences 
could hardly be aware of its cultural biases. But it was in 
Europe were the concepts of classical Marxism emerged: the no- 
tions of class, capitalism, feudalism and mode of production 
emerged as forms of analytical reflection on the history of 
European societies. And what is more important, they resulted 
from a discursive practice that has is origin in a form of 
rationality that its distinctly European: 
Marxism is an intrinsically European current of thought, 
which unites several of the most characteristic traits of 
European civilisation as a whole: the sense of history in- 
herent in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and the Promethean 
urge to transform nature that has manifested itself since 
the Renaissance and specially since the industrial revolu- 
tion. Transplanted to Asia, to societies most of which did 
not have this sense of history, and none of which tradi- 
tionally had such a vision of man as "mar'tre et possesseur 
de la nature" (in Descartes's well-known phrase), it caused 
a profound shock. Nor did Marxism escape unchanged from the 
encounter. 28 
Classical Marxism could have either maintained its claim to 
universality by putting its sense of European history in perspec- 
tive and cater for a plural world, or alternatively, sustained a 
sense of European history and culture and abandoned claim to 
universality. But none of this has happened: classical Marxian 
-------------------- 
28. H21Fne Carrere d'Encausse and Stuart Schram, Marxism in Asia, 
The Penguin Press, London 1969, p. 4 
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notions of evolution invariably located the European west at the 
highest stages of historical development, subsuming the major 
stages of universal development into a European sense of histori- 
cal continuity. Marx argued that industrialised nations (all of 
which were European) show to the less industrialised ones the 
image of their own future. The Epiphenomenal and Mechanistic 
Marxism of the Second Intern ational supported, as it will be 
shown in chapter 3, the "civili satory mission" of some forms of 
"progressive colonialism". And even before this, Engels con- 
sidered that the colonies best suited for independence were those 
populated by Europeans: 
In my opinion the colonies proper, i. e., the countries oc- 
cupied by a European popu lation- Canada, the Cape, 
Australia- will become independent: on the other hand, the 
countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply 
subjugated -India, Algeria, the Dutch, Portuguese and 
Spanish possessions - must be taken over for the time being 
by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towa rds 
independence. 29 
And even Lenin, while providing a novel and perceptive ar- 
ticulation between class and colonial struggles, still maintained 
that the highest stage of development of the productive forces 
and the more "advanced" social formations were located in in- 
dustrial and capitalist Western Europe. 
The notion that the ruling ideas of every society are the 
ideas of the ruling class is at the heart of the classical Mar- 
xist analysis of the ar ena of the social. Classical Marxists 
therefore had an acute awareness of the relativity of the claims 
to universalism of the dominant ideas in different historical 
---- 
29. 
---------------- 
F. Engels to KautsKy, on September 12,1882 in Marx and En- 
gels on Colonialism, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1974, p. 342 
42 
periods. Even in the case of the national question, the classi- 
cal Marxist perception was a form of relativised historicism: The 
nation was conceived as a social formation that originated in the 
process of transition from feudalism to capitalism. It seems 
remarkable today, that classical Marxists were not aware of the 
relative historical location of their own works. Classical Mar- 
xists never developed a Marxist analyses of the Marxist dis- 
course. For it is clear that the main corpus of Marxist litera- 
ture emerged at a definite historical period and could not there- 
fore escape the influence of the hegemonic ideas of Its time. 
Not only did the Industrial Revolution provide the historical 
context for the emergence of Marxism, but also Marxist theory and 
practice emerged at a time when European colonialism was at its 
peak. If the same criteria used to evaluate other ideological 
practices had been used for the evaluation of Marxism, the 
Eurocentric bias would most certainly have been detected. But 
what happened was rather the opposite, as Anouar Abdel Malek per- 
ceptively explains: 
The nation is conceived as the socio-economic formation with 
the state emerging from the disintegration of the feudal 
system in Western Europe; and it is seen concomitant with 
the emergence of the capitalist system. This definition, 
which belongs to classical historical sociology, was taken 
up again and refined by the Marxist theoreticians, notably 
Stalin. This tacit consensus expresses, of course, the 
unity of the socio-historical framework which gave rise to 
the notion. Thus the right to national existence of other 
social formations prior to the capitalist system will be 
challenged, even though they present the same features which 
were said to be constitutive of the modern nation: 
geographical unity, historical continuity, a single lan- 
guage, a single unified economic market and a unified cul- 
tural consciousness.... the real problem is the , extrapolation 
of European Experience- designated as normal, and thus given 
objective priority- to the experiences of other peoples. 
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The European origins of the social sciences lead to 
Eurocentrism - The world is conceived in Europe's image, in- 
vited to conform to it, and rejected, if it creates an 
exception. 30 
The result of this situation was the emergence of compara- 
tive criteria for the evaluation of the non-European world, which 
responded to a continuum between "Progressive" and "Reactionary" 
poles. The more a social formation departed from the Western 
European models, the more reactionary it was. This form of 
ideological and political mapping resulted from the dogmatic 
epistemology that configurates classical Marxist discourse, and 
which renders its own discursive practice immune from a critical 
evaluation. Classical Marxism gives ontological priority to the 
development of the forces of production, in an argument in which 
the mode of production and the social formation are defined as 
"objective realities", and therefore extra-discursive. The con- 
ceptualisation of an extra-discursive "universal reality" lies at 
the heart of Marxist dogmatism, and renders impossible the his- 
torical location of the Marxist discourse. The efforts of Mar- 
xist scholars with an interest in the the non European world to 
free classical Marxism from its Eurocentric bias becomes an im- 
possible tasK if, at the same time, the ontological priorities 
and epistemological construct are not also criticised. Marxism 
cannot lead to a pluralist perception of humanity if it does not 
develop an understanding of itself as an historically located 
discursive practice. 
The Eurocentrism of classical Marxism is thus the result of 
the overdetermination of the two parameters of Marxian analysis 
discussed in the first part of this chapter: a mechanistic and 
linear perception of historical evolution, and the ontological 
-------------------- 
30. Anouar Abdel-Malek, Nation and Revolution, vol. 2 of Social 
Dialectics, The MacMillan Press, London 1981, P. 15 
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privilege of the process of production in the form of an economic 
reductionism. This is the point at which many brave attempts to 
overcome the Eurocentric bias of classical Marxism fail. For 
there cannot be a criticism of the Eurocentric bias of classical 
Marxism if at the same time, a criticism of Marxist ontology and 
epistemology is not attempted. The Eurocentric bias results from 
the privilege given to the forces of production over other his- 
torical forces, and from a hierarchical sense of historical 
evolution which is in turn, derived from the observation of 
humanity from the privileged vantage point of the history of the 
European continent. In other words, the Eurocentric bias is a 
logical result of the hierarchical and universal categorisation 
of social evolution, and the economic reductionism of classical 
Marxism. It could only be corrected by rejecting the epis- 
temological dogmatism of the classics. If this is not done, the 
Eurocentric analysis will continue to creep back into every form 
of anti-imperialist Marxist discourse, no matter how much it 
tries to free itself from a Eurocentric influence. 
The purpose of this chapter was to critically identify the 
epistemological constraints that prevent classical Marxism from 
developing a multifarious understanding of that highly elusive 
phenomena called "the national question". In the following chap- 
ters it will be shown how the analytical paradigms discussed 
above crucially configurated the most important aspects of the 
classical Marxist discussion of the National Question. This pat- 
tern of analysis created a paradigmatic straitjacket which 
obscured some of the more essential and meaningful aspects of the 
national phenomenon. This caused some of the most resounding 
political failures of classical Marxism. In Chapters 5 and 7 it 
will be argued that the woks of Bauer and Gramsci provided a 
richer - but still limited - perception of the multifarious na- 
ture of the national phenomenon because of their ability to par- 
tially break from the epistemological traps of classical Marxism. 
Obviously, the purpose of this work cannot be to reformulate the 
Marxist theory of the national phenomenon. But it makes a first 
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step in this much needed reformulation by engaging in a concep- 
tual critique of the most' influential European discussions of the 
national phenomenon. It clears the ground for a more sensitive 
evaluation of that multidimensional and recurrent phenomenon 
called nationalism. This is a task that Marxist and Sociological 
discourse have so far eluded. 
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Chapter 2: Marx, Engels and the National Questionl 
With the development of Capitalist production an average 
profile (durchschnittliches Niveau) of bourgeois societies 
comes into existence, and consequently, of the temperaments 
and inclinations of different peoples. As Christianity, 
this mode of production is essentially cosmopolitan. 2 
An important and influential group of scholars and and his- 
torical analysts of the works of Marx and Engels, sustain, in a 
variety of influential works, that the latter had no theoreti- 
cally coherent approach to the national phenomenon. This argument 
also sustains the idea that Marx and Engels related to every na- 
tional movement on purely "ad hoc" basis and that their attitude 
was often dictated by circumstantial political events such as the 
concrete case of a democratic movement or the need to overthrow a 
despotic regime. 3 
-------------------- 
1. I wish to thank Professor Bill Brugger for his useful comments 
and suggestions on an earlier version of this chapter. 
2. K. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, quoted by R. Rosdolsky, 
'Friederich Engels und das Problem der "Geschichtlosen" Völker. 
(Die Nationalitätenfrage im Der Revolution 1848-1849 im lichte 
der "Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung")', Archiv -f Or Sozialgeschichte, 
Vol IV, Hannover 1964 p. 242. for a spanish translation by C. 
Ceretti, see R. Rosdolsky F. Engels y el Problema de los Pueblos 
"S; n Historia", Series Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente nOmero 88, 
Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Mexico 1980, p. 186 
3. See for example, H. B. Davis, Socialism and Nationalism, 
Monthly Review Pres 1967, M. Lowy, "Marxists and the National 
Question", New Left Review, 96, p. 81, J. L. Talmon, The Myth of 
the Nation and the Vision of Revolution, University of California 
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The purpose of this chapter will be to show that this ap- 
proach is incorrect insofar as the lack of theoretical coherence 
is considered to be the main characteristic of Marx and Engels' 
approach to the national question. With the help of the 
theoretical parameters discussed in the previous chapter, it will 
be argued that Marx and Engels had a coherent (but essentially 
mistaken) view of the national phenomenon, even if there is no 
single corpus of literature that directly presents their theories 
in an explicit way. The social- evolutionary and economic reduc- 
tionist parameters of analysis provide the coherent basis for the 
formulation of a theory of the national question, which is com- 
patible with the apparently contradictory positions that Marx and 
Engels held in relation to various movements of national eman- 
cipation. This largely unwritten, but not less real and influen- 
tial perception of the national phenomenon, provided the intel- 
lectual basis for the way in which subsequent generations of Mar- 
xists understood the national question, 4 as well as for some of 
contemporary widely held Marxist beliefs about the National 
-------------------- 
Press, Berkley, 1981, p. 38; Z. A. Pelczynski, "Nation, Civil 
Society, state: Hegelian sources of the Marxian non- theory of 
nationality" in Z. A. Pelczyn <i (ed. ) The State and Civil 
Society, Cambridge University Press 1984, p. 262. G. Haupt, "Les 
Marxistes face ä is question nationale: 1'histoire du probleme" 
in G. Haupt. M. Lo wy and C. Weill, Les Marxistes et la Question 
Nationale, Maspero. Paris 1974, p. 13 ff. For refre shingly dif- 
ferent and more interesting approach, see A. Walicki Philosophic 
and Romantic Nationalism: The case of Poland, Clarendon Press Ox- 
ford 1982 p. 375 ff. 
4. Particularly in the case of the most influential works of the 
Second and Third International, whose work will be reviewed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
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Question. 5 
Above all, two considerations were crucial in the formula- 
tion of Marx and Engels theoretical understanding of the national 
phenomenon: the first was their adherence to a universal, but at 
the same time, historically-located model for national develop- 
ment. This is the model 'state- language -nation'. The second 
consideration concerned the capacity or incapacity of concrete 
national communities to evolve from "lower" to "higher" stages in 
developing production. This is the theory of "historical versus 
non historical" nations. It is necessary to evaluate these two 
considerations in some detail. 
The Pattern: "State - Language - Nation" 
For Marx and Engels, what was called the "Modern Nation" was 
the direct outcome of a process whereby the feudal mode of 
production was superseded by the capitalist mode of production - 
a situation that caused dramatic concomitant changes in the 
process of social organisation. This event, according to Marx and 
Engels, impelled a number of western European social formations 
to evolve into more linguistically cohesive and politically 
centralised units through the formation of "modern states". 6 
-------------------- 
5. In relation to the national question in Catalonia and the 
equation of the "national bourgeoisie" and "national identity, J. 
Llobera perceptively argues that... "/t never ceases to amaze me 
the extraordinary appeal that Vulgar Marxism - Economism- has on 
people of different theoretical persuasions when reasons of 
political expediency requires it! - Josep Llobera, The Idea of 
Volksgeist in the formation of the Catalan National Ideology, un- 
published paper. Goldsmith College, London 1983. 
6. In the context of the ongoing discussion on the national 
phenomenon the concept of "the state" is used in the descriptive 
sense of a centralised unit of political administration and 
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Thus, what Marx and Engels called "Modern Nations" only came into 
existence through the embryonic capitalist economy in the transi- 
tion from Feudalism to Capitalism. As a direct result of this 
process, the feudal society was slowly united under the structure 
of the embryonic modern state. This, according to Marx and En- 
gels, caused the destruction of local peculiarities, initiating 
the process of uniformisation of populations, which was con- 
sidered an important condition for the formation of a market 
economy - an essential feature of the capitalist system.? In 
Marx' view, one of the strongest indicators of this process of 
uniformisation was the emergence and development of Western 
European languages. In Marxist terms, a crucial characteristic 
of the capitalist mode of production is the intensification of 
the of division of labour coupled by a growing inter-dependence 
among the different units of production, holding together a mass 
of dispossessed free labourers capable of selling their labour 
power in a free market. Thus the capitalist mode of production 
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authority and not in the more elaborate analytical sense of a 
system of ideological and political organisation that flows from 
the works of the Austro Marxists, Gramsci and Poulantzas. for a 
valuable discussion of Marxist theories of the state see B. Jes- 
sop, The Capitalist State, Martin Robertson, Oxford 1983 and B. 
Jessop, Nicos Poulantzas, Marxist Theory and Political Strategy, 
part II pp. 53-84, MacMillan, London 1985 
T. F. Engels, "t)ber den Verfall des Feudalismus un das Aufkommen 
der Bourgeoisie" Marx Engels WerKe (MEW), Dietz Verlag, Berlin 
1977, Vol. 21 p. 395. ff., English translation in F. Engels, 
"Decay of Feudalism and Rise of Nation States" in F. Engels, The 
Peasant War in Germany, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1977, p. 178 
ff. See also G. Haupt and C. Weil, "L'Ereditti di Marx ed Engels e 
Ia Questione Nazionale", Studi Storici, lstituto Gramsci Editore, 
15,1974 ,2p. 281 
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breaks the isolation of feudal units increasing the interaction 
of the various participants in the newly-formed market. This in 
turn, necessitates a "medium" for efficient communication; thus 
according to Marx and Engels, western European languages emerged 
to fulfill this role and to consolidate distinct and recognisable 
linguistic units based on the embryonic absolutist state. 8 That 
is, in essence, Marx and Engels account of the emergence of 
"Modern Nations". From the discussion above, it is possible to 
derive two important observations which help to define the mean- 
ing of the notion of "modern nations" by understanding the essen- 
tial features of the phenomenon under consideration. A "modern 
nation must fulfill the following criteria: 
a) lt must hold a population large enough to allow for an in- 
ternal division' of labour which characterises a capitalist 
system with its competing classes; and 
b) it must occupy a cohesive and "sufficiently large" ter- 
ritorial space to provide for the existence of a "viable 
state". 9 
This understanding of the process of formation of "modern 
nations" is clearly derived from Marx and Engels' observation of 
the process of formation of national states in Western Europe, 
particularly France, and to a limited extent, England. But above 
all, it adheres to the view that the French revolution provided 
the model for national development. + he founding fathers of his- 
torical materialism regarded the process of national consolida- 
8. G. Haupt and C. Weill, L'eredit2 di Marx ed Engels.., op. cit. 
p. 275 
9. S. Bloom, El Mundo de las Naciones, spanish transalation of 
"the World of Nations", siglo veintiuno editores, Buenos Aires, 
1975, p. 44 
51 
tion that took place after the French revolution as a model for 
national formation in other "less developed" parts of the world; 
and much of their discussion on the national question appears as 
an implicit (and sometimes also explicit) attempt to generalise 
from the "French Model", into an overall process of national 
evolution. Given the importance of the "French Model" of na- 
tional formation in Marx and Engels thought, it may be useful to 
briefly discuss the process of national formation in that country 
particularly at the time of the French revolution. 
The Jacobins and other French revolutionaries believed that 
the best way to establish a democratic state was to follow a path 
of tight centralisation and linguistic standardisation. Persuing 
this political project, the Jacobins perceived the existence of 
non Parisian- French speaking peoples within the boundaries of 
the French state as a considerable menace to this process of 
uniformisation. It has been widely argued that the mobilising 
effect of the revolutionary ideology assisted the formation of 
the first modern nationalist movement creating the unity of the 
French people (nation) in the revolutionary process. Steges and 
the Jacobins firmly believed that the third estate was, in fact, 
the French nation. All this, however, belongs to revolutionary 
mythology. The geographical area occupied by the French ab- 
solutist state, was in fact, inhabited during the best part of 
the pre-revolutionary period by a conglomerate of linguistic com- 
munities, some of which spoke Romance languages (Langue D'Oc, 
Langue D'Oil, Catalan), others celtic languages (Breton), and 
other ancient pre- Latin languages (Euzkera). In reality, the 
language of the court of Versailles, which subsequently became 
"French" was spoken only by a minority of the population of the 
state. Pierre Giraud argues that 
During the Middle Ages there was not one French languages 
but several French languages. Each province spoke and wrote 
its own dialect. 10 
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But, during the period preceding the Revolution, the lan- 
guage of Paris began to exercise its definitive supremacy, even- 
tually converting itself into the official language of the 
state. 11 After the revolution this process was greatly en- 
couraged by the revolutionary government, anxious to create a 
"national state" with a uniform language for all its citizens. 
But this task was not at all easy. According to C. F. Brunnot12 
of a total population of about 25 million inhabitants, between 
six and seven millions did not understand Parisian French, a 
similar number was only capable of holding a very basic conversa- 
tion in this language; ten million were bilingual, using their 
respective "dialects" as their mother tongue and Parisian French 
as the "lingua franca". Only three million inhabitants of Paris 
and surrounding areas spoke "French" as their mother tongue, and 
an even smaller number was capable of reading and writing in this 
language. This situation was reported to the 1791 constitutional 
convention, resulting in intensified efforts by the revolutionary 
government to spread the use of the French language as fast as 
possible. Two closely connected reasons account for this: the 
revolutionaries wish to create a democratic and tightly 
centralised state and the need to ensure, the hegemony of the 
Parisian bourgeoisie against pockets of feudal and aristocratic 
resistance in remote locations. Given the close association be- 
tween Parisian French and revolutionary aims, it is hardly 
surprising that the counter-revolution was stronger in those 
areas where French was hardly spoken. Brittany for example. A 
-------------------- 
10. Pierre Giraud, Patois et les dialectes Franpais, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1968, p. 27, Paris 
11. Albert Doujot, Le Patois, Paris, Librairie Delagrave, 1946 
12. Histoire de la Langue Franpaise, Paris, 1958 pp. 44-49 
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tightly centralised state was bound to destroy the administrative 
and cultural autonomy of the non- French national communities. 
The combination of cultural imperialism and tight administrative 
centralisation, lead an almost complete destruction of the cul- 
ture and language of the non- Parisian French national com- 
munities. As the animosity of the oppressed national communities 
towards the Parisian bourgeoisie grew, they became the rallying 
point for counter-revolutionary activities. In response the 
Jacobins equated the national identity of those unfortunate 
peoples with counter-revolution, without realising that it was 
the Jacobins' own lacK of sensitivity towards their cultural 
aspirations that was pushing these communities into the arms of 
the reaction. The Jacobin Deputies Barrere and Gregoire 
presented a report the constitutional assembly of 1794 with a 
very revealing title: Report on the need and means to destroy 
rural dialects (patois) and universalise the use of the French 
Language. This title eloquently illustrates the ideas and 
generalised positions of the Jacobins in relation to what we may 
call today "national minorities". 
Federalism and superstition speak low Breton... the emigra- 
tion and hatred to the republic speak German, the counter- 
revolution speaks Italian and fanaticism speaks Basque 
(Euzkera).... It is necessary to - popularise the (French) 
language; it is necessary to stop this linguistic aris- 
tocracy that seems to have established a 'civilised nation in 
the midst of barbaric ones. 13 
-------------------- 
13. "Rapport sur la necessit2 et le moyens d'aneantir les patois, 
et d'universaliser l'usage de Ia langue franpaise, " Gazette 
Nationale, 28 January 1794, quoted by R. Rosdoisky op. cit. F. 
Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen" Volker.. " p. 100, 
spanish translation, p. 24, also quoted by S. Salvi, Le Nazione 
Proibite, Guida a dieci colonie "interne" dell'a Europa occinden- 
tale, Vallechi Editore, Florence 1973, p. 477 
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One year later, the above-mentioned Jacobin deputies ad- 
vanced the following revolutionary slogan: ".. dans une Rtpublique 
une et indivisible I'usage unique et indivisible de la langue de 
la libert&, 14, a slogan which as RosdolsKy argues, conveniently 
forgot that French was also the language of the court of Ver- 
sailles and of pre-revolutionary absolutism in general. 
It is perhaps interesting to note that this tendency to use 
the French language as the cultural medium for the advancement of 
revolutionary goals was noted by Marx in his famous refutation of 
Lafargue's attempt the abolition of all national differences. 
... the English laughed very much when 
I began my speech by 
saying that our friend Lafargue and others had spoken "en 
francais" to us, i. e. a language that nine tenths of the 
audience did not understand. I also suggested that by the 
negation of nationalities, he appeared quite unconsciously 
to understand their absorption by the model French nation. 15 
Marx, however, did not draw any theoretical conclusions from 
this incident and continued all, his life to believe that the 
"French model" was the universal path for national development. 
Marx and Engels believed that state centralisation and national 
unification with the consequent assimilation of small national 
communities was the only viable path to social progress. Their 
preference for large centralised states was not only a strategic 
consideration, but also the basis their unwritten conceptualisa- 
tion of the national phenomenon inspired, it will be remembered, 
-------------------- 
14. "In the one and undivided Republic, the one an undivided use 
of the language of freedom", ibid. 
15. K. Marx to F. Engels, 20 June 1866. Marx' and Engels' Col- 
lected Works (MECW), London, Lawrence & Wishart, vol 21, p. 288-9 
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I 
by the parameters of analysis discussed in the previous chapter. 
The basis for their position can be seen in their discussion of 
the civil society, the national state, and what they called the 
"historical nations". 
The concept of "Civil Society" was taken by Marx from 
Hegelian political philosophy. Civil society is for Hegel the 
place where individual self interest receives its legitimation 
and becomes "emancipated " from religious and other considera- 
tions, which until the formation of the civil society limited the 
free play of individual interests. 16 Since the development of 
individual interests to their fullest expression can only be 
achieved, according to Hegel, in a situation of a free market, 
then "civil society" as an institutionalised sphere of activity 
was the consequence of the technological and political achieve- 
ments of what he called the "modern world". The Hegelian defini- 
tion of the civil society bore some resemblance with the concep- 
tualisation of the Free Market in classical Political Economy. 
Civil society, according to Hegel, was an association of members 
acting as "self subsistent individuals", in which their associa- 
tion is brought about by their "needs". The purpose of this as- 
sociation is to "ensure security of persons and property", by 
means of an external organisation which supported "their par- 
ticular common interests". 17 This definition of the Civil 
society should be not confused, according to Hegel, with the 
definition of the state. According to Avineri, what the social 
contract theoreticians call "the state" is in Hegel's thought the 
civil society. Civil society is based on the needs of a "lower 
kind", which are best defined in the concept of "Verstand" 
(knowledge, understanding in the concrete mechanical sense). The 
State is the expression of a "higher level of reason" which Hegel 
16. S. Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, op. cit. p. 
142 
17. ibid., and G. W. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Paragraph 182 
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calls "Vernunft" (an ethical principle that permits essential un- 
derstanding or consciousness). For Hegel, the state is the con- 
sciousness of freedom, but in a way that it permits to enjoy that 
freedom "in conjunction with others", while in the civil society 
people realised their freedom with disregard to the freedom of 
others. 18 
Marx was certainly influenced by the Hegelian conceptualisa- 
tion of the civil society and its relation to the state, but he 
located that relationship in a different perspective, by attempt- 
ing to conceptualise the developmental historicity of both con- 
cepts within the context of the process of production. Civil 
society emerges, for Marx, at a specific stage of development of 
the productive forces. Here he inherited the evolutionist- 
universal perspective developed by Hegel; but he explicitly 
rejected its idealistic base. This becomes clear when Marx 
argues in "The German Ideology" that the modern state its very 
constitution, unable to overcome the the egoism of civil society, 
because "mere political emancipation" (the "bourgeois state") 
leaves intact the world of private interest (civil society)19 
In "The Jewish Question" Marx argued that the civil society is 
the "real" basis for 
. 
the State, and called for a separation be- 
tween them. Civil society is motivated by competition and egoism, 
in appearance the bourgeois state overcomes this contradiction by 
granting political emancipation, but in reality it is only a 
reflection of the social forces within it. 
20 
-------------------- 
18. S. Avineri, Hegel's theory of the Modern State, op. cit. P. 
143 
19. K. Marx, Early writings, introduction by L. Colletti,, 
Penguin Books, London 1985 pp. 28-35 
20. ibid. p. 218 ff. 
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Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of in- 
dividuals within a definite stage of development of produc- 
tive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial 
life of a given stage, and, insofar, transcends the state 
and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must as- 
sert itself in its foreign relations as "nationality" and 
inwar dly must organise itself as st ate. 21 
This is an important consideration. The general form of 
the civil society is present in the more specific forms of 
"state" and "nation", and given that the civil society is only 
the reflection of the dominant forces within it, it follows than 
in the capitalist mode of production the dominant class (the 
bourgeoisie), determines the form and content of the civil 
society, while the civil society itself, in the format described 
described by Marx, can not exist outside capitalist relations of 
production. 22 The implications of Marx' discussion of theoreti- 
cal status of the civil society are important for the discussion 
of the national question. In Marx and Engels' terms, the "modern 
nation" is an historical phenomenon that has to be located at a 
precise historical period; this is the era of the ascendance of 
the bourgeoisie as an hegemonic class, this is to say, the period 
-------------------- 
21. K. Marx, German Ideology, students edition, Lawrence & 
Wishart, London 1974 p. 57 
P-2. "The principle underlying the civil society is neither need, 
a natural moment, nor politics. It is a fluid divis ion of masses 
while vari ous formations are arbitrary and withou t organisation. 
The only noteworthy feature is that the absence of property and 
the class of immediate labour, of concr ete labour, do not so much 
constitute a class of civil society, as provide the ground on 
which the circles of civil society move and have their being. " K. 
Marx, Criti que of Hegel's Doctrine of the State, in K. Marx Early 
Writings, L. Colletti (ed. ) op. cit. p. 146-7 
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of consolidation of the capitalist mode of production. 
In this context the different treatment given by Marx and 
Engels to different national communities acquires meaning and 
coherence. The "modern nation" is an epiphenomenal result of the 
development of the bourgeoisie as the hegemonic class, and the 
former must be evaluated on the merits of the latter. If it 
represents a higher stage of development of the productive forces 
in relation to a pre-determined process of historical change, if 
it abolishes the feudal system by building a "national state", 
then the nationalist movement deserves support because it becomes 
a "tool" for progressive social change. If, however, the 
nationalist movement emerges among linguistic or cultural com- 
munities incapable of surviving the upheavals of capitalist 
transformation, because they are too small or they have a weak or 
non-existent bourgeoisie, then the nationalist movement becomes a 
"regressive" force because it is incapable of overcoming the 
stage of "peasant-feudal" social organisation. As is will be 
shown in a moment, Marx and Engels repeatedly argued that na- 
tional communities incapable of constituting "proper national 
states" should "vanish" by being assimilated to more 
"progressive" and "vital" nations. The concept of "Historyless 
Peoples" to be discussed in the next subsection of this chapter 
will further highlight the crudity of this social evolutionist 
perspective. 
The conceptualisation of the emergence and development of 
"modern nations" presented in this "social evolutionist" and 
epiphenomenalhst way, may be seen in every analysis of concrete 
features of national movements in the works of Marx and Engels 
and constitutes Marx and Engels theory of national development 
even though the specific question it is not specifically dis- 
cussed in any single work. There is however, a problem that has 
to be dealt with to understand the implications of Marx and En- 
gels position on the national question, and this is the ter- 
minological ambiguity that recurs in the works of of the founding 
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fathers of historical materialism. This must be clarified. 
The Terminological ambiguity 
In different European languages the concepts of "people", 
"nation" and "nationality" have at times different and confusing 
meanings. This situation is further complicated by the not less 
confusing and indiscriminate use of this terminology in the 
specialist literature. The terms "nation", "nationality", 
"people", "nation state", are either taken as synonyms or to mean 
different things in different situations, creating a terminologi- 
cal confusion that is seldom clarified with clear cut 
definitions. 23 Marx and Engels where not an exception to this 
situation. The terms "nations" "nationalities" and "Modern 
Nations" have at times different and confusing meaning in their 
work, as G. Haupt argues in his illuminating account: 
La difficult E premiere se traduit par la grande "misere" 
terminologique qui a entrav2 les tentatives de 
clarif ication. 24 
Ir) English and French the word "nation" usually refers to 
the population of a sovereign state, but it is sometimes taken to 
mean clearly identifiable national communities that lack a na- 
-------------------- 
23. In his influential study on Catalonia, Pierre Vilar argues 
that: "Une etude critique de Vemploi du vocabulaire montre en 
effet combien il est facile de mettre sur fiches un nombre im- 
posant d'emplois discutables ou manifestement abusifs des 'mots 
"nation", "national", "nationalisme", "patriotisme" ou 
"patrie".... La Catalogne dans L'Espagne Moderne, Bibliothtque 
Generale de L'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Vol. 1, Paris 
1962, p. 29 
24. G. Haupt, Les Marxistes face 8 la Question Nationale, op. 
cit. P. 21 
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tional state (for example, the Welsh nation or the Catalan 
nation). The word "nationality" has two different and confusing 
denotations: 
a) A synonym of citizenship, juridical definition of membership 
of a state usually defined by entitlement to a passport 
(British nationality, French Nationality). 
b) A community of culture and/or descent, which also incor- 
porates some of the meanings of the more contemporary term 
"ethnicity". (English nationality, Welsh nationality). 25 
Marx and Engels generally used the word "Nation" in its 
English and French meaning to designate the permanent population 
of a Nation- State. The term "nationality", however, was used in 
its central and eastern European denotation, to designate an 
-------------------- 
25. In other western European languages, the term has a more 
restricted meaning because the term "People" (Peuple, Pueblo, 
Volk in French Spanish and German) has a wider ethno- political 
denotation. In German the term "Nationalität, acquires almost ex- 
clusively the denotation (b), since the denotation (a) is covered 
by the word "StaatsangehörigKeit". Also the term 
"VolKszugehörigkeit defines people of the same (normally German) 
ancestral ethnic origin, - and it is enshrined in the "Transitional 
Provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
article 116 (1)"definition of German Citizenship". The other well 
know case of an ethnic criterion enshrined in Basic Laws of a 
state is the State of Israel, see sections (1) and (4) of the 
"Law of Return". In Slavic languages, the concept of "Narod" and 
related terms has also an ethno-political denotation. For a 
recent discussion of the lack of an English equivalence for the 
russian "narod'nost" see the illuminating article by T. Shanin 
"Soviet Theories of Ethnicity, The Case of The Missing Term" New 
Left Review, 1986 p. 113 ff. see also footnote 66 in chapter 4 
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had cultural community that ad not achieved full national 
status because it lacked a state of its own. 26 In Marx and En- 
gels works, "nationalities" will either become "nations" by ac- 
quiring a State of their own (Poland, Ireland), or alternatively 
they are said to be "Historyless Peoples" (Geschichtslosen 
Völker), national communities that lack "historical vitality", 
because of their inability to consolidate a national state. In 
the works of Marx and Engels, these "non historical 
nationalities" or "ruins of peoples"27 are intrinsically reac- 
tionary because of their inability to adapt to the Capitalist 
Mode of Production. This is because their survival is only 
guaranteed in the old order, so, by necessity, they have to be 
regressive, to avoid extinction. Following this rather twisted 
logic, Marx and Engels maintained that these "non historical" na- 
tional communities had "disappear" from the "stream of history", 
with democracy as compensation. 
To summarise the discussion so far: Modern Nations are for 
Marx and Engels what we may call today "nation states"; ethno 
cultural and linguistic communities with their own distinctive 
state. Nationalities are ethno cultural and linguistic groups 
not developed into full nations because they lack their own 
state. This model of national formation is greatly inspired by 
the historical development of the French and to a lesser extent, 
the British case, which by nature of being "the most advanced 
nations" must serve as a model for "less developed" national com- 
munities. But there is another dimension to Marx and Engels dis- 
cussion of national communities. The nation, as noted earlier, 
was for Marx one of the concrete forms of the -general form "civil 
society". Civil society only comes into existence as a result of 
-------------------- 
26. R. Rosdolsky, "Workers and Fatherland" Science and Society, 
Vol. 29,1965, p. 337 
27. F. Engels op. cit. Revolution and Counterrevolution in Ger- 
man 
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a specific configuration of classes, which in general responds to 
the characteristics of the capitalist mode of production. Since 
the bourgeoisie the universally dominant class in this mode of 
production, civil society gives legitimacy to bourgeois class 
domination by creating the impression that the class requirements 
of the oourgeoisie to reproduce its conditions of existence, are 
the "general" requirements of society as a whole. Thus, the 
state in its "national" form is responsible for regulating the 
best possible conditions for the fulfillment of these "general" 
requirements, which will inevitably lead towards towards the 
final contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, 
and to the eventual abolition of all forms of class domination. 
Following this logic, which is at the center of Marx and Engels' 
evolutionary discussion of the development of capitalism, it is 
possible to envisage a chain of events that will destroy the 
foundation of every form of class society via the emancipation of 
the proletariat. Thus, the achievement of this "final goal" of 
abolishing capitalist relations of production, has far reaching 
consequences for the "nation". This could be schematised in the 
following way: The abolition of the capitalist mode of production 
will cause the abolition of: 
a) civil society as an entity reproducing the conditions of ex- 
istence of class societies. 
b) the bourgeoisie as the hegemonic class of the civil society 
and the proletariat as the subordinated oppressed class. 
C) The state as the instrument through which the bourgeoisie 
controls the civil society. 
Cl) The nation as the framework for the existence of the bour- 
geois state. 
The nation as the framework for the existence of the 
capitalist (national) state, creates a "linguistic unit" that 
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is essential in consolidating of the conditions of existence of 
capitalism, by generating a medium of communication (language) 
and a focus of identity which gives a general appearence to the 
sectarian inter ests of the bourgeoisie (nationalism). Thus, in 
terms of this unilinear and Eurocentric process of development, 
the nation is crucially linKed with the fate of the capitalist 
state, because both are concrete epiphenomenal expressions of the 
"civil society"- the mechanism which created them in the first 
place. Once the state is abolished (or withers away), a similar 
fate awaits the nation. Consider the statement in the "Communist 
Manifesto": 
... the proletariat must first of all acquire political 
supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the na- 
tion, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the 
bourgeois sense of the word. 28 
One is presented with a tactical ploy to gain power to gain 
power from the bourgeoisie in its own terrain, since the nation 
will be abolished by the advancing tide of history: 
National differences and antagonisms between peoples are 
daily more and more vanishing owing to the development of 
the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world 
market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the 
conditions of life corresponding thereto. The supremacy of 
the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. 29 
Marx and Engels expected the proletariat to become the 
"national class" for a short period, believing that this is a 
-------------------- 
28. K. Marx and F. Engels The Communist Manifesto, various 
editors and editions. 
2 9. ibid. 
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transitional but historically necessary step in order to advance 
to a "hig her" developmental stage, the abolition of the national 
state. In this sense Marx ironic remarks on Lafargue's speech, 30 
does not indicate that he rejected the abolition of nations as 
such, but merely that he rejected the idea that such stage of 
development had come to pass at the time of the meetings of the 
international. 
The parameters of analysis discussed in the previous chapter 
help to give coherence to the apparently contradictory formula- 
tions of Marx and Engels on the national question. Their support 
for the right to self determination in the Irish and Polish case, 
as well as the opposition to any self determination to the so 
called "South Slavs", could be thus explained in terms of the 
rigid evolutionary model, the epiphenomenal economism, and the 
Western Eurocentric approach that permeated Marx and Engels in- 
terpretations of the processes of social change. These 
parameters of analysis, concerned as they were with the universal 
effect of the process of transformation of the productive forces, 
are insensitive to the concrete and specific circumstances that 
generate the emergence of concrete national movements. Marxist 
epistemology is only concerned with the impact of universal 
processes of social transformation, and is therefore, blind to 
all those aspects that cannot be directly derived from the laws 
of motion of political economy. The nation is understood to be a 
residual creation of the productive forces to secure the condi- 
tions of domination of the bourgeoisie during the transition to, 
and consolidation of, the capitalist mode of production. A clear 
effect of this requirement to refer concrete analyses of national 
communities to rigid universal laws of social evolution, is best 
exemplified by one of the most unfortunate aspects of Marx and 
Engels' conceptualisation of the national arena, the theory of 
the "Historyless peoples". 
30. see footnote 14. 
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The Theory of the Nations "without history" 
Bose, ak jus nikto nenj na zemi ktoby Slavom 
spraviedlivost (! inil? 31 
The way in which Marx and Engels related to a number of 
stateless or numerically small national communities had been a 
subject of both, embarrassment and amazement by a considerable 
number of commentators sympathetic to the Marxist tradition, from 
the second international, right up to recent works on the 
subject. 32 Nevertheless, with the possible exception of 
RosdolsKy's thorough and illuminating research, there have been 
very few attempts to understand Marx and Engels position on the 
subject, and locate this bizarre discussion in the context of 
their overall theoretical contributions. The purpose of the fol- 
lowing discussion will be to try to provide a link between the 
theory of "non historical" nations and the general Marxist dis- 
-------------------- 
31. "God!, is there anybody in this earth that will do justice to 
the Slavs? "; the desperate plight of the Czechs desdainfully 
quoted by Engels in a letter to Kautsky on 2 February 1882, 
Quoted by RosdoisKy. op. cit. P. 197, spanish translation, p. 136 
32. see K. Kaustky, "Die Moderne Nationalitat" in Die Neue Zeit, 
5 1887. Spanish transaltion in La Segunda International y et 
Problema National Y Colonial, part 1, series Cuderno de pasado y 
Presente, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Mexico 1978; H. B. Davis, 
Socialism and Nationalism, Monthly Review Press 1967, p. 73; G. 
Haupt, Les Marxistes et Ia Question Nationale, op. cit. p. 22, M. 
Lowy, "Marxists and the National Question", New Left Review, 96, 
1976 p. 83, however the most detailed and illuminating discussion 
of this unfortunate use of hegelian terminology could be found in 
R. RosdolsKy, op. cit. F. Engels und das Problem der 
"geschichtslosen" Vl5lker 
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cussion of the national question. 
As has been noted, the idea of progressive centralisation, 
as the economy develops from a lower to a higher stage is at the 
heart of Marx and Engels analysis of the national question. This 
premise, as Ian Cummings asserts, "runs like a red thread through 
Marx's writings"33. Since this is an axiomatic point of departure 
for many discussions of concrete national movements, it is hardly 
surprising to find that Marx and Engels regarded every form of 
nationalist ideology and activity as aimed towards the formation 
and consolidation of national states. Nationalist ideology is 
for Marx, a mere epiphenomena of the growth of he nation. 34 One 
of the main problems with this pattern of analysis, is that one 
the one hand it leads to a gross over-estimation of the struc- 
tural need of the bourgeoisie to build a national state, and on 
the other hand, to a parallel under-estimation of cultural and 
ethnic factors (insofar as they are not explained as an 
epiphenomena of the Economy) in the process of formation of na- 
tional communities. The problem here is not only the use of 
Western European models of development, but also a "Capital- 
centred" emphasis in the discussion of all aspects of the na- 
tional phenomenon. Nationalist movements and nationalist com- 
munities are always defined in terms of their position or fuc- 
tionality within the capitalist system. 35 Once the clear goal of 
-------------------- 
33. Ian Cummings, Marx, Engels and National Movements, Croom 
Helm, London, 1980, p. 31 
34. A. D. Smith, "'Ideas, ' and 'Structure' in the Formation of In- 
dependence Ideas", Philosophy of Social Sciences", Vol. 3,1973 
p. 21 
35. R. Gallisot, "Nazione e Nazionalitiý nei Dibattiti del 
Movimento Operwo" Storia del Marxismo, E. Hobsbawn, G. Haupt, F. 
Marek, E. Ragionieri (eds. ), vol. 2 p. 809. Turin, Einauidi 
Editore p. 809 
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national communities is defined to be the formation of national 
states, the resultant difficulty from this over-simplified 
analysis is how to explain the existence and behaviour of 
nationalist movements that are neither capable of making, nor 
willing to form a national state. 
If, in accordance to the Marxian interpretation, the growth 
of the nation only heralds the formation of national states, so 
that the bourgeoisie could secure its hegemonic position, the in- 
escapable logic of this analysis, as has been noted, dictates 
that national communities incapable of constituting national 
states, are acting against "the tide of history". National com- 
munities incapable of constituting national states perform a 
"reactionary function" since according to this analytical logic, 
they cannot develop a "healthy" and hegemonic bourgeoisie, a con- 
dition "sine qua non" for the subsequent proletarian revolution. 
This analysis, however, leads to an even more serious and dis- 
turbing conclusion; these usually small national communities are 
not only "functionally" reactionary, but intrinsically reaction- 
ary relics of the past, which must disappear to pave the way for 
social progress. Since for Marx and Engels, the only purpose of 
national agitation is the drive to build a national state, those 
national communities that because of there size are not viable 
independent economic units, have no "raison d'2tre". If these 
national communities wish to follow a path of national revival, 
according to this faulty logic, they will become "socially 
regressive" since they cannot adapt to the capitalist mode of 
production, and therefore have to remain "feudal enclaves" in or- 
der to subsist as 'independent entities. Furthermore, according to 
Marx and Engels, these "feudal enclaves" have no other choice but 
to "closely associate" with those reactionary forces that oppose 
the "progressive" unifying role of the bourgeoisie. These unfor- 
tunate national communities (ethnographic monuments in Engels 
words), must culturally and politically perish in order to give 
way for the unifying role of the bourgeoisie. Closely following 
some of the worst excesses of the Hegelian political thought, 
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Marx and Engels called these national communities "Non- Histori- 
cal Peoples (Geschichtslosen Volker). 
The concept of "Non- Historical Nations" emerges out of some 
of the most reactionary (if not blatantly racist) aspects of 
Hegel's political philosophy. The central idea behind this 
dubious concept is the argument that peoples (Völker) who had 
proven to be unable to build a state over a period of time, will 
never be able to do so. 36 Hegel makes a sharp distinction be- 
tween "Nations" and "States". For Hegel, a group of people may 
exist as a nation, but in such a condition the nation is unable 
to contribute to the unfolding of world history. A nation, ac- 
cording to Hegel, will only fulfill its "historical mission" if 
it is capable of building a stable state. 37 Hegel justifies this 
analysis by arguing that history should be understood as the 
process of development from lesser to greater freedom, and 
freedom is only realised in the organised community. History 
begins with "self conscious" activity, that is, in the organised 
community, which in Hegelian terms it means the embryonic 
state. 38 Therefore it is not an accident that what Hegel calls 
"uncivilised peoples" have no history, because they have been 
proven "incapable of having a state". 
As it was argued in the previous chapter, from this Hegelian 
conceptualisation of history Marx and Engels drew the logic of 
their evolutionary paradigm. Hegel argued, perhaps for the first 
time, that history cannot be conceived as a mere recording of 
change, but must be first and foremost considered in terms of the 
36. H. B. Davis, Socialism and Nationalism, op. ci t. P. 2 
37. ibid. 
38. see H. A. Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of Hegel, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1967, P. 226 ff. 
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development of the human agency. Hegel's teleological conception 
of history indicates not only the direction, but also the stages 
of evolution towards a higher stage of freedom embodied in a su- 
perior state. Thus, earlier or "less developed" civilisations 
must give way to more advanced forms of social organisation that 
will unavoidably result in a superior state. However, what fate 
awaits those national communities unable to achieve a higher 
degree of statehood, or those nations that lost their national 
state, or even those that never had a national state?. On this 
issue, Hegel's position is very clear: Peoples (Völker) who had 
been proven incapable of building a state will never be able to 
do so, and are dammed to culturally vanish in the stream of 
history. 39 
Hegel makes a clear distinction between State and Nation 
while arguing that the supportive base for the state is the na- 
tion. A nation in Hegelian terms, is held together by natural 
and emotional ties: kinship, language and other means of union. 
In translating this argument into more contemporary terminology, 
nations are first and foremost ethno- cultural communities. The 
state preserves the ethnic link, but its specificity is derived 
from something different - the ethical ideal derived from the 
genius of the "national spirit" (Volksgeist). The particular na- 
tional spirit of each nation develops as a consequence of the 
harmonic interaction of the particular elements that constitute 
the whole: the people, the civil society, ethnic links, the 
rulers, etc. Since the "national spirit" is the result of the 
harmonic interaction of the above mentioned elements, it becomes 
a discrete' unit independent of it constitutive elements. In this 
way the "national spirit" takes an "objective" form by generating 
the state and its institutions, but this only occurs if the 
"national spirit" is capable of a significant contribution to the 
development of freedom. If this condition is fulfilled, the 
-------------------- 
39. Hegel, Philosophy of History a. CIt 
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"national spirit" has a place in history. National communities 
that hold such a "national spirit" then become "historical na- 
tions bearers of the world spirit" (Welthistorische 
Volk sgeister). 40 
In the existence of a Volk, there is a substantial purpose 
to become a state, and to maintain themselves as such; a 
Volk without a state formation (a nation as such) had ac- 
tually no history, as the people before their state forma- 
tion existed and others yet exist, as wild nations. 41 
The unfortunate national communities that are incapable of 
creating a national state are not the bearers of the "world 
spirit". Because of their inability to contribute to the 
"unfolding of civilisation", they are peoples without rights 
(Rechtlos), and as Hegel clearly indicates, they "count no longer 
in history"42. Also, for Hegel, not all nations have the same 
rights, the rights of "barbarian nations" are certainly unequal 
to those of "more civilised nations" the true bearers of the 
spirit of freedom. 
The same consideration justifies civilised nations in 
regarding and treating as barbarians those who lag behind 
them in institutions which are the essential moments of the 
-------------------- 
40. Hegel, Philosophy of History, quoted by H. Marcuse, Reason 
and Revolution, Beacon Press, Boston 1969, p. 237 
41. G: F. W. Hegel, "Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaf- 
ten im Grumdrisse", quoted and translated by C. Herod, The Nation 
in the History of Marxian Thought, Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 
1976 p. 30 
42. G. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, paragraph 347, Translated with 
notes by T. M. Knox, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1953, p. 217-218 
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state. Thus a pastoral people may treat hunters as bar- 
barians, and both of these are barbarians from the point of 
view of agriculturalists & etc. The civilised nation is con- 
scious that the right of barbarians are unequal to its own 
and treats their autonomy as only a formality. 43 
These idealistic speculations are perhaps one of the weakest 
features of Hegel's political philosophy and are certainly in 
direct opposition to an historical materialist conception of his- 
tory. It is indeed strange to find this conceptualisation echoed 
in the works of the founding fathers of historical materialism. 
The revival of hegelian terminology, particularly in the context 
of 1848 revolutions, was coupled with an increasing usage of 
abusive language (sometimes blatantly racist statements) vis e 
vis communities that did not conform with the path to national 
development discussed above. The intense dislike and hostility 
to these national communities could be ascertained from the fol- 
lowing quotations. 
Spaniards and Mexicans 
... The Spaniards are indeed 
Spaniard, a Mexican that is 
Spaniards - Boastfulness, 
are found in the Mexicans 
Scandinavians 
degenerate. But a' degenerate 
the ideal. All vices of the 
Grandiloquence, and Quixoticism - 
raised to the third power.. 44 
... Scandinavism is enthusiasm for the brutal, sordid, 
piratical old norse national traits, for the deep inner life 
-------------------- 
43, ibid., paragraph 351 p. 219 
44. Marx and Engels correspondence, 2 December 1847, quoted by L. 
Aguilar, Marxism in Latin America, New York, W. Knopf, 1969 p. 67 
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which is unable to express its exuberant ideas and senti- 
ments in words, but can express them in deeds, namely in 
rudeness towards women,. perpetual drunkenness and wild ber- 
serk frenzy alternating with tearful sentimen- 
tality.... Obviously, the more primitive a nation is, , the 
more closely its customs and way of life resemble those of 
the old norse people, the more "scandinavian" it must be. 45 
Chinese 
It is almost needless to observe that, in the same measure 
in which opium has obtained the sovereignty over the 
Chinese, the Emperor and his staff of pedantic mandarins 
have become dispossessed of their own sovereignty. It would 
seem as though history had first to make this whole people 
drunk before it could rise them out their hereditary 
stupidity. 46 
North African Bedouins 
... The struggle of the 
Bedouins was a hopeless one, and 
though the manner in which brutal soldiers like Bugeaud have 
carried on the war is highly blameworthy, the conquest of 
Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress 
of civilisation ... and even if we may regret that the liberty 
of the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed, we must 
not forget that these same Bedouins were a nation of rob- 
bers, whose principal means of living consisted in making 
excurSions upon each other, or upon settled villages. 47 
45. MECW, vol 7, p. 422 
46. K. Marx, "Revolution in China and in Europe" New York Daily 
Tribune, 14 June 1853, quoted in S. Avineri, op. cit. Karl Marx 
on Colonialism and Modernisation, p. 68 
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This is only a sample; Marx and Engels were, to put it 
mildly, impatient and intolerant with ethnic minorities. It is 
possible to ascertain this from their private correspondence of 
which the most infamous example is t he characterisation of 
Lasalle as a "Jewish Nigger". 48 But the dichotomy "historical- 
non historical nations" was revived by Marx and Engels in the 
context of the 1848 revolution while discussing the revival to 
national life of the Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians (Ruthenians), 
Serbs all of which were Eastern Eur opean national communities 
that spoke Slavonic-related languages. These diverse national 
communities were constituted into a fictitious unit called the 
"Southern Slavs". The reasons that lie behind this can be under- 
stood if Marx' and Engels' model of national formation discussed 
above, is taken into consideration. If the conditions of a na- 
tional community do not allow for the formation of a "viable" 
state, the national community has to assimilate to a larger state 
and a more viable national community, with "democracy as 
compensation". 49 
-------------- ------ 
47. Quoted by I. Cummings, Marx and Engels and the National Move- 
ments, op. cit. P. 54 
48. It is now perfectly clear to me that, as testified by his 
cranial formation and hair growth, he is descended from the 
negroes who joined Moses' exodus from Egypt (unless his paternal 
mother or grandmother was crossed with a nigger). Well this com- 
bination of Jewish and Germanic stock with the negroid basic sub- 
stance is bound to yield a strange product. K. Marx to F. Engels 
on 30 July 1862. MEW, op. cit. Vol. 30 p. 259, English transla- 
tion in F. J. Raddatz (ed. ) Marx and Engels Personal Letters, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981 
49. F. Engels, " The Democratic Panslavism" pp. 362-8, and "The 
Magyar Struggle", p. 227, in MECW, op. cit. vol. 8 
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But not only this process of national assimilation is highly 
desirable in Marx and Engels view, but it cannot also be opposed. 
Nations that are incapable of forming national states and still 
persist in their claim to nationhood oppose the inexorable 
process of development of the Capitalist Mode of Production, by 
virtue of their claim to national existence in a Capitalist world 
which according to Marx and Engels, they cannot possibly survive. 
The conclusion that the founding fathers of historical 
materialism drew from this situation, was that, if national sur- 
vival is to occur, then the national community in question must 
seek to return to the state of affairs that preceded capitalist 
transformation, a retrograde step in the evolution of humanity, 
just for the sake of allowing the survival of a national com- 
munity. 
In this context, the old Hegelian terminology served a very 
useful purpose in the Marxian analysis of the Slavonic national 
communities. These unfortunate peoples were defined as "non 
historical" in much the same way as Hegel used the term for the 
same peoples a century before. The Hegelian "Volksgeist" was re- 
placed by the "capacity to enter the Capitalist Mode of 
Production", but much of the metaphysical social evolutionist 
logic survived to demand the disappearance of the "South Slavs". 
These national communities where understood by Marx and Engels as 
incapable of having National States of their own because they 
were either "to small" or they lived in areas of mixed popula- 
tion, in the midst of a "more energetic race" (usually German, 
but also Magyar), in a situation in which the other national com- 
munity was considered "more advanced" and "better equipped" in 
terms of its class composition to constitute a national state. 
Bohemia and Croatia (another disjected member of the 
Slavonic family, acted upon by the Hungarian, as Bohemia by 
the German) were the homes of what it is called on the 
European continent "Panslavism". Neither Bohemia nor Croatia 
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was strong enough to exist as a nation by herself. Their 
respective nationalities, gradually undermined by the action 
of historical causes that inevitably absorbs into a more 
energetic stock, could only hope to be restored to anything 
like independence by an alliance with other Slavonic 
nations. 50 
Thus, if the Slavonic East European Nationalities cannot 
constitute national states, their only hope for survival accord- 
ing to Marx, was to constitute a federation of "Slavonic 
Nations", under the leadership of the Czar of all Russia, the 
"bulwark of European reaction". The Democratic Movement in 
Austro Hungarian Monarchy, will according to Marx and Engels, as- 
similate this "remnants of peoples, transforming their culture 
and national identity into the "superior" German and Magyar cul- 
ture, granting to them a democratic way of life as a compensa- 
tion. But given that national communities persisted in preserv- 
ing , their "Backward" national identities and culture, they could 
only subsist on condition that they locate themselves within the 
sphere of influence of the equally "backward" Russian Absolutism. 
So according to Marx and Engels, only in semi-feudal conditions, 
could these national communities survive, and this only could be 
guaranteed by the "Backward" Russian Empire. 
51 
Engels provided the theoretical justification for this 
-------------------- 
50. K. Marx, "Panslavism - The Schlswig Holstein War" in Revolu- 
tion and Counter Revolution, edited by Eleanor Marx Aveling, Lon- 
don, Unwin Books, 1971, p. 48 
51. This analysis had strong implications for the emergence of 
the socialist movement in Austria around the turn of the century, 
as it will be shown later in this work. For a discussion of the 
ingenious socialist solution to the complex national question in 
Austro Hungary see Chapter 6. 
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analytical logic in the following way: 
There is no country in Europe which does not have in some 
corner or other one or several fragments of peoples, the 
remnant of a former population that was suppressed and held 
in bondage by the nation which later became the main vehicle 
for historical development. These relics of a nation, merci- 
lessly trampled under the course of history, as Hegel says 
These residual fragments of peoples (VÖlKerabfalle) always 
become fanatical standard bearers of counter revolution and 
remain so until their complete extirpation or loss of their 
national character, just as their whole existence in general 
is itself a protest against a great historical revolution. 
Such in Scotland are the Gaels, the supporters of the 
Stuarts from 1640 to 1745. 
Such in France are the Bretons, the supporters of the Bour- 
bons from 1742 to 1800. 
Such in Spain are the Basques, the supporters of Don Carlos. 
Such in Austria are the panslavist Southern Slavs, who are 
nothing but residual fragments of peoples, resulting from an 
extremely confused thousand years development. This residual 
fragment, which is likewise extremely confused sees its sal- 
vation only in the reversal of the whole European movement, 
which in its view ought to go not from west to east, but 
from east to west... 52 
Here it is possible to find with unusual clarity, as Ros- 
dolsKy correctly points out, the repetition of a pattern which 
first emerged with the French revolution and constitutes the 
theoretical basis for Marx and Engels' analysis of the national 
question. The revolution will destroy the particularism of small 
-------------------- 
52. F. Engels, 'The Magyar Struggle" in op. cit. MECW, vol 8 pp 
234-5 it will be difficult to find a clearer example of Western 
European supremacy and narrow mindness. 
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nationalities, incorporating them to the "higher" and "developed" 
nations, becoming in this way the vehicle for emancipation from 
feudalism and superstition. German is the "language of liberty" 
for the Czechs in Bohemia, in the same way as French is the lan- 
guage of liberty for the Occitans - and Bretons in the French 
State. In the same way as the 'Jacobins perceived the non- French 
nationalities as intrinsically reactionary, Marx and Engels so 
perceived the "South Slavs" in the Austro Hungarian Empire. 
The same argument that so -strongly denies the right to self 
determination and historical continuity of the "non historical" 
nations, also sustains a strong justification for the emancipa- 
tion and state independence of the so-called "historical 
nations". These are national communities capable of being agents 
of historical transformation, that will, in the judgment of Marx 
and Engels, further the formation of a strong capitalist economy. 
The founding fathers of historical materialism strongly supported 
the right to state independence of the Irish and Poles, since 
they were considered historical nations that did not have a na- 
tional state. In this sense, the right to self determination 
(meaning state independence) for Marx and Engels is not an ab- 
solute right, is the right of "some" nations - those which are 
capable of being "agents" or "vehicles" of social transformation 
- for themselves and for the nations that oppress them: 
A French historian has said: 11 ya des peuples ne3cessaires- 
there are necessary nations. The Polish nation is un- 
doubtedly one of the necessary nations of the nineteenth 
century. But for no one is Poland's national existence more 
necessary than for us Germans .... So long, therefore, as we 
help to subjugate Poland, so long as we keep part of Poland 
fettered to Germany, we shall remain fettered to Russia and 
Russian policy, and shall be unable to eradicate patriarchal 
feudal absolutism in Germany. The creation of a democratic 
Poland is a primary condition for the creation of a 
democratic Germany. 53 
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Similar observations were made by Marx and Engels over the 
Irish question. They reasoned. that England cannot embark on a 
true revolutionary path until it "got rid" of the Irish problem. 
In the concluding section of chapter 25 of "Capital" Marx con- 
clusively shows how the occ upation of Ireland "underdeveloped" 
the country by making it and appendix of the British Economy. 54 
Consequently , the separation and independence of Ireland from 
England was not only a vital step for Irish development, but also 
was essential for the British people since "A nation that op- 
presses another forges it own chains"55 
... in the big industrial centers in England there is a 
profound antagonism between the Irish and the English 
proletariat... The average English worker hates the Irish 
worker as a competitor who lowers wages and standard of 
life. This antagonism among the proletarians is artificially 
nourished and supported by the bourgeoisie. It knows that 
this scission is the true secret of maintaining power. 56 
-------------------- 
53. MECW, op. Cit. vol 7, pp. 350-351 
54. K. Marx Capital, Vol. 1, Lawrence & Wishart, London 1977 pp. 
652-666. The term "underdevelopment" is of course a modern term, 
associated with the work of A. Gunder Frank and the "dependency 
theory". However, the intellectual meaning of the term, namely 
the prevention of economic development in a peripheral country by 
the intervention of a more powerful dominant economy, is at the 
heart of Marx' conceptualisation of the Irish Problem. 
55. K. Marx "Confidential Communication" Written in 1870, in K. 
Marx and F. Engels On Colonialism, Progress Publishers, Moscow 
1974 p. 259 
5 6. ibid. 
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But this analysis is not applicable to the "non historical 
nations", and in terms of Marx and Engels analytical logic, there 
is no contradiction or incoherence. The Irish and the Polish na- 
tional movements are perceived to advance the course of 
"progress" by constituting national states capable of developing 
a "healthy" contradiction between the Proletariat and the Bour- 
geoisie. Furthermore, their state independence will be a con- 
siderable help for the proletarian struggles within the nations 
that subjugate them. The "non historical" nations cannot, in the 
judgment of Marx and Engels, develop a bourgeoisie, because they 
either are "peasant nations", or because they cannot develop a 
state of their own, because they either live in a mixed area of 
residence, or they are too small to create an internal market. In 
this conditions, in the judgment of Marx and Engels, the "non 
historical" nations must seek an alliance with the defenders of 
"the old order", since this is the only way of securing their 
survival. Consequently, the "irresistible flow of progress" 
requires either the voluntary assimilation or the anhilation of 
these national communities. If they persist in maintaining their 
national identity in alliance with reactionary forces in a 
revolutionary situation, they will be simply "trampled over" by 
the 
, 
forces of progress. This is particularly the case of the 
"Southern Slavs" who must "perish in the revolutionary struggle". 
... We shall fight an implacable life and death struggle with 
the Slavs, which have betrayed the revolution, a war of an- 
hilation and ruthless terrorism, not in the interest of Ger- 
many, but in the interests of the revolution. 57 
-------------------- 
57. F. Engels, "The Democratic Panslavism" in op. cit., MEW, vol 
6 p. 286, also in G. Haupt., C. Weill and M. Lowy, Les Marxistes 
et la Question Nationale, op. cit. p. 86 
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The contrast between Marx and Engels perceptive discussion 
of the Irish question and their racist attitude towards the 
"South Slavs", puzzled many observers and commentators on the 
works of Marx and Engels on the national question. The differen- 
tial treatment received by different national communities in 
struggle for self determination surprised them and they attempted 
to account for this apparent inconsistence in a number of ways. 
The most common position is the argument that Marx and Engels had 
"no theory" on the national question and the inconsistencies in 
the discussion of the national phenomenon are the direct result 
of the "ad hoc" position in every case. Here, Marx and Engels 
discussions of concrete national situations are considered to be 
more connected to circumstantial political events and are seen to 
be devoid of any theoretical significance. This is the position 
of among others, Lowy and Davis. 58 
Nevertheless, even a superficial evaluation of the works of 
Marx and Engels shows this this is not the case. The presence 
of important traces of Hegelian historicism in the universal 
evolutionary theory of the founding fathers of historical 
materialism, and the related understanding of the national state 
as an historical construct to secure the conditions of existence 
of the bourgeoisie, makes an "ad hoc" discussion of the national 
question an unthinkable event within the parameters of analysis 
indicated above. If all historical devices have a functional 
purpose in terms of the overall movement of history, it is incon- 
ceivable that the national phenomenon should be a exception. On 
-------------------- 
58. H. B. Davis, Soc; alism and Nationalism op. cit. pp. 79-82, M. 
Lowy, argues that "Marx offered neither a systematic theory of 
the national question, a precise definition of the concept of 
"nation", nor a general political strategy for the proletariat in 
this domain", see Marxists and the National Question, op. cit. P. 
81 
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the contrary, the systemic view of the process of evolution of 
humanity through different Modes of Production and their con- 
comitant forms of social organisation must provide the analytical 
tools to conceptualise the nation within definite historical 
boundaries. The "modern nation state" is for Marx and Engels, 
that which secures the conditions of existence of the bour- 
geoisie, and as such it is intimately bound to the latter, for as 
Cutler et al argue, it is an absurdity to argue that something 
secures the conditions of existence of something else that does 
not exist. 59 Consequently, the emergence of every national state 
is for Marx and Engels indissolubly linked with the universalisa- 
t; on of the capitalist mode of production and the hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie. The viability or otherwise of every national state 
is tested against this fundamental theoretical assumption. Each 
of Marx and Engels concrete analysis of a specific national com- 
munity, from the firm advocacy of the right to self determination 
to Irish and Poles, to the harsh treatment of the "southern 
slays" is guided by this principle, which gives meaning the every 
concrete analysis. 
A second influential explanation of the embarrassing Engel- 
sian statements about the "southern slays" is advocated by S. 
Bloom. Referring to Engels scornful attacks on the "southern 
slays" he argues that most of them "must not be taken into 
account", because Engels was more prone to "political 
generalisations" and he was "rather more severe" than Marx with 
small nations. 60 The implication of this argument is that Marx 
should be disassociated from this analysis because it was Engels 
that promoted the use of Hegelian terminology as well as being 
-------------------- 
59. A. Cutler, B. Hindess, P. Hirst, A. Hussain, Marx's " Capital" 
and Capitalism Today, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 216 f. f 
60. S. Bloom, El Mundo de las Naciones, Spanish translation of 
"The World of Nations", op. cit. p. 49 
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guilty of a certain "german jingoism" in his youth. Such an ex- 
planation is also partly accepted by Davis. R. Rosdolsky, in his 
very detailed discussion of the problem appears also to suggest 
the same argument. 
Engels understood by the notion of "peoples without their 
own history", peoples (Vt5lker) that in the past were not 
capable of creating a vigorous state system, and because of 
this, in Engels view, they had no vigor to obtain national 
autonomy in the future. 61 
While Rosdolsky does not in this paragraph explicitly disas- 
sociate Marx from this analysis, by arguing that ... Engels under- 
stood, and ... in Engels view, he implicitly appears to be disas- 
sociating Marx from this conceptualisation. 
This conclusion is unjustified for two main reasons: first, 
as it was shown below, Marx also indulged in a derogatory denun- 
ciation of small and non western European national communities. 
Second, and even more important, it is unthinkable that Marx and 
Engels in a situation of close collaboration and joint revolu- 
tionary work, would disagree over such a fundamental question. 
As David Fernbach rightly suggests62 the reason for Engels 
recurrent use of Hegelian terminology, was mainly a consequence 
of the division of labour between between the two partners. In 
this situation, as Fernbach suggests, Engels was in charge of the 
national question and in the hypothetical case that the senior 
partner was in disagreement with the views of the junior partner, 
he never made this disagreement explicit. If such a disagreement 
-------------------- 
6 1. R. Rosdolsky, F. Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen" 
Volker, op. cit. P. 87, Spanish translation p. 10 
62. David Fernbach, "introduction to the 1848 Marx and Engels 
writings" 
83 
existed, this would a been a extraordinary situation, given the 
importance of the issue during the period 1848-52. 
Also F. Mehring, 63 in a comprehensive study of the writings 
of Marx and Engels in the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung", argues that 
there is no clear way to determine the origin of the majority of 
the leading articles of this newspaper (most of the attacks on 
the "South Slavs" appeared in this format), which as a rule were 
written in close collaboration between the two partners. Con- 
sequently, it is then hard to escape the conclusion that the ar- 
ticles referring to the use of the Hegelian derogatory terminol- 
ogy were written in close collaboration and agreement, and were 
not the result of Engels' idiosyncratic perception of the 
problem. 
Another perhaps more sophisticated interpretation of the em- 
barrassing use of the racist Hegelian terminology is discussed in 
G. Haupt and C. Weill well documented article on the Marxian 
heritage concerning the national question. 64 According to these 
authors, the persistent use of the hegelian terminology should 
be understood in the same context and domain in which the ter- 
minology was used, namely the area of political action. Con- 
sequently the authors reason that this terminology is neither the 
result of any aprioristic elaboration, nor does it arise from a 
careful and systematic thinking of the problems involved. It 
-------------------- 
63. F. Mehring, Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von K. Marx, F. 
Engels und F. Lasalle quoted in C. Herod The Nation in the His- 
tory of Marxian Thought, Matinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976, p. 19 
64. G. Haupt, C. Weill, L'ereditt di Marx ed Engels e la ques- 
tione nazionale, op. cit. P. 284 ff., similar ideas are expressed 
in the not less valuable introductory essay by G. Haupt. in op. 
cit. G. Haupt., C. Weill, M. Lowy, Les Marxistes et la Question 
Nationale 
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arises from the heath of the revolutionary fervor of the 1848 
revolutions. In this situation Marx and Engels perceived the 
tasK of the democratic and revolutionary forces to be: 
a) The destruction of the political system established in the 
Congress of Vienna of 1815, and in particular, the disman- 
tling of the big multinational Empires (Austria Hungary and 
Czarist Russia). 
b) The political independence of the "big" historical nations, 
particularly those oppressed by the above-mentioned multina- 
tional Empires. 
But according to Haupt and Weill, this strategy did not take 
into account the interests of the small national communities 
(which Marx and Engels considered to be "backward peasant 
nations"), and which needed the equilibrium of the multinational 
Empire to counteract the assimilationist pressures of their 
larger neighbors in order to maintain their national in- 
dividuality. In this situation, the movements for national 
revival among the small slavic national communities, were pushed 
by the incapacity of the revolutionary movement to provide a 
solution to their national aspirations, into the arms of the 
counter revolutionaries, because by preserving the "status " quo", 
they were not forcing assimilation upon themselves. 65 Thus, ac- 
-------------------- 
65. As it will later discussed in Chapter 6, this situation was 
half a century later, understood by the Austrian socialists, who 
in the Brno (Br(nn) Programme, incorporated a number of important 
safeguards to protect the rights of these small national com- 
munities. See "Protokoll über die Verhandlugen des Gesamt - 
Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in 
Osterreich, BrOnn", Spanish tanslation, in La Segunda Inter- 
nacional y el Problema Nacional y Colonial, Cuadernos de Pasado y 
Presente 73, Vol 1, Mexico 1978, pp. 181-217 
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cording to Haupt and WeiI , 
66 Marx and Engels *drew theoretical 
conclusions from the transitory and conjunctural circumstances of 
the 1848 revolution, by defining these unfortunate peoples as 
"intrinsically reactionary". 
While Haupt and Weill's hypothesis has the important merit 
of providing a very plausible historical context for this bizarre 
analysis it is still not entirely satisfactory for two main 
reasons: first, Marx and Engels maintained their strong animosity 
towards the small central European national communities over most 
of their political career. In 1855 in an article in the "New 
York Daily Tribune", Marx argued that "one part of the Austrian 
Slavs consists of tribes whose history belongs to the past. 67, 
and Engels repeated this same argument in an article about 
Russia. 68 In 1882, one year before the death of Marx, Engels 
declared in response to a criticism by KautsKy, that he had no 
sympathy for the small slavonic groups" and "ruins of nations", 
who looked to the Czar for salvation, and in 1885, two years 
after the death of Marx, Engels argued that: 
The European War is beginning to seriously threaten us. 
These miserable remnants of former nations - Serbs, Bul- 
garians, Greeks and other dishonest rabble [RaDbergesindel3 
- over which philistine liberals gush in the interests of 
Russia, are unwilling to grant each other the very air they 
breathe and seem to be compelled to cut each others greedy 
throats. That each of these tiny tribes can determine 
whether Europe is to be at war or peace serves these 
-------------------- 
66. ibid. P. 287 
67. New York Daily Tribune, 7 May 1855, quoted by C. Herod, The 
Nation in the history of Marxian Thought, op. cit. p. 33 
68. F. Engels, MEW, op. cit. vol 18 p. 586 
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nationalistic philistines right. The first shot has been 
fired at the Dragoman, where and when the last shot will -be 
fired, no-one knows. 69 
Second, as it was shown earlier in this chapter, _ 
Marx and 
Engels used their offensive terminology, and the Hegelian con- 
cepts, not only in writing about the "Southern Slavs", but also 
in respect of (or rather with disrespect to), other national com- 
munities. In using this terminology, Marx and Engels created a 
system of equivalences which clearly implied the creation of a 
dichotomous analysis of national communities, on the one hand 
were the "historical" great European nations - on the whole, the 
standard bearers of the process of "civilisation and progress". 
On the other hand, were the small and "non western and central 
European nations" - on the whole, "barbaric and reactionary". 
This dichotomous conceptualisation implies that the pattern of 
national development of Western and Central Europe, should be 
considered "normal" and "universal", and lack of compliance with 
it implies a reaction and retrogression. In conceptualising the 
national phenomenon in this way, the emerging theoretical 
categories of analysis go beyond the specific case of the 1848 
revolutions. 
Otto Bauer, in his monumental work on the national question, 
also provides for the Marxist tradition a highly ingenious way 
out of this embarrassing analysis, by arguing that the concept of 
"Non Historical Nations" is not an absolute criterion, but the 
result of a set of historical circumstances occurring at a par- 
ticular period in the process of development of the forces of 
production. In a different set of circumstances connected with 
-------------------- 
69. Letter of F. Engels to August Bebet in Berlin, on 17 November 
1885, MEW, op. cit. Vol 36, p. 390, translated from German by P. 
Vintila. Also quoted by C. Herod, op. cit. The Nation in the 
History of Marxian Thought p. 33 
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the development of a more "advanced" stage of capitalist develop- 
ment, these "non historical" nations will "awake to national 
life". Bauer's arguments will be further discussed in chapter 
seven, for the moment it is sufficient to note that Bauer felt 
uneasy about the categorical and deterministic use of the con- 
cepts of "historical" vs. "non historical" nations, but neverthe- 
less accepted them as the theoretical point of departure, if 
only to radically change their meaning. 
Rosdolsky's Critique of the concept of "Non Historical Nation: 
But it is above all R. Rosdolsky, the distinguished UK- 
rainian Marxist scholar who, without any doubt, provides the most 
comprehensive, detailed and scholarly written work on the subject 
of the "Non Historical" Nations. T° It is regrettable that, to 
date this very important work has not been translated -into 
English, depriving the English reading audience of an extraordi- 
nary rich and useful source of information as well as a 
stimulating analysis. Even if some of Rosdolsky's conclusions ap- 
pear to lack sufficient critical discussion, the work should be 
praised for its detailed discussion and systematic use of primary 
sources. 
The first part of Rosdolsky's work is devoted to a com- 
prehensive presentation of the attitudes of the Neue Rhenische 
Zeitun and of Marx and Engels towards each of the Eastern 
European National communities under discussion, attempting an 
initial tentative explanation of the reasons for Marx and Engels 
attitude towards these national communities. According to Ros- 
dolsKy, one factor that must be taken into account is the com- 
plexity of the national problem in Austria, and the dif ficulties 
faced by anyone attempting to provide a so lution to the conflict- 
--------------- 
70. R. Rosdolsky, 
----- 
Friederich Engels und das problem der 
"Geschichtlosen" Völker, op. cit. 
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ing clams of the national movements under consideration: 
On the one hand, there were plebeian populations that had 
just awaken to historical life, did not have their own bour- 
geoisie or working class, and were just able to sustain an 
autonomous national existence. On the other hand, there was 
a German bourgeoisie that felt at home in the. slavonic 
countries of the monarchy as it felt in Germany proper, 
populating the cities of those countries, and dominating in- 
dustry and commerce. Given its class position, (the German 
bourgeoisie) was not prepared to resign its privileged posi- 
tion, as for example the Hungarian or Polish nobility to the 
exploitation and domination of its foreign tributary 
(Hintersassen) Groups. 71 
This situation of clear cultural and political domination of 
the German bourgeoisie over territories inhabited by national 
communities of slavic descent and culture, made the acceptance of 
any form of national emancipation of the latter (meaning national 
-territorial state sovereignty) by the German bourgeoisie an im- 
possible situation. In this sense, Rosdolsky argues that to ask 
the German bourgeoisie to voluntarily give their hegemonic posi- 
tion in these slavonic countries was tantamount to "Question the 
ability of the German bourgeoisie to participate in the 
revolution". 72 So, according to RosdolsKy, Marx and Engels 
found themselves in an acute dilemma: if they supported the 
emerging national communities this would certainly alienate the 
German bourgeoisie, the "most advanced class at the time" which 
-------------------- 
71. ibid., p. 91-92, spanish translation p. 15. The word Hinter- 
sassen has no precise English equivalent, in the ongoing discus- 
sion it has been translated is "tributary". For the etymological 
meaning of the term, Chapter 7 footnote 74 
7 2. ibid. 
89 
was the very basis of the 1848 revolutionary fervor. Thus Ros- 
dolsky reasons that Marx and Engels had "no other choice", but to 
support the "progressive bourgeoisie", even if this meant en- 
couraging harsh and savage national repression of the "non 
viable" national communities. The Czech provinces were, according 
to RosdolsKy, "in the middle of Germany"73, and in a language 
that is more in tune with a reactionary and nostalgic "vnikisch" 
nationalist rhetoric than the analytical wit of a distinguished 
Marxist scholar, he argues that if the slavic national com- 
munities were to constitute a national states, they would have 
represented "Einem Dorm in Fleische des krrnftigen grossdeutschen 
Reiches bilden (!? )"T 4. If this was not enough, there was ac- 
cording to Rosdolsky, a second major problem: the 
"underdevelopment" of the Czechs and other "Southern Slav" na- 
tional communities vis a vis the German bourgeoisie. 
.. in addition to this, evidently 
the Czechs and South slays 
were not sufficiently mature to form national states, and 
such states -in the hypothetical case that they would have 
been formed- would h ave only become with ease "bounty of 
Czarism" (Beute des Zarismus) in becoming "vanguard 
positions" (Vorposten) of the latter in Central Europ e. 
75 
By posing the problem in these 
into the same paradigmatic trap that 
sensitive to the plight and national 
communities wich did not conform with 
-------------------- 
73. K. Marx Her Vogt, Buenos Aires, 
quoted in RosdolsKy, op. cit. P. 93, 
terms, RosdolsKy is falling 
made Marxian analysis so in- 
awakening of the national 
the pattern of national 
Editorial Lautaro p. 212, 
spanish translation p. 16 
,74, "A thorn in the flesh of the future 
Great German Empire", 
ibid. P. 93, spanish translation p. 16 
7 5. ibid. 
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development of non Western European national communities. Ros- 
dolsKy is repeating Marx' epiphenomenal analysis by arguing that 
a) every national movement exists to build a national state, and 
b) national awakening is only progressive where there is a strong 
bourgeoisie. Rosdolsky however, qualifies his analysis by argu- 
ing that the danger of counter-revolution would have been Kept 
under control if these national communities had achieved autonomy 
and equality of rights at the cultural, linguistic, and political 
levels. But RosdolsKy asks the rhetorical question "What could 
have moved the German bourgeoisie to unilaterally resign their 
privileges? " Here he believes that to suggest a programme of na- 
tional cultural autonomy, as it was suggested fifty years later 
in the Brno (BrOnn)76 congress of the "All Austrian" 
(Gesamtpartei) Socialist Party, was during this period, an 
utopian solution. 
In this situation, Rosdolsky concludes his analysis by argu- 
ing that given the conjunctural relations of forces, the German 
revolution could only give power to the German bourgeoisie and to 
the Hungarian and Polish aristocracy, the junior partners of the 
former. This argument leads RosdoisKy to the conclusion that the 
victory of the revolutionary forces would have had to coincide 
with an even greater oppression of the so called "Non Historical" 
nations. Rosdolsky attempts a critical defense of the German left 
and of Marx and Engels when he argues that: 
It was impossible for the German left to identify objectives 
that went beyond this objective "barrier" (Schranke) of the 
revolution, and attempt a reconciliation of irreconciable 
antagonisms. 77 
-------------------- 
76. For a discussion of this programme see chapter 6 
77. Rosdolsky, op. cit. P. 194, spanish translation p. 133 
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Consequently, "the left" was unable to reconcile the an- . 
tagonisms which, according to RosdolsKy, were "irreconciable" at 
that particular historical period. In this situation, RosdolsKy 
argues, the left had "no other option" but to take position "in 
favour" of the "progressive" bourgeoisie and to declare as their 
"natural enemies" the populations that resisted the political 
hegemony of the German bourgeoisie and the Polish and Hungarian 
nobility. In other words, the German left had to declare entire 
national communities "counter-revolutionary". This posed a 
theoretical problem for the left as well as for the founding 
fathers of historical materialism: 
This unusual distinction between nations and not between so- 
cial classes had to be . 
explained, this is to say, deduced, 
from the history or from the nature of these nations. In 
this situation it seemed "natural" for the revolutionary 
"left" to recur to the traditional Hegelian doctrine of 
"historical" and "non historical" peoples (Völkern) as a 
mechanism for self deceit, escaping to the terrain of his- 
torical mythology to cover for the fatal objective dif- 
ficulties of the revolution. The Hegelian nostalgic recol- 
lections (Reminiszenzen) of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung were 
very useful for this purpose... 78 
Consequently, Rosdolsky"s arguments could be summarised in 
the following way: a)The "objective" conditions did not allow for 
the emancipation of the "South Slavs"; even if it would have 
been possible for them to gain some form of national emancipa- 
tion, they were too "backward" to constitute modern nations. b) 
The revolutionary "left" had no alternative, but to oppose the 
demands of these unfortunate national communities, even if they 
were struggling against a vicious form of oppression. The vic- 
-------------------- 
78. R. RosdolsKy, F. Engels un das Problem..., OP. Cit. P. 194, 
Spanish translation p. 133. 
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tory of the bourgeoisie was supposed to pave the way for the 
eventual emancipation of humanity as a whole in the form of the 
impending proletarian revolution. If in order to achieve this 
goals whole national communities were culturally and politically 
obliterated, the left had to shrug its shoulders and wonder about 
"the heavy price" paid for development of "progress". So, accord- 
ing to Rosdolsky, the "mistakes" 
, 
of the revolutionary left were 
conditioned by historical circumstances and were in this sense, 
unavoidable. Thus Rosdolsky argues that one must not judge them 
in terms of our "contemporary perceptions of the national 
question", but they should be perceived in terms of the historical 
circumstances of the period in question. 79 
RosdoisKy's conclusions are problematic in a number of ways: 
First, the theory of "nations without history" was applied, as 
Rosdolsky is well aware, not only to the small Slavonic national 
communities. They were also applied to a variety of nations, both 
large and small which in Marx and Engels judgement, were not 
capable of a revolutionary transformation of their societies (the 
Welsh, the Scots, the Quebecois and the Mexicans are just but few 
examples). The widespread use of the theory denotes a more sys- 
tematic conceptualisation than the conjunctural explanation 
proposed by Rosdolsky appears to indicate. 
Second, it seems that also Rosdolsky falls into the paradigmatic 
theoretical trap which logically leads to the formulation of the 
theory of "non historical nations". This is clear from 
Rosdolsky's argument that historical circumstances were not yet 
"ripe" for the emancipation of the "Southern Slav" national com- 
munities. By sustaining this argument, he is implicitly accepting 
the teleological model of social evolution behind the Hegelian 
-------------------- 
79. ibid. Conclusions, p. 240 and ff., Spanish translation, p. 
184 and ff. 
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theory of "non historical" peoples. This influence was also 
noted in Chapter 1, when evaluating the social evolutionary 
parameter inherited by the Marxian tradition from the works of 
the founding fathers. The Epiphenomenalist equation: 
Modern Nation = National State = Hegemony of the Bourgeoisie 
Is accepted by RosdolsKy, considerably weakening his case against 
Marx and Engels abusive attitude towards the "South Slavs". 
Third, Rosdolsky fails to see the link between his very well 
documented section of Marx and Engels evaluation of the national 
question and the overall theory of evolution developed by the 
founding fathers of historical materialism. Rosdolsky argues 
that "Revolutionary Left" could not overcome the "objective" cir- 
cumstances in which the struggle for the emancipation of the 
southern slav national communities was taking place, and there- 
fore it had to oppose their struggle for national emancipation to 
prevent further delays to the development of a "revolutionary" 
class (the bourgeoisie). The problem in this argument is not the 
"objective" conditions, but the use of epistemological constructs 
which lead to a conceptualisation of the lack of maturity of the 
"objective" conditions. Rather than the "objective" cir- 
cumstances, it was the numbing effect of the epiphenomenalist 
epistemology that prevented the German "left" from conceptualis- 
ing the national problem in such a way that takes into account 
the national development of the "South Slavs". Marxist epistemol- 
ogy required the definition of a developmental continuum in which 
the national state must be historically located to function as a 
vehicle for the crystallization of bourgeois power. National com- 
munities that do not follow this developmental path cannot "fit" 
the theoretical model, and are declared "deviant exceptions" that 
to be rectified at the best possible opportunity. This is per- 
haps the single most important explanation for the lack of a sen- 
sitive analysis of the national phenomenon in the works of Marx 
and Engels, as well as in subsequent generations of Marxists dis- 
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cussing the national question. The 
which demands the historical location 
within a hierarchical, universal and 
must be seriously challenged, if the 
provide a more sensitive discussion 
of the national arena. 
epistemological requirement 
of the national phenomenon 
developmental continuum 
Marxist tradition is to 
of the multi-dimensionality 
To conclude this chapter, it may be useful to summarise the 
main findings of the discussion. 
First, Contrary to the assertions of Davis, Lowy and other 
analysts and commentators of the work of Marx and Engels on the 
national question, it has been argued in this chapter that the 
work of the founding fathers of historical materialism could be 
understood as. a coherent corpus of literature, even if the 
theoretical arguments 'which sustain Marx and Engels analysis have 
not been explicitly conceptualised. The "Modern Nation" is a 
clearly defined and historically located political phenomena. It 
represents a mechanism for consolidating and securing the condi- 
tions of existence of the bourgeoisie. The theory of the "non 
historical nations" is not a curiosity, a slip of the tongue, an 
ad hoc" argument or a regrettable mishap. It is rather the 
result of the formulation of the rigid universal laws of social 
evolution that define the precise historical location of the 
"modern nation" and by default renders obsolete national com- 
munities that cannot fulfill this Eurocentric political 
criterion. All this gives meaning to the rigid evolutionist 
epiphenomenalism that colored Marx and Engels analysis of the 
various aspects of the national phenomenon. 
Second, the analytical parameters discussed in chapter 1, 
inform the conceptual requirement that every "modern nation" must 
form a national state to further the development of the bour- 
geoisie. Furthermore, the formation of a national state is a 
"sine qua non" functional requirement for the survival of a na- 
tional community in a capitalist mode of production. National 
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communities incapable of forming national states are hindering 
the development of . 
the progressive centralisation and uniformisa- 
tion of humanity, and must therefore, assimilate to more "vital" 
and "energetic" nations capable of forming national states with 
democracy "as compensation". The National State is the condition 
for a mature bourgeoisie and the requisite for the final con- 
tradiction that will render both, the nation and the state his- 
torically obsolete. The "model" for national development is that 
of the "large" Western European nations, particularly France, but 
also British England, which is considered a "successful case" of 
assimilation of the celtic fringe, with the important exception 
of Ireland- a "historical" nation. 
Third, the perception of the national community outlined 
above is the nucleus of the misleading heritage of European Mar- 
xism. It informed -the positions of the main debates within the 
Second and Third International, and it configurated the framework 
in wich subsequent generation of Marxists thought the national 
question. As it will be shown in later chapters, some were more 
succesful than others in their attempts to break with these abor- 
tive rigidities. The impact of this discussion on the works of 
the most influential traditions on the second international will 
be now evaluated. 
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Chapter 3: The Second International and the National Question 
Leszek Kolakowski argues in his influential book on the his- 
tory and development of the Marxist theory that the Second Inter- 
national "may be called without exaggeration the Golden Age of 
Marxism"l, and this is because: 
Marxist doctrine had been clearly enough defined to con- 
stitute a recognisable school of thought but it was not so 
rigidly codified or, subjected to dogmatic orthodoxy as to 
rule out discussion or the advocacy of rival solutions to 
theoretical and tactical problems2 
While this may be superficially the case, particularly wherC 
the proliferation of debates and thinkers is taken into account, 
this apparent plurality of approaches hides a more dogmatic and 
deterministic approach to the fundamental features of historical 
materialism. The Second International's "Left", Right", and 
"Center", were closely associated with, and became leading ex- 
ponents of, the parameters of analysis discussed in Chapter 1, 
which choked the analytical creativity and imagination of the 
movement in more than one way. As it will shown in a moment, the 
conceptualisation of the national question is one of the many im- 
portant examples of this dogmatism and ossification of the old 
parameters of analysis. A significant exception in this analyti- 
cal pattern was the emergence and development of the Winer 
Marxsche Schule (Viennese Marxist School) which was later to take 
the name of "Austro-Marxism". Given the importance of the con- 
tribution of the Austro-Marxist school to the analysis of the na- 
-------------------- 
1. L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Clarendon Press, Ox- 
ford 1978, Vol 11, The Golden Age, p. 1 
2. ibid 
97 
tional phenomena, a specific chapter will be devoted to the dis- 
cussion of Austro-marxism and the national phenomena. 
As Kolakowski rightly argues, the Second International was 
blessed with a prolific discussion of a number of controversial 
issues, of which the "National Question" was both one of the 
most important and one of the most heatedly debated. While from 
this debate it is possible to recognise a genuine attempt to come 
to grips with an important problem that was perceived to have 
been insufficiently discussed by the founding fathers of histori- 
cal materialism, the possibilities of conceptualising the na- 
tional phenomena in a novel and imaginative way were silenced 
from the start by the logic of the parameters of analysis dis- 
cussed in chapter one. 
It will be impossible in the context of this work to provide 
a detailed and comprehensive account of the historical cir- 
cumstances and substantive arguments that surrounded all debates 
on the national question that took place in the context of the 
Second International. The purpose of this chapter will be rather 
more modest: to account for the most influential arguments on the 
national question debated during this historical period, con- 
sidering the factional organisation that resulted from the 
revisionist debate, as a cleavage that in many ways determined 
the configuration of ideas in the context of the Second Interna- 
tional, and the intellectual legacy of of the period as a whole. 
The Marxist-Leninist and Austro-Marxist traditions will be con- 
sidered in separate chapters given the intellectual originality 
of the latter and the profound influence of the former in contem- 
porary discussions of the national phenomena. In this chapter k 
discussion of the contributions of Eduard Bernstein, Karl Kautský 
and Rosa Luxemburg will be attempted, these being the most in- 
fluential figures in the "Revisionist", "Center" and "Left" fac- 
tions. 
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The ephinomenalist analysis of the national question; Kautsky ant 
Luxemburg 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky represent two different and 
often contradictory approaches and political strategies in the 
context of the second international in the years preceding world 
war I. R. Luxemburg was the outstanding figure of the radical 
left and K. Kautsky was the most influential intellectual figure 
of the so called "centrist" or "orthodox" faction. Many conten- 
tious issues separated both Marxist thinkers, but in spite of 
these differences it is possible to detect a common 'axiomatic' 
departure in their conceptualisation of theory and discussions 
over strategy. This common axiomatic departure was precisely the 
cornerstone of the epiphenomenalist approach to the so called 
"superstructural phenomena"3: This is the direct equation of 
political and social institutions with the most meaningful fea- 
tures of the economic order and the understanding of the process 
of production in a functionalist and deterministic way. Every so" 
cial institution "represents" an agent in the class struggle and 
socialism will evolve out the capitalist mode of production in a 
mechanistic way, much the same as capitalism was perceived to 
have evolved out of the feudal mode of production. 
Kautsky, heavily influenced by earlier forms of a Social 
Darwinian logic, 4 developed his analysis of the process of socia' 
-------------------- 
3. For a discussion of the concept of "Epiphenomenalism", see 
Chapter 1, and C. Mouffe Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, in C. 
Mouffe (ed. ) Gramsci and the Marxist Theory op cit. P. 169 
4. Kautsky himself in a number of occasions acknowledged Darwin' 
influence in his thought, defining for instance morality as an 
ethical impulse derived from the natural social condition of 
humans. However as Steenson rightly argues, Kautsky subsumed un- 
der the name o f Darwin a number of diverse influences in his in- 
terpretation of Marxism For a fur ther discussion on the subject 
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transformation in terms of what he called "The natural neces- 
sities of the capitalist mode of production"5. This meant that 
history should be understood as a series of interrelated stages 
of linear development, the so-called "Iron Laws of Evolution", 
which will lead history to its inexorable end: the abolition of 
capitalism and the socialist transformation of society. Com- 
munities, like all other "superstructural" social institutions 
are understood to be mere tools or instruments in this process: 
All communities have economic functions to fulfill! This 
must, self evidently have been the case with the original 
communist societies which we encounter at the threshold of 
history"6 
Rosa Luxemburg's major theoretical work, "The Accumulation 
of Capital" is also committed to the same analytical logic: 
(Imperialism is]... The political expression of the accumula 
tion of capital in its competitive struggle for what remain 
still open to the non-capitalist environment" ... "Though im 
perialism is the historical method for prolonging the 
career of Capitalism, it is also a sure means of bringing i 
to a swift conclusion... But the more violently, ruthlessly 
and thoroughly imperialism brings ab out the decline of non- 
capitalist civilisation, the more rapidly it cuts the very 
ground from under the feet of capitalist accumulation... 7 
-------------------- 
see G. P. Steenson, K. Kautsky, Marxism in the Classical Years, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978, p. 24-25. 
5. K. Kautsky, The class struggle W. W. Norton, New York, 1971, p. 
6. Karl Kautsky, The Class struggle, op. cit. P. 104 
T. R. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, p. 446. This deter- 
ministic understanding of the development of capitalism con- 
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These notions of the "inescapable" and "unavoidable" impend 
ing collapse of capitalism are the logical conclusion of 
Kautsky's and Luxemburg's analytical logic. The "prophetic" na- 
ture of this prediction is deeply rooted in the transparent and 
linear nature of the epiphenomenalist analysis - the very essenc 
of the mechanistic Marxism of the men and women of the Second in 
ternational. The apocalyptical perception that the process of 
social transformation will unavoidably result in the eventual 
collapse of the capitalist mode of production results from the 
transparency of the "base-superstructure" relationship, which in 
turn, is determined by the rigid and mechanistic interpretation 
of the function of the laws of motion of political economy. Thi 
analytical logic deeply influenced Kautsky's and Luxemburg's un- 
derstanding of the national question. In what follows, it will b 
argued that this understanding was intellectually abortive since 
it confined the analysis of the national phenomenon to the 
paradigmatic straitjacket of epiphenomenalism. In this way it 
prevented a more multidimensional and imaginative understanding 
of the national question, which was during this period, of enor- 
mous importance for the theory and strategy of the workers' move 
ment. The legacy of K. Kautsky on the national question will be 
discussed first. 
-------------------- 
tradicts Luxemburg's emphasis on political activism and radical 
action by the working class. This contradiction in Luxemburg's 
work has been discussed at some length by her biographers, e. g., 
J. P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburgs abridged edition. Oxford University 
Press 1969 and P. Froilich Rosa Luxemburg London, Pluto Press 
1972. 
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The National Question in KautsKv's WorK 
The classical form of the modern state is the National 
State. But the classical forms only exist as tendencies. It 
is only seldom that they develop in a typically perfect 
form8 
For Kautsky, as for Marx, the origin of the modern nation 
was unequivocally located in the period that led to the con- 
solidation and development of the capitalist mode of production. 
Kautsky further argued that the basic requirement for the 
development of a modern nation is a common language. national 
languages, Kautsky argues, had most probably developed from 
idioms used by traders. With the creation of internal markets 
and the development in the context of emerging capitalism of free. 
wage labour, the nation emerges embracing all classes in society 
Nationalism is, for Kautsky, the expression of the interest 
of commercial capitalism and the cover for "the most sordid 
profiteering"9. In Kautsky's analysis, the central factor in the, 
formation of nations has been language: to the extent that modern 
economic development has taken priority, the need for all those 
who speak the same language to be united in a common state became, 
a priority in the process of social organisation. This point is 
crucial for the development of Kautsky's argument; not only is 
this linguistic unification of the modern state a causal explana" 
-------------------- 
8. K. Kautsky Die Moderne Nationalitat, in G. Haupt, C. Weill, M 
Lowy, Les Marxistes et la Question Nationale, F. Maspero, Paris 
1974, p. 114, my own translation from French. 
9. K. Kautsky, Die Moderne Nationalitat, Neue Zeit, 5.1887, 
quoted and translated by H. Momsen and A. Martiny in "Nationalism 
and the Nationalities Question", Encyclopedia of Marxism, Com- 
munism and Western Society, op. cit. p. 42 
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tion for the formation of modern nations, but also the existence 
of a common language becomes for Kautsky a "methodological 
yardstick" for the process of national development. Languages 
play the role of "barometers" of the stage of development of the 
productive forces. 10 This is because it is possible to measure 
the level of national development from the degree of linguistic 
unification of the state under consideration, and this in turn 
will denote the level of hegemony achieved by the bourgeoisie of 
that particular nation. For Kautsky, languages are the basic 
medium of social intercourse, and the full development of 
capitalism out of the Feudal Mode of Production requires as a 
condition "sine qua non", the formation of a market, which is in 
the first instance, ' the place in which this extended intercourse 
takes place. For market forces to be able to interact without 
hindrance, a medium of communication must be defined and in- 
stitutionalised, and this is when a common language becomes the 
functional necessity of the new state, delimiting in this way 
the administrative and territorial boundaries of the linguistic 
unit in the process of becoming a nation. 
For Kautsky then, language constitutes the system of com- 
munication through which the interaction required for the forma- 
tion of markets takes place. However, the process of linguistic 
consolidation is not an abrupt transition. Is a gradual process 
of evolution in which different dialects and languages merge to 
form the common base for the interaction process. The constituen 
parts of the emerging economic system face a darwinian dilemma, 
either they adapt to the new socioeconomic condition or perish %4 
the process, trampled over by the irresistible forces of 
"progress". According to Kautsky, this process is at times pain 
ful 11, but the inexorable laws of capitalist development evolve 
-------------------- 
10. K. Kautsky, Die Moderne Nationalitat, in Haupt, Weill and 
Lowy, op. cit. P. 119. 
11. this probably reflects KautsKy's tribulations about his own 
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without hindrance. The fate of "modern nations" is linKed to the 
fate of capitalism, and all this is expressed in the evolution OP 
modern languages: 
To the extent that international communications expand, the 
need is felt for a medium of international communication, 
for a universal language 12 
But this cannot and will not be an "ad hoc" language like 
Esperanto. Neither will it be one of the "civilised" contemporar 
languages such as French, English or German. The universal Ian 
guage will result from the mutual assimilation of the most impor 
tant contemporary languages as the process of economic develop- 
ment brings into a single system the different national 
economies. l3 However, according to Kautsky, this process cannot 
be achieved as a result of political or extra-economic coercion, 
as it was taking place in Czarist Russia at the time that Kautsk 
wrote his essay on "modern nations". National assimilation is 
the essential and necessary outcome of the amalgamation of marke 
forces, so, according to Kautsky, it cannot be imposed by politi 
cal decree. Linguistic difference is merely a symptom not the 
problem; the real locus of the problem has always to be located 
at the level of the economy. To clarify this point, Kautsky 
refers to the Irish question: 
-------------------- 
nation, the Czechs, to whom he recommended a prompt assimilation 
to the more "civilised" Germans. 
12. K. KautsKy, Die Moderne Nationalitat, in Haupt, Weill and 
Lowy, Les Marxistes et la Question Nationale, op. cit. p. 121 
13. ibid. P. 12 2 
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The Irish case is a clear proof that the solution to the 
"linguistic question" would not be enough to suppress a na- 
tional antagonism, while the economic conditions that 
created this antagonism in the first place still persist. 14 
Thus Kautsky correctly argues that after centuries of 
British colonisation in Ireland, and the subsequent loss of 
Gaelic as the national language, Ireland did not became part of 
Britain through the loss of its national language. This was be- 
cause according to Kautsky, the country was exploited and 
colonised rather than integrated into the British economy. In the 
same way, Kautsky argues that the national communities in Czarist 
Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire will not assimilate out of 
forcible compulsion. But neither the languages of the small Slav 
national communities nor the Irish Gaelic have any future. The 
relentless process of assimilation of all nations into an 
"international community will simply imply that the languages 
of the small national communities will vanish first. At most, 
Kautsky argues, these national languages will remain for 
"domestic use" in the same way as "old family furniture" is con- 
served for "family veneration" but has little practical use. 15 
The languages spoken in the international trade and com- 
munication centers will slowly take the place of the more 
peripheral ones, until one of them will assimilate the others. 
But only "economic considerations" will decide the victor, and 
not considerations of "grammar or musicality", since for Kautsky 
The need for a universal 
symptom of the need for 
stitute modern civilisation 
ritory, which will undo 
language is nothing else but a 
the union of all nations that con- 
into a single economic ter- 
national barriersl6 
14. ibid p. 117 
15. ibid p. 12 2 
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In concrete terms, this means that for Kautsky only the more 
"advanced" and "developed" nations will survive the initial 
process of assimilation; "small communities" like the Czechs, are 
bound to disappear in "the near future". 17 To the extent that 
capitalism develops in Bohemia, the importance of the Czech lan- 
guage decreases and the importance of German increases. However 
Kautsky advises the Czechs to find solace and consolation in the 
fact that the same fate awaits "larger" and more "advanced" na- 
tional communities. 
Kautsky's position on the national question remained un- 
changed through his long and prolific political life. Twenty 
years after Die Moderne Nationalität, Kautsky wrote a polemical 
article in which he tried t o refute Oto Bauer's contention that 
national communities will survive capitalism. In this article, 
Kautsky restates his epiphenomenal analysis in all its crudity: 
Once we have reached the state in which the bulk of the 
population of our advanced nations speak one or more world 
languages besides their own national language, there will be 
a basis for a gradual reduction leading to the total disap- 
pearance of languages of minor nations, and finally, to the 
uniting of all civilised humanity into one language and one 
nationality. 18 
From the above it is clear that Kautsky's analysis is 
-------------------- 
16. ibid p. 122 
17. ibid. p. 121 
18. K. Kautsky, Nationalität und internationtlitat, in H. Mom- 
msen, op. cit. p. 43 
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replicating the epistemological premises that determine the 
evolutionary parameter of analysis of classical Marxism. The 
process of social transformation is determined by universal laws 
and the existence of national communities and nationalist move- 
ments must be located within the parameters of this discussion. 
In other words, each national community must "fit" into this 
process of social transformation, and, what is more important, 
this posits a crucial limitation to the interpretative capability 
of the emerging theoretical analysis on the national question. 
The logic of interpretation of the general behavioral patterns, 
and historical meaning of national communities, is informed "a 
priori" by conceptual constructs resulting from the above men- 
tioned epistemological devices. This situation renders impossible 
an analysis of the national phenomenon in terms of a conceptual 
framework incompatible, or even unrelated, to the teleology of a 
universal and linear process of social evolution leading to the 
eventual dissolution to the nation in general. For example, if 
the working class is bestowed with the privilege of being the so 
cial stratum that will preside over the dissolution of national. 
ties, it becomes then impossible for the latter to claim any kind 
of connection with the national phenomenon other than to assist 
in the process of bourgeois consolidation, a situation which in 
itself contains the seeds of its own destruction. Consequently, 
any working class attachment to the national community is 
rendered impossible by the terms of reference of the epis- 
temological devices used in the Kautskian discussion. Also, and 
equally important, any conflictive relation between national com 
munities is not analysed in its own merits, but in terms of pos- 
sible "progressive" outcome of the process of change. If the cul- 
tural existence and values of more "backward" national com- 
munities is shattered in the quest for "human progress", then 
this is always an acceptable and even desirable outcome, since 
the above discussed parameter of analysis ascribes no importance 
or meaning to cultural diversity. Indeed, cu'tural diversity, 
would not "fit" into the rigid categories of social evolution, 
and is therefore a utopian principle. As Rosa Luxemburg argues 
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it is always necessary to sustain a "healthy" and "objective" 
perspective in the analysis of the national - question. Anything 
that cannot "fit" the general logic of epiphenomenality, i. e., 
the epistemological principles that inform the Kautskian 
analysis, is rendered an illegitimate concern. In what follows 
it will be shown how these axiomatic analytical tools are 
developed even more explicitly in the works of Luxemburg, who 
took this logic of analysis to its inescapable conclusion by ar- 
guing that nations are only "temporary phenomenon". 
The rejection of the nation: The work of Rosa Luxemburg 
... In a society based on classes, 
the nation as a uniform 
social and political whole simply does not exist. Instead 
there exist within each nation classes with antagonistic in 
terests and "rights". There is literally no social arena, 
from the strongest material relationship to t he most subtle 
moral one, in which the possessing classes an d the self- 
conscious proletariat could take one and the same position 
as one undifferent iated national whole. 19 
Rosa Luxemburg was probably the most uncompromising Marxist 
discussant on the national question. She became involved in 
countless debates and discussions on the subject, particularly i 
relation to Poland, her native country. Her constant involvement 
in discussions on the national question led one of her most im- 
portant biographers to argue that she had an "insatiable appetit 
for public polemics on the subject"20. Her uncompromising op- 
position to any concession to nationalism or to the widely ac- 
cepted "right of nations to self determination" must be under- 
-------------------- 
19. Rosa Luxemburg, The question of Nationality and Autonomy 
quoted by Nettl op. cit. and H. B. Davis (ed. ) op. cit p. 135-6 
20. J. P. Nettl, op. cit. P. 505 
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stood not only as the result of the logic of epiphenomenalism, 
but also in the context of her analysis of the contemporary 
situation in her native land. She was in principle opposed to 
the creation of an independent Polish state. 
Around the turn of the century, the demand for the libera- 
tion of Poland became one of the key political demands of the 
young european Social Democracy. This followed a long tradition 
dating from the works of Marx and Engels in which Polish indepen- 
dence was considered to be of paramount importance for the 
development of the revolutionary forces in Europe. However, Ros, 
Luxemburg challenged this interpretation of events. Her main are_ 
gument was that the Polish working class in the areas of occupa- 
tion should join forces with their fellow workers in their 
respective multinational states, rather than join forces with the 
Polish petty bourgeoisie for what she regarded to be "utopian" 
liberation of Poland, which according to Luxemburg will in- 
variably signify the creation of a bourgeois Polish state. While 
she acknowledged that Marx was justified in campaigning for the 
emancipation of Poland in 1848, towards the end of the century 
social conditions had changed dramatically; Czarist Russia showed 
signs of developing towards a capitalist economy, and this shoulJ 
certainly change the Marxist perception of Russia and ' Poland. 
Consequently, if the independence of Poland in 1848 was supported 
because it helped the development of the capitalist forces of 
production, it must, given the dramatic change in the 
socioeconomic circumstances, be opposed at the end of the century. 
for the same reasons. Czarist Russia is not any longer a semi- 
feudal economy, but a state rapidly changing towards a capitalis- 
system. In a polemical article published in the theoretical jour- 
nal of the German socialist party, Die Neue Zeit, 21 in response 
-------------------- 
21. Der Sozialpatriotismus in Polen, Die Neue Zeit, 2,14,1895- 
96 pp. 324-332. Spanish translation in El desrrollo industrial 
de Polonia y otros escritos sobre el problema nacional, Cuaderno- 
de Pasado y Presente, 71 Siglo XXI editores, Mexico 1979, pp 195- 
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to a previous article by a group of socialist activists from the 
city of Cracow, 22 Luxemburg argued that since the removal of 
the tariff boundary between Congress Poland (This was the area o- 
Poland under the occupation of Czarist Russia), and since the 
freeing of serfs, industry had "mushroomed" in Congress Poland. 
The effect was to tye this part of Poland to Czarist Russia, on 
which it depended for the maintenance of its markets. Luxemburg 
concluded that the Polish bourgeoisie is economically linked to 
Czarist Russia, and is therefore not interested in an independen- 
Polish state. This was because a Polish state would create cus- 
toms barriers that would jeopardize the expansion of markets of 
the bourgeoisie in Congress Poland. The same criterion applied to 
the Polish textile industry since it depended for its markets on 
Czarist Russia. Consequently, Luxemburg argued that there are 
"sound and objective economic reasons" for the bourgeoisie of 
Congress Poland not to support the movement for Polish unifica- 
tion. 
However, the petty bourgeoisie was another matter. While 
acknowledging that the petty bourgeoisie was by no means united, 
and that certain sections had done well under the annexation to 
Czarist Russia, the "backward" nature of the cottage industry 
generates very good reasons for petty bourgeois support for the 
unification of Poland, since, according to Luxemburg, the small 
industry: 
... has been obliterated by the Russian connected big 
in- 
dustry. These petty bourgeois, with their very backward 
productive methods, with no capital and near bankruptcy have 
good reasons to be dissatisfied with the current state of 
affairs... as big industry is the result of the Russian an- 
nexation, the petty bourgeoisie trampled over by the latter 
-------------------- 
209 
22. S. Hacker, "Der Sozialismus in Polen" Die Neue Zeit, 14,2 
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becomes the adoptive parent of that orphan national aspira- 
tion... "the bourgeois intelligentsia is initiated into the 
national sentiment by the brutal system of Russification... 
and only those [intellectuals] who had not been absorbed 
into industry complain against their exclusion from the 
civil service and from the heart of the nationalist 
agitation. (23) 
From her analysis in the above mentioned article, Rosa 
Luxemburg concludes that only two class fractions have a tendenc 
towards nationalism: the declining petty bourgeoisie and the in- 
telligentsia that cannot find its place in the more advanced 
capitalist structure that resulted from Poland's incorporation 
into the Czarist economy (24). Given this configuration of 
forces, Luxemburg argues that in principle, the unification of 
Poland will be a retrograde step, since it will impede the 
development of capitalism and consequently will only benefit 
those reactionary forces which want to return Poland to a pre- 
vious stage in its developmental process. The proletariat, which 
is the progressive class "par excellence", cannot take sides wit 
"backward " forces in the process of development: 
If the proletariat would consider Polish independence as 
its own political program, this will be against the process 
of economic development. This will not only be of no help 
in the fulfillment of its tasK as a class, but, on the con- 
trary, it will produce an ever widening gap between itself 
and its goals and aspirations. (25) 
------------------- 
1895-1896 pp. 324-332. 
23. R. Luxemburg, Die Sozialpatriotismus in Polen, in op. cit. E 
desarrolo Industrial de Polonia p. 206-207(my own translation 
from spanish), a similar quote could be found in in H. B. Davis, 
Socialism and Nationalism Monthly review Press, 1967 p. 136 
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In her doctoral thesis at the university of Zurich(26), 
Luxemburg develops further the argument first sketched in the 
above mentioned article, providing an impressive economic sub- 
stantiation of the structural link between the Polish and Russian 
economies. The central argument of the work could be summarized 
in the following way The emergence of Polish industry took place 
between 1850 and 1870. The introduction of a railway system ac- 
celerated the process of capitalist development even further. 
After 1877 Polish industry was further stimulated by the intro- 
duction of protectionist policies by the Czarist government, and 
like St. Petersburg and Moscow, the Kingdom of Poland became one 
of the most developed regions of the Czarist Empire. In 1886, 
according to Luxemburg, the 141 largest factories in Poland sold 
537 of their production to Russian markets, and in 1898 the whole 
of the Polish textile industry sold more than 50% of its produc- 
tion to Czarist Russia. On the basis of an impressive array of 
statistical data of which the above is only a small part, Luxem- 
burg concluded that the the Polish bourgeoisie had benefited and 
been strengthen economically with its close connection with' the 
Russian market. Given this situation, the industrialisation of 
Poland would go ahead accompanied by a growing Polish 
proletariat, which would eventually transform Poland into a 
socialist society. In view of this, the separation of Poland from' 
its Russian markets would bring the process to an end without any 
gain for the socialist cause. In the same way as the economic 
activity between Polish and Russian business interests tended to 
have the effect of destroying national separatism, a strong com- 
-------------------- 
24. ibid p. 207 
25. ibid. P. 208 my own translation from Spanish 
26. Industrielle Entwicklung Polens, (The Industrial development 
of Poland). The thesis was submitted on 12 March 1897 and ex- 
amined on I May of the same year by Professor Julius Wolf. 
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munity of interests would emerge between the nascent Polish and 
Russian proletariat. The political consequence of this analysis 
of the economic tendencies of the kingdom of Poland was that 
"self determination", meaning a separate national state, was a 
retrograde step. By cutting Polish industry from Russian markets 
the class struggle could only be slowed(27). 
Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of the Polish case aroused a 
strong controversy not only among Polish socialists but in the 
whole socialist international. The tactical and political im- 
plications of her thesis was to fuel the discussion as to whether 
the working class and its political organisations was to support 
national liberation movements - or should social emancipation 
take priority? In terms of the epiphenomena list analysis of Ros, 
Luxemburg, the priorities are clear. national oppression was only 
one aspect of the process of oppression in general, which is the 
direct result of the division of social formations into classes. 
The main task of the working class was to abolish the very root 
of the system of oppression, the class society. Since* all forms 
of oppression are derived from the need to sustain class 
cleavages, with the emancipation from class societies, the op- 
pression of nations will be necessarily abolished after the 
abolition of classes. This analysis caused a vigorous discussion 
within the Second International, which motivated Lenin to write i 
series of influential articles of the national question. (28) 
-------------------- 
27. R. Luxemburg, El desarrollo Industrial de Polonia, Spanish 
translation of Industrielle Entwicklung Polens (The industrial 
Development of Poland), Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente 71, Siglo 
XXI editores, Mexico p. 155 
28. Lenin's arguments will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. for an appreciation of Lenin's arguments see "Critical 
Remarks on the National Question" and "The Right of Nations to 
Self Determination", in which Lenin develops a strong polemic 
against Luxemburg's discussion of the national question, in V. 
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The intransigent position of Rosa Luxemburg and her sup- 
porters finally split the Polish socialist camp. The Polish 
Socialist Party (known by its Polish initials P. P. S. ) favored the 
reconstitution of Poland and its branches in the parts of Poland 
under foreign occupation campaigned for a reconstitution of a 
Polish State. In 1893 Luxemburg and her supporters founded the 
Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania 
(known by the polish acronym SKDKPiL) which campaigned against 
the creation of a separate Polish state (29). Rosa Luxemburg 
consistently polemized against the PPS, accusing them of being 
"social patriots" (a term that she herself coined and used for 
the first time in the socialist movement). The theoretical and 
political conflict between the PPS and the SKDKPiL grew in inten- 
sity and in the course of the heated debate, Rosa Luxemburg 
developed a strong theoretical and political animosity towards 
the national liberation movements of small national communities. 
In the heat of the argument Luxemburg adopted uncompromising 
positions that puzzled many commentators. (30). In her analysis 
of the Russian situation, she discussed the position of the small 
national communities of the Czarist Empire with the same lack of 
sympathy and understanding that characterised Marx and Engels' 
discussion of the situation of the "South Slavs". Since she was 
-------------------- 
Lenin Collected Works Vol. 20 
29. H. B. Davis, The Right of Nations to Self Determination, 
Luxemburg vs Lenin, introductory article in H. B. Davis (ed. ) The 
national Question, Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, Monthly 
review Press, 1976, p. 13 Davis underestimates the socialist 
commitment of the PPS and overestimates the popularity of 
Luxemburg's arguments among Polish socialists. 
30. see for example J. P. Nettl Rosa Luxemburg, Vol. II, Oxford 
University Press 1966 p. 859 
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strong supporter of the principle of state centralisation to 
achieve larger marKets that will p ermit capitalism to arrive at 
its ma turity, her sympathies were definitively not with small na- 
tional communities struggling for national emancipation. Small 
states only delay the process of socialist transformation. 
In an article published in Die Neue Zeit (31), Luxemburg 
argued that the Russian middle class was "immature" since it sat 
and watched the freedom of Russia being *destroyed* because of 
the conflicts between the various national groups. 
... the many Kirgiz, Baschirs, Lapps and others, 
the 
remainders and ruins of former nations had no more to say in 
the social and political life of Russia than the Basques in 
France and the wends in Germany. (32) 
She then rhetoricaly asked 
could constitute a parliament and 
"they will tear each other hair 
how these numerous nationalities 
concluded that in two days 
out"(33). 
Clearly the model that emerged from her doctoral thesis, on 
the lack of economic viability of Poland as an independent state, 
informs much of Luxemburg's strategical and theoretical analysis 
on the national question. The only "healthy objective criterion" 
to judge a nation's performance was to evaluate its capacity to 
develop productive forces that will help it to evolve towards 
socialism. However, J. P. Nettl. Rosa Luxemburg's most important 
-------------------- 
31. R. Luxemburg, "The Problem of the Hundred Nationalities", Die 
Neue Zeit, Vol 1,20.1904/1905, quoted by C. Herod, The Nation 
m the History of Marxian Thought, The Hague. M. Nijhoff, 1976 
32. in C. Herod, ibid. 
33. ibid 
t15 
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biographer, argued that the denial of the Polish right to self 
determination (the creation 'of a separate Polish state), was not 
the same thing as the denial of a separate Polish nationality. 
She always recognised, Nettl claimed, the distinctive national 
identity of the Poles. (34) Without denying that it is possible 
to sustain the principle of national identity while arguing 
against the creation of national states, this seems to me not to 
faily characterize Rosa Luxemburgs position, since for her, the 
unity of the nation was invalid, precisely because it cut across 
class identities. Her epiphenomenalist analysis did not permit 
the conceptualisation of any unitarian, autonomous social 
phenomenon that cuts across class identities. Classes are for 
Luxemburg not only the causal explanation of superstructural 
phenomena, but also they are constituted into clear and distin- 
guishable units with no genuine common interests. If Nettl is 
right in arguing that Luxemburg recognised the distinct national 
identity of the Poles, this was presumably of bourgeois and 
proletarian Poles alike, a position totally incompatible with her 
epiphenomenalist premises. At best, it is possible to argue that 
perhaps Luxemburg was prepared to recognise the principle of 
nationality in a future classless world, or to accept the na- 
tional identity of a uniform proletarian national community, but 
neither of these possibilities applied to the Polish nation of 
her time, or indeed to any other national community. 
But it was only in 1908, when 
series of articles entitled "The 
Autonomy"(35) that her main ideas 
-------------------- 
34. J. P. Nettl, op. cit. p. 860 
Rosa Luxemburg wrote her major 
Question of Nationality and 
were presented in a theoretical 
35. This series of articles was originally published in the 
polish journal Przeglad Soc ialdemokratyczny , Organ Socjaldemok- 
rajci Krolestwa Polskiego i Litwy (Social Democratic Review, the 
organ of the social democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and 
Lithuania) Cracow numbers 6,7,8-9 and 10, August- December 1908 
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and systematic way. In this series of articles she argues that 
the very concept of nation is temporary, is not an absolute 
standard of measurement. It is not more than the particular way 
in which the bourgeois society encapsulates its structural ar- 
rangement. To talK about a theoretical "right of nations" that 
is valid for all nations at all times is for Rosa Luxemburg a 
metaphysical cliche such as "the rights of man" and "the rights 
of citizens". The "scientific nature" of historical materialism 
demonstrates in the eyes of Rosa Luxemburg, that rights are not 
"universal and absolute", but are determined by the "material 
conditions of production" of the period under consideration. (36). 
In other words, It is not possible to conceptualise any so-called 
"superstructural" phenomena outside a strict determination of the 
forces of production. In terms of Luxemburg's analytical logic, 
it is unthiKable to conceptualise "superstructural" phenomena 
that transcend the immediate economic conditions of causality. 
For this type of Marxist interpretation, to refer to general 
principles outside the immediate sphere of production is il- 
legitimate, because this means locating these principles outside 
the parameters of the epiphenomenal relations of causality, an 
unthinkable situation in terms of the epistemological premises of 
the Marxism of the Second International. On the basis of this 
argument, for Luxemburg, the position of socialists on questions 
of nationality is not guided by some universal "abstract" prin- 
ciple, but depends primarily on the concrete circumstances of 
each case, which differ in each country and change with time(37) 
there is an English translation of this series of articles in H. 
B. Davis (ed. ) The National Question, op. cit. P. 101 to 288 
36. R. Luxemburg, The National Question and Autonomy, in Davis 
(ed. ) op. cit. p. 111. 
37. ibid. P. 112 
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To support the "right of nations to self determination" is for 
Luxemburg to be in favor of an abstract and metaphysical right, 
because the epistemological stance of epiphenomenalism prevents a 
conceptualisation of the term nation beyond the parameters of the 
existing conditions of production. To talk about the right of 
nations to self determination is for Luxemburg to posit the 
"right" of workers to eat in "gold plates" or to sustain "the 
right to work" in a world in which unemployment is a structural 
feature of social organisation. (38) 
Since in the Capitalist world at least, for Luxemburg 
regards the nation as a uniform entity which does not exist, sup- 
port for the right of nations to self determination implies at 
best support for a non-existant entity and at worst support for 
the bourgeoisie which uses the nation as a smoke screen to 
present its sectarian interests as the general aspiration of the 
community. Also, following her Polish discussion, there is 
another important impediment to the formulation of a general 
theory of national self determination: to support the right of 
self determination for small national communities, incapable in 
the words of Luxemburg, of constituting a proper state, is a 
retrograde step that impedes the development of the bourgeoisie 
and the emergence of a victorious proletariat. 
From the previous review of the main ideas of Kautsky and 
Luxemburg on the national question, it is possible, as previously 
suggested, to recognise the nature of the paradigmatic trap that 
severely impoverished the ability of both Marxist thinkers to 
conceptualise the national phenomenon: logic of epiphenomenalism. 
-------------------- 
38. ... even if present day governments were 
forced to declare a 
universal right to work it would remain only a fine sounding 
phrase, and not one member of the reserve army of labor waiting 
on the sidewalk would be able to make a bowl of soup for his 
hungry children from that right ibid. p. 123 
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KautsKy and Luxemburg, in spite of profound and lasting disagree- 
ments over conceptual and strategical issues, were both bound to 
a severely limited analysis of the national phenomenon by an 
epistemological stance that could only recognise the position of 
a so called "superstructural" phenomenon in terms of a chain of 
causality directly derived from the conjunctural relations of 
classes in a limited historical setting. An observed change in 
the conjuctural relation between the most important classes in 
the social formation under consideration represented, for Kautsky 
and Luxemburg, an unmistakable sign that a similar change is 
taking place at the level of the so called "superstructure". This 
renders an autonomous theoretical analysis of the national ques- 
tion a conceptual impossibility. If the national phenomenon has 
no logic of its own, but is determined by events outside its 
topographical location, it is impossible to deduce its nature 
even from a generalised observation, since changes are not en- 
dogenous, i. e., the result of a developmental logic of the 
phenomenon in question, but must be always attributed to events 
that occur outside its topographical boundaries. As a con- 
sequence of this, transformations in the function of the na- 
tional phenomena are always exogenous to the event under con- 
sideration and cannot be deduced from an isolated analysis of the 
phenomena in question. In a similar way, it is equally impos- 
sible to ascertain causal connections with events that are lo- 
cated outside the relations between the fundamental classes. Any 
such relation of causality will be rendered illegitimate by the 
epistemology of epiphenomenalism, since the latter only recog- 
nises transparent relations of causality. In this sense, the 
epiphenomenalism of the Second International was not restricted 
to the so called "left" or to the so called "center", but became 
a central paradigmatic feature of the turn of the century Mar- 
xism. National communities were only to be understood in terms 
of the universal development of the forces of production and, 
even under these circumstances, they remained closely linked to 
the fate of the bourgeoisie. In the same way as the bourgeoisie 
was considered a transitory class destined to be abolished in the 
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course of the unavoidable transformation of capitalism into 
socialism, the nation was also a transitory category, resulting 
from the bourgeois bid for hegemonic power and destined to col- 
lapse with it. This dogmatic and shortsighted conceptualisation 
of the national phenomena was an important factor in the resound- 
ing Marxist defeat in its struggle against nationalism on the eve 
of World War I. The narrowly focused chain of causality that was 
the cornerstone of epiphenomenalism was only to be partially 
corrected by the Leninist criticism of Kautsky and Luxemburg and 
by the more flexible interpretation of the national phenomena ad- 
vocated by Lenin and Stalin. The Bolshevik contribution to the 
debate and Lenin's criticism of Luxemburg's discussion of the 
right of nations to self determination will be discussed in chap- 
ter 4. 
REVISIONISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 
Superficially the term "Revisionism" appears to be 
define: Bernsteins and his supporters evaluation of 
Marxism, and their attempt to "revise" some aspects of 
of the founding fathers of historical materialism not 
relevant to their period. However the tasK is not that 
KolaKowsKi rightly argues, the term "Revisionism" never 
precisely defined and in present day Marxist discourse 
little else than an arbitrary label affixed to any group 
dividual who in any way criticises Marxist orthodo xy39 
easy to 
classical 
the works 
considered 
easy, as 
has been 
it is 
or in- 
t 
L. Labedz goes as far as to say that the term "revisionism" 
implies a certain institutionalisation of a form of Marxist or- 
thodoxy to the point that the use of the term becomes to classi- 
cal Marxism what heresy is for religious thought. 40 Fortunately, 
39. L. Kolakowski, O. Cit p. 98 
40. L. Labedz (ed. ) Revisionism. Allen & Unwin, London 1962 for a 
more recent use of the term in way described by Labedz see R. 
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for the purposes of our discussion on the national question in 
the context of the Second International it is not necessary to 
engage in such hair-splitting debate on orthodoxy and heterodoxy. 
The term Revisionism will be confined to its original meaning, 
namely the critique of classical Marxism that emanates from the 
works of Eduard Bernstein and his followers. The subsequent use 
of the term "revisionism" is devoid of any unitarian meaning ex- 
cept in an oppositional relation to Marxist orthodoxy. "Maoism", 
"Eurocommunism", "Titoism", the writings of Hindes and Hirst, 
Laclau and Mouffe etc., only have in common an oppositional rela- 
tion to classical Marxism, without holding any intrinsic 
similarity that may warrant a common theoretical location. The 
parallelisms between the work of Bernstein and his followers, and 
the variety of Marxist and post-Marxist discussions lumped 
together in what R. Milliband called "The New Revisionist 
Spectrum"41 ceases here. In the work of Milliband revisionism is 
at best a descriptive oppositional category devoid of any intel- 
lectual meaning, and at worst a pejorative grouping and labeling 
of ideas with whom Milliband disagrees. 
However, even within the period under consideration in this 
chapter, namely the debates in the Second International, 
"revisionism" was only a cohesive and homogeneous position in the 
writings of many of its critics. Revisionism was not at any time 
a cohesive theoretical and political movement in the context of 
the German Social Democracy. Its relative unity consisted in its 
critique of classical Marxism by way of giving stronger emphasis 
to the paradigms of social evolution and rejecting the notion of 
the eventual revolutionary collapse of the capitalist mode of 
production. In this sense, revisionism not only doubted the clas- 
-------------------- 
Milliband, iL The New Revisionist Spectrums New Left Review 150. 
41. see R. Milliband, The New Revisionist Spectrumop. cit. 
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sical Marxist notion of the inevitable collapse of capitalism, 
but it was also skeptical of the notion of the immiseration of 
the proletariat and the idea that society is polarised into two 
antagonistic fundamental classes. The consequence of this 
criticism of classical Marxist notions of economic determination 
was the development of a vision of the political arena as a more 
autonomous dimension, directly opposed to the classical Marxist 
view of the political arena as being determined by the parameters 
of class struggle. However, this does not mean that revisionism 
was free from the parameters of analysis that imprisoned classi- 
cal Marxist conceptions of the so-called "superstructural" arena. 
As will be shown in a moment, this relative liberation from the 
straitjacket of economism was replaced by an even stronger depen- 
dence on the paradigmatic notions of universal social evolution. 
Revisionism merely displaced the traditional Marxist privileged 
agency of social change (the working class), for another 
privileged agency (the ethical-progressive human being emerging 
out of modernity), thus maintaining the same teleological bias of 
classical Marxism of bestowing the functional causality of the 
process of social transformation upon a social agent defined a 
priori. If Revisionism "revised" Marxist epistemology, it was 
only to change its format and relation of priorities, but main- 
taining its epistemological logic intact. In this shifting of 
privileges, history maintained its Telos, but "The Ethical 
Progressive Man" replaced "Class" as the agency of social trans- 
formation. In this sense, it is difficult to understand why Mil- 
liband sees any continuity between Bernstein and the recent 
"post-Marxist" debates, for what characterises this recent 
debate is precisely the rejection of any ontologically privileged 
historical agency capable of being the universal agent of change. 
In what follows a review of Bernstein's critique of classi- 
cal Marxism will be attempted, followed by an analysis of the im- 
plications of this review for the analysis of the national 
phenomena. 
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Bernstein's Critique of Classical Marxism 
In order to understand Bernstein's critique of classical 
Marxism, it is necessary to locate the debate in the context of 
the German Socialist Party (SPD) around the turn of the century. 
Above all, two elements precipitated the crisis of orthodox 
Marxism in the context of the German socialist party. The first 
element could be best described by the apocalyptic vision of 
Bourgeois democracy sustained by the majority of the socialist 
parties before World War I. As Joll argues, no socialist party 
could escape the difficulties presented by its own existence as a 
mass party, forced to operate in a political system to which it 
denied legitimacy and which it consciously sought to destroy. 42 
To illustrate the Point, Joll quotes from a report of the par- 
liamentary section of the party to the 12th congress of the SPD: 
... social democracy differs from all other parties through 
its fundamental opposition to the social and governmental 
system of ' capitalism. 
Faced with this situation, it becomes difficult to justify 
socialist participation in all the forms of political maneuvering 
that are part of the bourgeois parliamentary system. When the 
socialist parties were marginal to the process of policy maKing 
it was possible to maintain a principled position by rejecting 
the system in toto. But when, as in the case of France and Ger- 
many, the socialist parties became leading political parties, 
with a distinct possibility of at least sharing political power, 
this contradictory stance became a continuous source of internal 
debate. 
The second 
------ 
element that precipitated the ideological crisis 
----------- 
42. J. Joll, The 
--- 
Second International, op. cit. P. 77 
123 
of the Western European socialist parties, was the perceived 
failure in the context of the European process of industrialisa- 
tion of the theory of the immiseration of the masses and sub- 
sequent class polarisation. The western European societies of the 
turn of the century were far from the Marxist vision of clearly 
defined social classes conscious of their role in history and 
confronting each other. With the consolidation of the bourgeois 
democratic state, a multiplicity of social strata emerged, and 
this had the effect of blurring the traditional distinction be- 
tween the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Not only was the 
working class only a segment of the population of the main in- 
dustrialised states, but it became difficult to determine with 
any degree of certainty the class location of a substantial sec- 
tion of the population. This problem was to shadow marxist dis- 
cussions for generations to come 43 . As Laclau and Mouffe cor- 
rectly argue, the emergence of the revisionist critique of or- 
thodox Marxism has to be understood as a response to the disjuc- 
tion between classical Marxist theories and the observable ten- 
dencies of capitalism in the period under consideration. 44 
In his major work Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus45, 
Bernstein begins his criticism of orthodox Marxism by examining 
-------------------- 
43. This debate is far from over. For a contemporary discussion 
of this subject see among others G. Therborn, "What Does the 
Ruling Class do When It Rules? ", in A. Giddens and D. Held (eds. ) 
Classes, Power, and Conflict, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1982, pp. 
224-248; E. 0. Wright, Class, Crisis and the State, New Left 
Books, London 1978, N. Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary 
Capitalism, London, New Left Books, 1975 
44. E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, New 
Left Books, London 1985 p. 29 
45. Translated as Evolutionary Socialism, with an introduction by 
Sidney Hook, Schocken paperbacks, New York 1961 
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the distribution of wealth in a number of West European 
countries and then asserting that the theory of the immiseration 
of the masses is not sustained by facts. After a statistical ex- 
amination he argues: 
.. it is thus quite wrong to assume that the present develop- 
ment of society shows a relative or indeed an absolute 
diminution of the number of the members of the possessing 
classes. Their numbers increased both relatively and 
ab solutely46 
In this 
, 
context, it is interesting to note that Bernstein 
is borrowing a methodology from the then nascent social sciences 
- empiricism - and using it to sustain a revision of the 
theoretical tenets of classical Marxism. Some authors argue that 
the data - used by Bernstein was incomplete and that it represented 
at best, only part of the picture. 47 But unless the crude em- 
piricism that is being criticised by these same authors is ac- 
cepted, it is necessary to conclude that the main thrust of 
Bernstein's argument was valid (with or without accompanying 
data). Is then socialism an unattainable utopia? Not for 
Bernstein. The shortcoming of classical Marxism is the result of 
the inability to understand that socialism and the abolition of 
capitalism are not dependent on the pauperisation of the 
proletariat. Socialism will be the result of what he calls "the 
irreversible advances" of democracy in industrial societies. 
Socialism is not only the collectivisation of the means of 
production, but the fulfillment of. the theory and practice of 
democracy in the widest possible array of social relations. From 
46. E. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, op. cit. P. 48 
47. See for Example, P. Gay, op. cit. The Dilemma of Democratic 
Socialism, A. Pierre, E. Bernstein et l'evolution du socialisme 
allemand, Paris 1961, L. Labedz, op. cit. Revisionism 
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tnis Bernstein concludes tnat socialism is not the result of the 
fulfillment of the corporate aims of the working class, nor does 
it represent any "objective" need of the latter as such. For 
Bernstein socialism results from the universal embodiment of 
"human" interest, the interests of all human beings qua humans. 
All forms of dictatorship, including "the dictatorship of the 
proletariat", are then alien to socialism, which constantly tends 
towards a further democratisation of social life including the 
economy. Bernstein was critical of those cadres in the socialist 
movement who were contemptuous of what he called "contemporary 
societies" and were prepared to demand sacrifices from contem- 
porary generations for the achievement of a socialist goal in a 
distant future. This is the context in which he formulated his 
famous slogan: What is generally called the ultimate goal of 
socialism is nothing to me, the movement is everything This 
statement was of course ambiguous and therefore distorted by his 
orthodox critics. Bernstein did not mean that socialists should 
limit their horizons, and work only towards the achievement of 
limited immediate goals, but simply that immediate sacrifices for 
the sake of a distant socialist future should be out of the 
question. 48 This statement also constituted the focus of the 
classical Marxist backlash against Bernstein's ideas, and should 
not be confused with the prevailing reformism of the trade union 
movement in Britain, France, and Germany. While trade union 
reformism and Bernstein's revisionism may coincide in certain 
points of immediate policy, there are a number of fundamental 
differences that separate both positions. Reformism referred to 
the gradual consolidation of the achievements of the trade union 
movement and the working class. Such an approach was corporatist 
in nature; it practiced a form of political activity that subor- 
dinated political activity to the daily needs of the trade union 
movement. As Laclau and Mouffe correctly argue, this form of 
political quietism did not prevent reformist leaders from accept- 
48. W. KolakowsKi, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol 2 op. cit. p. 109 
126 
ing the theory and political goals of classical Marxism. In the 
context of the German socialist party, many reformist leaders 
voted with classical Marxists on issues of principle. This posi- 
tion becomes clear from a letter of I. Auer a trade union leader 
to Bernstein: 
Do you thinK that it is really possible for a party that has 
a literature going back fifty years, an organisation going 
back forty years, and a still older tradition, to change 
direction like this in the twinkling o fa eye?... My dear 
Ede, one doe sn't formally decide to do what you ask, one 
doesn't say it, one does itl... our whole activity is the ac- 
tivity of a Social democratic reforming party. A party that 
reckons with the masses simply cannot be anything else. 49 
The reformist leadership attempts to defend what they con- 
sidered to be the immediate interests of the working class 
required both, a defensive political stance and a clear demarca- 
tion of the working class as a corporate entity with clearly 
defined boundaries. 50 But Bernstein was precisely arguing the 
opposite; socialism was considered to be part and parcel of the 
democratic tradition and as such was not in the corporate in- 
dividual interests of any one section of society, but in the in- 
terests of the community as a whole. In this sense, as Laclau and 
Mouffe correctly argue, while reformism was closing boundaries 
for the working class, Revisionism represented an effort to break 
with the corporatist isolation of the working class, by attempt- 
ing to establish an autonomous political arena5l. The 
-------------------- 
49. E. Bernstein, "Ignaz Auer, der Fuhrer, Freund und Berater", 
in Sozialstische Monaschefte, organ of the revisionist section of 
the SPD, quoted by J. Joll The Second International, op. cit p. 
95 
50. Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit. p. 30 
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Revisionist attempt to establish an autonomous political arena 
was the result of the need to recompose at a political level a 
fragmented working class by the fundamental changes that affected 
capitalism around the turn of the century. If the middle classes 
were not proletarianised but, on the contrary, sections of the 
working class joined the consumer patterns of the middle strata, 
then the reconstitution of the fragments could only occur at a 
political level. As Laclau and Mouffe perceptively observe; 
Under such conditions, socialism had to change its terrain 
and strategy, and the key theoretical moment was the break 
with the rigid base/superstructure distinction that 
prevented any conception of the autonomy of the political52 
But as Laclau and Mouffe rethorically ask, if the class 
unity can only be reconstituted at the political arena, in what 
sense is this unity a class unity?. At this point Bernstein in- 
troduced an element that became crucial for the revisionist dis- 
cussion of the national question: The notion of the evolutive and 
progressive nature of human history. Bernstein accepted without 
reservations the evolutionary parameters of classical Marxism, 
making it a crucial milestone of his discussion of the develop- 
ment of industrial societies. 
Now, to whatever 
economic, influence 
also does the sw, 
historic necessity 
distinguish in this 
-------------------- 
51. ibid, p. 31 
degree other forces besides 
the life of society, just 
3y of what, in an objective 
change. In modern society 
respect two great streams. 
the purely 
so much more 
sense we call 
we have to 
On the one 
52. ibid 
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side appears an increasing insight into the laws of evolu- 
tion and notably economic evolution. With this knowledge 
goes hand in hand, partly as its cause, partly again as its 
effect, an increasing capability of directing economic 
evolution"53. 
Thus, the more "advanced" a society is, the less dependent 
it becomes on economic forces, and the greater the possibility of 
a conscious human agency to direct this process of social trans- 
formation. In this sense Bernstein appears to be arguing that 
with technological development, the iron laws of history tend to 
play a less determinant role. If this is the case, the process of 
technological development introduces an element of growing in- 
determinacy in the process of historical development, but this 
apparent indeterminacy is controlled by another element that 
gives intention and coherence to the process of social evolution: 
the ethical dimension of human behavior and the notion that 
socialism is an ethical principle. 
For the epiphenomenalist Marxism of KautsKy and Luxemburg, 
socialism was the embodiment of the "objective interests" of the 
working class and as such it became an ethical principle. In op- 
position to this idea, Bernstein argued that a) socialism appeals 
to humanity as a whole, b) technology liberates humanity from the 
determination by the laws of motion of political economy, and c) 
the more "civilised" a society becomes the greater the need for 
cooperation between different social forces. The result of this 
is an historically constructed ethical subject, increasingly 
liberated from the tyranny of political economy and embodied with 
the need to cooperate with other human beings. Thus a new his- 
torically constructed ethical subject emerges out of the 
civilisatory process, replacing the working class as an agent of 
social transformation, via his or her capacity to master the en- 
53. E. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism op. cit. P. 14 
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vironment through an ever more sophisticated technology. The 
higher the level of "civilisation", the lesser the dependency on 
economic forces and the possibilities of realising the great 
ethical ideas of socialism. 
Bernstein relied on the neo-Kantian critique of classical 
Marxism to sustain his arguments about ethics but, as P. Gay cor- 
rectly argues, Bernstein had no proper training in philosophical 
issues and never clearly understood the neo-Kantian critique of 
historical materialism. The denial that ethics has a status of 
a rational discipline separates Bernstein from the neo-Kantian 
interpretations of Marxism, an issue on which Max Adler was later 
to demolish Bernstein's arguments, 54 for, as we shall see later, 
Austro-Marxism provided the only fruitful combination of Kant and 
Marx. 
Bernstein's linear and one-dimensional perception of human 
progress owes more to classical Marxism than many of Bernstein's 
Marxist critics cared to admit. Peter Gay argues that Bernstein 
distorted the classical Marxist concept of evolution because it 
eliminated its dialectical dimension55. But while it is true 
that Bernstein was hostile to the use of Hegelian dialectics and 
saw its influence on Marxism as pernicious, the consequences of 
his evolutionary vision were not that different from those of 
classical Marxism. Humanity was seen in terms of a hierarchical 
and universal process of social transformation of social struc- 
tures. In terms of the resulting model of development, it matters 
very little whether this evolution was the result of a dialecti- 
cal process or the result of cooperation between different social 
subjects. 
54. P. Gay The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, Octagon Books, 
New YorK 1979 pp. 158-60 
55. ibid., p. 143 
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What is the crucial distinction between Marxist theory and 
socialist doctrines preceding Marx? It is the emphatic and 
profound achievement of a form of developmental thought 
[EntwicKlungs gedaken] and the conceptualisation of evolution 
[Evolutionsbegriff], that was taxen to its most significant 
consequences, in a way in which it was not done by any other 
socialist thinker, before Marx or during his lifetime. 56 
The methodological result 
of a hierarchical and universal 
which locates concrete societies 
structed social continuum. This 
evolutionist parameter discussed 
of this analysis 
model of social 
in terms of a 
is precisely the 
in Chapter 1. 
REVISIONISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 
is the creation 
transformation 
heuristically con- 
essence of the 
Bernsteins faith in the progressive nature of the process 
of social evolution had a profound effect on the way in which 
Revisionism conceptualised the national phenomenon. The idea 
that the Western state moves to higher levels of democratic 
achievement, as the process of historical development unfolds, 
led Bernstein to the following reflection: 
... if one starts from the sentence 
in the Communist 
Manifesto "The proletariat has no fatherland". This sentence 
might, in a degree, perhaps, apply to the worker in the 
forties without political rights, shut out of public life. 
To-day in spite of the enormous increase in the intercourse 
-------------------- 
56. Eduard Bernstein, "Der Revisionismus in der Sozialdemokratie" 
in Handbuch de Politik, vol 2, p. 55, quoted and translated into 
Italian by Vernon L. Lidtke, "Le premesse teoriche del socialismo 
in Bernstein" in Annali, Istituto Giacomo Feltrinelli, 15,1973, 
p. 156. 
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I 
between nations it has already forfeited a great part of 
its truth and will always forfeit more, the more the worker 
by the influence of socialism moves from being a proletarian 
to a citizen. The workman who has equal rights as a voter 
for state and local councils, and who thereby is a fellow 
owner in the common property of the nation, whose children 
the community educates, whose health it protects, whom it 
secures against injury, has a fatherland without ceasing on 
that account to be a citizen of the world. 57 (emphasis 
added) 
The above quote shows the extent of Bernstein's positive 
assessment of what the Victorians called "the irreversible ad- 
vances of progress and civilisation". For Bernstein, the ques- 
tion of the national identity of the working class was directly 
linked with their participation in the affairs of the state 
through the electoral system. For Bernstein, nationhood was es- 
sentially a political issue, linked to the nature of the state 
apparatus; cultural and ethnic considerations are absent from his 
analysis. 
Bernstein strongly opposed the anti-nationalist rhetoric of 
the radical left, arguing that the break-up of the nation was "no 
beautiful dream" and German Social Democracy should not be indif- 
ferent to the German nation carrying out what Bernstein beleieved 
to be was "its honourable share in civilising the world"58. 
This "honorable share in civilising the world" implied a positive 
attitude towards the colonial ventures of the European powers. 
Over the issue of colonialism, Bernstein sharply disagreed with 
Kautsky and Luxemburg. 
-------------------- 
57. E. Bernstein, Evolutionary socialism, op. Cit. p. 169-70 
58. ibid. P. 170 
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The assumption that the extension of colonies will restrict 
the realisation of socialism rests at the bottom of the al- 
together outworn idea that the realisation of socialism 
depends on an increasing narrowing of the circle of the well 
to do and an increasing misery of the poor59 
Clearly Bernstein misunderstood the critique of ' colonialism 
that came from the left and center of the German socialist party. 
For Bernstein, colonies were one aspect of "progress" and 
"civilisation" and as such an important part of the development 
of industrial societies. In this sense he believed that the 
socialist party should be a strong advocate of colonialism: 
... if we take into account the fact that Germany now imports 
yearly a considerable amount of colonial produce, we must 
say to ourselves that time may come when it will be 
desirable to draw part of this products from our own 
colonies. 60 
In other words, for Bernstein reasons of capitalist ex- 
pediency dictate that the socialist party should become a fully 
fledged partner in the colonial enterprise, but would this situa- 
tion contradict the ethical postulates of socialism that 
Bernstein advocated so vehemently? 
Not at all, 
... but if it is not reprehensible 
to enjoy the produce of 
tropical plantations, it cannot be so to cultivate such 
plantations ourselves... It is neither necessary that the oc- 
cupation of tropical lands by Europeans should injure the 
natives in their enjoyment of life nor has it hitherto 
-------------------- 
59. ibid p. 175 
60. ibid., p. 178 
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usually been the case. 61 
The dogmatic use of the evolutionary 
revisionism becomes clear from the above 
advocacy of a form of "humane colonialism" 
with the revisionist analysis of the role 
progress. If some societies (i. e. Europe) 
level of civilisation and development" then 
"less developed" soci eties will be for the 
developed peoples. But not only "humane 
benefit colonials and native aliKe, but also 
ciple, "natives" have no exclusive rights t 
principle of 
quotation. Bernstein's 
is completely coherent 
of civilisation and 
achieve a "higher 
their occupation of 
benefit of those less 
colonialism" will 
as a matter of prin- 
> their own lands: 
... Moreover, only a conditional right of savages to the land 
occupied by them can be recognised. The higher civilisation 
can ultimately claim a higher right. Not the conquest, but 
the cultivation of the land gives the historical legal title 
to its use. 62 
In order to give emphasis to his argument, Bernstein quotes 
Marx's Capital when he argues that all contemporary societies are 
only tenants and usufructuaries of land and have a social respon- 
sibility towards coming generations. 
It was Bernstein's uncritical acceptance of the progressive 
nature of industrial capitalism coupled with a rigid and dogmatic 
understanding of social evolution in eurocentric terms that 
provided the rationale for this analysis. The eurocentric and 
rigid evolutionary analysis constructs a new subject the 
"industrial and civilised democratic man" who takes over as the 
agent of social transformation. An ethical notion of socialism 
61. ibid. 
62. ibid p. 178-79 
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becomes intelligible out of the superior morality of this 
democratic subject. Many of Bernstein's socialist critics rushed 
to denounce the non-Marxist nature of this analysis, and the in- 
troduction of neo-Kantian categories of analysis was blamed for 
this "idealist deviation". However, it would * be illegitimate to 
completely disassociate this analysis with. classical Marxism, 
even if the Kautskian center and the radical left relentlessly 
criticised and denounced Bernstein's views. As was shown in 
Chapter 2, Marx was not exactly tolerant towards the 
"peculiarities" of many non-European national communities, and 
KautsKy and Luxemburg themselves argued that "less developed" na- 
tions should relinquish their right to self determination and as- 
similate to more "civilised" nations so that the cause of 
progress could be advanced. In fact, Bernstein's analysis should 
not be considered an aberration of classical Marxism, but on the 
contrary one of the possible interpretation of the dogmatic and 
unilateral evolutionism that colored classical Marxist inter- 
pretations of the national phenomenon. If the emergence and 
legitimate existence of national communities is to be located in 
in a universal-historical continuum, then there is no escape from 
a hierarchical interpretation of national development, and from 
the argument that, given the uneven nature of the process of 
development, some nations are "more civilised" than others. The 
first partial break with this parameter of analysis is to be 
found in the work of Lenin on colonialism and imperialism, and 
this will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Bernstein was even more explicit in his "humane colonialist" 
position in a number of articles published in the Neue Zeit and 
Sozialistische Monatshefte. 63. In an article published in the 
Neue Zeit devoted to the British colonisation of India, Bernstein 
argued that it was "not fair" to blame the British Empire for the 
-------------------- 
63. Organs of the German Socialist Party and the Revisionist wing 
of the partly respectively. 
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famine in that country. On the contrary, it was the British 
reforms of the Indian political system that would help to al- 
leviate such crisis. If the Indian population still fell victim 
of famines, it was "their own fault", since given the 
"backwardness" of the population "it is not easy to help Indian 
peasants". The "well intended" reforms of the British clashed 
with "religious and other prejudices" of the Indian population. 
But above all, the "passive resistance" of the Indian population 
was the most difficult stumbling block. 64 In a famous article 
discussing the Armenian genocide in Turkey at the beginning of 
the century, B ernstein wrote a passionate plea supporting the 
situation of t he unfortunate Armenians. However the theoretical 
part of this article gives a unique insight into Bernstein's 
Eurocentric and dogmatically evolutionist position with regard to 
national and colonial questions. According to Bernstein, in 
Africa there are "tribes that give themselves the right to slave 
trafficking" and they can only be dissuaded from such purposes by 
more "civilised nations". From this Bernstein concludes that: 
Peoples that are enemies of civilisation and incapable of 
achieving higher level of culture have no right to request 
our sympathy when they rise against civilisation65 
-------------------- 
64. E. Bernstein Einigen Uber Des Indische Problem, Die Neue 
ZEIT, 15 1896-97 quoted by L. Marmora (ed. ) in his introduction 
to La segunda Internacional y el Problema Colonial, Siglo XXI 
editores Mexico 1978 p. 11 
65. E. Bernstein, Die Deutsche SozialdemoKratie und Die Turkische 
Wirren, (The German social democracy and the Turkish 
disturbances) translated into Spanish by C. Cerreti and published 
in La Segunda Internacional y el Problema Colonial part 1, siglo 
XXI editores, Mexico 1978, p. 48, my own translation from 
Spanish. 
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Bernstein agrees with critics of colonialism that certain 
methods used to subdue "savages" are cruel and unethical, but he 
makes clear that this does not mean that such "savages" should 
not be subdued, since "the right of civilisation should prevail" 
For a struggle for emancipation to awake our interest... it 
must have a civilising character: this may either be peoples 
or nations that develop a cultural life of their own and 
rebel against a foreign domination that hinders their 
development, or the uprising of progressive classes against 
the subjugation they suffer from more backward ones. To 
every people (volK) that gives evidence of its capacity to 
develop a national cultural life we should recognise the 
right to nationality... If some time ago, the proposition to 
support savages and aborigines in their struggle against 
capitalism was made from a socialist point of view, this was 
only the result of a romanticism whose inconsistency could 
be easily demonstrated by simply observing the consequences 
of such proposition66 
Bernstein goes on to argue that support for the struggle of 
aborigines against capitalism cannot be sustained by any serious 
socialist argument, and this proposition only makes sense if the 
blind eurocentric bias of the debates of that period is taken 
into account. The dogmatic epiphenomenalism of the various fac- 
tions of the second international prevented any serious intellec- 
tual or political challenge to this proposition. The works of 
Kautsky and Luxemburg on the national question show a similar 
eurocentric bias. In the first footnote to this revealing ar- 
ticle, Bernstein is full of praise for Rosa Luxemburg's article 
on the national struggles in Turkey: 
-------------------- 
66. ibid., p. 49, my own translation from Spanish 
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This essay was almost finished when I received the relevant 
copies of the Sachsisten Arbeitzeituna [The Workers 
Newspaper of Saxony] - with the articles of Miss Luxemburg on 
social democracy and the national struggles in Turkey. From 
the contents of this article the reader will be able to 
judge how much I agree with the arguments and conclusion of 
that excellent work. 67 
While Luxemburg opposed all forms of colonialism, Kautsky 
was ambivalent about its progressive role, supporting settler 
colonialism but opposing other forms of imperial colonisation68 
... consequently, with reference to settler colonialism, even 
if in many occasions we are obliged to criticise the treat- 
ment given to the natives, we cannot reject the act of 
colonisation. On the contrary, we must see it aa powerful 
lever for the development of humanity, and for this reason 
the latter has a debt of gratitude to this policy 69 
67. ibid., p. 47 ff. I Unfortunatelly Bernstein does not provide 
a more precise reference to this article. Luxemburg's con- 
temptuos perception of small national minorities in Czarist Rus- 
sia, was outlided above. 
68. Kautsky's abivalences on the colonial question are discussed 
in L. Marmora's introduction to La Segunda Internacional y el 
Problema Colonial, op. cit. Kautsky's position on the question of 
colonialism is spelled out in Sozialismus und Kolonial Politik 
(Socialism and Colonial Policy), Berlin, October 1907, translated 
into Spanish by Juan Behrens in La Segunda Internacional y el 
Problema Colonial Vol 2 op. cit, pp. 39-120 
69. K. Kautsky, Sozialismus und Kolonial Politik, my own transla- 
tion from Spanish in op. cit. p. 64 
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In the case of Bernstein, his support for colonialism is 
derived from the unilinear and Eurocentric understanding of so- 
cial evolution. The culture of the "civilised nations" only 
develops at a "high stage" . in the process of universal develop- 
ment. But for Bernstein, even the possession of a "civilised 
culture" is not yet enough to attract socialist support for the 
process of national liberation: 
The liberty of some insignificant nationality outside 
Europe, or in Central Europe cannot be compared with the 
development of the large and highly civilised peoples of 
Europe7O 
Here the full Eurocentrism of Bernstein becomes evident. 
The "big" and "civili sed" nations of Europe constitute the 
highest stage in the process of development, which is both, 
linear and universal, with the large Western European nations lo- 
cated at the pinnacle of this process of de velopment. 
After clarifying the theoretical standpoint of revisionism 
vis-a-vis national and colonial questions, Bernstein proceeds to 
tackle the main theme of his article, the massacres of Armenians 
in Turkey. The Turkish society is presented as a prime example 
of 'oriental decadence", and the Turkish state as incapable of 
overcoming its internal disintegration. The main religion of the 
Ottoman Empire - Islam - constituted according to Bernstein an 
important factor in the "Ottoman backwardness". Even if the Mus- 
lims "propagated culture" through southern Europe, they "did not 
know how to preserve it" or "continue with its development": 
... the religion they professed - Islam - did not stop them 
from becoming barbarians; quite to the contrary, under the 
-------------------- 
70. E. Bernstein, "Social Democracy and the Turkish disturbances" 
op. cit p. 49 
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influence of the conditions of J 
couraged them. In accordance with 
tions and its precepts [Islam] re: 
religion of barbarians, this is to 
the old style and peasants that 
munities. (emphasis added) 71 
he orient, this religion en- 
its fundamental concep- 
sults in reality as a 
say, nomads, traders of 
still live in local com- 
The racialist72 tone of this argument is 
closet racist like Bernstein must concede that 
own cannot hinder historical development, so of 
"enlighten" observation on Islam, Bernstein arg 
prevented Turkey from becoming a modern state 
to assimilate the ethnic communities under thei 
is, according to Bernstein, the reason for this 
"Simply, their are a barbarian people, violence 
indolence"73. 
clear, but even a 
religion on its 
: er the above 
ed that what 
was its inability 
rule. And what 
state of affairs? 
is mixed with 
71. E. Bernstein, Social Democracy and the Turkish Disturbances, 
op. cit, my own translation from Spanish. 
72. The term "racialism" used in this context follows the defini- 
tion provided by Professor John Rex in his insightful book on 
Race Relations. In our belief the common element in these 
[racialist) theories is that they see the connection between mem- 
bership of a particular group and the genetically related sub- 
groups (i. e. families and lineages) of which that group is com- 
punded and the possession of evaluated equalities as completely 
deterministic. It doesn't really matter whether this is because 
of men's genes, because of the history to which their ancestors 
have been exposed, because of the nature of their culture or be- 
cause of divine decree. John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological 
Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1983 p. 159 
T3. ibid. P. 49-53 
140 
Edward Said would have been hard put to find a better ex- 
ample of the nature and aims of "orientalism", the Western image 
of the east, that he so vividly and eloquently describes in his 
remarkable booK74. As far as Orientalism in particular, and the 
European Knowledge of non-European societies in general, the his- 
toricist evolutionism of which Bernstein was just one exponent 
meant that there was just one universal human history that either 
culminated in the West or was observed from the vantage view 
point of Europe, conditioning in this way the intellectual, 
political and economic superiority of the West. 75 - sub species 
aeternitatis. Classical Marxism was not the only intellectual 
and political tradition guilty of this myopic understanding of 
the world, others, such as the ruling classes in colonial states, 
had a vested interest in this approach, given the benefits they 
derived from it. 
In view of the intellectually abortive nature of this form 
of analysis, the failure of revisionism to understand the na- 
tional question becomes clear. The optimistic confidence in 
"Progress and Civilisation" fueled a complacent and profoundly 
ethnocentric perception of the national phenomenon. While the 
revisionist enthusiasm for colonial ventures was unique in the 
context of the Second International it would be wrong to regard 
this as a unconnected aberration. The unilinear notions of so- 
cial evolution -with and without dialectics- that permeated most 
of the classical Marxist works on the national question where 
responsible, at least in part, for the emergence of this ideas. 
Eurocentric notions of evolution were present in the works of the 
orthodox center and the radical left, since they where the un- 
challenged epistemological premises of the parameters of analysis 
74. Edward Said, op. cit. Orientalism 
75. E. Said, Orientalism Reconsidered, Race and Class, 27,2,1985 
p. 10 
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of classical Marxism. 
This chapter began with L. KolakowsKi's evaluation of the 
Second International. On the light of the preceding discussion, 
how can we evaluate KolaKowsKi's assertion the the Second Inter- 
national was the golden age of Marxism because Marxist theory 
was not so rigidly codified or subjected to a dogmatic 
orthodoxy? 76 If the previous discussion has not confirmed that 
at least on the analysis of the national question, there was a 
certain rigidity and Eurocentric dogmatism, it may be appropriate 
to quote KolaKowsKi himself when he describes what were the 
central beliefs of the different Marxist factions. According to 
KolakowsKi, in the period of the Second International, a Marxist 
was a person who accepted among others, the following 
propositions: 
The interests of the proletariat are identical 
scale, and the socialist revolution will come 
tional event, at all events in the advanced 
societies. 
In human history, technical progress is 
in bringing about changes in the class 
changes determine the basic features 
tions and the remaining ideology. 77 
on the world 
as an interna- 
industrial 
the deciding factor 
structure, and these 
of political institu- 
These rigid notions of universal evolution and Eurocentrism 
represented the basis for a "rigid codification of a dogmatic 
orthodoxy" - in spite of KolaKowsKi assertion to the contrary - 
preventing an imaginative understanding of the multifarious forms 
of the nat ional phenomenon. At least at the level of the 
76. see footnotes I&2 
77. L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 
vol II op. cit. p. 5 
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analysis of the national phenomenon, this intellectual dead end 
was partially corrected by, the contributions of the BolsheviKs, 
Gramsci and the Austro-Marxists and their work will be discussed 
in the remainder of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Marxism-Leninism and the National Question 
... For the present it is essential to realise the incontest- 
able truth that a Marxist must take cognizance of actual 
events, of the precise facts of reality, and must not cling 
to a past theory, which like all other theories, at best 
only outlines the main and the general, and only ap- 
proximates to an inclusive grasp of the complexities of 
living reality ... he who continues to regard the "completion" 
of the bourgeois revolution in the old way sacrifices Mar- 
xism to the dead letter1 
In terms of the epiphenomenalist epistemology and rigid 
evolutionist notions that prevailed in the thought and actions 
of the leaders of the Second International, the October Revolu- 
tion in Russia was an almost inconceivable event. But at the same 
time, to regard Lenin's break with the epiphenomenalism and rigid 
evolutionism of the Second International as an opportunistic at- 
tempt to justify the October revolution is a gross over- 
simplification of the social and political background that 
revolution. In his early worKS2 it is possible to. detect a break 
V. I. Lenin. Selected Works, Vol 6 p. 34 
2. See for example, "Who are the Friends of the People? " and his 
influential work "The Development of Capitalism in Russia", Col- 
lected Works, Volt. In his important study of the Politics of 
Combined and Uneven Development, Verso, London 1981, Michael Lowy 
argues that... "A close reading of Lenin's most important politi- 
cal text of the period, Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the 
Democratic Revolution, reveals with extraordinary clarity the 
tension in Lenin's thought between his profound revolutionary 
realism and the limitations imposed by the straitjacket of so- 
called "Orthodox Marxism" p. 34 
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with epiphenomenalism, a break that was to be maintained during 
all his political and intellectual life, relentlessly criticising 
Western forms of epiphenomenalism, while paradoxically claiming 
total adherence to the principles of classical Marxism. Given the 
incompatibility of the claims, it is interesting to note that 
there is no evidence in Lenin's writings that he was aware of the 
contradictory nature of his positions. In what follows, it will 
be argued that this incompatibility resulted from Lenin's intro- 
duction of an element of indeterminacy to Marxist theory at the 
level of the economy by breaking with the predicament of "the 
Iron Laws of Necessity", an essential part of the 
epiphenomenalist conceptual discourse among the Orthodox and 
Radical wings of the Second International. But at the same 
time, this moment of indeterminacy was immediately superseded at 
the political level by the definition of the 'role of the avant- 
garde party and the crucial role of professional revolutionaries 
in the process leading towards a revolutionary change. Given the 
lack of symmetry between the economic and political levels in 
the conceptualisation of social relations of causality of classi- 
Cal Marxism, the resolution at the political level of a tension 
that had it origins at the level of the economy, generates an in- 
soluble contradiction that requires a constant intervention of 
political actors to make the conjunctural configuration relations 
of production intelligible. This argument will be expanded in a 
moment. 
A great deal has been written about the nature of Lenin's 
and the Bolsheviks' original contributions to Marxism, but as 
Marcel Liebman perceptively argues, a great part of it is sterile 
historiography. This results from the extraordinary paradox that 
one of this century's most subversive political theories was con- 
verted into a theoretical system that justifies a particular es- 
tablished political order3. At the same time and at the opposite 
3. Marcel Liebman, Leninism under Lenin, Merlin Press, London 
1980, p. 19 
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end of the political spectrum, many western worKs * on Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks attempt to do the exact opposite, to find reasons 
in their earlier theories and actions to discredit the contem- 
porary Soviet political order. While not denying that certain 
features of Marxism-Leninism lend themselves to a sectarian, dog- 
matic and Manichean perception of political arena, it is impor- 
tant to understand the reasons for the emergence of Marxism- 
Leninism in terms of its factual (but not theoretical) breaK with 
Classical Marxism, and not as an a priori justification of the 
nature of the Soviet state. If this rather more productive line 
of inquiry is taken one dominant factor prevails: the 
specificity of the Great Russian situation. The causes of the 
Bolshevik's break from epiphenomenalism must be found in the so- 
cial and political structure of Czarist Russia which defied at- 
tempts to extrapolate rigid western models of development. Lo- 
cated at the physical and political periphery of Europe, in- 
habited by more than one hundred national communities, Czarist 
Russia's social and political order was perceptively different 
from that of Central and Western Europe. This major difference 
was without any doubt a major factor in the transformation ex- 
perienced by Marxism in Russia and in the originality of Lenin's 
thought. 
During the nineteenth century generations of Marxists and 
democratic thinkers (including Marx himself), regarded Czarist 
Russia as the most backward European state. In the words of Marx, 
Russia was the "bulwark" of antidemocratic absolutism. But the 
concept of "backwardness" is always an oppositional category; it 
must be defined in terms of its opposite, the concept of 
"progress". Given the all inclusive contextual nature of the 
universal process of development espoused by classical marxists, 
the comparative criterion that gave meaning to Russian bacKward- 
ness was the notion of a more "advanced" western. European situa- 
tion. This situation prevented any constructive understanding of 
the specificity of not only Czarist Russia, but the "non- 
European" world in general. If Lenin and the Bolsheviks were to 
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provide a constructive understanding and a guide to action for 
the non-central and non-western European world, they had to first 
and foremost break with the logic of epiphenomenalism. The way 
in which Lenin and the Bolshevik party broke with the central 
tenets of epiphenomenalism is amply discussed in the ever growing 
literature on Lenin, Stalin and Soviet Communism4. The Bolshevik 
strategic break with epiphenomenalism had, as will be shown in a 
moment, a profound impact in the way on which Marxism-Leninists 
conceptualised the national question. But before approaching the - 
discussion of the national phenomenon, it seems appropriate to 
briefly evaluate those theoretical aspects of Lenin's work that 
bear a direct relation to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of 
the national question. These aspects are: a) the emphasis on 
the political dimension, b) The conceptualisation of the Revolu- 
tion, and C) The conceptualisation of imperialism and the theory 
of uneven development. These three aspects will be briefly dis- 
cussed. 
The emphasis on the political dimension: the organisational ques- 
tion 
With the possible exception of Rosa Luxemburg5, the most im- 
4. see for example E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, MacMil- 
lan London, 1963; G. Haupt & M. Jean-Jacques, Makers of the Rus- 
sian Revolution, Allen and Unwin, London 1974, L. Shapiro and P. 
Reddaway, Lenin: The Man, the Theorist and the Leader, Pall Mail 
press, London, 1967, A. Ulam, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Fontana, 
London, 1974, L. Colleti, From Rousseau to Lenin, New Left Books, 
London 1972, R. Service, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution 1917- 
1923,1979, MacMillan, London. One of the most constructive and 
readable works on Lenin and Marxism-Leninism is Marcel Liebman 
Leninism under Lenin, Merlin Press, London 1980 
5. See Chapter 3 footnote 7 
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portant theoretical figures of the Second International seriously 
neglected all aspects rel ated to political organisation during 
the process of transition from cap italism to socialism. The no- 
tion that the collapse of capitalism and the socialist transfor- 
mation of society are the inescapab le and impending consequences 
of the unfolding of the pr ocess of the universal development of 
the capitalist mode of production, inhibited any serious con- 
sideration of the role of political strategy in the achievement 
of the goals of socialism. As Eric Hobsbawm perceptively argues, 
Both classical social democracy in the period of the Second 
International and its opponents on the left tended, in dif- 
ferent ways, to share the assumption that the transformation 
to socialism would, and indeed could, only begin on the day 
that the proletariat and its party acceded to power, whether 
by revolution or by winning the magical minimun of 51% of 
votes6 
In "What is to be Done? ", Lenin strongly attacks two 
socialist newspapers that supported the spontaneous uprising of 
workers against their immediate conditions of oppression and 
economic exploitation. The arguments sustained by these 
workers' newspapers were in many ways, a direct continuation of 
the early Marxist traditions of the trade union movement: the 
workers' struggle over wage improvements, conditions of worK, 
etc., will necessarily create conditions for a revolutionary 
change as capitalism achieves its maturity. Lenin rejected this 
analysis of the workers' struggle labeling it "Economistic", be- 
cause it overemphasized the economic dimension and 
"underemphasized" the political struggle, considered by Lenin es- 
sential for the achievement of workers' hegemony. According to 
-------------------- 
6. E. Hobsbawn, "Gramsci and Marxist Political Theory", in Anne 
ShowstacK Sasson (ed. ) Approaches to Gramsci Writers and Readers 
Publishing Cooperative, London 1982 p. 24 
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Lenin, this "economistic trend" results only in the duplication 
workers efforts into local and limited actions, which would not 
challenge the hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a class. The task 
of the Social Democratic Party, Lenin argued, is not to support 
isolated and/or spontaneous uprisings of workers, si nce this will 
lead to the Kind of corporatist trade unionism that subsequently 
became the backbone of Reformism7, and will not chall enge the 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie. 
We must taxe upon ourselves the tasK of organising an all- 
round political struggle under the leadership of our Party, 
in such a manner as to maKe it possible for all oppositional 
strata to render their fullest support to the struggle and 
to our Party. We must train our Social Democratic practical 
workers to become political leaders, able to guide all 
manifestations of all this all-round struggle, able at the 
right time to "dictate a positive programme of action"... 
8 
r 
Consequently, the task of Social Democracy is to organize 
the working class in a way in which it could mount a political 
challenge to bourgeois hegemony. From this argument it is pos- 
sible to derive the initial dimension of Lenin's break from 
epiphenomenalism. The relentless process of the historical 
development of the productive forces is not enough to guarantee 
the required conditions for the construction of a socialist or- 
der. The socialist project also requires a properly and effi- 
ciently organised party of the proletariat, that has at its dis- 
posal the correct theoretical and methodological tools for a 
proper understanding of the conjunctural situation. Only in this 
-------------------- 
7. For the difference between Reformism and Revisionism, see 
chapter 3. 
8. V. I. Lenin, What is to be done?, Collected Works, Progress Pub- 
Iishers, Moscow 1964 Vol 5, p. 428 
149 
way could a guide to action in complex conjunctural situations 
be provided. The party would only be effective if it becomes a 
disciplined organisation of professional revolutionaries. it must 
be professional in two senses: the cadres will be full time ac- 
tivists and they should be ideologically and politically trained9 
In this way the party develops clear political aims, and 
these aims could be clearly conveyed to the mass of the 
proletariat, becoming in this way its avant-garde: 
The role of a vanguard party can be fulfilled only by a 
party guided by the most advanced theory10 
From the above discussion, the initial break of Lenin from 
epiphenomenalism becomes clear. For Lenin, the revolutionary 
struggle and the socialist project are not going to emerge out of 
the "objective conditions" of development of the forces of 
production. The revolution is not the unavoidable consequence of 
the "iron laws of necessity". For the revolution to occur, 
leadership must be provided by an elite of disciplined, organised 
and committed professional revolutionaries, capable of under- 
standing with a "correct" theoretical apparatus, the objective 
conditions for their willful actions. The apocalyptic perception 
of epiphenomena list Marxism concerning the collapse of capitalism 
is then replaced by a more voluntaristic understanding of politi- 
cal struggle. 
Lenin's argument opens the "Pandora's Box" of classical Mar- 
xism, for the conditions and relations of production do not 
anymore "determine" the spatial location of the political forces. 
Political actors, in the form of the "disciplined revolutionary 
-------------------- 
9. ibid. 
10. Lenin, ibid, p. 430 
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party", decisively intervene in the political arena without any 
obvious "economic" reason. What impels them to act is their 
"understanding" of their objective cpnditions of existence and 
their subjective commitment to the revolutionary cause. 
However, Marxism-Leninism follows the analytical logic of 
classical Marxism; "reality" must be understood as the result of 
"objective conditions of existence" which are determined by the 
logic of the process of production. But as such, "objective 
conditions" have no meaning for the project of social transforma- 
tion. It is only through the willful and voluntary intervention 
of the enlightened avant-garde that "objective" conditions have 
any significance for the project of revolutionary transformation 
of society. Marxism-Leninism opens, then, a dimension of in- 
determinacy at the level of the economy, since the arena of 
political struggles can no longer be deduced from the 
transparency of the process of production. 
... not every revolutionary situation gives rise 
to a 
revolution; revolution arises only out of a situation in 
which the above mentioned objective changes are acompanied 
by a subjective change, namely the ability of the revolu- 
tionary class to taxe revolutionary mass action strong 
enough to breaK or dislocate the old government. 11 
Thus the "gap" opened at the level of the economy, is im- 
mediately closed at the political level by the presence and will- 
ful action of the enlightened revolutionaries, who give meaning 
to the process of change by understanding and acting upon "the 
objective conditions". The attempt to close at the political 
level the indeterminacy identified at the level of the economy, 
while at the same time maintaining the privileged position of the 
-------------------- 
11. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, op. Cit. vol 21, p. 213-214, 
quoted by L. KolaKowski, op. cit. p. 495 
151 
economic (class) dimension, is a source of permanent theoretical 
tension, a tension that Marxism-Leninism never managed to fully 
resolve. The resolution of this tension could only be attempted 
in the direction of a greater autonomy of the political arena, 
but this implies a break from class reductionism, a position that 
Marxism-Leninism is not prepared to take. Given the lack of sym- 
metry in the classical Marxist conceptualisation of relations of 
causality between the economic and political dimensions, the 
autonomous intervention of political agents at the level of the 
economy is strictly unthinkable, and therefore the contradiction 
unresolvable. Consequently, the result of the existence of this 
area of indeterminacy at the level of the economy requires the 
constant intervention of political agents to "unmask" contradic- 
tions and to show the "right" path out of a situation that ceased 
to be intelligible by means of a straightforward observation of 
the activities of economic forces. 
These innovations had direct implications for the way in 
which the national question was conceptualised. As will be shown 
in a moment, the expansion of the political field in the manner 
described above, permitted Marxism-Leninism to discuss the 
political dimension of the national phenomenon, free from the 
limits of the transparent relations of causality that charac- 
terised the epiphenomena list discussion. The "relative autonomy" 
of the national phenomenon allowed Marxist Leninists the 
strategical use of national demands to advance the cause of the 
revolution. 
The conceptualisation of the revolution 
The epiphenomenal understanding 
the latter will occur as the result 
of capitalism and therefore will take 
"technologically advanced" collapsing 
west, having the most "advanced" an 
production, was the "natural" place 
of the revolution was that 
of the unavoidable advances 
place in a "mature" and 
capitalist system. The 
d "developed" conditions of 
where capitalism would 
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achieve its maturity. Given this logic of analysis it was un- 
thinKable that the socialist revolution could taxe place in a 
"backward" society. 
Czarist Russia, by virtue of being one of the most 
"backward" states in Europe was, in terms of the epiphenomenalist 
logic, a most unlikely place for a socialist revolution to occur. 
This conclusion had a profound impact on the way in which Russian 
marxists conceptualised the Russian situation. Given that the 
process of social transformation must precede in stages, most 
Russian Marxists believed that the downfall of Czarist despotism 
would signal the beginning of the "bourgeois democratic" revolu- 
tion, a revolution that was supposed to impel Russia to "the 
level of development" achieved by Western Europe in the eigh- 
teenth century. If this conceptualisation of the Russian situa- 
tion was to be accepted, then the turn of the century only saw an 
incipient bourgeois revolution taking place in this country, so a 
socialist transformation of society was unthinkable until the 
latter was completed, that is to say, when the Russian bour- 
geoisie as a class cannot further develop the productive forces. 
Lenin, timidly in "Two Tactics" (1905) and more firmly on 
the eve of the October Revolution in the "April Thesis" (1917) 
argued, in a nutshell, that the bourgeois democratic revolution 
must be transformed into a socialist revolution by the 
proletariat, enabling the latter to take over political power at 
the end of the process. This last argument was clearly developed 
in the "April Thesis" and in this form it took by surprise not 
only its opponents , but also some of the "old line" 
bolsheviks. 12 The March 1917 Revolution, according to Lenin, not 
only transfered power to the bourgeoisie, but also moved closer 
to "the revolutionary Dictatorship of the Proletariat"13. Ac- 
12. M. Liebman, op. cit., p 127-128 
13. V. I. Lenin, The April Thesis, in Collected Works, op. cit. 
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cording to Lenin, the March 1917 revolution caused 
The interlocking of two dictatorships, the dictatorship of 
the bourgeoisie .... and the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and peasantry. 14 
Consequently, the specific conjuncture of Russia enabled the 
bourgeois democratic and the socialist revolutions to taxe place 
almost simultaneously while at the same time, maintaining a 
separate identity. This conceptualisation of the Russian situa- 
tion enabled the Bolsheviks to sustain the general argument of 
classical Marxism in terms of the universal class determination 
of a revolutionary situation, while, at the same time, to justify 
the developmental multilinearity of the situation in Russia. 
Bourgeois and socialist revolutions were determined by different 
classes in every situation, but in Russia, proletarian power in 
the form of the Soviets was constituted before the crystal- 
lization of the bourgeois democratic state. Moreover, if the 
proletariat was to avoid the subordination of Soviet power to the 
apparatus of the nascent bourgeois democratic state -a bour- 
geois democratic revolution only constructs a bourgeois state - 
it must go beyond the limits of the bourgeois democratic state 
and establish a "dictatorship of the proletariat" through a 
"Republic of workers, soldiers and peasants"15. This was a 
novel and audacious understanding of a revolutionary situation. 
It brought upon Lenin a barrage of criticism, not only from west- 
ern European epiphenomenalists but also from some members of his 
-------------------- 
Vol 24 p. 60 
14, ibid, pp. 60-61 
15. V. I. Lenin, The April Thesis, Collected Works Vol 24, op. 
Cit., p. 70 
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own party. To this Lenin responded with the characteristic sar- 
casm of his polemical writings. 
... "Russia has not attained the level of development of the 
productive forces to make socialism possible", the heroes of 
the Second International including of course Sukharov, are 
proud of this proposition as a chicken that has laid an 
egg. 16 
According to Lenin, the specific location of Russia between 
East and West, the historical conjuncture of World War I, 
Russia's similarity with other Eastern countries with large 
peasant populations assuming revolutionary roles, caused the 
situation in Russia to be essentially different from that of 
Western Europe. The World War diminished the imperialist pres- 
sure but at the same time it increased the misery of the peoples 
of Russia. 
So what if the complete hopelessness of the situation, by 
intensifying tenfold the energies of the workers and 
peasants, has offered us the possibility of proceeding to 
create the fundamental requisites of civilisation in a way 
different from that of Western European countries? 17 
From the above brief discussion it is possible to infer two 
aspects of the Leninist conceptualisation of the revolution that 
are crucial for the understanding of the Bolshevik position on 
the national question. Firstly, bourgeois democratic and 
socialist revolutions may occur simultaneously, or the latter may 
closely follow the former. At the same time, both revolutions 
have distinct and contradictory identities because they respond 
16. V. I. Lenin, Our Revolution, Selected Works, Vol 6 p. 511 
17. ibid. 
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to hegemonic projects of different classes. 18 the transition 
from one revolution to the other is essentially a political act, 
the result of the actions of the avant-garde revolutionaries. 
Consequently, the transition from one revolutionary situation to 
the other is the result of activity that takes place outside the 
process of production. However, the identity of the revolution- 
ary process is determined by forces endogenous to the process of 
production, since they respond to the hegemonic project of fun- 
damental classes. The paradoxical nature of this situation 
requires a rigorous separation of identities at every moment of 
the revolutionary process, a situation that is logically incom- 
patible with the transitional nature of the revolutionary situa- 
tion. A way out of this paradox would have been to argue that 
revolutions cannot be defined a priori as "democratic" or 
"socialist", an unthinkable proposition in terms of the stageist 
and class reductionist nature of the Marxist-Leninist discourse. 
This confusing distinction subsequently becomes the cornerstone 
of the Marxist Leninist analysis of the national question. 
"National Self Determination" is a bourgeois democratic demand 
which is supported by the proletariat in what the Bolsheviks 
define as "backward" situations. This is to say, situations in 
which the bourgeois democratic revolution has not yet been fully 
accomplished, and the workers are aiming to transform the bour- 
geois democratic into a socialist revolution. This discussion 
-------------------- 
18. This is the essence of class reductionism, all superstruc- 
tural occurences are determined by classes even if they are 
mediated by a complex chain of causality. To conceptualise a 
bourgeois democratic revolution blending with a socialist revolu- 
tion is unthinkable in terms of the class reductionist paradigm. 
However, Trotsky stretched the class reductionist paradigm to its 
conceptual limits by arguing that this "blending" was possible 
under certain historical circumstances, but at the same time, he 
did not provide us with the analitical tools to conceptualise 
this situation. 
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will be expanded in the next section of this chapter. Secondly, 
the revolutionary process displays national peculiarities and it 
is possible to envisage different "revolutionary roads" from 
those that were been conceptualised out of the Western European 
experience. Lenin puts this argument in a forceful way: 
it never occurs to our European philistines that subsequent 
revolutions in Eastern countries, which posses vastly 
greater diversity of social conditions, will undoubtedly 
display even greater peculiarities than the Russian 
Revolution. 19 
In the context of these original ways of analysing revolu- 
tionary situations, a "revised" Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
the national question becomes essential, and this will be dis- 
cussed in a moment in the form Lenin's thesis on "The Right of 
Nations to Self Determination" and Stalin's monograph on the na- 
tional phenomenon. 
Imperialism and the notion of "uneven development"20 
While the notion of "the Law of uneven and combined 
development" was first coined by TrotsKy21, it would be impos- 
-------------------- 
19, V. I. Lenin, Our Revolution, in op. cit. P. 512 
20.1 wish to thank Norman Wintrop for a stimulating discussion 
on Trotsky and Lenin, and for Kindly allowing me to use his bib- 
liographical material on Trotsky. 
21. The "law of uneven and combined development" is discussed in 
L. TrotsKy The History of the Russian Revolution, Victor Gollancz 
Ltd., London 1965 Chapter 1, p. 25-28. For an evaluation of the 
concept of "combined and Uneven Development see B. Knei Paz The 
Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1978 pp. 62-107 
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Bible to exaggerate the importance 
development to Lenin's work or 
the Highest Stage of capitalism" 
the economic impact of imperialism 
of the argument is based in what 
able theoretical analysis of the 
development-23 from one of the 
figures of Austro-Marxism, Rudolf 
Lenin's work lies not so much in 
the political analysis derived from 
perialist period in the process 
of the concept of uneven 
imperialism. Lenin's "Imperialism 
was not an original appraisal of 
in the modern world. 22 Much 
Lenin described as a "very valu- 
latest phase of capitalist 
leading political and intellectual 
Hilferding24. The novelty of 
the economic discussion, but in 
the evaluation of the new im- 
of capitalist development. 25 
The "uneven" development of capitalism is a necessary pre- 
22. And certainly Lenin would not have claim it was, since his 
economic analysis was based on a critical discussion of the ear- 
lier worKs of Hilferding and Hobson. 
23. V. I. Lenin, lmperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, In 
V. Lenin, Selected WorKs in three volumes, Vol 1 p. 641, Progress 
publishers, Moscow 1976. Lenin's intellectual indebtebteness to 
Hilferding did not prevent him from wrongly accusing the latter 
of siding with Kautsky in the abusive and Manichean style of his 
polemical writings ... Hilf erding, ex- "Marxist" and now comrade- 
in-arms with Kautsky and one of the chief exponents of bourgeois 
reformist policy.. ibid., p. 639 
24. R. Hilferding Das Finanzkapital, Vienna, Wiener 
VolKsbuchandlung 1910 Vol. 3 of Marx Studien. There is an excel- 
lent English edition with an introduction by T. Bottomore; 
Finance Capital, Routledge and Kegan, London 1981 
25. Which were not explicitly 
limitations of Czarist Cens< 
the Highest Stage of Capita 
see 
work 
Lenin, 
. 634 
due to the 
Imperialism, 
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requisite to understand the logic and goals of the imperialist 
stage. The concept of "uneven" development appears at first 
glance to be deceptively simple. Capitalism develops in dif- 
ferent ways in different countries and, as a result of this, cer- 
tain states are "ahead" of others in that great single universal 
highway of capitalist development. Not only certain "Nation- 
states" are ahead of others, but they also use their commanding 
lead to ensure that that their leadership remains unchallenged. 
This results in an increased competition between the leading 
nation-states and, as a consequence of this situation, more "less 
developed" regions of the world fall into the hands of and are 
exploited by, these competing powers. Thus, capitalism becomes 
more and more a single universal system, eventually engulfing the 
whole world under its developmental logic. But this imperialist 
subjugation of the "backward" world does not necessarily result 
in a stable and comfortable situation for the leading national 
states. The very "backwardness" of the "East" is converted into 
an asset by the ability of these subjugated countries to imitate 
"modern" forms of economic, social, and political organisation. 
This has the net effect of paving the way f or the possibility of 
a challenge to the very hegemony of the nation-states that intro- 
duced into those "backward societies" the more "advanced" 
methods. However, this process of change and transformation is a 
far cry from the regular and predictable process envisaged by 
Marx in his preface to "Capital"26. "Backward" societies do not 
resemble the "advanced" capitalist states at a previous stage of 
development because their process of change is faster, but also 
bacause their development is "combined" with the elements of 
"backwardness" that characterise these societies, creating in 
this way a novel and unique transitional ensemble. This last 
argument was fully conceptualised by Trotsky in his History of 
-------------------- 
26. The country that is more developed industrially only shows to 
the less developed, the image of its own K. Marx Capital, Vol 1 
op. Cit. P. 19 
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the Russian Revolution, summarising arguments developed in pre- 
vious works. It led to the suggestion that, given the dramatic 
coexistence of "backward" and "advanced" social formations in 
Czarist Russia27 , it was possible to attempt a socialist revolu- 
tion circumventing the capitalist stage. This is clearly an 
anathema to the epiphenomenalist Marxism of the Second Interna- 
tional. However, following the logic of class reductionism, this 
coexistence of "modern" and "backward" forms of social organisa- 
tion is essentially unstable, given that only one fundamental 
class becomes hegemonic and determines the developmental logic of 
the process of change. At best, a relative stability may be 
achieved by the subordination and incorporation of the more 
"backward" class, or relational pattern of classes, into the 
hegemony of the dominant class. From the works of Lenin and 
Trotsky it is possible to infer that the inescapable tendential 
pattern is that privileged hegemonic positions are to be occupied 
by more "advanced" social classes. This situation sets the 
limits for the "unevenness" and "combinability" of the processes 
of social change in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. For the class 
reductionist logic of the analysis of the process of change 
precludes the hegemonic presence of a "backward" class leading 
the movement for change, or a political agent acting outside the 
arena of determination of the fundamental classes. In con- 
sequence, this situation requires the definition of clear class 
identities and their field of determination in the political 
arena, in order to account for the nature of the hegemonic force 
in the "combined" ensemble. Following this reductionist logic of 
analysis, the political hegemony of the Bolshevik party, or any 
other revolutionary organisation, is only justifiable at the 
point in which the latter claims the political representation of 
the proletariat in the form of its avant-garde. However, if this 
-------------------- 
27. A dying feudal class with a young proletariat without a cris- 
tallised "national" bourgeoisie. see L. Trotsky, History of the 
Russian Revolution, op. cit. chapter 1 
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is not the case, the revolutionary movement may be conceptualised 
as an "unconscious tool in the movement of history", in line with 
the Hegelian teleological stance that informs the class reduc- 
tionist position. The hegemonic presence, or even existence, of 
a non-class political force is an unthinkable utopia for the Mar- 
xist Leninist tradition, as Lenin clearly explained to the Narod- 
niK movement28. Even if the aim of a political movement is to 
sustain a project of socialist transformation, to succeed it 
must locate itself within the "objective conditions", meaning the 
paradigmatic field of action of the proletariat, the only class 
bestowed with the privilege of sustaining a socialist project. 
But following the logic of class reductionism discussed above, 
how fundamental was the proletariat as a class at the time of the 
1917 revolution?. And how much of the successful bid for politi- 
cal hegemony by the BolsheviK 'party resulted from its repre- 
sentation of the proletariat?. Similar questions were constantly 
asKed by KautsKy, the MensheviKs, and other epiphenomena list 
critics, and given the difficulties of Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
in providing adequate answers, the limitations of class reduc- 
tionism in coping with the Pandora's box opened by its rejection 
of epiphenomenalism becomes apparent. Given the limitations of 
class reductionism, it is crucial for Marxist Leninists to show 
the linK between the Bolshevik party and the proletariat, other- 
wise the whole project lacKs legitimacy, even if capitalism Is 
abolished and the road to socialism commenced. 29 A way out of 
-------------------- 
28. See V. I. Lenin, Who are the friends of the People, Collected 
WorKs, op. cit. vol. 1. P. 129 ff. 
29. A reverse problem affected the Marxist Leninist understanding 
of the recent Iranian revolution. The popular and antimperiallst 
nature of the Islamic Revolution defined its "progresiveness" vis 
a vis the Sha's regime and this prevented the understanding of 
its reactionary nature, even when compared with the previous 
regime. This "error of judgement" cost dearly to the Iranian 
left. 
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this situation is 
agents, but this 
reductionism. 
to simply deny ontological privileges to social 
is incompatible with the principles of class 
Similar limitations apply to the notion of uneven develop- 
ment. For the concept of uneven -development follows the logic of 
the evolutionary paradigm of classical Marxism even if though it 
rejects its Eurocentric prescription of a developmental 
linearity. The use of notions of "backwardness" and "progress" 
coupled with the constant identification of moments or stages in 
a developmental process denote a tendential movement defined by 
an a priori espistemological stance. This is because the iden- 
tification of a stage makes no sense unless a developmental con- 
tinuity is envisaged. Similarly the notions of "backwardness" 
and "progress" denote an interdependent polarity that gives the 
latter an ontologically privileged position. As will be shown in 
the next section, the Marxist-Leninist model of development had 
profound implications for the evaluation of the role of movements 
for national emancipation. The concept of uneven development 
broke with the arid linearity of epiphenomenalism, allowing a 
more flexible understanding of the political dimension of move- 
ments for national emancipation in the way of a conceptual 
framework that permits the analytical evaluation of unique en- 
sembles. However, the hierarchical and stageist dimension of the 
concept of uneven development imprisoned the Marxist-Leninist 
analysis into an exclusively political analysis of the national 
arena, which inhibited the understanding of those aspects of the 
national phenomenon that transcended the immediate conjunctural 
political stage, such as culture and ethnicity. Similarly, the 
class reductionist dimension of the Marxist-Leninist approach 
required every nationalist movement to respond to the political 
project of a fundamental class. In this way it prevented an un- 
derstanding of those aspects of the national phenomena that 
transcended a class location. This argument will be discussed in 
the next section. 
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The novel political understanding of the imperialist stage 
of development of capitalism had other implications for the Mar- 
xist Leninist understanding of the national question. Given the 
"parasitic"30 nature of imperialism and its incorporation of vast 
regions of the globe into the area of influence of the capitalist 
mode of production, Lenin lost faith in the ability of large 
sections of the European working class to lead the revolution. 
The workers in western Europe were "corrupted by the spoils of 
colonialism", developed "opportunistic" tendencies, and lost in 
this way their wish to radically transform the capitalist 
system. 31 Instead, Lenin pinned his hopes on the struggles of 
the peoples fighting imperialist domination. The notion of an 
"imperialist chain" in which the areas of the world exploited and 
subjected to the domination of imperialist states are the 
"weakest linK", opens the way for the conceptualisation of new 
forms of struggle. These new forms of struggle are derived from 
the contradictory interests of colonial and colonised nations, 
constituting in this way an antagonistic relation that was cru- 
cial to the revolutionary movement. 
The front of Capitalism will be pierced where the chain of 
imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is 
the result of the breaking of the chain of the world im- 
perialist front at its weakest linK32 
This novel conception of revolutionary struggle also 
required a revised conceptualisation of the national question. 
-------------------- 
30. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the highest Stage... ", OP. cit 
p. 7O8-710 
31, ibid. pp. 714-715 
32. J. Stalin, Works, Vol. 6 p. 100, Progress Publishers, Moscow 
1952 
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Revolutionary conditions were no longer internal to the state or 
region under consideration, they were also the results of the 
contradictions of imperialism as a world system. If the ex- 
perience of the working class in western Europe was no longer the 
model for socialism and the transformation of the non European 
world, and if imperialism and uneven development had opened the 
possibility of socialist revolutions in what the Bolsheviks 
called the "backward" world, then Stalin's controversial thesis 
of 1924 neatly follows: 
The victory of socialism in one country, even if this 
country is less developed in the capitalist sense, while 
Capitalism is preserved in other countries, even if these 
countries are highly developed in the capitalist sense - is 
quite possible and probable33 
Does the above mean that Marxism-Leninism decisively broKe 
with the evolutionary paradigm of classical Marxism? It will be 
fair to say that it broKe with the most glaring eurocentric 
aspects of the evolutionist paradigm - not an insubstantial 
achievement - while maintaining intact its adherence to the 
epistemological principles that sustain this paradigm. The con- 
stant referral to notions of "progress" and "backwardness" and 
the rigid use of a "stageist" conceptualisation to give meaning 
to a developmental process, clearly illustrates the indebtedness 
of Marxist-Leninism to the the evolutionary paradigm of classical 
Marxism. But in the same way as Revisionism opened areas of in- 
determinacy by criticising the ontological privilege given to the 
working class as an agent of social transformation, but at the 
same time compensating for this indeterminacy by giving greater 
emphasis to social evolution; so the Marxist-Leninist tradition 
broKe with the constraining determination of the parameter of 
-------------------- 
33. J. Stalin, Leninism, quoted by D. McLIelan, Marxism after 
Marx, op. cit. P. 122 
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evolutionary change, while compensating for the resulting in- 
determinacy with a strict and rigid conceptualisation of the 
class determination of every so- called "superstructural" 
phenomena. 
Since there can be no - talk of an independent ideology formu- 
lated by the working masses themselves in the process of 
their movement, the only choice is- either bourgeois or 
socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind 
has not created a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a 
society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non- 
class or an above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle the 
socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the 
slightest degree means to strengthen bourgeois ideology. 
[emphasis added]34 
The Marxist-Leninist theory sees no contradiction between 
the above-discussed deterministic conceptualisation of ideology, 
and the subjective and voluntaristic role of the avant-garde 
revolutionary party. In fact, they complement each other thanks 
to the pendular movement of Hegelian dialectics, for subjectivity 
can only achieve what is historically possible, and the subject 
achieves his/her highest degree of freedom by, paradoxically 
realising the power of historical constraint. 35 This perfectly 
meaningless tautology permits a synthetic construction that 
obscures the incompatibility of arguing for a strict and dogmatic 
form of class determination, while claiming that revolutionary 
change occurs when "free" subjects "voluntarily" act on behalf of 
this class determination. The tautological nature of this 
34. V. I. Lenin, What is to be Done?, Collected Works, Vol. 5 op. 
Cit. P. 384-85 
35. Within the Marxist tradition, this argument was developed by 
G. LucKacs in History and Class Consciousness Merlin Press, Lon- 
don 
165 
analysis results from the claim that revolutionary "success" 
results from the ability to correctly "understand and act upon" 
the "right" historical conditions and that revolutionary failure 
always implies "subjective" failure. For either the conditions 
were not yet ripe, or the revolutionary subjects had the "wrong" 
theory, in both cases there exists a failure of the revolutionary 
subjects to "understand" the "objective historical conditions". 
The only way out of this situation is to free the political arena 
from the totalising constraints of class determination in the 
form of a dogmatically fixed separation between "subjectivity" 
and "objectivity". 36 a position incompatible with the class 
reductionist nature of Marxism-Leninism. 
As it was argued in Chapter 1, to breaK with 
epiphenomenalism is not the same as to break with class 
reductionism37. To abandon epiphenomenality implies the rejec- 
tion of transparent explanations, which is not the same as to 
reject class determination. The class reductionist concep- 
tualisation implies, on the contrary, expanding the paradigmatic 
field of class determination by expanding relations of mediation 
through the "relative autonomy" of the so called"superstructure". 
While successfully breaking with epiphenomenality, Marxist 
Leninist theory remained trapped in the logic of a class reduc- 
tionist perspective by conceiving classes as sole and privileged 
historical agents, and awarding class belonging to every so- 
called "superstructural" phenomena. While remaining "relatively 
-------------------- 
36. This dogmatic separation is by no means exclusive to the Mar- 
xist tradition. In sociology it took the form of the now dated 
Weberian separation between "Science" and "Ideology" 
37. for a discussion of the difference between the two concepts, 
see chapter 1. The original use of this concept is to be found in 
C. Mouffe (ed. ) Gramsci and the Marxist Theory, Routledge & Kegan, 
London 1979. p. 168 
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autonomous", no political and/or ideological phenomenon could be 
understood outside the dynamics of class relations. It what fol- 
lows it will be argued that this had a profound impact in the way 
in which the national question was conceptualised in the Marxist- 
Leninist tradition. The break with epiphenomenalism resulted in 
the intense politisation of the national arena, considerably aug- 
menting its importance for the revolutionary struggle, and there- 
fore requiring a more careful conceptualisation. However, this 
conceptualisation was nevertheless severely restricted by the 
constraints of class reductionism, which impeded an appreciation 
of the importance of those aspects of the national phenomena not 
reducible to the logic of the class struggle, such as culture and 
ethnicity. 
The Marxist Leninist Theory of the National Question 
it is not difficult to understand that the recognition by 
marxists of the whole of Russia, and first and foremost by 
the great Russians of the right of nations to secede in no 
way precludes agitation against secession by Marxists of a 
particular oppressed nation, just as the recognition of the 
right to divorce does not preclude agitation against divorce 
in any particular case38 
Around the turn of the century the major point of reference 
on the national question for the majority of socialist parties 
was the resolution of the congress of the Second international 
held in London in 1897. Lenin considered this resolution of 
great importance for the nationalities policy of the Bolshevik 
party, to the extent that he quotes it in full in his article on 
the "Right of Nations to Self Determination": 
-------------------- 
38. V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, footnote p. 452. Progress 
Publishers, Moscow 1964 
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This Congress declares that it stands for the full right of 
all nations to self determination (Selbstbestimmungsrecht) 
and expresses sympathy for the workers of every country now 
suffering under the yoKe of military, national or other ab- 
solutism. This congress calls upon the worKers of every 
country to join the ranKs of the class conscious 
(Klassenbewusste) workers of the whole world in order 
jointly to fight for the defeat of international 
capitalism.., 39 
The only clear aspect of this resolution is its vagueness, 
which is the main cause of the difficulty in properly ascertain- 
ing the concrete meaning of the slogan "the right of nations to 
self determination". This ill-defined formulation was the end 
result of the controversial nature of the debate that took place, 
particularly between the Polish delegates, over the issue of 
Polish self-determination. 40 As H. B. Davis rightly argues, the 
phrase "self determination" is hopelessly vague on the crucial 
issue of whether it means "state independence", or some other 
status different from state independence for the national com- 
munity in question. 41 In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the prin- 
-------------------- 
39. Quoted by Lenin from the the official German report of the 
resolutions of the Congress. see V. 1. Lenin, The Right of Na- 
tions to Self Determination, in Questions of National Policy and 
Proletarian Internationalism, Progress Publishers Moscow, 1970 
also in Collected WorKs Vol 20. 
40. See chapter 3 on the controversy on Self Determination be- 
tween Rosa Luxemburg's SKDPiL and the PPS. 
41. H. B Davis, "The Right of Self Determination in Marxist 
Theory - Luxemburg vs. Lenin, in H. B. Davis (ed. ) The National 
Question, Selected writings by Rosa Luxemburg, op. cit. P. 20 
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ciple of "National-Cultural autonomy"42 was the socialist party's 
interpretation of the concept of self determination. Kautsky did 
not express a clear opinion on the subject, the radical left 
rejected the principle of self-determination in toto, and the 
revisionists made the principle conditional to the achievement of 
a "higher degree of civilisation". 43 For reasons to be dis- 
cussed in a moment, Lenin and the majority of the Bolshevik party 
(with the possible exception of Bukharin), took a clear and un- 
compromising position on the issue of self determination. 
... if we want to grasp the meaning of self determination of 
nations, not by juggling with legal definitions, or 
"inventing" abstract definitions, but by examining the 
historico-economic conditions of the national movements, we 
must inevitably reach the conclusion that self determination 
of nations means the political separation of these nations 
from alien national bodies, and the formation of an indepen- 
dent national state. 
Later we shall see still other reasons why it would be wrong 
to interpret the right of self determination as meaning any- 
thing but but the right to existence of a separate state. 44 
(emphasis added) 
Consequently, for Lenin self determination meant only the 
secession of national communities from multinational states to 
form their own separate national states. This is to say, the ex- 
clusive right to separation in the political sense, and it means 
42. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the Austrian socialist 
party's position on the national question 
43. for a discussion on the positions of Kautsky, Luxemburg and 
the Revisionists, see chapter 3 
44. Lenin, Collected works, op. cit. Vol 20 p. 397 
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neither the right to "federation" nor the right * to "autonomy". In 
his article "The Rights of Nations to Self Determination", Lenin 
sustains that "it is not difficult" to see from a Social 
Democratic point of view that the right to self-determination 
means neither "federation" nor "autonomy", while conceding that 
when speaking in abstract terms, these two concepts come under 
the general category of "self-determination". 
... The right to federation is simply meaningless, since 
federation implies a bilateral contract.... Marxists cannot 
include the defense of Federalism in general in their 
program. As far as autonomy is concerned, Marxists defend 
not the "right" to autonomy, but autonomy itself, as the 
general democratic principle of a democratic state with 
mixed national composition... Consequently, the recognition 
of "the right of nations to autonomy", is as absurd as the 
the "right of nations to federation". 45 
This position was by no means universally accepted in the 
Bolshevik party. A minority of Russian Bolsheviks rejected the 
notion of a right to self determination with arguments similar to 
those sustained by Rosa Luxemburg. Another small group of So1- 
sheviKs, particularly members of non-Russian national com- 
munities, demanded a broader definition of the slogan of the 
right of nations to self determination. The Armenian Bolshevik, 
Stephen Georgievich Shahumyan argued, contrary to Lenin's ideas, 
that the right to self determination could not only mean seces- 
sion, but also other forms of devolution, including autonomy or 
federation. In a letter to Shahumyan, Lenin restated his opposi- 
tion to accepting autonomy or federation as valid interpretations 
of the principle of self determination, since federation is an 
-------------------- 
45. V. Lenin The Right of Nations to Self determination, in op. 
cit., Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Inter- 
nationalism, ff. p. 91 
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agreement between "equals" and cannot be implemented if only one 
party agrees to it. In his letter to Shahumian, Lenin also 
argues that federations weaken economic links, and that all cir- 
cumstances being equal, he prefers a centralised state. With the 
characteristic forthrightness of his polemical writings he 
argues: 
The right to self-determination does not imply only the 
right to secede. It also implies the right to federal as- 
sociation, the right to autonomy", you write. I desagree en- 
tirely. It does not imply the right to federation. Federa- 
tion means the association of equals, an association that 
demands common agreement. How can one side have a right to 
demand that the other side should agre with it? That is 
absurd. We are opposed to federation in principle, it 
loosens economic ties and is unsuitable for a single state. 
You want to secede?. All right, go to the devil if you can 
breaK economic bonds, or rather, if the oppression and fric- 
tion of "coexistence" disrupt and ruin economic bonds. You 
don't want to secede?. In that case, excuse me, but don't 
decide for me; don't thinK that you have you have a 
"right"to federation. 46 
Given the nature of Lenin's interpretation, it would have 
been more precise to call this principle "the right of nations to 
an independent state", or "the right to statism", since he dis- 
regarded all forms of "self determination" that did not imply the 
formation of a separate national state. 
In order to properly understand Lenin's advocacy of the 
right to state separatism47, it is important to understand this 
-------------------- 
46. V. Lenin, Letter to Schaumian, G. Haupt, C. Weill, M. Lowy, 
Les Marxistes et la Question Nationale, Maspero Paris 1974 p. 352. 
also V. Lenin, Collected Works, op. cit. Vol 19 p. 500 
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position in relation to a) Lenin's definition of the role of the 
party and the notion of "democratic centralism" and b) in the 
context of the previously discussed taxonomical and hierarchical 
conceptualisation of social development. The role of the party 
and "democratic centralism" will be later discussed in conjunc- 
tion with Lenin's evaluation of national culture and his polemi- 
cal stance in relation to the project of "national cultural 
autonomy". 
In order to justify his position on self-determination, 
Lenin follows a conceptualisation of national communities that is 
initially based on the analysis of Kautsky . In The right of 
Nations to Self Determination48 he argues that, throughout the 
world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over 
feudalism is "linked" to the emergence and development of na- 
tional movements. Given that for Lenin, this form of class 
determination is crucial for the understanding of the emergence 
of national movements, the economic rationale that lies behind 
this linkage is expressed in the following observation: 
... for the complete victory of commodity production 
the 
bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be 
politically united territories whose population speak a 
single language, with all obstacles to the development of 
that language and its consolidation in literature 
eliminated. Therein is the economic foundation of national 
movements... unity and unimpeded development of language 
are the most important conditions for genuinely free and ex- 
-------------------- 
47. Given that for Lenin "self determination" means only "state 
separatism" I propose to use these phrases in an interchangeable 
manner 
48. Collected Works, Vol 20 pp. 393-454 
172 
tensive commerce on a scale commensurate with modern 
capitalism... (emphasis added)49 
Following this line of analysis, Lenin argues that unity 
of language is one of the most important conditions for an 
unimpeded exchange of goods between different peoples, and it is 
therefore a functional requirement for the initial development of 
capitalism. But once the first "seeds" of capitalism are im- 
planted, it subsequently draws "free" and "broad" groupings of 
population evolve into the forms of social organisation and class 
alignment that characterises the development of the capitalist 
mode of production. In Lenin's words, "for the establishment of 
a close connection between the marKet and each proprietor", and 
"between seller and buyer". In this situation, when marKet forms 
establish their preponderance over other forms of social dis- 
tribution, a common language becomes a crucially important func- 
tional requirement for the consolidation of the capitalist mode 
of production. Following this analytical logic, Lenin concludes 
that the tendency of every national movement is towards the for- 
mation of national states, where the organisational requirements 
of modern capitalism can be best satisfied50. In other words, 
the economic logic and organisational tendencies of the 
capitalist mode of production define the functionality of the 
formation and consolidation of national states, and the sub- 
sequent emergence of national movements is the "superstructural" 
response to this organisational tendency. Given that the 
hegemonic class in the process of consolidation and development 
of the apitalist mode of production is the bourgeoisie, the 
presence of national movements is the "superstructural response" 
-------------------- 
49. V. I Lenin, "The right of Nations to Self Determination", in 
op. cit. Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Inter- 
nationalism, p. 46. 
50. ibid. P. 46-47 
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to the needs and requirements of the bourgeois class. 
So far, Lenin's theoretical analysis appears to be almost 
identical to the one put forward by Kautsky. Lenin and KautsKy 
refer to the nation as the outcome of the emerging capitalist 
system, and both see in the preponderance of national movements 
an expression of bourgeois hegemony. Both give crucial impor- 
tance to language as the nucleus of the national community, and 
both conspicuously fail to distinguish between the specific con- 
figuration of the emerging capitalist state and the characteris- 
tics of national communities. In summary, both exhibit the main 
features of the class reductionist analysis. The bourgeoisie and 
the nation are connected in a relation of causality from the 
former to the latter. 51 
From the KautsKy-Lenin assertion that the national state is 
the "typical" form of state organisation under capitalism, Lenin 
derives his original contribution to the debate on the national 
question: the above mentioned theory on "the right of nations to 
self determination". While Lenin appears to accept the basic 
premises of the KautsKian position, it differs from Kautsky on a 
fundamental point which results from Lenin's break from 
epiphenomenalism: the principled application of the right to self 
determination (meaning of course state independence) to every na- 
tional community. But as it will become clear in a moment, this 
does not mean the principled acceptance of the right of secession 
in every case. 
Lenin justifies the advocacy of the right to state secession 
51. An epiphenomenalist position is always class reductionist, 
while the reverse is not the case. Epiphenomenalism refers to 
transparent and deterministic relations of causality, while class 
reductionism only refers to the paradigmatic location of a 
"superstructural" phenomenon in the area of influence of a class 
position. for a full discussion of both concepts see chapter 1 
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by referring to the taxonomical periodisation of the capitalist 
mode of production discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter. Given that the "typical" state under capitalism is the 
national state, the advocacy of the right of nations to con- 
stitute separate national states will assist in ensuring the op- 
timal development of the productive forces under capitalism, par- 
ticularly in those areas of the world in which the "bourgeois 
democratic" revolution is not yet in full swing. In this sense, 
for Lenin, the national question must be looKed upon within 
"definitive" historical limits52, meaning by this, the taxonomy 
of stages that, according to Lenin, give shape to the process of 
uneven development of capitalism. In discussing the role of the 
national state in the process of development of the capitalist 
mode of production, Lenin maKes a clear distinction between two 
historically different periods. 
The first period is that of the collapse of feudalism and 
absolutism. This is the period in which the "bourgeois 
democratic" state is formed, and the national movement becomes a 
mass movement under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. In this 
case, the national s truggle deserves the support of the incipient 
proletariat, because it is a struggle against feudalism and ab- 
solutism, for civil and political liberties, and for democracy, 
the main characteristics of a democratic republic", which is 
"the best possible 
-------- 
political shell for capitalism"53. 
---------- 
52. V. I. 
-- 
Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self Determination, op. 
cit. p. 47 and Theses for a Lecture on the National Question, 
Collected WorKs, Vol. 41 p. 313 
53. V. I. Lenin State and Revolt 
volumes op. cit., vol 2 p. 247. 
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The second is the period of fully formed capitalist states, 
with long established constitutional regimes and, above all, a 
highly developed antagonism between the proletariat and the bour- 
geoisie. In this situation, the bourgeoisie has consolidated 
power and developed the capitalist mode of production to its 
creative limits. At this stage of development of capitalism, 
support for nationalist movements is tantamount to supporting the 
bourgeoisie at the expense of the proletariat. 
From the above discussion Lenin infers that national move- 
ments should be supported if their aim is to overthrow absolutism 
and to build a "bourgeois-democratic" state. But it would be an 
"immense error from the point of view of the proletariat", to 
support the nation when the bourgeois-democratic movement 
achieves its maturity and the antagonism between the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat is highly developed. 54 In this sense, it is 
interesting to note the rigidity with which Lenin applied the 
above mentioned criteria to a number of European states, not- 
withstanding his argument that the two periods are not "walled 
off" from each other and are connected by "numerous transitional 
links". In spite of this, Lenin argued that "there can be no 
question of the Marxists of any country drawing up their na- 
tional program without taking into account all these general his- 
torical and concrete state situations"55. In this context, Lenin 
argued that bourgeois democratic revolutions in eastern Europe 
did not begin until 1905, while in western and continental Europe 
they took place during the period 1789 to 1871.56 His rigid and 
-------------------- 
54. V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self Determination, op. 
Cit. P. 51 
5 5. ibid. 
56. ibid. p. 55 
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formalistic presentation of the stages of development of the 
bourgeois democratic revolution results from the epistemological 
requirement to identify every "moment" of the developmental 
process within the paradigmatic field of determination of class 
positions, and leads Lenin to the absurd claim that in Western 
Europe nationally uniform states became the "general rule" at the 
close of period of consolidation of bourgeois democratic 
revolutions. 57 Consequently, Lenin argues, to seeK the right 
of self determination in the programs of the Western European 
socialist parties is "to betray one's ignorance on the ABC of 
Marxism"58. 
Given that according to Lenin the bourgeois democratic 
revolution only began in Czarist Russia in 1905, and taxing into 
account that the process of "uneven development" experienced by 
that diverse multinational state created developmental 
peculiarities, the "concrete features" of the national question 
in Russia were diverse and different from those experienced in 
western Europe at the same early stage of the "bourgeois 
democratic" period. 59. This argument permitted Lenin to maintain 
the developmental taxonomy of classical Marxism, while at the 
same time, to sustain an analysis that took into account the 
specific conjunctural situation of . 
Czarist Russia. According to 
Lenin, 577 of the population of Czarist Russia was not of 
ethnic60 Russian extraction, and national oppression there was 
-------------------- 
57. Indeed, the "general rule", is the exact opposite, 
"multinational states". Consider the U. K., France, Spain, Bel- 
gium, etc. 
58. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self Determination, in op. 
Cit. P. 56 
59. ibid. p. 57 
60, Given that there is no direct english equivalent to the Rus- 
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1 1. 
harsher than in other multinational states. As a" result of the 
peculiarities of the process of uneven development, capitalism 
was more "advanced" in some of the peripheral national com- 
munities than in the ethnic Russian center, while at the same 
time, some of the Asian national communities were only on the 
"eve" of the "bourgeois democratic stage". The combination of 
harsh national oppression, with a wide range of developmental 
diversity resulted in the "urgent" political need to resolve the 
question by the principled application of the right of nations to 
self determination61 
Rosa Luxemburg vehemently opposed the notion of a "right" of 
nations to self determination62, and consequently disputed 
Lenin's arguments. The polemic between Lenin and Luxemburg is a 
good illustration of the differences between the class reduc- 
tionist and epiphenomenalist position on the national question. 
Luxemburg denied that nations had "rights" while Lenin was 
prepared to grant certain qualified rights to national com- 
munities. While maintaining a strict class reductionist position, 
-------------------- 
sian "natsional'nost" and "narod'nost", the term ethnicity is 
used here as the closest substitution. The lacK of an ap- 
propriate equivalent in English is highly revealing of the his- 
torical context in which the English language crystallized. For a 
very interesting and thought provoking discussion of this situa- 
tion see T. Shanin's Soviet Theories of Ethnicity, the Case of a 
Missing Term in New Left Review, 1986 p. 113-122 
61. Lenin. The Right of Nations to Self Determination, in op. 
Cit. p. 55 
62. see chapter 3. Lenin devotes a substantial part of The Right 
of Nations to Self determination, op. cit., to polemise against R. 
Luxemburg. 
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Lenin understood that a "relative autonomy" of national movements 
will advance certain strategic objectives of fundamental impor- 
tance for the party of the "proletariat". Luxemburg following 
the assuptions of epiphenomenalism, rejected the notion of na- 
tional rights because there was no direct connecting relation of 
causality between national existence and the aims of the working 
class. If she was prepared to talk about rights at all, it was 
exclusively in terms of the rights of the working class63 , Rosa 
Luxemburg failed to see the "bourgeois democratic" revolutions in 
the same perspective as that of the Bolsheviks, because she was 
not interested in any political movements that did not directly 
advance the objectives of the working class. Lenin, however, un- 
derstood the strategic importance of operating in the political 
arena and forging tactical alliances with political groupings not 
directly connected with the working class. As H. B. Davis cor- 
rectly argues, Lenin opposed rejecting in toto nationalist 
demands, even if he did not agree with them, 64 because he saw 
that the strategical importance of the national question - an es- 
sentially political issue - transcended the immediate position of 
nationalist movements. In other words, Lenin understood the 
fundamental importance of not allowing nationalist movements to 
monopolise national demands. Luxemburg was blinded to this 
dimension because of her exclusive concentration on working class 
politics, and therefore she was not interested in political 
demands that were not directly connected with the root cause of 
all forms of oppression, the oppression of the working class. in 
this sense Lenin broke with the epiphenomenalist view that 
regarded national oppression as part of the process of class op- 
pression in general, understanding that the national question 
63. H. B. Davis, "The Right of Nations to Self Determination in 
the Marxist Theory - Luxemburg vs. Lenin", in op. cit. The Na- 
tional Question, Selected Writings, p. 17 
64. H. B. Davis, op. cit. P. 19 
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posed a specifically political problem that had to be resolved at 
the political level. In agreeing with Otto Bauer that a 
socialist commonwealth will cannot include national communities 
by the use of force, 65 Lenin envisaged that the specificity of 
national oppression required a specific political solution to the 
national problem. However, this specific general solution could 
only be achieved following the socialist transformation of the 
capitalist mode of production. 
... while being based on economics, socialism cannot be 
reduced to economics alone. A foundation - socialist 
production - is essential for the abolition of national op- 
pression, but this foundation must also carry a democrati- 
cally organised state, a democratic army, etc. By transform- 
ing capitalism into socialism the proletariat creates the 
possibility of abolishing national oppression; the pos- 
sibility becomes reality "only"--"only"! --with the estab- 
lishment of full democracy in all spheres, including the 
delimitation of state frontiers in accordance with the 
"sympathies" of the population, including complete freedom 
to secede. 66 
In this remarkable statement, Lenin is not only radically 
breaking from epiphenomenality, but at the same time he is push- 
ing the class reductionist position to its very limits. The 
socialist transformation of society is essential but not suffi- 
cient, to overcome national oppression, creating in this way a 
-------------------- 
65. Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitntenf rage und die Sozialdemokratie, 
Chapter 30 Socialism and the Principle of Nationality, quoted by 
Lenin in The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to 
Self Determination in op. cit. Questions of National Policy and 
Proletarian Internationalism, p. 129 
66. Lenin ibid. P. 129-130 
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limited autonomy of the political arena. In addition to the 
socialist transformation of the process of production, a full 
democratisation of the apparatus of government is required to 
resolve basic democratic demands such a the rights of national 
communities. However, this argument begs an important and un- 
resolved question: is it at all possible to have a form of social 
organisation based on socialist production that does not 
"democratise" the political arena?. This question is strictly 
unthinkable for epiphenomenalism given the transparency of rela- 
tions of causality, but it represents an unresolvable dilemma for 
class reductionists, for if the answer is affirmative, as Lenin 
appears to imply, then in what way is socialist production (the 
hegemony of the proletariat) essential in the determination of 
the nature of the political arena?. For if there is a clear dif- 
ference . between these two dimensions, the democratically or- 
ganised state appears no to be the outcome of "proletarian" 
hegemony- the "economic" cannot explain the "political". But on 
the other hand, if the answer is negative, there is no justifica- 
tion for any form of political activity that transcends the 
strictly corporatist demands of the working class, for the or- 
ganisation of socialist production will resolve all forms of 
political oppression, - the position of Luxemburg and a return to 
epiphenomenalism. A solution to this dilemma is to concep- 
tualise the political and economic dimensions as separate fields 
in the pursuit of the goals of socialism. But such a separation 
is an unthinkable position for class reductionism, for it implies 
an autonomous dimension to the political arena. This difficult 
dilemma exemplifies the achievements and failures of the Leninist 
evaluation of the national question. By decisively breaking with 
epiphenomenalism, Lenin was able to see the formidable strategic 
importance of the national question in the political domain, and 
the requirement of a specific form of "democratic politics" to 
solve the issues of national oppression. However, by trying to 
recognize the class identity of every national movement, Lenin 
severely limited the possibility of achieving his first goal, to 
develop the specific forms of national politics required for the 
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consideration of issues of national oppression as distinct from 
those of class oppression. 
But Lenin's most complete and definitive break from 
epiphenomenalism in the arena of the national question, relates 
to his appreciation of the revolutionary potential of the 
countries dominated by imperialism. One of the most important 
implications of Lenin's theory of imperialism is that it trans- 
formed the capitalist arena into a world system in which a small 
group of central national states oppress a large group of 
peripheral social formations. In this situation, the antagonis- 
tic nature of the relationship between dominant national states 
and the peripheral oppressed peoples, constitutes the main con- 
tradiction of the imperialist system. National liberation move- 
ments of national communities under the oppression of imperialism 
are for Lenin, progressive, because as noted above, they break 
the imperialist chain at the "weakest link". This is perhaps the 
most original aspect of Lenin's contribution to the Marxist 
debate on' the national question, and it occurs precisely at the 
point at which Lenin broke from epiphenomenalism. This novel con- 
ceptualisation of the struggle for national liberation explains 
the appeal of Marxism Leninism to the non European world. 
Lenin's theory of the right of nations to self determination, 
coupled with his appraisal of the role of imperialism results in 
the articulation of the inherent class conflict of the capitalist 
system with the inherent national conflict of the imperialist 
stage. The process of national liberation added a radically new 
dimension to the Marxist conceptualisation of revolution, and 
this, in turn, required a reappraisal of the revolutionary imagi- 
nary, breaking in this way with epiphenomenalist limitations. 
To imagine that social revolution is conceivable without 
revolts by small nations in the colonies and in Europe, 
without revolutionary outbursts by a section of the petty 
bourgeoisie with all its prejudices, without a movement of 
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the politically conscious proletarian and - semi-proletarian 
masses against oppression by the landowners, the church, and 
the monarchy, against national oppression, etc. - to imagine 
all this is to repudiate social revolution. So one army 
lines up in one place and says "We are for socialism", and 
another somewhere else and says, "We are for imperialism", 
and that will be a social revolution! Only those who hold 
such a ridiculously pedantic view could vilify the Irish 
rebellion by calling it a "pustch". 
Whoever expects a "pure" social revolution will never live 
to see it. Such a person pays a lip-service to revolution 
without understanding what revolution is. 67 
According to Lenin, liberation from national oppression is 
one the most important demands in the colonial world in the era 
of imperialism. The slogan of national self determination will 
allow the working class to put forward a concrete program against 
national oppression, creating the conditions for the workers to 
assume the leadership of the national movement. A second impor- 
tant consequence of this situation is to allow the development of 
a conceptual framework that will explain why revolutions unlikely 
to occur in "advanced" capitalist states, while at the same time, 
explain why they are more likely to occur in peripheral 
societies, and in places where the development of the productive 
forces will not assure the supremacy of the proletariat. Again, 
Lenin again draws the class reductionist approach to its concep- 
tual limits. He clearly understands the revolutionary potential 
of nationalist movements, and the specificities of the revolu- 
tionary struggle outside the European world, but the straitjacket 
of class reductionism prevents him form conceptualising these- by 
Lenin's own account- non-class antagonisms, outside the paradig- 
-------------------- 
67. V. I. Lenin, The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Na- 
tions to Self Determination, in op. cit. Questions of National 
Policy and Proletarian Internationalism, p. 159 
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matic field of class determination. If national- liberation move- 
ments are to move towards socialism, it will only take place un- 
der the leadership of the working class (and of course, its 
"avant-garde" party), even in places were an industrial 
proletariat hardly exists. The paradoxical nature of this 
analysis could have been avoided by rejecting - As Mao was even- 
tually to do - the ontological privilege " of the proletariat in 
the process of socialist development, an unthinkable proposition 
in terms of the limitations of class reductionism. 
The contribution of Lenin to the marxist debate on the na- 
tional question was summarised by Stalin in the following way: 
Formerly the national question was usually confined to a 
narrow circle of questions concerning primarily civilised 
"nationalities". The Irish, the Hungarians the Poles, the 
Finns, the Serbs, and several other European nationalities. 
This was the circle of unequal peoples in whose destinies 
the leaders of the Second International were interested. The 
scores and hundreds of millions of Asiatic and African 
peoples who are suffering national oppression in the most 
savage and cruel form, usually remained outside their field 
of vision"68 
Lenin's break from epiphenomenalism in the areas of politi- 
cal organisation, revolution and imperialism had a direct effect 
on the Marxist-Leninist perception of the national question: it 
enlarged the concept of self determination to the point in which 
it became a relevant tool in the antimperialist struggle of the 
non-European world. This resulted in an intense politisation of 
the national question. putting Politics "in Command", meaning his 
obstinate, inflexible, constant and unfliching tendency to 
.... highlight the political aspect of every problem"69 was the 
-------------------- 
68. J. Stalin, Works, op. cit., Vol 6, p. 443 
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main advantage and the main weakness of the Lenin's theory, as we 
shall see. But before evaluating the worK of Stalin and conclud- 
ing this chapter, it is necessary to discuss Lenin's interpreta- 
tion of national culture. 
In the article "Critical Remarks on the National 
Question"70 Lenin addresses the question of national culture, 
which he considers to be of "enormous importance" to Marxists 
(meaning of course, those who subscribe to the Bolshevik inter- 
pretation of Marxism). In this article, Lenin argues for a 
specifically Bolshevik position on the subject, distinct from 
what he calls "bourgeois propaganda" and from the program of 
"national cultural autonomy"71, a program for national 
decentralisation that Lenin and Stalin wrongly believed that was 
adopted by the Austrian Socialist Party in the Brno (Br(nn) con- 
ference, and was supported by the majority of socialist parties 
of the non-Russian national communities in Czarist Russia72. 
Lenin believed that it was important to discuss the issue of na- 
tional culture for two related reasons. Firstly, he regarded the 
what he believed to be the Austrian position on "national cul- 
tural autonomy" dangerous for the fundamental organisational 
principles of the Bolsheviks, because it implied a program of 
thorough decentralisation of the party and state, and this con- 
-------------------- 
69. M. Lowy, Marxists and the National Question, in New Left 
Review, 96,1976 p. 97 
70. Collected Works Vol 19 pp. 17-51 
71. ibid. P. 33 
72. for a discussion on 
program of "cultural 
pinciple"), see chapter 
the position of 
national autonomy 
6. 
Austrian socialism on the 
(the "personality 
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tradicted the fundamental Marxist-Leninist notion. of "democratic 
centralism". In the Austrian case, the Congress of Vienna- 
Wimberg decided in 1897 to divide the Austrian Socialist 
Gesamtpartei into a federal * organisation of six ethno-national 
parties, and the congress of Brno (Br(nn) decided in 1899 to 
demand the organisation of the Austrian state on a federal and 
multinational basis, with central power devolved into six 
autonomous national regions, with no linguistic privilege to be 
granted to any of the participant national communities73 . If 
the principle of "National Cultural" autonomy (the Austrian 
"personality principle")74, was to be translated to the Russian 
situation - as the Bund and other socialist parties of national 
minorities demanded - it would have implied the decentralisation 
of party and state, a clear anathema to the organisational prin- 
ciple of "democratic centralism" as first sketched by Lenin in 
"What is to be done"?. Second, the program of "National Cultural 
Autonomy" was supported by many influential socialist organisa- 
tions among the non-Russian national communities, and the Jewish 
Bund was actively campaigning for its implementation in Russia. 
Lenin and the Bolsheviks clearly understood that the support of 
the non-Russian national communities was essential for the 
73. Protokoll uber die Verhandlungen de Gesamtparteitages der 
socialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Osterreich, BrQnn, Vienna 
, 1899, translated into Spanish by Conrado Ceretti in La segunda 
Internacional y el problema colonial, part I Cuadernos de Pasado 
y Presente, Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores 1978 p. 181-183. The 
protocol of the debate that took place in the Austrian socialist 
party congress shows an amazing similarity with the recent 
protracted constitutional debate over the status of the 
autonomous national communities in the Spanish state. 
74. Which was only the position of the minorit at the Brno 
Congress the majority supported territorial federal autonomy, see 
chapter 6. 
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success of the Bolshevik position, and they also saw the need to 
forestall the danger of a possible alliance between the Men- 
sheviKs and the non-Russian socialist parties on the basis of the 
above mentioned program of national cultural autonomy. Faced 
with this situation, Lenin sketched an original programmatic 
position for the Bolsheviks, whose positive dimension was the 
above discussed "right of nations to Self-determination", and 
whose negative dimension was a ferocious attack on the concept of 
"national cultural autonomy" and a denial of the unity of na- 
tional cultures. This situation also constitutes the background 
for Stalin's famous pamphlet Marxism on the National question 
which will be discussed in a moment. 
The Leninist conceptualisation of "national culture", is 
perhaps one of the best examples of the limitations of class 
reductionism for the analysis of the multifarious nature of the 
national phenomenon. Lenin argued repeatedly that in every na- 
tion there are two cultures: the culture of the bourgeoisie and 
the reactionary forces, and the culture of the proletariat. Con- 
sequently, the cultural unity of national communities is nothing 
but the hegemonic ideology of the bourgeoisie in disguise: 
Politically conscious workers have understood that the 
slogan of "national culture" is a clerical or bourgeois 
deception - no matter whether it concerns Great Russian, UK- 
rainian, Jewish, Polish, Georgian or any other culture. A 
hundred and twenty five years ago, when the nation had not 
been split into bourgeoisie and proletariat, the slogan of 
national culture could have been a single and integral call 
to struggle against feudalism and clericalism. Since that 
time, however, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat has gained momentum everywhere. The 
division of the "single" nation into exploiters and ex- 
ploited has become an accomplished fact75 
-------------------- 
75. V. I. Lenin How does Bishop Nikon defend the 
187 
For Lenin then, the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat does not allow for the existence of a single national 
culture. The cultural domain is an area of the so called 
"superstructure", and it must therefore be explained in terms of 
the paradigmatic field of class determination. However Lenin 
concedes that at the "eve" of the bourgeois revolution, it was 
possible to speaK of a "single" national culture, and this is be- 
cause it had a certain "progressive" role in relation to the 
hegemonic struggle of the bourgeoisie. Lenin attaches a 
strictly a "political" meaning to the notion of national culture, 
ignoring therefore any possible ethno-historical or contemporary- 
relational dimension, i. e., dimensions that transcend the 
paradigmatic field of class determination. 
In his "Critical Remarks on the National Question", Lenin 
strongly attacked arguments in favor of a proletarian participa- 
tion in the national culture. Lenin argued that this discussion 
was required, because of the increase of national vacillations 
among the different national (i. e., non-Russian) Social 
Democrats76, as well as other pro-nationalist tendencies in the 
Russian society. In rejecting the argument in favor of the unity 
of the national culture sustained by the Bundist P. Liebman, 
Lenin argued that in every national community there are "toiling 
and exploited masses whose conditions of life inevitably give 
rise to the ideology of democracy and socialism", but every 
capitalist nation possesses a "bourgeois dominant culture", which 
makes the slogan of "national culture" to be the slogan of the 
bourgeoisie77. To conceptualise the national culture as an un- 
-------------------- 
Ukrainians ? Collected WorKs, op. cit. Vol 19 p. 380 
76. V. 1. Lenin, Critical Remarks on the National Question Col- 
lected Works, op. cit. Vol 20 p. 19 
77. ibid., p. 24 
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divided unit is unthinkable in terms of the class reductionist 
position held by Lenin, and consequently he advances the idea of 
the existence of "two" nations in every "modern nation". 78 The 
significance of the concept of national culture is determined ac- 
cording to Lenin, by the "objective alignment" of classes in a 
given country, which implies that, in capitalist societies, the 
"national culture" is the culture of the bourgeoisie. 
Developing capitalism Knows two historical tendencies in the 
national question. The first is the awakening of national 
life and national movements, the struggle against national 
oppression, the creation of national states. The second is 
the development and growing frequency of international in- 
tercourse in every form, the breakdown of national barriers, 
the creation of the international unity of capital, of 
economic life in general, of politics, science, etc. 79 
Lenin then argues that both tendencies are the "universal 
Law" of capitalism, which will eventually result in a process of 
"assimilation", a tendency that manifests itself "more and more 
powerfully with every passing decade". Here again, Lenin is 
reverting to the analysis of classical Marxism, which regards the 
national community as a "passing phase" in the development of 
capitalism. The principle of nationality "is historically 
inevitable" in bourgeois societies. Lenin therefore recognises 
the "historical legitimacy" of those movements in the process of 
consolidation of the capitalist mode of production. But this 
78. ibid. P. 32 
79. ibid. P. 27 
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recognition must be prevented from "becoming an apologia" for 
nationalism, it must be strictly confined to the period when the 
nationalist movement is a "progressive force" so that "bourgeois 
ideology" does not * obscure "proletarian consciousness" 
Marxism cannot be reconciled with nationalism, be it even of 
the "most just", "purest", most refined and civilised brand. 
In place of all forms of nationalism, Marxism advances in- 
ternationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the 
higher unity, a unity that grows before our eyes with every 
mile of railway line that is built, with every international 
trust, and every workers association that is formed80. 
(emphasis added) 
The proletariat, according to Lenin, supports "everything 
that makes the ties between nationalities closer" or "tends to 
merge nations"81, Consequently, for Lenin, the Austrian program 
of "national cultural autonomy" was a "refined dimension" of 
nationalism, and could not therefore be supported by the Bol- 
sheviks. On the organisational aspect of the State, Lenin argues 
that: 
Marxists are, of course, opposed to federation and 
decentralisation, for the simple reason that capitalism 
requires for its development the largest and most 
centralised possible states. Other Conditions being equal, 
the class conscious proletariat will always stand for the 
larger state. 82 
-------------------- 
80. ibid., p. 34 
81. ibid., p. 35 
82. ibid., p. 45 
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Consequently, Lenin accepts the transitional " nature of na- 
tional communities, implying that the process of development of 
the productive forces will lead to the "international unity" of 
all working peoples, meaning by this the eventual disappearance 
of national boundaries. This process of international assimila- 
tion must taxe place as a result of "the developmental logic" of 
capitalism and, subsequently, socialism, but should taxe place 
free of coercion. Any form of coercion or compulsion to assimi- 
late will, according to Lenin, have the reverse effect. This ar- 
gument becomes clear in Lenin's position on the issue as to 
whether it should be compulsory to learn Russian: 
The Russian language has undoubtedly been of progressive im- 
portance for the numerous small and backward nations. But 
surely you must realise that it would have been of much 
greater progressive importance had there been no compulsion. 
Is not an "official language" the stick that drives people 
away from the Russian Language? 83 
From Lenin's opposition to the compulsory use of any lan- 
guage, it appears that he maintained a pluralist position of the 
linguistic question. 
Why will you not understand the psychology that is so impor- 
tant in the national question and which, if the slightest 
coercion is applied, besmirches, soils, nullifies the un- 
doubtedly progressive importance of centralisation, large 
states and a uniform language? But the economy is still more 
important than psychology: in Russia we already have a 
capitalist economy, which maKes the Russian language essen- 
tial84 
-------------------- 
83. V. I. Lenin, Letter to Shahumyan, op. cit. Collected WorKs, 
Vol 19, p. 499 
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On the one hand, Lenin believed that ethnic minorities held 
to national and linguistic identities as a "psychological" reac- 
tion against coercion and forced assimilation. On the other hand, 
he believed that state centralisation and national uniformity was 
essential for the achievement of the Marxist-Leninist goals, 
but, to achieve this, he was not prepared to risk alienating the 
non-Russian ethno-national communities. The solution to this 
dilemma was paradoxically to invoke "the iron laws" of capitalist 
development, the very laws that were rejected in his discussions 
on the role of the party, the revolution, imperialism and uneven 
development. He asserted that economic forces in every case 
worked against a "split up" of large states, and therefore the 
actual implementation of "the right of nations to self 
determination" was, in most cases, against the logic of the 
process of economic development. The existing centrifugal forces 
were mainly "psychological" in their origin: 
The mass of the population knows perfectly well from daily 
experience the value of geographical and economic ties and 
the advantages of a big market and of a big state. They 
will therefore resort to secession only when national op- 
pression and national friction make joint life absolutely 
intolerable and hinder all and any economic intercourse... as 
long as national oppression is permitted, the victim 
minority was receptive to nationalist agitation; once this 
oppression ceased, the psychological basis for nationalism 
and separatism will vanish. And what better way could there 
be of striking at the very root of national antagonism than 
to guarantee to every nation the right to complete political 
freedom? 85 
8 4. ibid. 
85. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol t, part 2 Moscow 1950 p. 349, 
quoted by S. Shaheen The Communist Theory of National Self Deter- 
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Obviously Lenin was wrong on three counts. First, he was 
wrong in perceiving the awakening of national identity as mere 
reaction to national oppression. He failed to see the cultural 
content of national existence and the desire of members of na- 
tional communities to preserve their cultural heritage, even if 
went against what he believed to be "objective economic 
interests". Second, Lenin was wrong in believing that all 
problems of separate national identity will be solved by the con- 
stitution of separate national states. By overemphasizing the 
political dimension Lenin overlooked the cultural and ethnic 
dimensions of the national question. Third, Lenin was wrong in 
perceiving national culture as divided by class loyalties. Na- 
tional communities often have a sense of collective identity that 
transcends class units. As Gramsci was later to argue, the work- 
ing class also had a stake in the cultural national identity. The 
Marxist-Leninist concept of the "two nations" is intellectually 
abortive, because it gives a fixed class belonging to every na- 
tional identity, and consequently, prevents the understanding of 
the inclusive transformative potentiality of national identities. 
The above Leninist mistakes are all connected to the blinding im- 
pact of class reductionism. The requirement to see national move- 
ments and national identities located within the paradigmatic 
field of class determination inhibits the understanding of the 
role of national culture, sees national identity only as a 
political force, and overemphasizes the role of economic forces 
in the determination of national identities. The contribution of 
Stalin to the Marxist Leninist position will now be briefly ex- 
amined. 
Stalin and the National Question 
-------------------- 
mination, The Hague 1956, p. 103 
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Contemporary discussions of Marxist Leninist theories, par- 
ticularly sympathetic ones86, tend to diminish Stalin's contribu- 
tion. If Stalin is the "enfant terrible" of the Bolsheviks, then 
he should be detached as much as possible from Lenin. But 
whatever crimes were committed by Stalin in his leadership of the 
Soviet Union should not obscure the fact that he was regarded in 
the early years of the Bolshevik movement as the highest party 
authority on the national question. In 1913 he left for Vienna, 
possibly sent by Lenin, 87 to study the theories ' of the Austro- 
Marxists on the national question, and to produce a monograph on 
the Bolshevik theoretical position on the subject. The importance 
of the national question for the Bolshevik party has already been 
discussed and Stalin, being a member of a non-Russian national 
community, was in an ideal position to foster the much needed 
sympathy of the ethnic minorities towards the Bolshevik project. 
The "marvelous Georgian who sat down to produce an article", 88 
Lenin wrote to Gorki, in fact produced a mediocre monograph, par- 
ticularly when compared with the caliber of the works of Lenin 
and Trotsky. Stalin's work engaged in a discussion of Bauer's 
theories without seeming to understand them properly. However, 
Lenin at the time believed that the essay was a "very good one"89 
and Stalin was made the commissar for nationalities of the first 
Bolshevik government. Early differences between Lenin and Stalin 
-------------------- 
86. See for example M. Lowy, Marxists and the National Question, 
op.. cit. 
87. ibid. P. 95 
88. V. I. Lenin Letter to Gorki, Collected Works, vol 5 p. 84. The 
article in question is Marxism and the National Question, 
Stalin's "magnus opus" 
89. Quoted by H> B. Davis. Socialism and Nationalism, Monthly 
Review Press 1967 p. 81 
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on the national question are detectable on a number of important 
issues and will be discussed in a moment. 
In the essay Marxism and the National Question90 , Stalin 
saw the principal task of Social Democracy as being to protect 
ethnic minorities from the "epidemic" of militant nationalism. 
What he means by "epidemic" of militant nationalism is not en- 
tirely clear, judging from the examples presented in the work; 
not only does he refers to Georgian, Ukrainian, Armenian and what 
he calls "Polish chauvinism" but he also refers to Zionism, Pan- 
Islamism and anti-semitism as forms of nationalism91. But without 
any doubt, the most celebrated part of Stalin's essay is the 
schematic definition of what is nation: 
A nation is an historically constituted, stable community of 
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, 
economic life and psychological maKe up manifested in a com- 
mon culture92 
Language and units of economic life were already present in 
Kautsky's and Lenin's discussions on the subject. Community of 
territory is a derivative category of Lenin's theory of the right 
of nations to self determination; for if self determination means 
only secession and the formation of separate states, the ter- 
ritorial component is essential. The concept of "psychological 
make up manifested in a common culture" is * derived directly from 
-------------------- 
90. J. Stalin, Works Vol. 2, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
Moscow 1953, pp. 300-381 
91. J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, in op. cit. 
WorKs, Vol 2, pp. 300-301 
92. J. Stalin, op. cit., Marxism and the National Question in 
WorKs Vol 2 p. 307 
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Bauer's definition of nations as "communities of - destiny formed 
into communities of character"93. By integrating this element 
into his definition of nations, Stalin is implicitly accepting 
Bauer's main contention that the nation is an historical com- 
munity which is created through a common cultural, social and 
historical experience, and implicitly rejecting Lenin's argument 
about the two cultures in every nation. The problem for Stalin, 
was that this last argument was precisely the point of contention 
between Bolsheviks and Austro-Marxists. Lowy and Davis rightly 
argue that the concept of "psychological make up" is not at all 
Leninist, because Lenin's argument is exclusively political. At 
least Stalin was aware of the one-sidedness of the exclusive em- 
phasis on the political level. It is possible to see in Stalin an 
implicit acknowledgment that national communities are a multi- 
faceted phenomena, which cannot be satisfactorily explained by 
only taking into account the political and economic development. 
In fact, Lowy's criticism of Stalin for using culturalist ele- 
ments in his definition is 'a good example of arid dogmatism 
caused by the rigid Leninist appreciation of the national 
phenomenon: 
In fact, the idea of "national psychology" has more in com- 
mon with certain superficial and pre-scientifi c folklore 
than with a Marxist analysis of the National Question94 
-- 
The main problem in 
------- ---- - 
Stalin's definition is that it is so 
- 
93. 
-- -- - 
See chapter 7 for a discussion of Bauers work 
94. M. Lowy, Marxists and the National Question, op. cit. P. 95. 
It seems that for Lowy the only possible "marxist" interpretation 
of the national question is the Leninist interpreta tion, if cul- 
tural elements are integrated into the definition of a nation 
this is "pre scientific folKlorism". One wonders if this is also 
the case of Mao, Fanon, Cabral, etc. 
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defective that it excludes a large number of modern national com- 
munities. The Germans would have been two nations; Italy would 
have only become a nation in the nineteenth century, the citizens 
of the Spanish state one single nation, etc. Also, Stalin ap- 
pears to be criticising Bauer with self defeating criticisms: 
Bauer sets up an impassable barrier between the "distinctive 
feature" of nations (national character) and the 
"conditions" of their life, divorcing the one from the 
other. But what is national character if not a reflection of 
the conditions of life, a coagulation of impressions derived 
from the environment? 95 
But a page earlier, Stalin presents in criticism a quotation 
from Bauer that appears to be saying what Stalin thinks is his 
critique of Baer!: 
... a nation is nothing but a community with a common destiny 
which, in turn, is determined by the conditions under which 
people earn their means of subsistence and distribute the 
products of their labor96 
Stalin's understanding of the right of nations to self 
determination, resembles the argument of the Armenian Bolshevik 
Shahumyan and appears to differ from that of Lenin: 
The right of Self Determination means that a nation may ar- 
range its life in the way it wishes. I has the right to ar- 
-------------------- 
95. J. Stalin. Marxism and the National Question in op. cit. P. 
310-11 
96.0. Bauer, The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy, 
russian translation quoted by J. Stalin in op. cit. Marxism and 
the National Question p. 309 
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range its life on the basis of autonomy. It - has the right to 
enter into federal relations with other nations, it has the 
right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all 
nations have equal rights. 97 
Lenin, in the same year that Stalin's monograph was pub- 
lished, wrote in the above mentioned letter to Shahumyan: 
The right to self determination is an exception to our 
general premise of centralisation. This exception is ab- 
solutely essential in view of reactionary Great Russian 
nationalism, and any rejection of this exception means op- 
portunism.... But exceptions must not be too broadly inter- 
reted. In this case there is not, and must not by anythin 
more, than the right to secede" 
In theory, Stalin's version of the right of nations to self- 
determination is far less rigid than Lenin's version; in prac- 
tice, Stalin was less prepared to compromise his wish to achieve 
the highest possible centralisation of the Soviet state. In the 
same monograph, Stalin gives a clue as to what will be his be- 
havior ten years later as Commissar of Nationalities. 
The National question in the Caucasus can be solved only by 
drawing belated nations and nationalities into the common 
stream of higher culture (emphasis added)99 
By " higher culture" Stalin probably means "Russian culture". 
---------- 
97. Stalin. 
---------- 
Marxism and the National Question, in op. cit. p. 321 
98, Lenin. Collected Works. Vol 19, op. cit. p. 501 
99. J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, in op. cit., 
p. 364 
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The evolutionary and stageist perception of national development 
that permeated the worKs of Lenin, also had its impact on 
Stalin's understanding of the national phenomenon. When this is 
translated into the discussion of the western European societies, 
Stalin replicates the pattern of the assimilated intellectual 
from a non metropolitan society, which is often too critical of 
his own society, and uncritical of the "progressive" nature of 
the metropolitan world. In discussing anti-semitism in Russia, 
Stalin argues that: 
Russia is a semi-Asiatic country, and therefore in Russia 
the policy of "encroachments" not infrequently assumes the 
grossest form, the form of pogroms... Germany is, however, 
European, and she enjoys a measure of political freedom. It 
is not surprising that the policy of "encroachments" there 
never takes the form of pogroms. 100 
The bitter irony of this perception sadly reflects the 
mediocrity of a certain members of the colonised intelligentsia, 
who never loose the opportunity to inform the world of the 
"superiority" of the western ways. In this sense, Lenin clearly 
read the nature of the problem when he warned in his last writ- 
ings against the excesses committed by Stalin and DzerzhinsKy. 
I thinK that Stalin's haste and infatuation with pure ad- 
ministration, together with his spite against the notorious 
"nationalist-socialism", played a fatal role here... I also 
fear that 'comrade DzerzhinsKy, who went to the Caucasus to 
investigate the "crime" of those "nationalist-socialists" 
distinguished himself by his truly Russian frame of mind (it 
is common Knowledge that people of other nationalities who 
have become Russified overdo this Russian frame of mind). 101 
-------------------- 
100. J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, in op. cit. p. 
350 
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,: 
However, Stalin was considered to be the Bolshevik "expert" 
on the national question. His contribution to the Bolshevik 
debate should not be underestimated, in spite of the important 
theoretical differences with the work of Lenin on the subject. 
in summarising the Bolshevik contribution to the Marxist 
debate on the national question, it would be fair to say that the 
main achievement of the Marxist Leninist tradition was to 
successfully articulate the class contradictions of classical 
Marxism, with the national contradictions of the Imperialist era. 
In breaking with epiphenomenalism in order to explain the 
specific "unevenness" of the process of development in Czarist 
Russia, the Marxist-Leninist tradition managed to understand the 
political dimension of the national question, and the potential 
it has for the revolutionary movement outside Europe. However, 
"putting politics in command" in Lowy's (following Marx) for- 
tunate phrase, also was the main weakness of the Bolshevik ap- 
proach to the national question. For the class reductionist, un- 
derstanding of the political arena required the evaluation of the 
political nature of national communities within the paradigmatic 
field of class determination. The national question for Lenin, 
should always be looked at from the "angle" of the working class, 
an instrumentalist perception that obscures certain fundamental 
features of the phenomenon under observation. The Marxist- 
Leninist tradition was unable to come to grips with the cultural 
and ethnic aspects of national existence, since the impossibility 
to reduce the latter to the paradigmatic field of class deter- 
mination blinded the Bolsheviks to their impact in the constitu- 
tion and resilient existence of national identities. It was, in 
fact, a regrettable irony that the only theoretical analysis of 
the national question that could have provided Lenin and Stalin 
with a useful insight into the areas of culture and ethnicity, 
-------------------- 
101. V. Lenin, The Question of Nationalities or "Autonomisation", 
in op. cit. Questions of Nationality Policy... p. 165 
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was precisely the theory that they set out to criticise with the 
sense of self righteousness so characteristic of the polemical 
discussions of the Bolsheviks: the theory of Otto Bauer. 
From the political point of view, the taxonomical peri- 
odisation of the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the national ques- 
tion required the identification of a "bourgeois" dimension in 
every national movement. This effectively prevented a theoreti- 
cal appreciation of "non-bourgeois" national movements, a problem 
that was later to be partially solved by Antonio Gramsci and his 
concept of the "National-Popular". The Gramscian contribution 
broadened the understanding of the political base of national 
movements by perceiving the non-class historical dimension of the 
political arena through the concept of "Historical Bloc". 
Gramsci's analysis of the national question will be discussed in 
the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Gramsci and the National Question 
Today the "national class" is the proletariat. the multitude 
of workers and peasants.... who cannot allow the dismember- 
ment of the nation because the unity of the state is the 
form of the apparatus of production and exchange built on 
Italian labour, the heritage of social wealth that the 
Italian workers wish to bring to the Communist Interna- 
tional. Only the workers' state, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, can today halt the dissolution of national 
unityl 
Antonio Gramsci, as founding member of the Italian Com- 
munist Party, had always acknowledged his political loyalty to 
the principles of Marxism Leninism and his intellectual indebted- 
ness to the works of Lenin for "expanding" and "clarifying" fun- 
damental aspects of the Marxist Theory. But to argue that the 
proletariat is the "national class", and that the "workers state" 
is the only safeguard against the dissolution of national unity, 
is simply contradictory to the basic tenets of the Marxist- 
Leninist theory on the national question. This incompatibility 
results from the class reductionist nature of the Leninist asser- 
tion that in the era of imperialism and "advanced" capitalism, 
national movements are always located within the paradigmatic 
field of determination of the bourgeois class, and consequently 
the support of the proletariat is conditional upon the 
"progressive" nature of the bourgeoisie at the specific political 
conjuncture. In the above quotation, Gramsci appears to imply 
that the proletariat has a direct and immediate interest in the 
-------------------- 
1. A. Gramsci, L'Unita Nazionale, in L'Ordine Nuovo, 4 October 
1919, quoted by R. Absalom in Gramsci's Contribution, in 
Socialism and Nationalism Vol 2, Eric Cahm and V. Fisera 
(eds. )SpoKesman, London 1978 p. 29 
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national movement. Would this mean that Gramsci broke with the 
class reductionist dimension of the Marxist-Leninist tradition?. 
Yes and no. To understand the logic behind this paradoxical 
situation, it becomes necessary to see the simultaneous con- 
tinuity and fundamental if unacknowledged, rupture of Gramsci 
with the Marxist-Leninist tradition; an unresolved tension, -if 
not a downright contradiction- that in many ways colours the 
originality of the Gramscian thought. 2 On the one hand, what 
Gramsci had to say in the form of the concept of "hegemony" was 
original and fundamentally relevant for the evaluation of 
problematic areas of contemporary Marxism in the west, judging 
from the numerous responses and discussions of this aspect of 
his work. On the other hand, this "relevant message", elicited a 
series of contradictory and controversial interpretations, which 
are in most cases equally rooted in one aspect or another of 
Gramscian thought. For example, most contemporary Anglo-Saxon 
secondary sources make use of Gramsci's theoretical and 
methodological formulations in the analysis of coercion and con- 
sent in Western style parliamentary democracies. This may indi- 
cate that his work is perceived as highly relevant to understand- 
ing mechanisms of "domination" and "consent" in these political 
systems. However, who is precisely "dominating" and what is the 
nature of the mechanism for obtaining "consent" is a matter of 
profound controversy in the secondary literature. Another inter- 
pretation, which incidentally is that of a minority of writers in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, maintains that to interpret Gramsci's 
-------------------- 
2. The evaluation of the work of Gramsci is made the more dif- 
ficult by the fragmentary and discontinuous nature of his work, 
which comprises journalist articles and political reports, as 
well as his famous prison notebooks, written under the harsh con- 
ditions of the fascist jail. It is important not to loose sight 
of this situation, particularly when one writes in the comfort of 
the university environment, with a word processor, no censorship 
and access to bibliographical material. 
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original contribution to contemporary Marxism in terms of an 
analysis of "coercion" and "consent" is fundamentally misleading. 
Perry Anderson, in a celebrated (and vilified) article3, 
describes the Russian Social Democratic and Marxist-Leninist con- 
tinuity in the use of the concept of "hegemony", locating 
Gramsci's usage of the term at the end of that continuum. This 
gives the impression that Gramsci employed the concept of 
hegemony "for a differential analysis of the structures of bour- 
geois power in the west", but maintaining a formal continuity of 
essential meaning, namely, that of proletarian "class alliances" 
entered under specific historical circumstances. This is even if 
the discursive presentation of the argument permitted an 
"imperceptible transition to a much wider theory of hegemony than 
had ever been imagined in Russia". 4 Thus for Anderson, the no- 
tion of a "class alliance" is crucial for understanding the con- 
cept of hegemony, from is first Russian usage to the more 
"sophisticated" Gramscian understanding. While in some cases it 
is clear that Gramsci uses the term to imply class alliances, in 
others it is equally clear that this is not the case, giving the 
impression of an imprecise and " contradictory use of the term if 
Anderson's equation is accepted uncritically. 
From a very different perspective, the seminal worK of 
Laclau and Mouffe5, opens the way for a more creative reading of 
the concept of hegemony. The unity of meaning is achieved by em- 
phasizing Gramsci's breaK with class reductionism in his discon- 
3. Perry Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, New Left 
Review 100, November 1976, pp. 5-78 
4. ibid., p. 20 
5. E. Laclau and C. Mouffe Hegemony & Socialist strategy, verso, 
London 1985 
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tinuous use of the notion of "class alliances", providing in this 
way a conceptualisation of hegemony that radical. ly departs from 
the original Russian notion. 
More than any other theoretician of his time, Gramsci 
broadened the terrain of political recomposition and 
hegemony, while offering a theorization of the hegemonic 
linK which clearly went beyond the Leninist category of 
"class alliance"6 
Thus the value of the concept of "hegemony" resides 
precisely in the radical methodological breaK with the Leninist 
tradition, rather than in Gramsci's "adaptation" of the concept 
to the western situation. This fundamental break is achieved by 
presenting a "non class reductionist" analysis of the reconstitu- 
tion of the political arena. Following this line of analysis, it 
will be argued that it is only through a non class reductionist 
reading of Gramsci that the fundamental novelty of the Gramscian 
analysis of the national question could be ascertained. The 
Leninist tradition regarded national movements as representing at 
the political level, a stage in the development of the productive 
forces, narrowing the national question to the paradigmatic field 
of action of the bourgeoisie. If the notion that the 
proletariat is the "national class"is not to be regarded as a 
theoretical incoherence, it requires a conceptualisation of the 
national arena outside the paradigmatic field of class determina- 
tion, and here lies the originality of the Gramscian concept of 
"national-popular" as will be shown in a moment. While the 
author accepts that a "class reductionist" and a "non-class 
reductionist" reading of Gramsci are equally possible, from the 
point of view of the ongoing discussion on the national question, 
the originality and novelty in Gramsci's legacy only resides in 
recovering and expanding his partial breaK with class reduc- 
6. ibid. P. 66 
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tionism. The class reductionist reading of Gramsci is at best a 
sophisticated re-interpretation of the old problems of Marxism- 
Leninism, as is evident in Perry Anderson's article, and it will 
conspicuously fail to go beyond the question marKs and problems 
generated by the Leninist tradition as discussed in the previous 
chapter. The non-class-reductionist reading of Gramsci dis- 
closes an imaginative and original - but nevertheless partial - 
attempt to find new solutions to the perennial Marxist problems 
of interpreting social order and political power beyond the 
paradigmatic straitjacket of economism. This permits a concep- 
tualisation of the national arena outside the limitations of 
class reductionism, an essential step to grasp the multidimen- 
sional nature of the phenomena. This particular interpretation 
is concerned with a) Gramsci's critique of all forms of economism 
through the expansion of the notion of the state (the integral 
state), and b) with the rejection of teleological and trans- 
historical notions of human essence (as they exist in various de- 
grees in Hegelian readings of Marxist theory), to make room for a 
conceptualisation of a multiplicity of socially determined his- 
torical subjects, a condition 
. 
without which the understanding of 
the multifarious nature of the national phenomenon becomes an im- 
possible task. 7 
To understand the meaning and significance of the Gramscian 
concept of "national-popular" Gramsci's main contribution to 
the conceptualisation of the national phenomenon in the Marxist 
tradition, it is necessary to first discuss the importance of the 
-------------------- 
7. Besides the seminal worKs of Laclau & Mouff e, similar inter- 
pretations could also be found in C. Buci-GlucKsmann Gramsci and 
the State, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1980, S. Hall The Problem 
of Ideology, Marxism without Guarantees, in B. Matthews (ed. ) 
Marx 100 Years On, Lawrence and Wishart 1983, B. Jessop, The 
Capitalist State, Martin Robertson, Oxford 1982, Anne ShowstacK 
Sasson Approaches to Gramsci, Writers and Reader s, London 1982 
206 
!, 
concept of "hegemony", through the original Gramscian analysis of 
what he called the "Historical Bloc", and the all important role 
of the "intellectuals" in consolidating and giving shape to the 
national community. 
Hegemony in the Gramscian tradition 
As Perry Anderson clearly shows, the concept of "hegemony" 
has its origins in the Russian socialist literature. For Lenin, 
it was an important theoretical device , to thinK the political in- 
tervention of the "avant-garde" of the proletariat in a combined 
developmental situation, when a number of other classes and so- 
cial strata (such as the peasants) where exploited and an- 
tagonised by ruling classes, considering that in a sho wdown with 
the bourgeoisie these strata could turn to be useful a nd impor- 
tant allies to the proletariat. In "State and Revolution", Lenin 
discusses the conditions in which the struggle of the proletariat 
must taxe into account the position of other oppressed strata: 
... Only the proletariat - by virtue of the economic role it 
plays in large scale production - is capable of being the 
leader of all the working and exploited people, whom the 
bourgeoisie exploit, oppress and crush, often not less but 
more than they do to the proletarians, but who are incapable 
of waging an independent struggle for their emancipation. 
The theory of the class struggle.... leads as a matter of 
course to the recognition of the political rule of the 
proletariat... The overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be 
achieved only by the proletariat becoming the ruling 
class, capable off... organising all the worKing and exploited 
people for the new economic system. 8 
------- 
8. V. I. 
------ 
Lenin 
------- 
State and Revolution, in Selected worKs in three 
volumes, Vol. 2, op. cit. P. 255 
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Thus, the proletariat is capable of translating its 
privileged position in the economic arena into a position of 
leadership in a political arena only under certain conditions. 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that Leninism opens an 
element of "indeterminacy" at the level of the economy, compen- 
sating this partial uncertainty with a reconstitution of the 
shattered chain of causality at the political level. Con- 
sequently, the potential capability for leadership of the politi- 
cal representative of the proletariat (the avant garde party) is 
only secured by a decisive "autonomous" intervention in the 
political arena. This has clear implications for the Leninist 
conceptualisation of the configuration of this arena. To succeed 
in the political struggle against the bourgeoisie, the "avant 
garde" party must become "hegemonic", e. i., capable of obtaining 
recognition from other political representatives of oppressed 
strata of the "privileged historical role" of the proletariat. 
The main purpose of this action is to subsequently secure the ac- 
tive collaboration and support of these strata in safely assuming 
the leadership of a politically constructed "anti-bourgeois 
coalition". Thus, the essence of the Marxist-Leninist notion of 
"hegemony" is the construction of a political coalition of anti - 
bourgeois forces, under the "hegemonic leadership" of the "avant 
garde" of the proletariat. 
The term has also other related usages in the Marxist 
Leninist tradition, some have a positive and others a negative 
connotation. For example, the concept is also used in the anti- 
imperialist struggle. This is done by defining the political role 
of the vanguard party of working class (often a small minority in 
non industrialised societies) as "hegemonic", because of its 
ability to organise and lead all the anti-imperialist forces in 
the war of national liberation. 9 The Leninist demand for "the 
-------------------- 
9. This understanding of hegemony is prevalent in M arxist- 
Leninist organisations in the non European world. It widely used 
in the Iranian revolution. 
208 
i 
iý z 
right of nations to self-determination" discussed in the previous 
chapter, must be also understood in this context. '0 
With reference to the Gramscian use of the term, it is pos- 
sible to identify an initial level of analysis that closely fol- 
lows the Leninist conceptualisation of hegemony. 
The proletariat can become 
class to the extent that 
alliances which allows it 
worKing population against 
state. In Italy, in the 
there, this means to the 
the consent of the broad 
the leading and the dominant 
it succeeds in creating a system of 
o mobilize the majority of the 
capitalism and the bourgeois 
real class relations which exist 
extent that it succeeds in gaining 
peasant masses". 
The above quotation appears to show an orthodox Marxist 
Leninist political analysis of a conjuncture coloured by "uneven" 
development. The tactical discussion on the "Southern Question" 
closely resembles Lenin's argument on the need to create an al- 
liance between workers and peasants12. If one follows the 
-------------------- 
10. The Chinese Communist Party gives an added negative connota- 
tion to the term, when it defines as "Hegemonism" what it con- 
siders to be an exaggerate claim to leadership of Communist Part 
of the Soviet Union in the affairs of other Communist Parties. 
11. A. Gramsci, Notes on the Southern Question, in Selections 
from Political Writings 1921-26, quoted by Laclau & Mouffe, op. 
cit. p. 66. As Tom Nairn perceptively argues in a fascinating ar- 
ticle, the conditions of the south of Italy were not that dif- 
ferent from those peripheral societies experiencing "uneven" 
development and which are normally called "Third World". See T. 
Nairn, Antonu Su Gobbu, in op. cit. Anne Showstack Sassoon (ed. ) 
Approaches to Gramsci pp. 159-79 
12. See V. Lenin, Two Tactics of Social Democracy, Op. cit. 
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Leninist logic, the analysis of the hegemonic situation is 
strictly confined to a political arena paradigmaticaly con- 
figurated by class relations, then the concept of hegemony 
definitively implies a system of class alliances since the align- 
ment is purely conjunctural. This is because the proletariat and 
the other participating subordinated classes have "higher 
interests" that transcend the conjunctural relationship. Follow- 
ing Laclau and Mouffe it is possible to argue that in this case, 
the class reductionist meaning is maintained, since the logic is 
still one of preconstituted sectorial interests, a conceptual 
frameworK that does not contradict the notion of class 
alliances13, and thus remains within the Marxist-Leninist 
parameters of class reductionism. This is the source of the 
class reductionist interpretation of the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony. In this case the only necessary and sufficient condi- 
tion to validate the class reductionist understanding of the con- 
cept of hegemony, is that the identity of the participant politi- 
cal forces remains within the confines of the paradigmatic area 
of influence of the participating classes. If this is considered 
---------------- 
Selected WorKs 
---- 
Vol 1. However, H. Portelli disagrees with this 
interpretation. He argues that Gramsci was only taxing into ac- 
count "the real class relations existent in Italy at that time", 
and that the working class was proposing a broad compromise 
taxing into account the interests of the peasants on the face of 
the nature of bourgeois power. In Portelli's words "this 
equalitarian alliance... must not hide the hegemonic character of 
proletarian direction" see H. Portelli, Gramsci y el Blogue His- 
torico, Siglo XXI, Buenos Aires 1974 p. 88. However the identity 
of the working class remains unchanged through the hegemonic 
relation and therefore the description of the event is not incom- 
patible with the Leninist concept of class alliances. 
13. Laclau & Mouffe, ibid. 
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to be the central aspect of the concept, then hegemony is an al- 
liance of classes in which the "dominant class" imposes its 
ideology on the "subordinated" ones. In this situation, the only 
innovative aspect of Gramsci's argument would have been an adap- 
tation and refinement of this Leninist argument to the political 
conditions of western Europe, and the extension of the concept to 
include the logic of domination of the bourgeoisie. Hegemony is 
then a "dominant ideology"14, and fundamental issues of coercion 
and consent remain as problematic as they are in the Marxist- 
Leninist tradition. 15. Central to this interpretation of the 
Gramscian concept of "hegemony", is a transcendental understand- 
ing of class identity: the economic identity of classes 
"transcend" the economic arena to replicate themselves at the 
political level. This logic requires the perpetuation at the 
political level of the "fundamental" class identity of the class 
"leading" the hegemonic relation throughout the hegemonic 
process. If the political class identity of the participants 
remains unchanged through the hegemonic relation, then those sec- 
tors located in a "subordinated" position in the hegemonic rela- 
tion have to be either "coerced" or they must "consent" to the 
leadership of the dominant class. 16 However, if it is possible 
-------------------- 
14. For a penetrating critique of the concept of "Dominant 
Ideology" see N. Abercrombie, S. Hill and B. Turner The Dominant 
Ideology Thesis, London, Allen & Unwin 1980 
15. This reading of Gramsci is common in British interpretations 
of Gramsci's worK. Besides the previous mentioned article by An- 
derson see J. Hoffman The Gramscian Challenge London, BlacKwell 
1984 
16. The problem here is not only a class reductionist logic. 
There is a manifest difficulty in translating concepts. The 
italian verb dirigere is translated into english as "to rule" or 
"to lead", and the adjective dirigente as "ruling" ( Classe 
dirigente = ruling class). This form of translation overem- 
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to show that the Gramscian concept of hegemony implies not a per- 
petuation, but on the contrary, a dissolution of political class 
identities and a reconstitution of the participant elements in 
the hegemonic whole into an autonomous political unit, then the 
paradigmatic field of class determination is thereby broken, and 
the concept of hegemony is freed from the straitjacket of class 
reductionism. In a moment it will be argued why this 
interpretation17 is more productive, and that the class reduc- 
tionist conceptualisation constitutes an incomplete reading of 
the Gramscian concept of hegemony. From the point of view of 
the analysis of the national phenomenon, the class reductionist 
interpretation adds very little to the Leninist political and 
strategic discussion outlined in the previous chapter, and would 
not have warranted a separate chapter in this worK. This is be- 
cause the national phenomenon remains within the paradigmatic 
field of determination of the participating classes, and follow- 
phasizes the aspects of "domination" and "coercion" of the con- 
cept (which are clearly there), and underemphasise the educa- 
tional aspects of the Italian term used by Gramsci (which in 
english is conveyed by different words, such as intellectual 
"persuasion" or "supervision"). G. Nowell Smith and Q. Hoare 
point out the difficulties in translating the term in the preface 
to their Selection from Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and Wishart, 
London 1971 p. XIV. However, the overemphasis on the coercitive 
aspects of the terms used in translation is not fully discussed. 
This may explain why British commentators (who on the whole rely 
on translations) tend to understand the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony as aa form of domination. The difficulties in concep- 
tualising hegemony in English are highly suggestive of the pat- 
terns of the relations of ordination and subordination in the 
English society at the time the language crystallized 
IT, Which has been convincingly developed by Laclau and Mouffe, 
see Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit. p. 65-71 
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ing Lenin, national movements must be analysed through the 
utilitarian logic of the transcendental demands of the worKers 
movement ( i. e., the "angle" of the working class). 
If a non-class-reductionist interpretation of the Gramscian 
concept of Hegemony is to be attempted, it becomes necessary to 
evaluate the logic of the Gramscian analysis by deconstructing 
the array of concepts that lead to the conceptualisation of 
hegemony. 
The point of departure in understanding Gramsci's transfor- 
mation of the concept of hegemony, is his perception of human 
identity emerging out the process of historical development. The 
realisation of the human condition lies in understanding and 
locating oneself in the context of the relevant historical 
process. The point of reference is an "historical humanism", but 
this term must be carefully defined outside the essentialist 
realm of teleology. There is no predetermined essentialist per- 
ception of human nature underpinning Gramsci's analysis. 
"Historical humanism" is not a Hegelian definition of the 
"essential characteristics" of human nature, but a rigorous at- 
tempt to understand the plural nature of the process historical 
constitution of the identity of the human species. Gramsci 
denies that "human nature" is an homogeneous and trans-historical 
attribute, but a set of historical characteristic, related to 
specific temporal circumstances18. 
If you thinK about it, the question itself "what is man? " is 
not an abstract or "objective" question. It is born of our 
reflection about ourselves and about others ... 
19 
-------------------- 
18. D. Grisoni and R. Maggiori Guida a Gramsci Biblioteca Univer- 
sali Rizzoli, Milan 1977 p. 263 
19. A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, op. cit. p. 
351 
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The implication of this premise is far reaching: if human 
identity is not a predetermined essential unit, but rather a 
plurality of moments emanating out of historical circumstances 
that cannot be defined a priori, then the same logic applies to 
all forms of 'human consciousness. Thus in abstract terms, there 
is no "false" or "real" consciousness, because there is no essen- 
tial matrix to stand as a referent. This represents a momentous 
break with the teleological and essentialist neo- hegelian per- 
ceptions of human nature that had plagued the Marxist tradition, 
culminating in the worKs of LuKacs and Korsch. The break with 
neo hegelianism is essential for a pluralist understanding of 
the process of historical development because it supersedes the 
essentialist class reductionism implied in the notion of a 
"Telos", and is capable of grasping the pluralist and multi- 
farious nature of the national phenomenon. 20. 
Consequently for Gramsci "man" does not relate to the 
"natural" world as a passive element in a relationship, but on 
the contrary, as an active component by means of worK, will and 
technique21 . Therefore society is not a mere mechanical jux- 
taposition of what Gramsci calls "Societas Hominem"22 with what 
he calls "Societas Rerum"23. but an organic relation of both: 
-------------------- 
20. see G. LuKacs, History and Class Consciousness, Merlin Press, 
London 1971 and K. Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, New Left 
BOOKS, 1970 . 
21. A. Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, Vol 2, Il Materialism 
Storico e la Filosofia de B. Croce (MS in the standard abbrevia- 
tions of the Prison notebooKs), Einaudi Editore, Turin 1966, p. 
28 
22. Human Collective Will - Social Organisation 
23. literally "Society of Things" - Gramsci means "objective 
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... the locus of this activity is the consciousness of a 
single man that Know s, desires, admires, creates insofar as 
he does n ot already Know, desire, admire, create, etc. con- 
ceptualised not in isolation, but enriched with the pos- 
sibility of offering to other men and to society those 
things of which there may n ot Knowledge off (likewise every 
man is a philosopher, every man is as cientist, etc. )24 
But humanity is not only the result of the activities of 
contemporary human beings, but is also the result of past ex- 
periences, which shape and give meaning to contemporary ac- 
tivities. 
It is not enough to Know the ensemble of relations as they 
exist in any given time or given system. They must be Known 
genetically, for each individual is the synthesis of not 
only existent relations. but of the history of these rela- 
tions. He is the resume of the past25 
The Gramscian definition of humanity combines in this way 
the ensemble of present relations with a "synthesis" of past ex- 
periences. Gramsci calls this combination "organic", because it 
linKs a series of discrete elements into a higher order coherent 
unit. Thus humanity is an ensemble of social relations which is 
unique to every historical period, and any comparison between 
human beings of different historical periods is impossible, be- 
cause according to Gramsci "we are dealing with different, if not 
heterogeneous objects"26. In the next chapter it will be shown 
reality"; or in marxian terms, the process of production 
24. A. Gramsci, MS, op. cit. p. 29-30, my own translation from 
Italian. Also quoted by by D. Grisoni and R. Maggiori, Guida a 
Gramsci op. cit. p. 265 
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how Bauer and Adler use a similar methodological principle as the 
point of departure for a far reaching conceptualisation of the 
national community. From the Gramscian point of view, human 
beings are both the originators of the will to change through 
their relation to present conditions, and simultaneously the 
"synthesis" of past experiences. Both dimensions are 
"organically" linKed and generate a specific "moment", for which 
no a priori conceptual relation of causality could be established 
in the abstract to explain the particular linK between the his- 
torical and contemporary elements. It is from this understanding 
of the development of humanity that the specific nature of the 
"national popular" ensemble is derived. Far from the stageist 
developmental logic that characterises Marxist-Leninism, the 
Gramscian methodology permits the conceptualisation of the 
specificity of a plurality of historical and contemporary events, 
which in turn permits us to thinK of the national community as a 
"unique", this to say, an historically particular, ensemble. To 
put in Gramsci's words: 
... the internal relations of any 
combination which is "original" 
unique: these relations must be 
their originality and uniqueness 
them and direct them27 
nation are the result of a 
an (in a certain sense) 
understood and conceived in 
if one wishes to dominate 
But in order to understand the implications of this discus- 
sion for the Marxist conceptualisation of national communities, 
another original Gramscian concept must be discussed, that of the 
"historical bloc". 
-------------------- 
25. ibid. P. 29 
26. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, OP. Cit. P 359 
27. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. cit. P. 240 
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The Gramscian concept of "historical bloc" is perhaps one of 
the most innovative and original contributions to contemporary 
Marxist theory. But at the same time, it has generated a 
protracted and controversial discussion over the precise meaning 
of the term. The problem results from the fact that the notion 
of historical bloc addresses itself to one of the most delicate 
areas of class reductionism, that of the relation between what 
Marx defined in that unfortunate metaphor of "base" and 
"superstructure"28 . The problem is compounded by the fact that 
while Gramsci made extensive use of the term, he only provided a 
schematic conceptualisation. 29 Gramsci's conceptualisation of 
the historical bloc appears to be an extension of the discussion 
on human nature outlined above 
Man is to be conceived as an 
dividual and subjective elements 
or material elements with which 
tive relationship. To transform 
general system of relations, is 
develop oneself30 
Historical Bloc of purely in- 
and as a mass of objective 
the individual is in an ac- 
the external world, the 
to potentiate oneself and to 
In the same way as Gramsci argues that historical and con- 
temporary experiences 
- ---- 
are "organically" linked in in every human 
-------------- - 
28. See for example the article by N. Bobbio and subsequent 
criticism by J. Texier in op. cit. C. Mouffe (ed. ) Gramsci and 
the Marxist Theory pp. 19-79 
29. H. Portelli, in his very illuminating study of the conc ept 
was able to find only six theoretical references to it in the 
whole Prison Notebooks, and all of them appear to sketch an 
"organic" relation between "base" and superstructure". see H. 
Portelli, Gramsci y el Bloque Historico, Siglo XXI, Buenos Aires, 
19T4, p. 8 
30. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison NotebooKs, op. Cit. P. 360 
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production, it subsequently becomes part of the "determining" 
process as a result of its "organical" link with the base. 
Paraphrasing Marx's Thesis on Feuerbach, Gramsci argues that once 
the "educator" has been determined, the educator himself becomes 
a factor in the process of subsequent determination33. The one 
sided "exaggeration" of the so called superstructure, Gramsci 
calls "ideologism" which he finds in the philosophy of B. Croce, 
as a notion of "free floating" ideas. Consequently, once the 
"historical bloc" has been constituted, then it is no longer pos- 
sible to conceptualise "base" and "superstructure" as separate 
elements in a relational whole, since they are now "organically" 
linked in the notion of historical bloc. Here resides the impor- 
tance of the concept for the development of Marxist theory, the 
endless and agonising debate on relations of causality between 
the "base" and the "superstructure", is replaced by the notion of 
"historical bloc", thus rendering the use of the Marxian 
metaphorical terms both unnecessary and obsolete. 
... The analysis of these propositions tends, I thinK, to 
reinforce the conception of historical bloc in which 
precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are 
the form, though this distinction between form and content 
has purely didactic value, since the material forces would 
be inconceivable without the form and ideology would be in- 
dividual fancies without material forces34 
Thus, from the point of view of our discussion on the na- 
tional question, the important novelty of this formulation lies 
in the fact that it frees the discussion of so called 
"superstructural" phenomena from narrow and abortive discussions 
concerning the nature of the process of determination. From 
33, A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. cat p. 350 
34. A Gramsci, Selection from Prison . Notebooks, op. cit. p. 3T7 
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production, it subsequently becomes part of the "determining" 
process as a result of its "organical" link with the base. 
Paraphrasing Marx's Thesis on Feuerbach, Gramsci argues that once 
the "educator" has been determined, the educator himself becomes 
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endless and agonising debate on relations of causality between 
the "base" and the "superstructure", is replaced by the notion of 
"historical bloc", thus rendering the use of the Marxian 
metaphorical terms both unnecessary and obsolete. 
... The analysis of these propositions tends, I thinK, to 
reinforce the conception of historical bloc in which 
precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are 
the form, though this distinction between form and content 
has purely didactic value, since the material forces would 
be inconceivable without the form and ideology would be in- 
dividual fancies without material forces34 
Thus, from the point of view of our discussion on the na- 
tional question, the important novelty of this formulation lies 
in the fact that it frees the discussion of so called 
"superstructural" phenomena from narrow and abortive discussions 
concerning the nature of the process of determination. From 
33, A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. cat p. 350 
34. A Gramsci, Selection from Prison . Notebooks, op. Cit. p. 377 
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Gramsci onwards, important areas outside the paradigmatic field 
of determination of fundamental classes are conceptualised 
through the notion of "historical bloc", opening new avenues for 
the understanding of the relations between the "social and 
"political " arenas by freeing the discussion from the narrow 
parameters of class reductionism. The other important aspect of 
the conceptualisation of the historical bloc from the point of 
view of the ongoing discussion on the national question, is that 
the historical bloc itself is the locus for the formation of na- 
tional identities. But before discussing this point, it becomes 
necessary to briefly evaluate Gramsci"s analysis of the role of 
the intellectuals in the historical bloc. 
Every social group that performs an essential function in 
the process of production creates, according to Gramsci, a group 
or strata" of intellectuals which gives "homogeneity" and 
"awareness" of its own function not only at the economic levels, 
but also at social and political fields35. This is a significant 
departure from earlier class reductionist perceptions of the in- 
tellectuals, which invariably located them as part of the upper 
classes, resulting from the classical Marxian division between 
Manual and Mental Labour36. Gramsci suggests a novel reassess- 
ment of intellectuals, by distinguishing the intellectual aspect 
"inherent" in every form of human existence from the intellectual 
"function". What distinguishes in concrete societies 
"intellectuals" from "non intellectuals" is what he calls "the 
professional function of the category of intellectuals". This 
distinction results from the concrete historical location of the 
intellectual function37. The intellectuals are not in them- 
-------------------- 
35. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. cit. P. 5 
36. See K. Marx The German Ideology, part I, Lawrence & Wishart, 
London 1974 pp. 51-52 
37. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. cat pp. 8-9 
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selves a social class, but are a social strata related to one of 
the fundamental social classes. The "organic intellectuals" of 
fundamental classes represent the ideas and aspirations of their 
respective class, and in the case of the leading class in the 
hegemonic relation, they constitute what Gramsci calls the 
"ideological bloc". 38 This ideological bloc is the way in which 
the intellectuals of the subordinated classes are "won over" to 
the hegemonic system, creating a medium through which the intel- 
lectuals of the leading class in the hegemonic relation become 
"examples" and "orientators" for the intellectual of the subor- 
dinated classes, incorporating in this way the subordinated 
classes to the hegemonic relation via the incorporation of their 
own intellectuals. However, Gramsci acknowledges that every new 
class or intellectual stratum does not emerge in a vacuum, but 
finds cultural and intellectual categories already in existence. 
These categories appear to delineate the formal continuity of the 
society in question, regardless of any changes introduced by the 
newly arrived class or intellectual strata39. The bearers of 
these "old" cultural and intellectual categories Gramsci calls 
"traditional intellectuals", and the example that Gramsci gives 
in the Italian case is that of the Catholic priesthood. The or- 
ganic intellectuals of the leading class asserts its 
"intellectual and moral leadership" by incorporating the 
"traditional" and "organic" intellectuals of the subordinated 
classes into the historical bloc through a process that Gramsci 
calls "transformismo". This is usually a two staged process in 
which the values and interests of the intellectuals not organi- 
cally linKed with the leading class are firstly "disarmed" of 
their contradictory or antagonistic positions vis-a-vis the his- 
torical bloc and secondly, integrated as much as possible into 
the broad positions of the historic bloC40. In this way the 
38. ibid. P. 60-61 
39. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. Cit. P. 7 
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hegemony of the leading 
porating to the hegemonic 
incorporation of their 
is to be successful in 
of the subordinated strat 
possible, so that it becc 
audience. In other words, 
tive interests" of the 1 
group to the point in wr 
be understood to be reps 
as a whole. At this poir 
class is secured, by defusing and incor- 
group the subordinated strata, via the 
intellectuals. But if the historic bloc 
the tasK of integrating the intellectuals 
a, it must broaden its image as much as 
)mes acceptable to the widest possible 
it must broaden the "narrow corpora- 
eading class or the existing hegemonic 
ich it must inspire popular support and 
^esenting the aspirations of the community 
it Gramsci introduces a new and highly 
original analytical category that will make possible the concep- 
tualisation of the identity of the expanding historical bloc 
beyond the confines of the paradigmatic field of the participant 
strata. This new concept will also be of cardinal importance for 
Gramsci's conceptualisation of the national arena: Collective 
Will. According to Gramsci, the Collective Will is a point of 
"practical articulation", creating a higher order unit of the 
non-antagonistic social forces that transcends and dissolves the 
"economic corporate" interests of the participant strata. As 
will be shown in a moment, this is the national identity. 
Any formation of a national-popular collective will is im- 
possible unless the great mass of peasant farmers bursts 
simultaneously into political life. That was Machiavelli 's 
intention through the reform of the militia, and it was 
achieved by the Jacobins in the French Revolution. That 
Machiavelli understood it reveals a precocious Jacobinism 
that is the (more or less fertile) germ of his conception of 
national revolution. All history from 1815 onwards shows the 
efforts of the traditional classes to prevent the formation 
of a collective will of this Kind, and to maintain "economic 
-------------------- 
40. ibid. P. 58-59. Note in particular the historical example of 
the Risorgimento. 
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corporate" power in an international system of passive 
equilibrium. 41 
If the historical arguments are left aside for the moment42, 
what Gramsci is arguing here is simply the dissolution of fun- 
damental aspects of class reductionism at the level of the 
political arena and at the same time, identifying a set of 
political protagonists that operate outside the paradigmatic 
field of class determination. It is through the actions of these 
diverse political actors cemented into a higher order unit called 
"collective will" and in the context of an historically specific 
framework called "historical bloc" that processes of political 
transformation taxe, or do not taxe, place, as in the case of the 
example above. In other words, the fundamental locus of politi- 
cal activity must be located outside the paradigmatic field of 
class determination. The economic field is only one among others 
and there is no discernible reason, for Gramsci, to privilege its 
influence in the political arena. 
Now it is possible to return to Gramsci"s discussion of 
hegemony. If the interpretation of hegemony as class alliances is 
accepted, then the historical bloc is merely a political replica- 
tion of of the outcome of the relation between classes at a given 
conjuncture, and the intellectuals induce either forms of "false 
consciousness" or "a scientific understanding of reality". The 
socialist component of the collective will is then the expression 
of higher levels of class consciousness as represented in the 
"enlightened" dimension of that unfortunate classical Marxist 
dichotomy- class in itself, class for itself, and in the various 
schools of Hegelian Marxism. The Gramscian imaginative richness 
41. A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, op. Cit. P. 132 
boldscript is my own. 
42. They will be discussed in the next section of this chapter 
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and diversity in conceptualising the political arena is then lost 
to the dogma of an increasingly irrelevant orthodoxy. From the 
point of view of our discussion of the national question, the 
national-popular is merely a conjunctural strategic device which 
will be ditched as the hegemonic proletariat achieves higher 
levels of "class consciousness". 
If, on the contrary, a non class reductionist understanding 
of Gramscian concept of hegemony is adopted, then it is possible 
to grasp with the help of the concepts of "historical bloc" and 
"collective will", how historically specific elements can be 
successfully incorporated into an analysis of a global inter- 
national-state situation. In the context of the historical 
bloc, and through the activities of the organic intellectuals, 
the hegemonic force develops a collective will that cements, 
leads and transforms the political arena, transforming its cor- 
porate character in the process. It is however clear that in the 
work of Gramsci that the leading force in the hegemonic relation 
must always be one of the fundamental classes, severely limiting 
the flexibility of the concept because the hegemony of the fun- 
damental class is not the result of the circumstantial relation 
of social and/or political forces, but has an ultimate ontologi- 
cal foundation43 in the privileged position of the process of 
production. The implication of this reductionist aspect of the 
conceptualisation of hegemony, is that the hegemonic unit is 
restricted to be either led by the bourgeoisie or the 
proletariat. This limitation perhaps makes the Gramscian con- 
cept of hegemony less fruitful from the the above discussed im- 
aginative ways of conceptualising the connection between the so- 
cial and the political arenas - the concepts of historical bloc 
and collective will. In this sense the seminal work of Laclau 
and Mouffe represents a welcome move beyond the limitations of 
the concept of hegemony in the Gramscian discussion. 
43. Laclau & Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, op. cit. P. 
69 
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In what follows, the Gramscian conceptualisation of the na- 
tional question will be discussed, attempting to locate the 
origin of the concept of National-Popular - Gramsci's original 
contribution to the Marxist analysis of the national phenomenon - 
in the context of the Italian state's historical development. 
The Gramscian conceptualisation of the National Question 
it is always important to recall this early phase of 
Gramsci's astonishing biography. He is the greatest of west- 
ern Marxists. But it cannot be without significance that he 
was also a product of the West's most remote periphery, and 
of conditions which, half a century later, it became 
fashionable to call "Third World". No comparable western in- 
tellectual came from such a background. He was a barbed gift 
of the bacKwoods to the metropolis, and some aspects of his 
originality always reflected this distance. 44 
There can be little doubt that the centrality of the so- 
called "Southern Question" in the Italian state, as well as his 
Sardinian origins played a crucial role in Gramsci's thinking on 
the national question. The crucial argument that runs like a 
thread through Gramsci's historical work is the manifest failure 
of the Italian bourgeoisie, from the Risorgimento onwards, to 
develop the newly centralised Italian state into a homogeneous 
-------------------- 
44. Tom Nairn -Antonu su Gobbu, in Ann Showstack Sassoon, op. 
cit. P. 161. The title of the article is in Sardinian language 
(which is spoken by the majority of the Sardinian population) 
meaning Antonio The Hump-backed, a reference to a handicap that 
made him both the object of fear and mockery in the superstitious 
and fatalistic peasant culture of his country of origin. This 
bitter experience was undoubtedly important for his subsequent 
discussions of folklore and popular culture. 
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national community. According to Gramsci, the northern in- 
dustrial bourgeoisie subjected southern Italy to the status of 
"exploited colonies»45, creating a deep seated division and an- 
tagonism which effectively precluded the crystallization of an 
Italian national identity. This cleavage between north and 
south, not only resulted in the exploitation of the southern 
peasants masses, but also created on the one hand, an attitude of 
rejection and prejudice among the workers of the north, and on 
the other hand, a stagnant society and culture that resulted from 
... a monstrous agrarian bloc which as a whole acts as an in- 
termediary and overseer for northern capital and the big 
banks. It sole aim is to preserve the status quo. Inside 
there is no intellectual light, no programme, no urge 
towards betterment and progress46 
Gramsci is not only critical of the reactionary nature of 
the "agrarian bloc" in southern Italy, but also of the inability 
of sections of the northern working class to overcome its 
"corporative hangovers" and prejudicial attitudes towards the 
southern peasant society47. Gramsci is particularly critical of 
the support given to the "southernist" views by leading members 
of the Italian Socialist Party. This "southernist" view shows 
remarKable similarities with the concept "Orientalism" evaluated 
in E. Said's noteworthy booK, a concept that results from the 
discussions of some Western "experts" on Middle Eastern 
societies. These arguments are usually presented in the cloaK of 
-------------------- 
45. A Gramsci, The Southern Question, in The modern Prince & 
other Writings, International Publishers, New YorK, 1968 p. 28 
46. ibid., p. 45-46 
47. ibid. P. 56 
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a "culturalist" analysis, and invariably present the "backward" 
oriental culture as the causal factor for underdevelopment. 48 
This ideology also impregna ted the worKs of Bernstein and other 
revisionists leaders49, and it is probably through the 
revisionist writings that the Italian socialists became ac- 
quainted with these ideas. According to Gramsci, this 
"southernist" view was also influential in the "political 
orientation" and "general ideology" of the proletariat itself, 
through the "multifarious" forms of bourgeois propaganda among 
the masses of the North. The essential arguments of the 
"southernist" position are defined by Gramsci in the following 
way: 
... the southeners are biologically inferior beings, semi- 
barbarians or complete barbarians by natural destiny; if the 
South is backward, the fault is not to be found in the 
capitalist system or in any other historical cause, but is 
the fault of nature which made the southener lazy, in- 
capable, criminal, barbarous, moderating his stepmother's 
fate by the purely individual outburst of great geniuses, 
who are like solitary palms in an arid and sterile 
desert.... the Socialist Party gave its blessing to the whole 
"southernist" literature of the clique of the so called 
positivist writers.... who in articles, sketches, stories, 
novels, books of impressions and memoirs repeated in various 
forms the same refrain; once again "science" had turned to 
crushing the wretched and the exploited, but this time it 
-------------------- 
48. For a penetrating discussion on the concept of "Orientalism" 
see E. Said Orientalism, Routledge & Kegan, London 1978 and B. S. 
Turner, Marx and the End of Orientalism, Allen & Unwin London 
1978 
49. For a discussion of the Revisionist conceptualisation of the 
national question, see chapter 3 p... 
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was cloaked in socialist colours, pretending to be the 
science of the proletariat. 50 
While Gramsci argued that the Turin communists reacted ener- 
getically against this ideology, there is no doubt that these 
views remain influential even today. The double entendre phrase 
quoted by Gramsci as characteristic of the hatred against worKers 
of the north by southern immigrants - Italy is divided into 
Northerners and filthy Southeners51, continues to be used in con- 
temporary Italian. This sharp north-south divide prevented the 
consolidation of an historical bloc which, according to Gramsci, 
must be able to transcend "prejudices and corporative demands" of 
the working class and constitute a higher unit capable of repre- 
senting the desires and aspirations of the community as a whole. 
However, the Italian working class would not be capable of con- 
stituting the historical bloc through which the hegemonic higher 
order unit will come into existence until it transcends its 
prejudices and constitutes a cultural community through which the 
subordinated peasants and the "southern masses" will be in- 
tegrated into the national culture. In other words, the working 
class must according to Gramsci, construct a new historical bloc 
that must taxe the form of the National Community, something that 
the Italian bourgeoisie conspicuously failed to do. 
For Gramsci the hegemonic unit constituted by a fundamental 
---------------- 
50. A. Gramsci, 
---- 
The Southern Question, op. cit. P. 31 
51. ibid. P. 41. The translator of the "Notes on the Southern 
Question" rightly argues in a footnote that it is impossible con- 
vey in English the bitter witticism of the contextual use of the 
referents sudici (southeners) and nordici (northerners) in the 
quoted phrase. This idiomatic peculiarity is highly indicative of 
the complex and persistent nature of the social problem it repre- 
sents. 
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Class is an international phenomenon insofar as it represents the 
development of a particular mode of production. The historical 
bloc is a national phenomenon insofar as it is the " result of a 
unique historical situation, and it becomes the locus for the 
formation of a community of culture through which the hegemonic 
unit comes into existence in a context delimited by an histori- 
cal, and at times, a geographical situation. In this sense, the 
cultural aspect is of crucial importance: 
Culture, at its various levels, unifies in a series of 
strata, to the extent that they come into contact with each 
other, a greater or lesser number of individuals who under- 
stand each other's mode of expression in differing degrees, 
etc.... From this one can deduce the importance of the 
"cultural aspect", even in practical (collective) activity. 
An historical act can only be performed by "collective man", 
and this presupposes the attainment of a "cultural social" 
unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with 
heterogeneous aims, are welded together in a single aim... 
52 
Common culture is then f or Gramsci a crucial aspect in the 
crystallization of a community. In Gramscian terms, no hegemonic 
unit will emerge in any given society without claiming to repre- 
sent the society as whole. A fundamental class becomes the or- 
ganiser of an hegemonic unit when in the context of the histori- 
cal bloc, the intellectuals and popular masses establish an 
"organic" link in which culture in the intellectual sense 
(Knowledge) develops a connection with culture in its 
"anthropological" sense (shared experiences). In Gramsci's 
terms, the organic intellectuals of the working class must not 
only "Know", but also "understand" and "feel" the link with the 
popular masses. 
-------------------- 
52. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. cit. p. 349 
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If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, 
between leaders and led, the rulers and the rule d is 
provided by an organic. cohesion in which feeling-passion be- 
comes understanding and thence Knowledge (not mechanically 
but in a way that is alive), then and only then is the 
relationship one of representation. Only then can there taxe 
place an exchange of individual elements between rulers and 
ruled, leaders (dirigenti) and led, and can the shared life 
be realised which alone is a social force- with the creation 
of the "historical bloc"53 
The constitution of an historical bloc, implies a radical 
and novel reconstruction of the relational nature and identity of 
different units of the social formation under consideration. 
It implies firstly the constitution of an "organic" link. This 
link in turn, constitutes a higher order grouping in which par- 
ticipant units merge their cultural identities, forming a higher 
order common culture that becomes the common denominator of the 
historical bloc. Consequently, in the same way as for Gramsci a 
class does not take state power, but it becomes the state54, the 
historical bloc does not take over the nation but it becomes a 
new national community. . 
To understand how this process takes place, Gramsci reverts 
to analyzing the French revolution, in which he sees a successful 
case of the formation of a "national-popular" historic bloc, and 
the case of his contemporary Italy, where he argues that the 
bourgeoisie had conspicuously failed to constitute this 
"national-popular" historic bloc. 
-------------------- 
53. A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, op. cit. P 418 
54. Laclau & Mouffe, op. cit. p. 69 
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France... experienced a great popular reformation in the 
eighteenth century with the Enlightenment, Voltarianism and 
the Encyclopaedia. This reformation preceded and accompanied 
the Revolution of 1789. It really was a matter here of a 
great intellectual and moral reformation of the French 
people, more complete than the German Lutheran reformation, 
because it also embraced the great peasant masses in the 
countryside and had a distinct secular basis and attempted 
to replace religion with a completely secular ideology rep_ 
resented by the national and patriotic bond. (emphasis 
added)55 
According to Gramsci, the bourgeoisie in France emerged as a 
fundamental class at the economic level, but did not achieve 
political power directly as a result of this situation. It 
achieved political power only because it was capable of con- 
stituting itself as the "leading class" of the emerging hegemonic 
grouping before the actual revolution took place. The bour- 
geoisie achieved, according to Gramsci, its hegemonic position 
because it transcended its immediate corporate interests and 
presented itself as the representative of the third estate. In 
terms of its political discourse the bourgeoisie transcended its 
"economic corporative" interests by constructing the notion of 
"popular sovereignty" which gave other subordinated strata a 
sense of representation. Consequently "national sovereignty" and 
"popular sovereignty" became interchangeable terms, because the 
national community became the sovereign through the concept of 
popular representation56. In this sense, the emerging historical 
bloc constituted the national community and this was done by 
55. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. cit. p. 394- 
95. 
56. A. Gramsci, Letteratura e Vita Nazionale, (LVN in the stand- 
ard abbreviation of the Prison NotebooKs) Quaderni del Carcere 5, 
Einaudi Editore Turin 1966 p. 105 
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creating an "organic" linK between the intellectuals and the 
popular masses 
More than any other national literature there exists in 
French philosophical literature treatments of "common 
sense": this is due to the more strictly "popular national" 
character of French culture, in other words, the fact that 
the intellectuals ... tend more to approach the people in or- 
der to guide it ideologically and Keep it linKed with the 
leading group. 57 
The responsibility for the development of national-popular 
link between the , organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie and the 
popular masses fell upon the Jacobins. Before the revolution the 
Third Estate was not, according to Gramsci, a homogeneous 
stratum. Gradually a new intellectual elite emerged, which was 
not concerned only with the sectarian interests of the bour- 
geoisie, but tended to construct a political image of the bour- 
-------------------- 
57. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. Cit. p. 421. 
In an enigmatic footnote on the same page, the editors and 
translators argue that the Gramscian concept of national popular 
is ... one of the most interesting and also most widely criticised 
ideas in Gramsci's thought... it is perhaps best taken as describ- 
ing a sort of "historic bloc" between national and popular 
aspirations in the formation of which the intellectuals, in the 
wide, Gramscian use of the term play an essential mediating role. 
To this fairly accurate description, the editors add: ... /t is 
important to stress however, that it is a cultural concept, 
relating to the position of the masses within the culture of the 
nation, and radically alien to any form of populism or "national 
socialism" . It is difficult to ascertain the meaning of this 
comment. National-Popular is a populist concept "par excellence" 
and it will be absurd to suggest any connection between Gramsci 
and "National Socialism". 
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geoisie as the hegemonic force of all subordinated strata. Ac- 
cording to Gramsci, the principal tasks of the Jacobins were to 
annihilate the counter-revolutionary forces, and more importantly 
from the point of view of the ongoing discussion on the national 
question, to enlarge as much as possible cadres of the political 
grouping led by the bourgeoisie. This meant identifying the 
specific requirements of all forces that were not in contradic- 
tion to the leadership of the bourgeoisie, in order to unite then 
under the patriotic banners of the revolution, creating in this 
way a cultural- patriotic linK that represented all popular 
forces, including large sections of the peasantry. 58 In this way 
the Jacobins managed to absorb into the revolution most sectors 
not directly connected with the "ancien regime". There was 
however, one important exception: the ethno-national minorities. 
Certain areas within the French state inhabited by non-Parisian- 
French speaking communities resisted their incorporation into the 
culture of the emerging French nation under the leadership of the 
Jacobins. This was particularly the case in the area called 
today "EuzKadi North" and in Brittany. The "Breton Question" 
proved to be more important than the drive to create "a single 
and compact" French nation. 
The resistance of the Vendee properly speaking is linked to 
the national question, which had become envenomed among the 
peoples of Brittany and in general among those alien to the 
slogan of the "single and indivisible republic" and to the 
policy of bureaucratic- military centralisation- a slogan 
and a policy that the Jacobins could not renounce without 
committing suicide59 
The implications of this analysis for the ethno-national 
58, A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. Cit. p. 78 
59. ibid., p. 79 
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minorities will be discussed in a moment. In terms of the 
Gramscian discussion of the role of the Jacobins in consolidating 
the French revolution, their main achievement was to develop a 
"national patriotic" collective will. In the Gramscian terminol- 
ogy, the term "Jacobinism" defines a political movement capable 
of creating a "collective will" that transcends the notion of a 
pure class alliances, to constitute a form of political subjec- 
tivity that as such has no necessary class belonging. Gramsci 
illustrates this point by arguing that during the French Revolu- 
tion the Jacobins were more "advanced" than the French Bour- 
geoisie at the time, creating irreversible "fait accomplis" and 
driving the bourgeois forward with "KicKs in the bacKside"60. 
Notions liKe "La Patrie", and the sense of belonging to the 
French nation became became crucial elements in the formation of 
the new historical bloc. The energetic actions of these intellec- 
tuals created the strongest possible linKs that paved the way for 
the a stable hegemonic grouping under the leadership of the Bour- 
geoisie 
For not only did they organise a bourgeois government, i. e, 
maKe the Bourgeoisie the dominant class -they did more. They 
created the bourgeois state, made the Bourgeoisie the lead- 
ing hegemonic class of the nation, in other words gave the 
new state a permanent basis and created the compact French 
Nation. (emphasis added)61 
However, the Italian case presented a different picture. the 
historical inheritance of the peninsula only allowed the forma- 
tion of an Italian nation at a relatively late period, and. the 
local bourgeoisie was too weaK and had to forge alliances with 
"cosmopolitan elements" such as the Catholic church, who 
60. ibid., p. 77 
61. ibid. p. 79 
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"sabotaged" the formation of a national-popular historical bloc. 
The ideological causes for this "retarded" formation of the 
Italian nation was the "unfortunate fact" that the Italian penin- 
sula was both the center of the Roman Empire and the spiritual 
and political center for the Catholic church. 62 At the time of 
the French Revolution the cosmopolitan ideology of the catholic 
church dominated those parts of the Italian peninsula which were 
not under the control of foreign powers. This resulted in a cast 
of intellectuals that were not attached to the national popular 
culture as in the case of France. 
The Italian intellectuals did not have a popular-national 
character, but one that was cosmopolitan on the model of the 
church; it was a matter of indifference to Leonardo whether 
he sold the fortifications of Florence to DuKe Valentino. 63 
Following this situation, the Italian intellectuals accord- 
ing to Gramsci responded to the humanistic and cosmopolitan na- 
ture of the Greco-Roman tradition. These intellectuals were 
oriented towards "encyclopedic" notions of culture, that in- 
variably put them in a position distant from that of the popular 
masses. At the political level, once the process of Italian 
unification started, the bourgeoisie was too weaK to create a 
Jacobin party modeled in the French experience. In Italy a 
Jacobin Party was never formed, creating instead an historical 
bloc with the Catholic church, and this greatly diminished the 
possibilities for the formation of a national-popular historical 
bloc. 64 Gramsci devoted a great deal of attention to an analysis 
of the reasons for the non-existence of a national-popular bloc 
62. ibid. P. 52-54 
63. ibid. ff. P. 56 
64. ibid. P. 82 
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in the Italian peninsula, since he believed that the ensuing na- 
tional cultural cleavage was partially responsible for the emer- 
gence of Fascism. 65. However the discussion of this interesting 
issue transcend the objectives of this section which is to 
evaluate the Gramscian conceptualisation of the national ques- 
tion. It will suffice to note that Gramsci concludes from his 
detailed historical analysis, that the Italian bourgeoisie failed 
to construct a "national popular historical bloc" and to generate 
a "national-popular collective will" as it was the case in 
France. But, according to Gramsci, the working class must 
succeed where the bourgeoisie failed. Because of the cosmopolitan 
nature of the bourgeois Italian intellectuals, because of the 
failure of the bourgeoisie to constitute itself as the "national 
class" and the related failure to constitute a "national-popular 
historical bloc" and a "National Popular Collective Will", The 
working Class occupies alone the role of the national class. 
Here lies the meaning of the quotation at the beginning of this 
chapter. The working class is called upon to be the fundamental 
class that builds an hegemonic grouping with the peasants and 
other subordinated strata, which will make possible a "national- 
popular historical bloc" and crystallizes a "national collective 
will" through the activities of the "new Jacobins" the PCI. As 
Eric Hobsbawn observes 
Gramsci"s strategy follows from his concept - quite original 
in Marxism, of the worKing class as part of the nation. 
Indeed, I believe that he is so far the only Marxist thinker 
who provides us with a basis of integrating the nation as an 
historical and social reality into Marxist theory. He breaKs 
with the habit of seeing it as "the national question", 
something external to the working class movement, towards 
which we have to define our attitude. 
66 
--- 
65. 
------------- 
A large part 
---- 
of the volume on the Risorgimento"", in the Quad- 
erni dal Carcere is devoted to this issue. 
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Thus the Communist Party, "the new Jacobins", as heirs of 
the Machiavellian insights and through their role as "organic" 
intellectuals of the working class, are the only ones in the 
Italian context capable of bridging the gap between "National" 
and "Popular" culture, between culture as "knowledge" and culture 
as "the collective experience of the community". They are also 
the only ones capable of reconstituting the dispersed "collective 
wills" of north and south, peasant and worker, and the intellec- 
tuals with all the rest, into a higher order "National Popular 
Will", a newly created political subject that as such transcends 
the class location of its participant elements. 
The above is the non-class-reductionist reading of 
Gramsci"s work on the national question. It is only possible 
through a non-class-reductionist reading of Gramsci's work, to 
derive a theory on the specificity of the national community. If 
a class reductionist position is maintained, then the "national- 
popular historical bloc" is only an instrumental and strategic 
alliance of forces, intentionally designed to secure the leader- 
ship of the party of the proletariat in a system of class al- 
liances determined by the paradigmatic positions of the par- 
ticipating political class agents. While both readings are 
equally possible, the non class reductionist position allows for 
an understanding that captures the specificity of the multi- 
farious national phenomenon at its cultural and political levels. 
-------------------- 
66. E. Hobsbawn, "Gramsci and Marxist Political Theory", in op. 
cit. A. Sassoon (ed. ) Approaches to Gramsci, p. 29. It is ex- 
traordinary that E. Hobsbawn, the most prominent contemporary 
Marxist historian, argues that Gramsci was the only Marxist 
thinker who provides us with a basis of integrating the nation as 
an historical and social reality to the Marxist theory. Why does 
he ignore the 600 plus pages of the original and pioneering work 
of his fellow Viennese Otto Bauer?. 
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The non class reductionist interpretation also provides an image 
of a more "coherent" Gramsci, particularly at the level of a 
theoretical discussion on the national question, since the 
characterisation of "national popular" equally applies to his- 
torical blocs that maKe possible a proletariat or bourgeois 
leadership of the hegemonic grouping. This conceptualisation is 
incoherent in a class reductionist discourse because all 
"superstructural" elements must have a class belonging. It is 
only though a definition of the national arena that transcends 
the paradigmatic field of class positions that the above concep- 
tualisation maintains is theoretical coherence. 
From the above discussion it appears that Gramsci had 
successfully transcended the paradigmatic limitations of classi- 
cal Marxism in evaluating the national phenomenon. However a num- 
ber of difficulties remain, and these are best exemplified in the 
way in which Gramsci relates to the ethno national and linguistic 
minorities in both the French and Italian state. The Gramscian 
conceptualisation of the national community has the major advan- 
tage over the analyses developed by the the theoreticians of the 
Second and Third International (Austro-Marxists excluded), in 
that it is capable of understanding the political importance of 
the cultural dimension as well as conceptualising a form of 
autonomy for the political realm - in itself not an insubstantial 
achievement. However, by overcoming one form of reductionism - 
that of economism - Gramsci appears to be privileging another 
dimension - the political . 
arena- instead of constructing a non 
reductionist analysis of the national phenomenon. The analysis 
of the national phenomenon in Gramsci is geared towards the 
search for mechanisms that will consolidate the cultural unifor- 
mity of the national state, rather than towards the evaluation of 
the plurality of cultural and national existence. The "nation" 
and the "national popular" are important only insofar as they are 
vehicles for the formation aa new form of political 
subjectivity: "The national popular collective will". Similarly, 
culture, in its various meanings, is only analysed in its 
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functionality to the political dimension. For Gramsci national 
state, national language and the organisation of culture are are 
different aspects of the same process: 
The problem of the intellectual and moral unity of the na- 
tion and the state is to be found in the unity of language67 
Gramsci castigates the Italian bourgeoisie for the same 
reason that he praises the French Jacobins: the consolidation of 
a single national- popular collective will in the form of one na- 
tion in one state. Having had first-hand experience of the 
perils of national oppression in his native Sardinia, an oppres- 
sion that is adequately documented in the writings on the 
"southern question", Gramsci then praises the Jacobins for their 
energy and action in consolidating the French nation and state, 
choosing to ignore that this consolidation also tooK the form of 
a ruthless suppression of national and linguistic minorities. The 
Jacobin slogan for a "one and indivisible" republic, and the re- 
lated zeal for the elimination of "Les Patois": Breton, Catalan, 
Occitan, Euzkera and other languages that vanished without trace, 
generated a ruthless repression exercised against those mainly 
landless peasant peoples that spoKe a different language from the 
Parisian French. Aux Armes Citoyens!, was not only the battle 
cry against the nobility and reaction, but also against those un- 
fortunate national minorities whose wish was to maintain a 
separate language and cultural heritage. In Chapter 2 the per- 
nicious effects of the "Jacobin Model" on Marx and Engels' con- 
ceptualisation of the national phenomenon was discussed. It will 
be sufficient only to recall the Jacobin report on the need to 
destroy rural dialects (patois) and universalise the use of the 
French language68. The net effect of the Jacobin policy was to 
-------------------- 
67. A. Gramsci, Quaderni 21,1934-5: 19, quoted by F. Lo Piparo 
Lingua, Intellectuali, Egemonia . in Gramsci, Laterza, Roma 1979 p. 
155-56, my own translation from Italian. 
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create a tradition of intolerance and state centralisation, which 
caused the almost total cultural obliteration of the non 
"Parisian-French speaKing" national minorities. 69. To be fair, 
Gramsci shows some inconsistency over this issue. On the one 
hand, he argued without elaborating that for the Jacobins to com- 
promise to the demands of the Vendee the slogan of "a single and 
indivisible republic" was liKe "committing suicide"70. 
Except for certain marginal areas, where the national (and 
linguistic) differentiation was very great, the agrarian 
question proved stronger than the aspirations to local 
autonomy. Rural France accepted the hegemony of Paris. 71 
On the other hand, in the Italian case, he gave signs of 
being aware of the "ethnic plurality" of the population of the 
Italian state, denouncing the the drives towards centralisation 
of the Socialist party. In a letter written in 1923 to L'Unit9, 
he argued that Italy should become a "Federal Republic of 
Peasants and WorKers". and in 1925 he delivers a letter from the 
Krestintern72, to the congress of the Sardinian Action Party 
68. See Chapter .2p. 54 
69. This pattern of tight state centralisation initiated by the 
Jacobins is not unconnected with subsequent French colonial 
policies, of which the political euphemism Territoires d'Ultramer 
is an adequate condensation. In this sense the problematic 
process of independence of Algeria and today's problems in New 
Caledonia are not unconnected with the slogan of a "one and in- 
divisible republic". 
70. See footnote 61 
71. A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, op. cit. p. 79 
72. This is the Peasants Communist international 
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(PSdA), which finishes with the slogan Long Live the Sardinian 
Republic of Peasants and Workers in the Italian Soviet 
Federation! ", and the Sardinian national slogan Porza Pari$73. 
However, at the level of theoretical analysis, Gramsci's 
work on the national question is fundamentally geared towards 
formulating an analysis of the process of consolidation of the 
cultural and political unity of a national state, in order to 
conceptualise the conditions for the formation of a "national 
popular collective will" that has the ability to lead the na- 
tionally united social formation into a stable socialist system. 
Formulated in this way, there is in this conceptual framework 
little room for national and cultural-linguistic pluralism within 
the boundaries of the state. 
As emerges from the previous discussion, within the confines 
of the national state, Gramsci attaches great importance to na- 
tional culture. The historical specificity of the national com- 
munity is the determinant of its cultural uniqueness. The 
capacity of the hegemonic grouping to "lead" the national com- 
munity is crucially related to its ability to incorporate this 
national uniqueness into its "world view", this is to say, to 
constitute itself as the "most. complete" expression of the iden- 
tity of the national community. While for Gramsci the leading 
position in an hegemonic grouping is always played by an 
"international" fundamental class, the internal relations of the 
a nation (state) are "original" and "unique"74. But from this 
-------------------- 
73. quoted by S. Salvi, Le Nazione Proibite, Vallecchi Editore, 
Florence 1973, p. 576 
74. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. cit. p. 240 
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emphasis on the national dimension, Gramsci distinguishes between 
"national" and "nationalism", a distinction that probably emerged 
out of the specific conditions of Fascist Italy. While half a 
century later it is no longer necessary to elaborate a conceptual 
distinction between "nationalism" and Fascism", Gramsci's obser- 
vation remains relevant. in criticising an article by Julien 
Benda in the journal Nouvelles Litteraires, who repeats the ques- 
tion asKed by an earlier writer: Nest-ce pas en se nationalisant 
qu'une litterature Arend une signification plus universelle, un 
interet plus humainement genera!? 75. To this, Gramsci replies: 
For Benda, taste which is universal, is best served by being 
as particular as possible. But one thing is to be par- 
ticular, another is to preach particularism. This is the 
mistake of nationalis m, and on the basis of this mistake it 
often pretends to be universalist.... to be national is 
therefore different from being a nationalist. Goethe was a 
German "national", Stendhal a French "national", neither 
were "nationalists". An idea is not effectual if it is not 
expressed in some way, artistically, this is to say, in a 
particularistic form. But is wit particular insofar as it is 
national?. Nationality . 
is a primary particularity, but great 
writers particularise themselves again amgng their fellow 
nationals and this second particularisation is not an exten- 
sion of the first. Renan, as Renan, is not at all a neces- 
sary consequence of French spirit; he is in relation to this 
spirit an original, arbitrary (as Bergson says) unpredict- 
able event. Still Renan remains French, as man because he 
is man remains a mammal, but his value as that of man, 
resides precisely in his difference from the group into 
which he was born. 76 
-------------------- 
75. In the original in French, Is 
national, a literature takes a 
more human general interest? 
it not true that in becoming 
more universal signification, a 
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For Gramsci then the critique of nationalism as an all 
embracing transcendental category cannot be based on an equally 
transcendental cosmopolitan (non-national) universalism. Na- 
tional locations are historically "given" attributes, but as such 
they say little about subjective individual characteristics. So 
far his observation is not questionable. However, Gramsci ap- 
pears to imply national culture and subjective individuality are 
unconnected, he reasons that ideas are national in "form" but 
their "content" transcends nationality. While at a high level of 
generalisation this may be correct (but as it will be shown in a 
moment, not for the reasons sustained by Gramsci), the "form" or 
to be more precise "the signifier" is not irrelevant to the con- 
dition of "the signified" or the "referent". However, as contem- 
porary post-structural linguistics remind us, relations between 
signifiers, signified and referents are not "fixed", but there is 
a constant flux through the subversion of boundaries between 
"meaning" and "content". The fact that signifiers are unfixed, 
does not mean that they are irrelevant to the condition of the 
"signified". Consequently, the expression of "abstract ideas" is 
not irrelevant to to the "national -cultural" conditions through 
which they are expressed, even if that connection is precarious 
and circumstantial, and meanings are constantly subverted. It is 
this constant unfixity of meaning that explains the 
"transcendentality" of the ideas referred to by Gramsci, not any 
intrinsic, transcendental "universal condition" attached to them 
as Gramaci appears to imply. 
However, Gramsci acknowledges the different referential 
meaning in different languages of the concepts of "national" and 
"popular", which appears to show a certain sensitivity for his- 
torically conditioned "subversion" of meanings 
-------------------- 
76. A. Gramsci Gli Intelletuali e l'Organizzazione dells Cultura, 
Editore Riuniti, Rome, 1977 p. 87 My own translation from Italian 
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It must be noticed that in many languages "national" and 
"popular" are synonyms or almost (this is so in Russian, in 
German where "volKisch" has a more intimate, racial meaning, 
the same as in the Slavic languages in general; in French 
"national" has a meaning in which the concept of "popular" 
is already more politically elaborated, because it is linked 
to the concept of "sovereignty". Popular sovereignty and 
national sovereignty have the same value, or they had it in 
the past). In Italy, the term "nation" has a very 
restricted ideological meaning, which in any case does not 
coincide with "popular", because in Italy intellectuals are 
remote from the people, this is to say, from the "nation". 
They are instead linked with a tradition of caste, which has 
not as yet been broken by a popular movement from below77 
From the above quotation it is clear that Gramsci was aware 
of the historical determination of the different forms of concep- 
tualising the boundaries of the national community. An under- 
standing of the specificity of national existence is clearly 
derived from the different ways of conceptualising the relation- 
ship between the "national" and the "popular", creating in this 
way a conceptual space that maKes it possible to encapsulate the 
political specificity of every national community. For Gramsci, 
the "national popular" appear to be overdetermined by both, a 
"universal" dimension in the form of the international mode of 
production and the class that leads the hegemonic grouping, and a 
"particular" dimension in the form of the historical and cultural 
specificity that becomes the foundation of the historic bloc. 
Is it possible to say that Gramsci broKe with the class 
reductionism of the Marxist-Leninist tradition? The answer to 
-------------------- 
77. A. Gramsci, Letteratura e Vita Naziovale, op. cit. p. 105. my 
own translation from Italian. 
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this question must be inconclusive. It is however possible to 
say that Gramsci's contribution to the development of Marxist 
theory is a set of analytical categories that enables us to thinK 
a conceptual frameworK that breaKs with class reductionism - but 
Gramsci himself fell short of this breaK. The notions of 
"historical bloc" and "collective will" permits a conceptualisa- 
tion of the political arena outside the paradigmatic field of 
class determination, given that their configuration is not ul- 
timately reducible to the determination of any of the fundamental 
forces in the process of production. This also allows a concep- 
tualisation of the national phenomenon outside the parametrical 
constraints of class reductionism in the form of the "national- 
popular collective will", which permits an understanding of the 
multifarious forms of national existence at both, the political 
and cultural levels. This two-dimensional understanding is 
however limited by Gramsci's commitment to a consolidation of a 
national state that provides the conditions for a process of 
"expansive hegemony". In this sense, the leading force in every 
hegemonic situation is a "fundamental class" - the bourgeoisie or 
the proletariat- and the reasons for this ontological privilege 
have little to do with the conjunctural analysis, but are the 
direct result of the an epistemologicaly defined process of class 
determination- the essence of class reductionism-. As Laclau and 
Mouffe argue. 
To assert, however, that hegemony must always correspond to 
a fundamental economic class is not merely to reaffirm 
determination in the last instance by the economy; it is 
also to predicate that, insofar as the 'economy constitutes 
an insurmountable limit to society's potential for hegemonic 
recomposition, the constitutive logic of the hegemonic space 
is not itself hegemonic. Here the naturalist prejudice, 
which sees the economy as a homogeneous space unified by 
necessary laws, appears once again with all its force. 78 
78. E. Laclau & C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, op. 
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Given this situation, the interpretation of the worK of 
Gramsci could be equally located in a class reductionist and a 
non-class-reductionist perspective, since both elements - in a 
tense and contradictory way - coexist in the worK of Gramsci. In 
terms of the ongoing discussion on the national question, if a 
class reductionist perspective is adopted, then the discussion 
maKes some marginal advances in relation to the conceptual 
methodological achievements and problems of the Marxist Leninist 
tradition. The discussion is focused in Western style 
democratic states, and the strategic importance of the national 
arena for the avant garde party is dully established. But the 
connection of the worKing class to the nation continues to be an 
insurmountable problem. However, if a non-class-reductionist 
interpretation of the Gramscian analysis of the national question 
is adopted, this analysis offers the possibility of conceptualis- 
ing the centrality of the national arena in defining the field of 
political activity for both: the working class and the hegemonic 
grouping. The strategy for the construction of a new historical 
bloc is designed to convert this historical bloc into the na- 
tional community, so that it could be the basis for an integral 
state and an expanding hegemonic process. But this last aspect 
points towards one of the most important limitations of the 
Gramscian discussion of the national question. The national com- 
munity is important only insofar as it becomes a vehicle for the 
formation of a new political subjectivity in the form of the 
"national-popular collective will". In this sense, the national 
phenomenon is important only to the extent that it becomes the 
basis for the formation of a cohesive national community that 
will be able to sustain a national state. The Leninist traces 
are evident. Gramsci's conceptualisation of the "national- 
popular" is a decisive an momentous advance on Lenin's theory of 
the right of nations to self-determination because of its novel 
cit p. 69 
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conceptualization of culture and the intellectuals, but at the 
same time, it remains trapped in the Leninist bias towards 
"statism"- the achievement and consolidation of a single state 
encompassing one single national community. If the non-class- 
reductionist perspective is accepted, Gramsci achieved an impor- 
tant breaK with Key aspects of class reductionism, but this is 
done at the cost of giving the political arena a privileged posi- 
tion. The logic of the Gramscian theory is to conceptualise the 
multidimensionality of the political arena, and its ultimate goal 
is to construct a stable foundation for an historical bloc that 
sustains a socialist and democratic, but not necessarily plural 
hegemonic grouping. The logic of political unity requires an 
"organic" fusion of the elements of the historical bloc, which in 
most cases means the assimilation of the culture of the 
minorities79 to that of the majorities. Pluralism is lost in the 
process of "organic" fusion. Thus, the traces of Marxist- 
Leninism are to be found Gramsci's blindness to those aspects of 
the national phenomenon that are not connected with the urge to 
form a cohesive national state, as it is in the case of the ethno 
national minorities that exist in every Western state. In this 
sense the plurality the national arena remains outside the 
Gr. amscian conceptualisation of the "National Popular", blinding 
the theory to an important dimension of national existence. This 
blindness to pluralism is evident in Gramsci's essay with the 
suggestive title: Hegemony of Western Culture over the whole 
World Culture 
Even if one admits that other 
tance and significance in the 
unification of world civilisation 
mitted without question), they 
only in so far as they have 
-------------------- 
79. Which are not only "national", 
national, cultural, sexual, etc. 
cultures have had an impor- 
process of "hierarchical" 
I (and this should be ad- 
have had a universal value 
become constituent elements of 
but "ethnic" as distinct from 
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European culture, which is the only historically and con- 
cretely universal culture -in so far, that is, as they have 
contributed to the process of European thought and been as- 
similated by it. 80 
Even Antonio Gramsci - Antonu su Gobbu from the "bacKwoods" 
- could not transcend the west European narcissistic fascina- 
tion. No theory of the national phenomenon could be sensitive to 
the multifarious aspects of national existence while remaining 
trapped in the "insights " of the above quotation. In chapter 
seven a theory of the national phenomenon that offers a better 
understanding of the pluralistic dimensions of national existence 
will be discussed: that of Otto Bauer. 
-------------------- 
80. A. Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, op. Cit. P. 416 
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Chapter 6: The Background to Bauers Theory: Austria and the Na- 
tional Question 
The acute nationalities conflict in the turn of the century 
Habsburg Empire was clearly a crucial factor in directing Otto 
Bauer's reluctant attention to the national phenomenon, as he 
himself acknowledges in the preface to the 1907 edition of his 
monumental worK1. While the nature of the national problem faced 
by the socialist movement in Austria was clearly a decisive fac- 
tor in motivating Bauer to conceptualise the national question, 
the theoretical appraisal that resulted from this conjunctural 
analysis, transcends the specific configuration of the Austrian 
situation to become a major contribution to the general develop- 
ment of Marxist theory on the national phenomenon. In order to 
discuss Bauer's theory, it becomes necessary to first histori- 
cally situate and contextualise the nature of Bauer momentous but 
partial breaK with economism, by evaluating in this chapter the 
three most important historical and theoretical influences on 
Bauer's analysis of the national phenomenon: The nationalities 
problem in The Austro-Hungarian Empire, the nationalities program 
of the All Austrian Socialist Party (Gesamtpartei), and the 
Austro-Marxist response to the neo-Kantian intellectual offensive 
against orthodox Marxism. 
-------------------- 
1. see Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitatenf rage und Die SozialdemoK- 
ratie 1924 edition in Otto Bauer WerKeausgabe(OBW), Vienna 1975 
Vol 1 p. 49-50 
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The nationalities problem in the twilight of Austro Hungary 
On the eve of the first world war the Austro Hungarian Em- 
pire was a dual monarchy with a total population of 53 million of 
more than 15 different nationalities, occupying an area roughly 
smaller than Texas or the Iberian peninsula2. In 1866 the 
Habsburg Empire was militarily defeated by Prussia, and as a 
result of this situation, the Empire was decentralised through 
the Ausgelich or compromise of 1867, which remained the constitu- 
tional basis of the multinational empire until its dissolution in 
1918. This agreement stipulated that the Empire should be 
divided into two autonomous halves: one had the curious name of 
"The Kingdoms and Countries represented in Parliament"3 (Austria) 
and the other was "The Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen" 
(Hungary)4 While foreign affairs, defense and finance were 
common concerns, both parts of the Empire had a very large 
degree of autonomy, which is best exemplified by the fact that 
there was no joint parliament. This situation in effect con- 
solidated the domination of the of the most centrally located 
ethno-national community in each of the two parts, the Austro- 
Germans and the Magyars. The Austro-German side was simply 
referred to as "Austria" and the Magyar dominated half as 
"Hungary". Professor Stadler argues that the main compromise 
2. B. F. Pauley, The Habsburg Legacy,, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
New YorK 1972 p. 23 
3. Die im Reichsrate vertretenen Köningreiche und Lander. For a 
very good discussion of the nationalities problem in the dual 
system, see OsKar Jaszi The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy 
Chapter XVI "The Period of Sham Constitutionalism" op. cit. p. 
106 -118 and Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire, two volumes 
New YorK, 1950 
4. K. Stadler, Austria, Ernest Benn Ltd. London 1971, p. 41 
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was paralleled with minor "compromises" 
plicated mosaic of ethno-national and 
Bauer summarized the situation in the 
which resulted in a com- 
class alliances. Otto 
following way: 
The "Compromise" is an understanding among the ruling 
classes of the historic nations (German, Magyar, Poles, 
Croats), against the mass of their fellow nationals (whom 
the curial franchise excludes from power) and against the 
newer nations (Czechs, Slovenes, and Ruthenes in Austria, 
and SlovaKs, Serbs and Rumanians in Hungary). 5 
While the Austro Germans and the Magyars were the most 
numerous nationality in their respective parts of the empire, 
they where far from being the majority of the population in each 
of the two halves. In 1910 the Austro Germans were 23.97 of the 
total population of the dual Monarchy and 35.6% of the population 
of Austria only. The Magyars where 20.2% of the population of 
the dual Monarchy and the largest single group in Hungary but no 
the majority. The Czechs, which according to Bauer lost out in 
the constitutional arrangement, were the second largest national 
community in Austria, with 237 of the population and 12.6% of the 
population of the Dual Monarchy as a whole. 6 To strengthen 
their political grip, the Austro German rulers conceded to the 
Poles of Austrian Galicia administrative autonomy. State offi- 
cials in that crownland were to be Poles and the Polish language 
was to be used instead of German in Galician schools.? This 
situation alienated the Yiddish speaking Jews and Ruthenians 
-------------------- 
5.0. Bauer, Geschichte Osterreichs, Vienna 1911, quoted and 
translated by K. Stadler, op. cit. p. 41. 
6.1. Oxaal, The Jews of Pre-1914 Vienna, WorKing Paper, Dept. 
of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Hull 1981 p. 62 
7.0. J2szi, op. cit. p. 109, B. F. Pauley, op. cit. p. 8 
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(Ukrainians) of Galicia, that together constituted in 1900 54% 
of the total Galician population. 8 This concession to the Poles 
also deeply antagonised the. Czech nationalist leadership, since 
the main demand of the Czech nationalist movement was to recover 
for Bohemia the status of historical Kingdom (Staatrecl, t), with a 
similar degree of political and national autonomy as the Magyars 
had in Hungary or the Austro Germans had in Austria. The coali- 
tion between Austro Germans and Poles, effectively neutralised 
the political influence of the Czechs. The problem was also com- 
plicated by the fact that within Bohemia there was a large German 
speaking minority and a substantial number of Czechs residing 
outside the historical boundaries of Bohemia. In this situa- 
tion, the Czech nationalists resented the German presence in 
Bohemia, considering the Bohemian Germans as "colonists", even if 
their presence in Bohemia dated back several centuries, On the 
other hand, the Bohemina Pan Germanic (Deutschnational) activists 
considered themselves as the Herrenvolk (master race) and accord- 
ing to Pauley regarded the Czech language as "a mere dialect 
suitable only for peasants and servants"9. The result of this 
situation was that the Czech nationalists were often blocking and 
filibustering legislation in the Austrian parliament, and the 
pan-Germans were equally bent on obstructing the provincial diet 
in Prague. When in 1897 it was decided that all civil servants 
in Bohemia should be bilingual, this brought bitter complaints 
from the Germans who felt discriminated against by this legisla- 
tion since a large number of Czechs were conversant in German, 
but not vice-versa. Another problem was that the demand that 
civil servants should be bilingual in Bohemia rekindled similar 
demands by other national communities, particularly the UK- 
8. I. Oxaal, op. Cit. P. 74. For a detailed analysis of the 
demographic structure of the Galician population see Oxaal ibid. 
pp"72-76. 
9. B. F. Pauley, op. cit. p. 17 
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rainians in Galicia. 10 To complicate matters further, towards 
the end of the century Austria experienced a process of rapid in- 
dustrialisation and related social change. By the turn of the 
century, the industries of Lower Austria and Bohemia reached a 
stage of development similar to those in England and Germany. 
Austrian coal production increased at a phenomenal rate and on 
the eve of World War I Austria stood in sixth place in the world 
production of iron. 11. In Austria, during 1903 -1913 the rate of 
industrial growth was higher than in Great Britain or Germany at 
the same period, but this apparently high rate of growth con- 
cealed a pronounced process of differential industrial develop- 
ment taxing place concurrently with a long process of agricul- 
tural decline, causing a large internal migration towards newly 
industrialised areas, in particularly towards industrialised 
areas of Bohemia and the capital, Vienna. This process exacer- 
bated further the unresolved ethno national tensions, for it 
diluted the territorial concentration of the conflicting national 
communities. It would, however, be incorrect to say that in- 
dustrialisation was the cause of national tensions since the 
problem pre-existed the process of industrialisation. The 
upheavals of differential development only aggravated an already 
existing problem. The Bohemian case provides a good example of 
this. In 1851 in Bohemia there were five towns with over 10.000 
inhabitants, by the turn of the century there were forty three. 
this process of urbanisation and industrialisation had predict- 
ably a profound effect in the ethno-cultural composition of 
Bohemia. as Zeman puts it: 
-------------------- 
10. Manuel Garcia Pelayo, La teoria de la nacitn en Otto Bauer, 
Politea, Mexico 
11, Z. A. B. Zeeman, The Twilight of the Habsburgs, Purnell & 
Sons. London 1971 p. 33 
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Early in the 19th century, Germans and Czechs lived side by 
side in sharply defined and separate settlements. The 
Czechs held with the exception of the towns, the central 
districts; The Germans surrounded them in an arc running 
through the border territories of Bohemia and Moravia. That 
situation changed with the growth of the local industries 
which made no national discrimination in its demand for 
labour; it was calculated that in 1900 Czech labour was 
three times as mobile as German. In the Czech districts, 
the urban population became mainly Czech, and the balance 
started changing even in the German border areas. 12 
In Vienna, population changes were equally dramatic. In 
1857 the population of the capit al was 476,220 while in 1910 it 
was 2,031,498. In other words, the population increased more 
four times in fifty three years13 . As Oxaal argues, the process 
of economic expansion and liberal democratic reform was at the 
root of this massive migration, which had its symbolic expression 
in the destruction of the inner city walls in 1858. With the 
migration of peoples from all four corners of the Empire, Vienna 
was converted into a lively and cosmopolitan city. Towards the 
end of the nineteenth century Vienna experienced an intellectual, 
artistic and aesthetic development with few comparisons in the 
history of European culture. The names of Strauss, Schoenberg 
and Mahler in music, Gustav Klimt and Oskar Kokoschka in paint- 
ing, Otto Wagner and Adolf Loos in architecture and town plan- 
ning, S. Zweig and R. Musil in L iterature, Sigmund Freud14 , the 
12. Z. A. B. Zeman, op. cit. p. 35 
13. I. Oxaal, op. cit. P. 60 
14. Bauer was a personal friend of Freud, and his sister was one 
of the famous patients of the founder of psychoanalysis. She was 
refered to in Freud's writings with the ficticious name of 
"Dora". 
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founder of psychoanalysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Ernst Mach in 
Philosophy, Otto Bauer and Max Adler in Marxist theory - these 
are just but a few examples. of the extraordinary legacy of in- 
tellectual and cultural diversity of turn of the century Vienna15 
But turn of the century Vienna also witnessed the erosion 
of the progressive values that gave way to this extrordinary cul- 
tural reneissance. The development of the multi-ethnic and mul- 
ticultural environment that made possible this cultural and in- 
tellectual development was deeply resented by conservative Pan 
Germans (Deutschnational), incapable of adapting to the changing 
pace of life and nostalgically yearning for a "pure" German past. 
This nostalgic backlash took the form of bitter controversies 
over schools in languages other than German (particularly Czech), 
bilingual notices, and place names. This situation moved Victor 
Adler, the veteran socialist leader and founding member of the 
All Austrian Socialist Party, to say that In Austria, the ques- 
tion of names of railway stations had become one of principle of 
the most important kind16. But for the Pan-Germans, the 
presence of ethnic minorities in "their" Vienna was a constant 
irritation and a source psychological insecurity in a multicul- 
tural environment. 17 The frustrations and nostalgia of the Pan- 
-------------------- 
15. For a discussion of this extraordinary intellectual and cul- 
tural environment see Carl. E. SchorsKe, Fin de SiBcle Vienna 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1980, on Wittgenstein see A. 
JaniK and S. Toulmin Wittgenstein Vienna, London Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson 1973 
16. James Jolt, The Second International, op. cit. P. 122 
17. K. Stadler, op. cit. p. 67. For 
tial integration of Vienese Jews see 
Social Life in Vienna, in Oxaal. op. 
Schmidtbauer, "Zur sozialen Situation 
1857" in Studia Judaica Austriaca, 
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the high levels of residen- 
I. Oxaal, Aspects of Jewish 
cit. pp 55-117 and Peter 
der Wiener Juden in Jahre 
VI, pp. 57-91 
ý' i 
Germans were displaced in the form of a pathological hatred of 
the less cohesive and politically weaKest ethnic minority: the 
Vienese Jews. The multicultural environment of Vienna moved a 
young Pan-German from the Austrian provinces, Adolf Hitler, to 
say: 
Deutschösterreich muss wieder zurücK zum grossen deutschen 
Mutterlande... Gleiches Blut gehört in ein gemeinsames 
Reich18 
The sense of ethnic insecurity of Pan-German Austrians vis- 
a-vis both, the multicultural environment of late imperial 
Vienna, and the then recently united German state was to become 
later, in the words of Professor Stadler, the original home of a 
particularly virulent and cruel brand of Nazism19. But even 
long before the emergence of the Nazi party, Austrian politics 
witnessed the emergence of a nostalgic and racist party in the 
Christian Social Movement20, that was to become the main politi- 
cal rival of the Socialist Gesamptpartei, the only truly multina- 
tional political organisation in late Imperial Austria. The 
virulent anti-semitism that characterised the Christian Social 
Movement was according to Boyer 
-------------------- 
18. German Austria must return to the great German mother- 
land-People of the same blood belong in the same Reich Adolf 
Hitler, Mein Kampf p. 1 quoted in the original German by K. Stad- 
ler op. cit. Austria, p. 70 
19. K. Stadler, op. cit. P. 67 
20. For a detailed discussion of the Christian Social Movement 
and its charismatic leader Karl Lueger see John Boyer, Political 
Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna, University of Chicago Press, 
1981 
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... an exceedingly complex defense mechanism against unwar- 
ranted social change, but one which functioned in very dif- 
ferent ways depending upon the actor group involved. It was 
not the only issue which brought ultimate victory to Lueger 
and his party in 1896, even if it did provide a useful ini- 
tial principle of organisation and cohesion in the early 
days of the movement. 21 
As the study by Oxaal shows, the Jewish Population of Vienna 
was culturally, occupationally and residentially diverse. There 
was a profound cultural gap between the intellectual and German 
speaKing strata from which major leaders of the socialist party 
emerged, and the recently arrived Yiddish speaking traditional 
Jews from the Eastern crownlands, Galicia and Bukovina. There 
was no Jewish ghetto as such, Jews lived in different parts of 
the city and in occupational terms 
For every one Jew so employed [as money dealers] in Austria 
in 1900 it appears that four Catholics were engaged in a 
trade which was fundamental to the perpetuation of the 
Jewish stereotype.... The data on Jewish occupations in 
Vienna, far from suggesting that they were unique and un- 
representative indicate that many of Jews held positions 
which were typical of the occupational structure of the 
city. 22 
In other words, "Jewish homogeneity" only existed in the 
minds of the Vienese anti-semites and the emerging Zionist 
movement. 23 A large number of prominent leaders of the Austrian 
-------------------- 
21. J. Boyer, op. cit. p. X-XI 
22. I. Oxaal, op. cit. pp 111-112 
23. Theodor Herzt, the founder of the Zionist Movement was a 
Budapest born, German speaking journalist working during this 
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Socialist party were of Jewish extraction (including Bauer 
himself), and this situation had a profound impact in the con- 
tradictory anti-semitic stereotaping, since at times Jews were 
stereotyped as "greedy capitalists" and on other occasions as %od- 
less revolutionary socialists" to fit the image of the socialist 
party. 24 Antisemitism has not dissapeared in contemporary 
Austria even if the Jewish population is very small, the 
"Waldheim affair" is eloquent proof of this. 25 
-------------------- 
period in the Viennese newspaper Neue Freie Presse. The First 
Zionist congress took place in Basle in 1897, the same year that 
Karl Lueger, the anti-semitic leader of Christian Social Movement 
became the mayor of Vienna. For the ideological connection be- 
tween Zionism and Anti-Semitism see Moshe Machover and Mario Of- 
fenberg, Zionism and its Scarecrows in Khamsin 6,1978 pp 33-59 
and N. Weinstock Zionism, False Messiah, Inklinks, London 1978 
24. For a detailed analysis of the contradictory nature of the 
anti-semitic narrative see Jean Pierre Faye, Los Lenguajes 
Totalitarios spanish translation of Therie du r1%_ cit, Introduction 
aux Langages Totalitaires, Taurus Ediciones, Madrid 1974, and 
Jean Pierre Faye, Migrations du Recit sur le Peuple Juif, Collec- 
tion "Elements", Paris 1974 
25. For a controversial discussion of the antisemitic echos of K. 
Waldheim's electoral campaign, see R. A. Berman, "Fascinating 
Vienna" in Telos 68, summer 1986 pp. 7-38. On page 30 of this 
article Berman argues: ... The centrality of anti-semitism in Nazi 
ideology hardly needs to be pointed out; its virulence in the 
same turn of the century Vienna which gave birth to the cultural 
wealth now making way through the museums of the world is more 
significant. Waldeheim is a direct heir to Lueger, both exponents 
of an Austrian political anti-semitism framing the Vienna fas- 
cination. While it is important to recognize the anti-Semitic 
dimension of Waldeheim's electoral campaign, the pseudo- 
psychonalitic explanation offered in Berman's article appears to 
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The young Hitter detested the multicultural environment 
of turn of the century Vienna. He often referred to it as Ras- 
senbabylon and Stadt der Blutschande (City of Incest), which ac- 
cording to Professor Stadler, shows Hitler's lacK of competence 
on the subtleties of the German language, since the term 
"Blutschande" (incest) denotes the very opposite of what he meant 
- The shameful pollution of German blood with foreign26 
As with the contemporary relvance of the ongoing discussion 
on the conceptualisation of the national phenomenon in the Mar- 
xist theory, the debate about the nature of multicultural Vienna 
is also not without its contemporary manifestations. The follow- 
ing letter to "The Times" from Emeritus Professor F. Hayek on the 
occasion of Mrs. Thatchers speech about being "swamped by alien 
peoples", gives a unique insight into the nostalgic thinking of 
those who cannot find their place in a pluralist environment. 
The importance of the argument for both the nationalities ques- 
tion in Late imperial Vienna, and contemporary debates on multi- 
culturalism in Britain and In Australia, merits the full 
reproduction of this letter. 
From Professor F. A. Hayek FBA 
Sir, Nobody who has lived through the rise of the violent 
anti-semitism which led to Hitler can refuse Mrs. Thatcher 
-------------------- 
be more of an outdated cliche than an original, let alone con- 
vincing, argument. For a more interesting discussion of the turn 
of the century Austrian cultural life, see A. Ajtony, "Vienna and 
Budapest, Complementary Figures at the turn of the century" in 
the same issue of Telos, pp 137-150 
26. K. Stadler, Austria, op. cit. p. 67 
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admiration for her courageous and outspoken warning. When I 
grew up in Vienna before World War I the established Jewish 
families were generally a respected group progressively 
merging with the rest of the population and all decent 
people would frown upon the occasional anti-Jewish outburst 
of a few popular politicians. ' In fact the only serious 
nationalistic agitation I can remember from that time was 
directed against the Czechs who had been streaming into 
Vienna in large numbers and were beginning to create their 
own schools. 
It was the sudden influx of large numbers of Galician and 
Polish Jews, fleeing before the invading Russians, which in 
a short period changed the attitude through 4 large part of 
society. They were too visibly different to be readily ab- 
sorbed in what was still a fairly homogeneous population. 
was shocked on my visits to Vienna in the early 1930's to 
find people who had not long before regarded as indecent any 
anti-semitic remark (including a good many people of Jewish 
descent) arguing that, though they detested Hitler, they had 
to agree with his anti-semitic policies - which of course, 
had not yet revealed their most dreadful forms.. 
I am, etc. 
FA HAYEK27 
Clearly, even Emeritus Professors of Economics and Nobel 
Prize winners are not immune to the poisonous curse of European 
racism. 28 
------- 
27. The 
------------- 
Times letters to the Editor, Saturday February 11,1978. 
quoted in 1. Oxaal, op. cit. P. 7 
28. Similar arguments are sustained by contemporary nostalgic 
detractors of Multiculturalism, in the British case this is sus- 
tained by Enoch Powell and his associates and in the -Australian 
case by Professor G. Blainey and his associates. 
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The Specificity of Austrian Socialism 
Given this situation of intense ethnic hatred and national 
confrontation, it becomes clear 'why the socialist party had to 
devote a great deal of intellectual and political resources to 
deal with the problem. An added difficulty for the Austrian 
socialist movement was that, as was shown in Chapter 2, Marx and 
Engels developed in the course of the 1848 revolutions a crude, 
misinformed and uncompromising stance on the nationalities 
problem of the Habsburg Empire. Marx and Engels professed, to 
put it mildly, a profound "ethnic antipathy" towards the Czechs, 
Croats and other slavic national communities lumped together in 
an imaginary unit called called "South Slavs". They used the 
hegelian concept of "Historyless Peoples" (Geschichtslosen 
Vo1Ker), to conceptualise what they considered to be the 
"intrinsically reactionary" nature of this unfortunate peoples, 
whose national existence was considered not "worth surviving" the 
democratic revolutions. The solutions offered by Marx and Engels 
to the "South Slavs" was to either totally assimilate to the 
"superior" German or Magyar nations with "democracy as 
compensation", or to be "obliterated" in the course of the 
democratic struggle. 29 The problem for the turn of the century 
Austrian socialists was that the solutions to the nationalities 
problem in the Habsburg Empire proposed by Marx and Engels circa 
1848 were strikingly similar to the positions held by their con- 
temporary Pan-German (Deustchnational) movement. This situation 
required a radical reappraisal of the nationalities problem in 
29. for a discussion of the concept of " Historyless peoples" and 
the way in which Marx and Engels used it in relation to what they 
called "South Slavs" see Chapter 2, p. 66 If. and R. RosdolsKy 
op. cit. F. Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen" Völker; 
R. Kann The Multinational Empire, op. cit. Vol 1 Chapter XVI, pp 
40-51 
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Austria, and this was initially achieved, as it will be shown in 
a moment, in the party congresses of Vienna-Wimberg and Brno 
(Br(nn). 
Socialism in Austria did not begin with the formation of the 
All Austrian Socialist Party (Gesamtpartei). In German Austria, 
the socialist movement grew out of the Arbeiterbildungsverein, or 
societies for the cultural improvement of the working class. This 
characteristic of the embryonic socialist movement had, according 
to Rabinbach, a profound impact in the subsequent development of 
the party since it never abandoned its pedagogical and educa- 
tional role. 30 At the same time, a number of socialist organisa- 
tions emerged among the Czech workers and other non-German na- 
tional communities, who where nevertheless suspicious of the Ger- 
man socialist organisation, given the national antagonisms out- 
lined above. The process of rapid industrialisation experienced 
by several Austrian regions was a fertile ground for the forma- 
tion of an All Austrian socialist party, but nationalist and 
ideological dissensions, coupled with repressive measures of the 
Austrian regime, only permitted the formation of a united party 
in Hainfeld, a sleepy village south of Vienna, in 1889, and this 
thanks to the intense efforts of Viktor Adler. 31 The socialist 
party was defined to be "Whole Austrian" (Gesamtösterreischen), 
or as it was later called "Gesamtpartei" (whole party), in order 
to indicate the multinational nature of the organisation. With 
the possible exception of the army and bureaucracy, the 
30. A. Rabinbach, The Crisis of Austrian Socialism, University of 
Chicago Press, 1983 p. 7 
31. Kurt L. Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Socialism State 
University of New YorK, 1962 pp. 8-9, A. Rabinbach, The Crisis of 
Austrian Socialism, op. cit. P. 10, W. M. Johnson, The Austrian 
Mind, University of California Press, 1972 p. 99, Manuel Garcia 
Pelayo, op. cit. P. 15. R. Kann, op. Cit. Vol 1, p. 104 
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Gesamtpartei was the only truly multinational entity in the final 
years of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was also, according to 
Kann, the only example in Austrian history of the emergence of a 
major political party that came into existence beyond national 
loyalties32. In the course of its first decade of existence the 
socialist party became an important parliamentary force, after 
the abolition of restrictive ordinances and the establishment of 
male universal suffrage in 1896.33 However, from the moment of 
its formation, the party had to cope with the difficult problems 
of ethno-national divisions within its ranKs. In particular, the 
Czechs socialists resented the high profile of the Germans within 
the party and demanded the establishment of their own trade union 
commission. 34 Initially the demands of the Czech sections of 
the party were resisted by the respected leader Viktor Adler, but 
by 1897, the situation became unsustainable, and the Party as a 
whole began to recognise that the resolution of the national 
question could not be postponed until "the victory of the working 
class" and the need to clearly delimit the position of the party 
vis-a-vis the national question. 35 In this sense, the burdening 
nationalities problem of late imperial Austria, impelled the 
socialist party to relinquish the economic reductionism prevalent 
in most turn of the century socialist parties, and to adopt a 
32. R. Kann, op. cit. Vol 1 p. 104 
33. Kurt L. Shell, The Transformation of Austrian socialism, op. 
cit. P. 11 
34. M. Sully, Continuity and Change in Austrian Socialism, The 
Eternal Quest for the Third Way, Columbia University Press, New 
YorK 1982 p. 13 
35. Hans Mommsen, Die SozialdemoKratie und die 
Nationalitätenf rage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat, Vienna 
Europa Verlag 1963 p. 175-76 
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position more sensitive to national demands. In 1897 the bian- 
nual congress of the Gesamtpartei took place in the Wimberg Hotel 
in Vienna. Following Czech demands, the party decided to trans- 
form itself into a federative organisation of six national 
parties (UKrainian, Czech, Polish, German, Italian and Slovene), 
with a common executive committee36 . This new organisational 
arrangement gave way to an intense and prolonged discussion of 
the theory and strategy of the nationalities question, which cul- 
minated two years later, in the biannual historic congress 1899 
in the Moravian city of Brno (Br(nn). In this congress an 
unusually thorough theoretical and strategic debate on the na- 
tional question took place, which culminated in a number of 
unprecedented theoretical and organisational decisions that sub- 
sequently sent shock waves through the international socialist 
movement. The protocols of the conference maKe fascinating 
reading, 37 since in terms of the economic reductionist logic then 
prevalent in the socialist movement, it made no sense to devote 
an almost entire biannual congress of a working class party to 
discuss the national question. However, in the political cir- 
cumstances of Austria this was the main topic of the conference, 
and the discussion represented a serious attempt to discuss the 
political cultural and theoretical dimensions of the national 
phenomenon. The tension between eoonoruc reductionism and the 
36. J. R. Recalde, La Construccinn de las Naciones, Siglo XXI de 
Espana Editores, Madrid, 1982 p. 279 
37. Protokoll riber die Verhanlungen des Gesamtparteitages der 
sozialdemokratischen Arbeteiterpartei in osterreich Brrinn, Vienna 
1899. All references in this worK are from the spanish transla- 
tion by Conrado Ceretti in op. cit La Segunda Internacional y el 
Problema Nacional y Colonial, pp 181 -217. There is a good 
English summary of the discussion in A. G. Kogan, "The Social 
Democrats and the Conflict of Nationalities in the Habsburg 
Monarchy", Journal of Modern History 21,1949 pp. 204-217. 
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wish to come to grips with the elusive national problem, is best 
exemplified in the opening speech of the official speaker on be- 
half of the executive committee of the Gesamtpartei, J. Seliger. 
He initially argued that it is an "apparent contradiction" for 
the congress of "International Social Democracy in Austria" to 
try to find a "theoretical solution" to the nationalities problem 
in the multinational Empire38, but he then goes on to argue that 
the party's interest in the nationalities question was wholly 
legitimate. It was "the workers who suffered most as a result of 
national strife", and those conditions of national strife 
"prevented the workers from uniting against the bourgeoisie»39. 
In the congress itself there were three detectable positions on 
the national question. The first was the epiphenomenalist posi- 
tion maintained by Prähauser, a delegate from Salzburg, the most 
ethnically homogeneous German city in Austria. Prahauser sup- 
ported Luxemburg's position that the origin of national strife is 
"economic", a dispute among the different sections of the bour- 
geoisie, and as such is of no importance for the workers movement 
that must concentrate on class issues. He was supported by the 
Italian delegate from Trieste, Gerin, who argued that the only 
tasK of Social democracy is to "continue the class struggle" and 
not to indulge on discussions on the national question. On the 
language question, Pr3hauser argued that German will continue to 
be the language of "culture and communication" regardless of the 
opinions of the "Czech comrades»40. This position was however, a 
minority view, and was of no consequence for the final resolu- 
tion. The second the position was sustained by the Slovenian 
delegate Etbin Kristan from Trieste. Kristan argued for the com- 
38. Verhandlungen ... spanish translation, op. cit 184 
39. A. G. Kogan, op. cit p 207, Verhandlungen... Spanish transla- 
tion 0 p. cit. 184-185 
40. ibid, pp. 192 and 200 
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plete separation of the concept of nation from any form of ter- 
ritorial organisation: The executive demands autonomous national 
territories, we demand national autonomy regardless of 
territory41, this position was almost identical to the argument 
sustained by Karl Renner under the pseudonym of "Synopticus" in a 
booklet published in Vienna that same year42. This position was 
Known as the "personality principle"43; it demanded the organisa- 
tion of national communities regardless of the place of 
residence, with a strong emphasis on cultural institutions, 
coupled with non national forms of territorial organisation. 
This position was on the whole supported by delegates from ethno 
national communities that were territorial minorities. Also, ac- 
cording to its proposer, this form of national organisation ac- 
counted for the widespread geographical mobility of workers 
within the boundaries of the Austrian state, that resulted from 
the process of differential industrialisation. This position was 
influential beyond the borders of Austria. It was later adopted 
by the Jewish Bund- in Czarist Russia, since it best suited the 
minority status of Jewish communities. This was the principle of 
"national cultural autonomy", so severely attacked by Lenin and 
Stalin, who wrongly believed as will be shown in a moment, that 
this was the final resolution of the socialist congress at Brno. 
Viktor Adler, the respected leader of the Gesamtpartei opposed 
the motion arguing that while he believed that it was a "very in- 
genious idea", the practicalities of implementing such a complex 
two tier organisational principle was a bureaucratic nightmare. 
-------------------- 
41. ibid P. 198, A. Agnelli, Questione Nazionale e Socialismo, 
Contributo alto studio del pensiero de K. Renner e 0. Bauer, il 
Mulino, Bologna 1969, p. 67 
42. Synopticus, Staat und Nation, Vienna 1899 
43. In the Russian debates, it was called "National-Cultural 
Autonomy". 
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He also believed that the resolution presented by the slovenian 
delegate was self contradictory, because it demanded a federal 
state, and federalism could only by organised on the basis of 
territory. The motion was put to a vote and rejected. 44 The 
third position was presented by the executive committee of the 
Gesamtpartei, which demanded in essence that Austria should be- 
come a democratic federation of autonomous national states. This 
was the position that was finally adopted after the incorporation 
of a number of amendments introduced by the Czech delegates con- 
cerning the German language. The Czechs objected to the original 
executive proposal that German should be considered the common 
language out of practical necessity, because they were unwilling 
to grant any special status to German. The final resolution read 
as follows 
I Austria should be transformed into a democratic federa- 
tion of nationalities (Nationalit&tenbundestaat) 
2 The historic Crownlands shall be replaced by nationally 
delimited, self-governing areas in each of which legis- 
lation and administration should be entrusted to na- 
tional chambers elected on the basis of universal suf- 
frage. 
3 All self-governing regions of one and the same nation 
shall jointly form a single national union which shall 
manage the national affairs on the basis of complete 
autonomy. 
4 The right of minorities should be protected by a spe- 
cial law. 
5 We do not recognise any national privilege and there- 
fore we reject the demand for an official language. 
Parliament will decide as to whether and in what degree 
a common language is necessary. 45 
-------------------- 
44. Verhandlungen... Spanish translation, op. cit. p. 193, A. Ag- 
nelli. op. cit. P. 67-69, A. G. Kogan, op. cit., p. 209 
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From the above it is possible to see why Lenin and Stalin 
were so wrong about the Brno programme. The decision of the con- 
ference was to campaign for the formation of an autonomous and 
multinational federal state, rather than to implement the concept 
of "national cultural autonomy". (Ironically, the Brno programme 
appears to be closer to the letter of the Soviet Constitution, 
than to any other existing form of state organisation). The 
source of the Bolshevik confusion was the so called programme of 
"national cultural autonomy". This last idea was the basis of 
the minority motion of the Slovene delegate Kristan, and it was 
masterminded by Karl Renner, who with Otto Bauer became later 
recognised as the main theoretician on the national question of 
the Gesamtpartei. There are however, a number of significant 
differences between Bauer and Renner. Not only did Bauer belong 
to the left wing of the party, while Renner aligned himself with 
the position within the Gesamtpartei closest to Revisionism, but 
more importantly for the ongoing discussion on the marxist con- 
ceptualisation of the national phenomenon, Renner's project was 
directed towards conceptualising the constitutional rights of na- 
tional communities in multinational states, while Bauer's worK 
was directed towards the historical and theoretical concep- 
tualisation of the national phenomenon. 46 K. Renner only offi- 
-------------------- 
45. Verhandlungen... op. cit. p. 211., A. G. Kogan, op. cit., 
p. 210, H. Konrand, Nationalismus und Internationalismus, 
Europaverlag, Vienna 1976 p. 70 
46. The discussion of the constitutional work on the 
nationalities question of K. Renner is beyond the scope of the 
present work, for an evaluation of Renner see R. Kann, op. cit. 
Vol 2 pp. 157-167 and R. Kann "Karl Renner", Journal of Modern 
History, 23,1951 pp. 243-249. In contrast to Bauer, Renner most 
significant work has been translated into English see K. Renner, 
The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions, Lon- 
don, Routledge & Kegan 1949, reprinted 1976 
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cially joined the socialist party after the Brno congress, and 
because he was a civil servant barred from political activity, he 
published his early works under the pseudonym of "SynoptiKus" and 
"Rudolf Springier". In his famous book "The Right of Nations to 
Self Determination" he considered as his main task: 
to explore and present this internal state order and 
supranational order of law, which should replace the politi- 
cal struggle of the nationalities for power with the orderly 
procedure of court and parliamentary transactions... [the 
purpose is to] materialise the legal concept of nation, 
first within the narrow frameworK of the nationalities 
state, and thus present an example for the future national 
order to manKind. 47 
Consequently, the main task of Renner's work was not to con- 
ceptualise the nation as such, but as Agnelli argues, to find a 
solution to the constitutional problems of Austria on the basis 
of a strictly federalist position, carefully separating the ter- 
ritorial state from national identities48 In the congress of 
47, K. Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungrecht der Nationen in beson- 
derer Anwendung auf Oesterretch, Vienna, 1916, p. 36, quoted by 
R. Kann, op. cit. Vol 2 p. 157. No connection with Lenin's work 
of the same title. 
48. A. Agnelli Questione Nazionale e Socialismo... op. cit. P. 74. 
While this is undoubtedly a most interesting problem, it unfor- 
tunatelly falls beyond the scope of the present work. The author 
hopes to return to this discussion in the near future on a work 
on ethnocentrism and the national state. For the moment it will 
be sufficient to say that Renner's conceptualisation of the con- 
stitutional arragement in a Multinational State, curiously 
resembles the Ottoman Millet system. In a period in which new 
forms of struggle against state centralisation are constantly 
emerging, Renner's project on ethno-national decentralisation 
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Brno, Renner's ideas were only supported by a minority. 
In summarising the positions of pre-Bauer Austrian socialism 
on the national question, it is possible to say that the class 
reductionist Marxist analysis prevalent in the socialist world of 
that time, also found its echo among the leaders of the Austrian 
Socialist Movement. On the one hand, the deep rooted national 
confrontations of the dual monarchy and their paralyzing impact 
in the Austro-Hungarian political life, and on the other hand, 
the profound impact of nationalist ideals in large sections of 
the socialist rank and file, forced the leadership to move out of 
the "traditional" socialist terrain of the political dimension of 
the class struggle to the theoretically virgin and politically 
unknown national arena. This was done reluctantly, to judge 
from the utterances of a number of leading Austrian. socialists. 
It is possible to find a kind of impatience, almost an angry 
reaction to their "bad fortune" in comparison with other "more 
fortunate" socialist parties, particularly in Germany. The 
Austrian socialists deeply resented that they were obliged to 
devote their precious intellectual and revolutionary energies to 
a problem that in their perception had little to do with the 
stated goals of working class politics. As N. Leser argues 
Austrian socialists like all other, were primarily concerned 
with the emancipation of the working class, but their day- 
to-day political work compelled them to acknowledge the 
overwhelming importance of the nationality issue within the 
context of the Habsburg empire. To the bulk of the popula- 
tion these questions were at least and of equal immediate 
concern as the tactics of the class war. 49 
-------------- ------ 
deserves a fresh reconsideration. 
49. Norbert Leser, Austro-Marxism, a reappraisal, Journal of Con- 
temporary History, 11,1976, p. 134 
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There is a profound paradox in this situation. From the 
Austrian Socialist Party's reluctant engagement in an intellec- 
tual and political debate with nationalism, and from their not 
less reluctant but concerted effort in coming to grips with the 
national phenomenon -instead of the more "normal" issues of work- 
ing class politics -a theoretical and political analysis " of un- 
par. alleled sophistication emerged. While the conditions of 
"combined and uneven development" produced in Czarist Russia 
highly innovative ways in conceptualising the political struggle 
in the Marxist tradition, the political nightmare of the national 
struggles in the collapsing dual monarchy, produced some of the 
most theoretically sophisticated Marxist discussions of the na- 
tional phenomenon. This was not the result of unqualified sup- 
port for the national causes, as the Bolshevik detractors were 
quick to argue - there was, in fact, no love lost between the 
Austrian socialists and nationalist movements. It was rather 
that the Socialist Party of Austria (Gesamptpartei) realized that 
without tackling the national question head on, without develop- 
ing a thorough political and intellectual understanding of the 
national phenomenon, an understanding that was so conspicuously 
absent in the classical Marxist tradition, they where condemned 
to political paralysis and oblivion under the raising tide of 
nationalism. 
In tackling this burdensome problem, Austrian socialism 
prepared the ground for the development of a theory of the nation 
in the work of Otto Bauer -a theory of the nation that 
transcended the political and intellectual limitations of the 
nationalist bickering of the decaying Habsburg monarchy, to be- 
come the patrimony of the universal heritage of the Marxist 
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tradition. As it be shown in chapter 7, in order to think a 
theory that encapsulated the multidimensionality of the national 
phenomenon, Bauer had to implicitly break with the fundamental 
canons of economism. Thus in the introduction to his monumental 
work Bauer argues: 
The national community is one of the most complex social 
phenomena, with a vast array of different social manifesta- 
tions. For this reason, to understand how linkage to the 
national community shapes the will of the working class on 
struggle, it becomes ess ential to consider the pro blem from 
different angles. If we do not wish to r elinquish such a 
tasK, we must risk ven turing beyond our narrow disciplinary 
boundaries. 50 
From this it is clear that for Bauer the political impos- 
sibility in locating the multidimensional national phenomenon in 
terms of the traditional corporatist politics of turn of the cen- 
tury Marxist socialist movement, as well as the intellectual im- 
possibility of conceptualising this elusive phenomenon in terms 
of the orthodox canons of classical Marxist thought, created the 
condition for a decisive but never explicitly acknowledged - let 
alone conceptualised - breaK with all forms of economism. In or- 
der to understand the intellectual conditions for the development 
of this unacknowledged breaK with economism, a brief discussion 
of the "Austro-Marxist" debate with neo-Kantianism is required. 
-------------------- 
50. OBW, Vol 1, op. Cit. P. 49 
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The Theoretical Impact of Austro-Marxism51 
The theoretical development of Austro-Marxism is perhaps one 
of the most interesting political paradoxes taKing place in fin 
de siecle Vienna. For as M. Sully perceptively argues, 52 in 
Vienna a curious combination of cultural and intellectual 
creativity symbioticaly co-existed side by side with an obsolete 
and decaying social and political order. Bauer himself locates 
the emergence of the Austro-Marxist tradition, in the response 
developed by a young generation of intellectuals and political 
activists to the theoretical criticism of classical Marxism in 
turn of the century in Austro-Hungary. 53 In this sense it is 
very important not to confuse Austro-Marxism with the Austrian 
Socialist Party since the development of the two does not coin- 
cide. During the formative years of the party the most influen- 
tial current of thought was Kautsky's orthodox interpretation of 
classical Marxism, a position they shared with the majority of 
socialist parties affiliated to the Second International. 
54 The 
-------------------- 
51. According to 0. Bauer the term "Austro -Marxism" was first 
coined by an american socialist L. Boudin who in 1907 published 
The Theoretical System of K. Marx, a booK defending classical 
Marxism from Revisionism and the Austrian marginal utility school 
of economics. See Bottomore, op. cit. Austro-Marxism, op. cit. 
p. 1 and p. 45 
52. M. A. Sully, Continuity and Change in Austrian Socialism, The 
Eternal Quest for the Third Way, op. cit. p. 1 
53. O. Bauer, "was ist Austromarxismus? ", in the organ of the 
Austrian Socialist Party Arbeiter-Zeitung on 3 November 1927. 
translated and reproduced by T. Bottomore (ed. ) Austro-Marxism, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978, p. 45. see also G. Marramao, 
Austromarxismo e Socialismo di Siniestra fra le due Guerre, La 
Pietra, Milan 1977, p. 11 
273 
emergence of Austro-Marxism as a distinctive intellectual ap- 
proach within the Marxist tradition must be understood equally as 
a generational reaction against the ossification of the 
"traditional orthodoxy" of KautsKy, as critical reaction to 
Bernstein's revisionism and the powerful intellectual critique of 
orthodox Marxism from the neo-Kantian "ethical socialists" of 
the Marburg School, and as a response to the criticism of Marxist 
economic theory from the Viennese "Marginalist School" of 
economics. The leading Austro-Marxists grew up in the socialist 
student movement of the university of Vienna, and it is from 
there that they engaged in the political activities of the 
Austrian Social Democratic Party55 Bauer locates the origin of 
the school in the activities of 
A group of young Austrian comrades active in scholarly re- 
search ... They were united not so much by a specific politi- 
cal orientation as by the particular nature of their 
scholarly work. They had all grown up in a period when men 
such as Stammler, Windelband, and Rickert were attacking 
Marxism with philosophical arguments; hence they were 
obliged (felt the need) to engage in the controversy with 
the representatives of modern philosophical trends.... living 
in the old Austria rent by national struggles, they had to 
learn to apply the Marxist conception of history to very 
complicated phenomena which defied analysis by any superfi- 
cial or schematic application of the Marxist method. Thus 
there developed within Marxism a narrower (spiritual) intel- 
-------------------- 
54. G. Marramao, Austromarxismo e Socialismo di Siniestra..., op. 
cit. P. 13 
55. T. Bottomore (ed. ), Austro Marxism, editor's introduction p. 
3, G. Marramao, Austromarxismo e Socialismo di Siniestra.. ", in- 
troductory essay, op. cit. p. 10 
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lectual community (Geistesgemeinschaft) which has been 
called "Austro-Marxism" This is intended precisely to dis- 
tinguish itself on the one side from the (previous) gener- 
ation of Marxists represented above all by KautsKy, Mehring 
and Cunow, and on the other side, from contemporary schools 
of Marxism in other countries, above all the Russian and the 
Dutch schools... (emphasis added)56 
The Austro-Marxists operated as an influential theoretical 
and political grouping within the party up to World War I. After 
the war Otto Bauer became the general secretary of the party and 
the members of the group tooK different positions in the context 
of the then ongoing debates within the socialist movement. The 
term Austro-Marxism then became in the usage of Austrian politics 
a term of abuse, equivalent to "extremism" and used mainly by the 
right to vilify the Austrian socialist movement. Professor Bot- 
tomore argues the first decade an a half of the twentieth century 
was the most brilliant intellectual period in the history of 
Austro-Marxism57 . In 1903 Max Adler and other members of the 
group constituted in the educational tradition of the Austrian 
Socialist Party, the Zukunft-Verein, an educational academy for 
workers. The Austro-Marxist Group also began to hold regular 
meetings in the Cafe Central. In 1907 Bauer and Renner founded 
the journal Der Kampf to give expression to the innovative views 
of the Austro-Marxist Geistesgemeinschaft. The publication of 
Der Kampf also denotes a political and theoretical distancing 
from the editorial policies of KautsKy and the Neue Zeit, since 
-------------------- 
56. Otto Bauer, Was ist Austro-Marxismus? in Arbeiter Zeitung,, 3 
November 1927, translated into English by T. Bottomore in op. 
cit. Austro-Marxism, p. 45-46 and into Italian by G. Marramao, in 
op. cit. Austromarxismo e Socialism di Sinistra, p. 12. Words in 
parenthesis appear only in the Italian translation. 
57. T. Bottomore, op. cit. P. 13 
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all members of the group had been regular contributors to that 
journal. This distancing will be later reflected in KautKy's 
polemics with Bauer over the national question. But above all, 
it was in the Marx-Studien series edited by Max Adler and R. Hil- 
ferding, that most influential works for the theoretical develop- 
ment of Marxism were published. In volume I Max Adler's Causality 
and Teleology and Karl Renner's 
. 
Social Functions - of Juridical In- 
stitutions were published, Volume 2 was - Otto Bauer's 
Nationalities Question, Volume 3 was Hilferding's Finance Capital 
Volume 4 was Max Adler's The Marxist Conceptualisation of the 
State. It will be impossible in the context of this worK to do 
justice to the richness, originality and variety of the Austro- 
Marxist contribution to the development of Marxist theory, but in 
a very general sense it is possible to say that what charac- 
terises Austro-Marxism is not so much an homogeneous approach to 
crucial problems for Marxist theory, but, as Bauer argues, the 
awareness of the complexity of the problems under discussion, 
witch defied monocausal or one-dimensional explanations. The 
second important characteristic of Austro-Marxism was that it at- 
tempted to engage in a serious debate with non-Marxist political 
and philosophical schools, such as the Austrian marginalist 
school of economics and the neo-Kantian philosophical tradition. 
The third characteristic of Austro-Marxism was its rejection at 
the political level of the dichotomy reform-revolution as ex- 
hausting all categories of political activity. In this sense it 
is possible to see in Austro Marxism a discussion of the com- 
plexities of the political arena which necessarily leads to a 
breaK with epiphenomenalism and class reductionism, and is only 
paralleled in the Marxist theory in the worK of Gramsci. 58 As 
-------------------- 
58. A number of contemporary discussions of Austro Marxism under- 
stand its intellectual heritage as crucial for building a "third 
way" strategy between Revisionism and Marxist-Leninism. This in- 
terpretation supported by the contemporary emergence 
"Eurocommunism" which inevitably draws a number of parallelisms 
with the political project of Austro-Marxism between the two 
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it will be shown in a moment, the debate with the "Ethical 
Socialism" of the Revisionists and socialist Neo Kantians was 
crucial in this endeavor. As Ananiadis argues: 
What constitutes the originality of Austro-Marxism is the 
supercession of the theoretical configuration (economism, 
instrumentalism) that informed the themes of pre war debates 
and fixed their terms in oppositional couplets 
(reform/revolution, parliamentary democracy/dictatorship of 
the proletariat). It is this restructuring of the theoreti- 
cal terrain that made it possible for the Austro-Marxists, 
in the light of the new 'experiences of the labour movement, 
to pose the problem of the relation between socialism and 
democracy in novel terms. 59 
From the point of view of the ongoing discussion on Marxism 
and the national phenomenon, the Austro-Marxist debate with Neo 
Kantianism was crucial in providing the critical categories of 
analysis that permitted Bauer to devise the novel conceptualisa- 
tion of the national phenomenon developed in the 
Nationalit2itenfrage, which, as indicated above, was originally 
published as the second volume of the Marx-Studien. In many 
-------------------- 
world wars. This explains in part the popularity of Austro- 
Marxism in Italy. see D. Albers (ed. ) Otto Bauer und die "Dritte 
Weg" Campus Verlag. FranKfurt 1979. and D. Albers Otto Bauer und 
Antonio Gramsci. for an excellent discussion in English of the 
issues involved in Austro Marxism and the "third way" strategy 
see G. Ananiadis, Austro Marxism and the "Third way" to 
Socialism, unpublished thesis Dept. of Government University of 
Essex 1981. 
59. G. Ananiadis, Austro Marxism and the Third Way to Socialism, 
OP. Cit. p. 1 
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ways, Adler's vigorous debate with Neo Kantianism in Causality 
and Teleology60, in volume 1 of the Marx-Studien series paved the 
way for the conceptual framework of Bauer's discussion. But in 
order to contextualise Adler's arguments, it becomes necessary to 
briefly review the neo-Kantian criticisms of classical Marxism. 
The Neo Kantian Critique of Marxism and Adlers Response 
The turn of the century witnessed a powerful intellectual 
and political attack on classical Marxism. The characteristic of 
this attack was not that it came from reactionary forces, but on 
the contrary, from groups that were in part genuinely interested 
in socialism and saw in the socialist idea a desirable political 
project. Within the organisational context of German socialism, 
Bernsteins revisionism challenged the central tenets of histori- 
cal materialism61 , and at a more sophisticated level outside the 
organisational framework of the socialist movement, in the works 
of the "ethical socialists" of the neo-Kantian Marburg school. 62 
-------------------- 
60. Kausalitat und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft" 
Marx Studien 1, Vienna, Wiener VolKsbuchandlung 1904. all 
references in this work are from the Italian Translation 
Causalit9 e Teleologia nella Disputa sulla Scienza, with an in- 
troduction by R. Racinaro, De Donato Editori, Bari 1976 
61. for a discussion of revisionism see chap. 3 and P. Gay, op. 
cit. The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism. 
62. As P. Gay correctly argues, there is a difference between 
Bernstein's revisionism and Neo Kantian socialism in spite of the 
fact that Bernstein claims adherence to the principles of Kantian 
philosophy in the last chapter of "Evolutionary Socialism". For 
Bernstein " science is free from bias", and "ethics is not a 
Wissenschaft", this is, a subject of disciplined and rational un- 
derstanding. Both claims could be hardly accepted by Neo Kan- 
tians. see P. Gay, op. cit. p. 159. However, it is probably the 
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The neo-Kantian tradition emerged in Germany in the later part of 
the last century. The movement grew rapidly in size to become 
the "nouvelle vogue" of German Philosophy and the basis for 
philosophical training in German universities. The tradition it- 
self had little in common besides a reaction against ir- 
rationalism and materialism, and the idea that philosophy could 
acquire a "scientific status" if it returned to the methodologi- 
cal premises of Immanuel Kant. After World War I, the movement 
rapidly declined, defeated in part by the emerging tide of roman- 
ticism and irrationalism. In terms of the critique of Marxism and 
the Austro-Marxist response, the Marburg school and the so-called 
"Southwestern" or Baden school developed the most influential ar- 
guments. While most members of the Marburg school professed a 
form of "ethical socialism" which made them sympathetic with some 
of the goals but not the practice of the socialist movement, this 
was not the case with the Baden school. They, however, professed 
a greater interest for the historical and cultural sciences than 
other branches of neo-Kantianism, and were a major influence to 
Max Weber and his sociological tradition. This situation made the 
ecounter with Austro-Marxism unavoidable. 
The Marburg school was initiated by Hermann Cohen and his 
disciples, P. Natorp; R. Stammler, whose work is discussed by Ad- 
ler and Bauer; and E. Cassirer. Following the Kantian tradition, 
they understood history and politics as a process of education 
guided by reason and the moral idea of "free men" exercising 
rights and responsibilities in a constitutional state63 They 
-------------------- 
case the Bernstein confuses Neo Kantianism with Empiricism, since 
Epistemological issues had never been Bernsteins strength, and 
this perhaps explains his eclectic approach to Politics. In other 
words, it seems that Bernstein did not properly understand the 
Neo Kantian critique of Marxism. 
63, T. E. Willey, Back to Kant, Wayne State University Press, 
Detroit 1978 p. 103 
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were "bourgeois humanists" and rationalists, and therefore op- 
posed to violent revolutions, believing in human "good nature" 
and reformability. The Marburg school proposed a form of 
"democratic evolutionary socialism" and as such it had a certain 
appeal to revisionist intellectuals. The worK of Cohen, the 
founder of the school was directed to prevent the subordination 
of consciousness to what he called "undifferentiated experience" 
and to protect the "free individual" from all forms of "monism 
and determinism"64 of which "Historical Materialism" was one of 
its most important forms. Cohen firmly believed that truth was 
always in agreement with reason and that the laws of reason are 
independent from experience. As Willey argues, in this situa- 
tion "being" is transformed into the problem of validity, 
metaphysics is replaced by logic, and the realm of being is re- 
placed by the realm of values65 . Cohen's theory of Knowledge is 
the core of' his humanism because the conditions for producing 
-general human culture are found in logic. According to his stu- 
dent, E. Cassirer, what distinguishes critical thought from dog- 
matic thought for Cohen, is the fact that the former never ex- 
presses itself in a merely static way. it is a "living and 
dynamic effort that must always be prepared for a new start". 
Thought is not gegeben (given) but aufgegeben (propounded). It is 
not an immovable center of our intellectual universe, but a con- 
tinual process and endeavor. 66 A common characteristic of both 
Marburg and Baden Neo Kantians was that they agreed in the 
priority of the ethical "Ought" over the phenomenal "Is". One of 
64. ibid., p. 108 
6 5. ibid. 
66. E. Cassirer, "Hermann Cohen", Social Research, 10,1943 p. 
220 
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Cohen's most influential disciples, Rudolf Stammeer, became one 
of the leading legal philosophers in the German world an his 
philosophy of law was criticised by Adler and Bauer. For Stam- 
mler, ethical philosophy begins with the Kantian separation of 
"Is" and "Ought", but he argues that the goals of the "ought" are 
not less real because they cannot be known in experience. They 
are liKe The polar star that guides the mariner67. Willey 
argues that the neo-Kantians went beyond Kant by giving ethical 
ideas a "quasi-ontological status". In this sense, for Cohen, 
Moral law has two meanings "The idea of humanity and the idea of 
socialism". in sharp difference with Marxist socialism, Cohen 
argued that these two ideas have no determinate content since 
they possess the character of "purpose". Humanity and Socialism 
belong to the "Ought", they exist as a mission for man's "moral 
will". The essence of socialism is to be found in the integrity 
of persons and their purposeful role in unfolding moral order. 
For Cohen "Society itself is a moral idea" is the reforming guide 
and principle of world history. Socialism thus becomes in the 
Kantian fashion, a postulate of practical reason, indispensable 
to the coexistence of humans in industrial societies. The dis- 
crepancy between social reality and moral existence is thus only 
overcome through the aim of achieving socialism. 
68 From the 
above brief synthesis of Cohen's idealism, the profound diver- 
gences from Marxism become apparent. Cohen and the neo-Kantians 
in general deplored what they called "Marx monism", since His- 
torical Materialism ignores the all-important separation between 
the "Is" and the "Ought". Since in orthodox Marxism human beings 
do not strive for "ethical goals", but act on behalf of their 
class interests, Marxism represents for the Neo Kantians a "flat 
denial of moral freedom", an odious anathema to their core 
values. For Natorp, a disciple of Cohen, Socialism cannot be 
67. ibid., p. 125 
68. T. E. Willey, Back to Kant, op. cit. p. 113 
281 
produced by fiat; it is only through spiritual and social educa- 
tion aimed towards the "free" development of the individual 
spirit that socialism will be achieved. In a clear reference to 
avant-gardist theories, Natorp argued that the "bilding of 
socialism" cannot be the monopoly of any special elite, but it is 
a process involving "the organic community", of which each in- 
dividual is an integral part. 69 The following description by 
Cassirer of Cohen's rejection of Marxism, is highly symptomatic 
of the Marburg School's general critique of Historical 
Materialism. 
He [Cohen] had the deepest sympathy for the working class; 
he was aware of its needs and he defended its claims. In 
this respect he was always a "socialist", even at a time in 
which a profession of socialism was very dangerous at a Ger- 
man university. But he could never adopt an "orthodox" 
socialism. His whole philosophy was in strongest opposition 
to the fundamental views of Marxism, to "economic 
materialism. " "Who could ever have thought", he remarked in 
one of his papers, "that the great political party which 
fights out the social problem in all its consequences, 
should regard materialism as its true basis and principal 
dogma?. This program and this party grew from the soil of 
idealism. Historical Materialism is the strongest contradic- 
tion to that ethical idealism in which socialism has both 
its theoretical and historical roots. (emphasis added)70 
This criticism of orthodox Marxism had, in spite of claims 
to the contrary by Kautsky, a genuine appeal to many Marxists, 
given that the Marburg neo-Kantian tradition hoisted the banner 
of social justice in what it vaguely defined as "ethical 
-------------------- 
69. ibid. P. 122 
70. E. Cassirer, Hermann Cohen, op. cit. p. 232. 
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socialism". This was particularly the case among those disen- 
chanted by the lacK of fulfillment of the epiphenomenalist 
prophecy of the impending and necessary collapse of capitalism. 
True, Marburg neo-Kantians, were denounced as "petty bourgeois 
ideologues" and "metaphysical idealists", but it was only in the 
worKs of the Austro-Marxists that a serious counter criticism 
beyond stereotypes and cliches was attempted. 71 Max Adler 
attempted a defense of Marxism at very philosophical terrain in 
which this school emerged, the Neo Kantian philosophy. But before 
evaluating Adlers argument a brief review of the Baden school of 
Neo Kantianism is required. 
In sharp contrast with the Marburg school, the Baden or 
Southwestern Neo Kantian school had almost no interest in con- 
crete socialist problems, and their involvement in concrete 
political issues was Kept to a minimum. In spite of this, their 
methodological discussions had a not insubstantial impact in the 
future development of history and the social sciences, par- 
ticularly in major methodological and epistemological issues that 
subsequently became the point of departure the Weberian tradition 
in sociology. The founder of the school was Wilhem Windelband, 
who became the most eminent historian of philosophy in the German 
world of his time. The other important figure of the Baden school 
was Heinrich Rickert, the great systems builder of the school, 
who became Windelband's successor in Heidelberg. In his previous 
appointment, in Freiburg, he developed a long and intellectually 
influential friendship with Max Weber, The main concerns of Win- 
delband and Rickert was to develop a theory of values that will 
delineate the boundaries between what in German is called Natur- 
-------------------- 
71. Lenin's main philosophical work Materialism and Em- 
pirocriticism, only makes passing references to the Neo-Kantians, 
since the bulk of the work is directed to polemise with Russian 
followers of Avenarious and Mach, who where not strictly speaK- 
ing, neo-Kantians. 
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wissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaften72, However, Windelband 
himself referred to what in English is normally called natural 
sciences as "nomothetic sciences"; and the humanities and social 
sciences he called "idiographic sciences". As opponents of his- 
toricism and relativism, the two founding members of the Baden 
school argued for the "universal nature" of values. In this 
sense, in producing guidelines for the historians, Windelband 
states that the historian should asK: Through what impulses of 
thought in the course of historical movement are the principles, 
which we use today to understand and judge man and his world 
scientifically, brought to consciousness and improved? 73. This 
question is directed to dispel the influence of the Hegelian 
logos in historical analysis by developing a form of "empathetic 
understanding", and in this sense it shows remarkable 
similarities with Dilthey's "Verstehen" method. However, in 
72. This terms are normally translated as "natural sciences" and 
"cultural sciences", however the english translation is only an 
approximation since the words "Wissenschaft" and "science" are 
not exactly equivalent. The word "Wissenschaft" is far more com- 
prehensive than the English equivalent normally used. P. Gay 
correctly argues the German term refers to any discipline which 
attempts to establish a system, generality, or some definite 
method. "Science" on the other hand is largely limited to the 
natural sciences of physics, chemistry, etc. with their special 
methodology which stresses induction and empirical content Peter 
Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic socialism, op. cit. P. 157 see 
also H. Stuart Hughes Consciousness & Society. The Harvester 
Press, 1979 p. 195. Consequently "ethics" and "logic" are Wis- 
senschaften but not "sciences". This situation is symptomatic of 
the intellectual paradigms that dominated the German and English 
intellectual life at the time of the consolidation of their 
respective languages. 
73. quoted in T. E. Witley, op, cit., Back to Kant, p. 134 
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spite of important similarities, the Kantian rationalism of the 
founders of the Baden school prevented a full agreement with Dil- 
they over this issue. Both Dilthey and the Baden neo-Kantians, 
believed that a methodology of history first required a critique 
of consciousness, and they also agreed that the historian seeks 
"meaning" and "significance"in the events under historical 
analysis. But there is an important difference of emphasis: for 
Dilthey "meanin " is the fundamental category, so he attaches 
great importance to "Verstehen"; for Rickert and Windelband 
"valuing" is the fundamental category. In this sense, for the 
Baden neo-Kantians the conceptualisation of universal values is 
of primordial importance, and a careful analysis of the role of 
"value" (wert) is required. In their discussions, the concept as- 
sumes a double function: it is the principle that defines the 
unity of all "scientific Knowledge", and at the same time it is 
also the principle that defines the scope of "meaning" of that 
scientific Knowledge. In this sense, a system of values not only 
reflects the presuppositions of the sciences, but also their 
goa174. Windelband goes then to argue that within the framework 
of of what we may call today "social sciences" historical and 
human facts are not only singular and unique, concerned with un- 
repeateble phenomena; they are also teleological. They always 
relate to "meaning" and "purpose" because as single, never recur- 
ring events they posses inherent value. The task of "human 
sciences" is not to explain "human facts" but to understand them 
in terms of the motives and experiences of the human beings con- 
cerned. This last idea had a profound impact on the work of M. 
Weber. Max Adler in "Causality and Teleology" subsequently 
criticised Windelbands arguments. about the teleological nature 
-------------------- 
74. P. Heintel, "Neo Kantianism" in C. D. Renning (ed. ) En- 
cyclopaedia of Marxism, Communism and Western Society, New York, 
Herder & Herder, 1972 p. 101, H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and 
Societ , op. cit. pp. 183-200., 
T. E. Willey, BacK to Kant, op. 
cit. P. 137 
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of the historical sciences. KolakowsKi argues that according to 
Windelband and Rickert, the teleological viewpoint applies to 
natural sciences too, but in a more restricted sense. 75 Crucial 
to the arguments of the Baden school was the idea that all 
Knowledge involves the adoption and rejection of judgments, the 
attainment of "truth" being the supreme objective. Against all 
forms of relativism Rickert argued that to recognise truth, is 
also to recognise general obligation. The value of "truth" does 
not derive from science, but on the contrary, it is a precondi- 
tion to it. The work of Rickert was also of great intellectual 
influence on Max Weber, particularly on the arguments about mean- 
ing and value. He defined cultural values in the following way: 
In regard to values considered in themselves, one cannot asK 
weather they are real, but only whether they are valid. A 
cultural value is either actually accepted as valid by all 
men, or its validity... is at least postulated by some 
civilised human being. Furthermore, civilisation or culture 
in the highest sense must be concerned not with values at- 
tached to objects of mere desire, but with excellences 
which ... we feel ourselves more or less "obliged" to esteem 
and cultivate for the saKe of the society in which we live 
76 
In " Causality and Teleology", and other worKs on the epis- 
temology of the social sciences, Max Adler criticises both the 
works of the Neo Kantians of the Marburg and Baden Schools as 
well as the orthodoxy of classical Marxism. His criticisms are 
developed at two 
---- 
levels: one directed 
--- 
against the economism of 
------------- 
75. L. KolaKowski, Main Currents of Marxism, op. cit. Vol. 2 p. 
259 
76. H. Rickert, Science and History: a Critique of Positivist 
Epistemology, translated by G. Reisman Princeton, 1962, p. 19; 
quoted by T. E. Willey, Back to Kant, op. Cit. P. 147 
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the Second International, and in the later works, of Marxism- 
Leninism; and the other against the transcendental idealism of 
the neo-Kantians. This is done by using the kantian "critical" 
methodology to criticise epiphenomenalist notions of economic 
determination and rejecting classical notions of historical 
materialism. At a second level of analysis, Adler criticises the 
idealist transcendentalism of the Neo Kantians by sustaining the 
non reducible specificity of social processes; in particular, by 
arguing that the fundamental neo kantian concepts of "truth" and 
"value" are meaningless outside an "a priori" socialised exist- 
ence. Adler's work represents a major contribution to the 
development of Marxist and sociological theories and as such it 
is regrettable that no English translation is available. 77 
The point of departure of Adler's analysis is what he con- 
siders to be the neo-Kantian misinterpretation of Marxism as a 
form of "materialist economic history". In this sense, he 
rejects Rickert and Stammler's accusation of "one sided 
materialism" and that "historical materialism conceives ideologi- 
cal phenomena as a by product of economic relations" by arguing 
that Marxism by virtue of being a "science" (Wissenschaft) 
rejects every form of essentialism. Marxism is a 
"sociological" theory, meaning by this a theory of the social 
processes, and as such, according to Adler, incompatible with any 
form of "materialist metaphysics" -a position that privileges 
"material" over "social" relations. 78 For Adler, Marxism has 
-------------------- 
77. A good summary of Adler's work could be find in L. 
Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, vol 2 op. cit. pp 258-268 
and in T. Bottomore Austro-Marxism, op. cit. p. 15-22 and ex- 
cerpts from "Causality and Teleology" and other works in pp. 57- 
78 
78. Peretz Merhav, "Marxismo e NeoKantianismo in Max Adler" in 
Storia del Marxismo Contemporaneo, Istituto Feltinelli, Turin 
1974 p. 394 
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nothing to do with materialism as a metaphysical system. He 
thought that this was a misunderstanding that resulted from the 
unfortunate use of the term "historical materialism" and because 
Marx himself developed a "certain tactical alliance" with eigh- 
teenth century materialism, against the abuses of idealistic 
speculation. 79 Adler firmly believed that every essentialist 
definition of the social arena, be it "materialist" or 
"spiritual" is arbitrary and teleological, because neither 
"matter" nor "spirit" in themselves can be Known outside the 
realm of socialised experience. He further argued that ex- 
perience is not an "a priori" because it is unthinkable outside 
socialised existence, and therefore stands in a relation of 
"dependent causality" from social relations. In this sense, Ad- 
ler returns the original accusation "philosophical monism" 
against the Neo Kantians, by maintaining that they themselves are 
falling into the forms of essentialism that they supposedly 
criticise in Marxism, by wishing to separate the problem of 
"objective validity" from the "reality of experience" allowing 
validity like a new sort of Platonism to shine upon the world 
from an inaccessible beyond80 
From the point of view of the ongoing discussion of the Mar- 
xist analysis of the national phenomenon, Adler's criticism of 
the neo-Kantians in term of the ireductibility of social forms is 
of enormous importance, since it is the basis for Bauer's sub- 
sequent discussion of the specificity of national existence. For 
Adler, social experience is a "transcendental" condition of human 
existence, because it is based on a form of human cognitive 
capacity, whose "formal existence" is not amenable to causal ex- 
planations. For Adler, a non-societalised individuality is mean- 
79. L. KolaKowsKi, Main currents of Marxism, op. cit. p. 260 
80. M. Adler, Kausalität und Teleologie in Streite um die Wis- 
senschaft, quoted by P. Heintel, op. cit. "Neo Kantianism" p. 104 
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ingless concept because individuals always require social 
referents to assume autonomous existence. Thus the "forms of 
individuality" are inherent to the "form of the social" and the 
formal relation between the two cannot be deduced causally, in 
the same way as no causal explanations are able to clarify 
general notions of time and space81 . What emerges from Adlers 
argument is that the arena of the social implies always a form of 
relationship between the "individual" and the "collective" and 
the formal configuration of this relationship is not reducible to 
what Adler calls "scientific" laws of causality. 
Thus, the debate of Adler with neo-Kantianism is a useful 
point of departure for the formulation of a multidimensional 
theory of the national arena in two respects. Firstly, because 
Adler through the use of a Kantian critical methodology rejects 
any a priori positional privilege in the process of social 
causality. Neither "the process of production" nor "the national 
spirit" are in themselves valid points of departure. Secondly, 
because the notion of the irreductibility of the forms' of the so- 
cial permits us to theoretically delimit the relation "national 
identity of subjects" -"national community" by referring to 
Adler's concept of "societalization". In the analysis of the so- 
cial arena, the point of departure for Adler is neither "abstract 
individuals" nor "society", which he considers "empty 
abstractions«82 but, what he calls a "societalised men", i. e. 
the idea that the basis for all sociation is to be found in 
"individual consciousness". The individual consciousness is not 
a transcendental abstraction, but an indivisible aspect of the 
existence of the social arena. In this sense, it could be argued 
-------------------- 
81. M. Adler, Causalit9 e Teleologia nella disputa sulla scienza, 
op. Cit. p. 176-77 
82. M. Adler, : The 
Philosophy". in T. 
Relation of Marxism 
Botomore, op. cit. 
to Classical German 
Austro-Marxism, p. 65 
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(as Bauer does) that "ethno-national" identities are one of the 
many individual manifestations of that societalised subjectivity. 
In a nutshell, the idea that A he national community is a form of 
societalised subjectivity is precisely the core of Otto Bauer's 
theory, as it will be shown in the next chapter. 
Adler's secoid critical path is directed against all forms 
of economic reductionism of the Second and Third International. 
In later writings it was also directed against the reductionist 
nature of the of Marxist-Leninist discourse. Adler found Lenin's 
philosophical criticism of the worKs of Avenarious and Mach", 
philosophicaly deficient and with a musty aroma of philosophical 
and theoretical necromancy. For Adler, Materialism in Lenin's 
hands becomes a dogmatic world view in which "dialectic is a mere 
sham and cover for unresolved problems" 
It is no longer possible in this fashion, as habit, opinion 
or philosophical standpoint may dictate... simply to begin 
with either spirit or matter, nor can the* so-called external 
world just be set up independent of our consciousness 
without falling, as Lenin did, into precisely what he ac- 
cuses the idealists of, namely "the most thickheaded 
fiaeism"84 
As it will be shown in the next chapter, the specific con- 
figuration of the nationalities problem in Austria, the original 
response of the socialist party, and the productive theoretical 
debate that resulted from the neo-Kantian critique of Historical 
Materialism, were all contributing factors for the development of 
the nationalities theory of Otto Bauer. 
83. see V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirocriticism 
84. M. Adler, Lehrbuch der materialistischen Geschichtsauffas- 
sun , quoted by Peter Heintel, op. cit. p. 
104 
290 
Chapter 7: Otto Bauer and the National Question 
... so in a socialist society, no new or foreign element of 
culture will be able to gain access to a nation without 
fusing with the culture of that nation, without entering 
into a transformative relation with it, and without being 
deeply influenced by it. The autonomy of distinctive na- 
tional cultural communities will mean that the cultural dif- 
ferences between them will become more pronounced after 
their socialist transformation, despite the elimination or 
reduction of material differences. 
Integration of the totality of peoples (vealker) to their na- 
tional cultural community, full achievement of self- 
determination of nations, growing spiritual differentiation 
of nations - this is the meaning of Socialism. 
1 
In contrast to the reductionist analysis of the national 
phenomenon represented in all mainstream *theoretical discussions 
on the national question in the Third and Second international, 
Bauer's assertion that the fulfillment of socialism will imply 
"growing spiritual differentiation of nations", represents a 
glaring contradiction. This is because in the above mentioned 
paradigms, national existence cannot transcend considerations of 
class position, and therefore cannot be located outside the 
paradigmatic boundaries of class determination. In the economis- 
tic paradigm, socialism is required by definition to both 
transcend and abolish the process of class determination in all 
forms of societalised existence. From this perspective socialism 
and national existence are clearly incompatible. A Gramscian 
analysis will go along with Bauer's argument only to the point in 
which this growing spiritual differentiation of nations results 
-------------------- 
nie tiation AIitw anfrage und nee Snzialder kraue, 1924 edi- 
tion in Otto Bauer WerKeausgabe (OBW), Vienna 1975 Vol 1 p. 168- 
69 
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from the presence of a politically hegemonic force that coalesces 
the national community with the aid of a strong "Jacobinian" col- 
lective will. The aim of this is to articulate the "national" 
with "international" dimensi ons of cultural and political exist- 
ence. Would this imply that the worK of Otto Bauer provides a 
definitive breaK with both branches of economism in the analysis 
of national communities? In this chapter it will be argued 
that Bauer develops a far reaching discussion of the national 
question that permits the conceptualisation and definition of the 
national phenomenon outside the paradigmatic field of class 
determination - an almost unique event in the Marxist tradition. 
But at the same time, this analysis is undermined by Bauer's con- 
tention that the most important causal factors of the process of 
national transformation are crucially influenced by events that 
taxe place at the level of the economy. 
The Context of Bauer's work 
The nationalities theory of Otto Bauer has been unjus- 
tifiably omitted from many contemporary discussions on the 
theoretical and empirical aspects of the process of national for- 
mation. In the English-reading world Otto Bauer's work has been 
until recently almost completely ignored. 
2 While Bauer's 
monumental book Die Nationalitatatenf rage und die Sozialdemok- 
-------------------- 
2. For a recent refreshing discussion on the work of Bauer see R. 
Munck, "Otto Bauer, towards a Marxist Theory of Nationalism", in 
Capital and Class, 25 pp. 84-97; R. Munck, The Difficult Dialogue, 
Marxism and Nationalism, Zed Press, London 1986. prior to the 
publication of this works, L. Kolakowski in op. cit. Main Cur- 
rents of Marxism, Vol 2, pp 285-297 and H. Mommsen and A. 
Martiny's article in op. cit. Encyclopaedia of Marxism, Communism 
and western Society pp. 39-45 were some of the very few publica- 
tions in English with correct interpretations of the work of 
Bauer. 
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ratie is considered Epochemachend in the Marxist theory of the 
National question, it has so far not been translated into 
English, except for some subsections of paragraphs 10 and 30.3 In 
French, there is also no available translation of Otto Bauers 
worK, but some 
excellent reader 
is only recently 
tunity to read 
translation into 
not available in 
on nations and 
ing references 
incorrect"7. 
chapters have been published in translation in the 
Les Marxistes et la Question Nationale4 , and it 
that the Spanish-reading audience had the oppor- 
Bauer's complete booK. 5 There is also a partial 
Hebrew. 6 However, not only is Bauers worK 
English or French, but most contemporary worKs 
nationalism ignore Bauers worK or only maKe pass- 
to it which, as KolakowsKi argues, are "generally 
3. in T. Bottomore, op. cit. Austro Marxism, p. 102-117 
4. Francois Maspero, Paris, 1974 
5. La Cuestidn de las Nacionalidades y la Social Democracia, 
Siglo " Veintiuno Editores S. A., series Biblioteca del Pensamiento 
Socialista, edited by J. Aric4 Mexico 1979 
6. Hashela Haleumit, Sifriat Hapoalim, Tel Aviv 1943 
T. L. Kolakowski op. cit. P. 285. For example, in his stimulat- 
ing book Theories of Nationalism", London, Duckworth London 1971, 
2nd edition 1984, A. D. Smith only has a passing reference to 
Bauer, and in a recent article, Smith wrongly equates Bauer's 
work with the voluntaristic theory of E. Renan. See "Nationalism 
and Classical Social Theory" British Journal of Sociology, vol 
34, n. I Mar. 1983 p. 23. On the same misinterpretation see H. B. 
Davis. Socialism and Nationalism, op. cit. P. 151 and A. 
Touraine, "Sociological Intervention on the internal Dynamics of 
the Occitanist Movement" in E. Tiryakian and R. Rogowski, New 
Nationalisms of the Developed West, Allen & Unwin London 1985, p. 
167. Bauer in fact, explicitly rejects Renan's theory by arguing 
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in spite of the challenge to contemporary Marxism posed by 
the recurrence of nationalist movements the highly original con- 
tribution of Bauer appears to have been forgotten. This omission 
is all the more puzzling when the prominent role of Bauer's argu- 
ments in the debates around the turn of the century is taxen into 
accounts. Some contemporary writers acknowledge the exceptional 
quality of of Bauer's worK: KolaKowsKi considers that Bauer's 
worK is ... the best treatise on nationality problems to be found 
in Marxist literature and one of the most significant products of 
Marxist theory in general, while H. B. Davis argues that Bauer's 
book remains to this day the most pretentious Marxist treatise in 
the field9 . In light of the above comments, Bauer's absence 
-------------------- 
that this theory is unsatisfactory because it ignores the all im- 
portant question of why we wish to link our fate with one group 
of human and not with others and that is equally incorrect to say 
that all human beings that wish to belong to a nation" are ipso 
facto a national community. Besides for Bauer, awareness of 
nationhood is not an essential aspect of belonging to a national 
community. OBW, op. cit. vol 1 p. 229. For an English translation 
of E. Renan's essay "Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?, see J. Figgs & 
R. Laurence (eds. ) The History of Freedom and other essays, London 
MacMillan 1919 
8. K. Kautsky wrote an article in Die Neue Zeit to polemicise 
with Bauer's worK. See "Nationalität und Internationalit3t, to 
which Bauer wrote a rejoinder "Bemerkungen zur 
Nationalit3tenfrage", Die Neue Zeit, March 1908. Both articles 
have been translated into Spanish and included in op. cit. La 
segunda Internacional y el Problema Colonial. Stalin's monograph, 
op. cit. Marxism and the National Question, was mainly written to 
counteract Bauer's influence in Russia. Lenin also repeatedly 
taxes issue with Bauer, see "Critical Remarks on the National 
Question", op. cit. 
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from contemporary theoretical debates is puzzling. 
So why was Bauer forgotten? This form of "theoretical 
amnesia", appears to be related to the abortive theoretical 
problems of the Marxist tradition in trying to come to grips with 
the national phenomenon. In this context, it is possible to 
detect three causes, firstly, the theories of Bauer are perceived 
by some historical commentators to be primarily devoted to the 
discussion of the nationalities problem in the context of Austro- 
Hungary. Consequently, the argument ceases to have any relevance 
after the collapse of the dual monarchy. While it is clearly the 
case than from 600 or so pages of Bauer's work, roughly half is 
devoted to the analysis of the development of national com- 
munities within the context of Austro-Hungary, it is also clear 
that the theoretical conceptualisation used for the discussion of 
the case studies, goes far beyond the limitations of the Austrian 
case. Secondly, Bauer's main programmatic proposals in the con- 
text of the Habsburg state, (The notion of "cultural national 
autonomy") are confused 'with his theoretical analysis, to the 
point that the failure of the programme of national cultural 
autonomy is considered tantamount to the failure of Bauer-Is 
theory. This is the line of argument taken by most Marxist 
Leninist critics of Bauer, who are anxious to criticise the no- 
tion of "national cultural autonomy" because it contradicts 
Lenin's theories of both, "democratic centralism", and the "Right 
of Nations to Self Determination". The Jewish "Bund" and other 
Social Democratic parties of oppressed national minorities in 
Czarist Russia were inspired by the programme of national cul- 
tural autonomy in their demands for self rule in the context of 
Czarist Russia. Given that the Bolsheviks opposed the demands 
for national and political decentralisation sketched in the 
"cultural autonomy" programme, it was for them a matter of great 
political urgency to refute these arguments. 
10 This understand- 
9. L. KolaKowski, op. Cit. P. 255; H. B. Davis, op. Cit. p. 149 
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ing of Bauers position is incorrect in a number of ways. The 
Austrian Gesamtpartei main programmatic proposals on the national 
question (The Brno programme) must not be confused with Bauers 
theoretical analysis, and also the project of "national cultural" 
autonomy should not be attributed to Bauer. 11 As was shown in 
previous chapters, this confusion results from the Bolshevik 
debate on the national question in the context of Czarist Russia. 
It was Karl Renner and not who Bauer originally developed the 
programme of national cultural autonomy, and it was first dis- 
cussed in the Brno congress of 1899 when Bauer was too young to 
attend. The third source of confusion is that the programme of 
national cultural autonomy is not a theoretical analysis, but a 
programmatic political position developed in the context of the 
bitter national struggles of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bauer 
himself was critical of aspects of the programme, as Lenin was 
always quicK to quote. Bauers reservations related to the posi- 
tion of the workers' organisations vis-a-vis national organisa- 
tions, and the rights of non territorial national minorities, 12 
The third element that contributed to Bauers unpopularity 
with classical Marxists had to do with the dogmatic rigidities of 
epiphenomenalism and class reductionism. In the previous chapter 
-------------------- 
10. See V. I. Lenin "The Right of Nations to Self Determination" 
and "Critical RemarKS on the National Question" in Collected 
Works, vol 20. On the Bund, see H. Tobias, The Jewish Bund in 
Russia from its Origins to 1905, Stanford University Press, 1965 
11. for the essential arguments of this mistaken criticism, see 
Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, op. cit., sections on Bauer and 
"Cultural National Autonomy". 
12. See OBW, Vol 1 pp. 571-582 
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it was argued that Max Adler in the course of his double debate 
with Neo Kantianism and classical Marxism sustained that the 
forms of the social cannot be ascertained through mediating 
causal laws. Bauers "Nationalitätenfrage" represents, as will 
be shown in a moment, a concrete elaboration of these postulates 
in the analysis of the national question. An economistic epis- 
temology can hardly encapsulate Bauers conceptualisation of the 
national phenomenon, since he deviates from the postulates of 
economism on the crucial issues of the non-reductibility of the 
forms of the social, and refusaes to apply the methodological 
logic of the natural sciences to the understanding of social 
relations of causality. Given the paralyzing impact of economism 
in the theoretical development of the Marxist tradition, it is 
not surprising that the "heretical" ideas of the Austro-Marxists 
were consigned to oblivion. In recent years, serious attempts 
have been made to rethink economistic categories of analysis and 
to sensitise the Marxian tradition to non-economic agents and to 
the plural nature of the social process of causality13. Given 
this novel way of understanding the social arena, this would ap- 
pear to be appropiate time to resuscitate the Austro Marxist 
tradition from its undeserving hibernation, and in particular to 
critically examine the insights that Bauer may offer to the un- 
derstanding of that elusive and recurrent problem called 
nationalism. 
The conceptualisation of nations in Bauer's work 
In sharp distinction to most Marxist discussions of the na- 
tional phenomenon, Bauer does not begin his worK with the evalua- 
tion of the role of the bourgeoisie, nor from the mode of produc- 
tion, not even from the point of view of the class struggle. Also 
-------------------- 
13. See among others the pioneering worKs of E. Laclau and V. 
Mouffe, op. cit. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and op. Cit. A. 
Cutler et al., Marx Capital and Capitalism Today 
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in a clear rejection of any form of essentialism, Bauer 
provide an initial defini tion of the national community, 
his new introduction to the 1924 edition, he warns the 
that the definition that he will subsequently provide is 
important part of his conceptual isation of the national 
phenomenon. 
does not 
and in 
reader 
not the 
As a matter of fact, the center of gravity of my theory of 
the nation is not in my definition of a nation, but in the 
description of the integrative process out of which the 
modern nation emerged. If my theory can claim any merit, it 
is that it derived that process of integration for the first 
time from economic development, from the changes in the so- 
cial structure and from the articulation of classes in 
society. 14 
As G. Haupt argues, 15 Bauers purpose in embarking in his 
detailed analytical discussion, is to try to understand the na- 
tional community as a discrete unity resulting from a complex and 
multidimensional ensemble of social forces, and to elaborate a 
theory that is both argued from a Marxist standpoint and capable 
of grasping the nature of the national phenomenon not as a static 
unit but as a dynamic process of transformation and continuous 
change. In order to do this, Bauer begins his analysis from what 
he considers to be the "concrete expression" of the existence of 
the national community in each individual member of the nation. 
This what he calls the "National Character" 
The question of the nation can only be explored on the basis 
-------------------- 
14. OBW, op. Cit., Vol 1 p. 66 
15. G. Haupt, "Les Marxistes face 8 la Question Nationale: 
1'histoire du problbme", in G. Haupt, C. Weill, M. Lowy Les Mar- 
xistes et la Question Nationale, op. cit. p. 47 
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of the notion of a "national character". If we were to take 
any German to a foreign country, e. g., to sojurn among the 
English, he would immediately realize that these people are 
different, with a different way of thinking and a different 
way of feeling... provisionally we shall call the set of 
physical and spiritual features that distinguish one nation 
from another its "national character". 16 
The concept of "national character" does not, according to 
Bauer, exhaust all the possibilities of grouping human beings. 
Besides national characteristics, all human beings have a common 
sense of humanity, while classes, professional groups, interest 
groups, oppressed groups, etc. have common characteristics that 
transcend national differences. However, Bauer attaches a dis- 
tinctive quality to national identities, and in a moment it will 
be shown why. He also acknowledges in the spirit of Marxism that 
ties of solidarity unite workers from different nations, but 
carefully differentiates this solidarity from the concept of 
"national character". For Bauer the question of cultural bonds 
between the working class and the bourgeoisie of any given nation 
is not connected with the question of the attitude of workers to 
their own bourgeoisie, or to the workers of other national 
communities. 17 The question of solidarity between workers is an 
ethical and political issue, which as such is not connected with 
the alleged intensity of the national community of character. 
One of the main difficulties with the concept of "national 
character" is that the term has been so successfully monopolised 
by ethnocentric and racialist theories, to the point that in many 
contemporary discussions the concept lost its previous polysemic 
nature, to become a code word for the justification of some type 
16. OBW, OP. Cit. Vol 1, p. 70 
17. OBW, op. Cit. Vol. I ff. P. 71-72 
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of inherent superiority of one national community over another. 
In this sense, it is possible to find in most discussions of the 
national phenomenon, particularly those that taxe place within 
the Marxist tradition, a studious avoidance of any positive use 
of the term, perpetuating in this way its conceptual monopoly by 
racialist and ethnocentric theories. Yet the curious fact 
remains that historians, 18 as much any branch of the social 
sciences including Marxism constantly use the concept. The 
terms "French Structuralism", "German Marxism", "Austro Marxism", 
"British Labourism", "American Jingoism" have a precise meaning 
witch is often put to use by people who at the same time will 
strenuously deny any significance to national characteristics. On 
the other hand, the term "character" is distinctly polysemic, as 
Metzger shows in his interesting but somewhat dated article. In 
German scientific discourse, the term Charakter generally refers 
to a sum of traits, and sometimes to their configuration19. In 
English, in addition to this, it could either show a high degree 
of individuality (s/he is a great character) or alternatively a 
collective generalisation closely connected with will power 
("strong" or "weaK" character). In classical Marxism, the notion 
"the character of the working class" is used to conceptualise the 
configuration of traits and characteristics that result from the 
common position of the proletariat in the capitalist mode of 
production. When classical Marxism sustains that "workers have 
more in common with each other than with the bourgeoisie of their 
respective nation", it is not to deny the specific character of 
the working class or the national community, but it is merely to 
-------------------- 
18. W. P. Metzger, "Generalizations about National Character: An 
Analytical Essay" in L. Gottschalk (ed. ), Generalization in the 
Writing of History, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1963, p. 77 
19. W. McDougall, Character and Personality, quoted by W. 
Metzger, op. cit. p. 79 
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assert as an ontological certainty the necessary condition that 
one set of characterological traits derived from an economic 
position supersedes others derived from national existence. This 
argument is as absurd and undemonstrable as its ontological mir- 
ror image, the equally absurd notion that "national identity al- 
ways transcends class loyalties". To use terminology borrowed 
from Max Adler, both assertions portray a static metaphysical es- 
sentialism incompatible with the dynamic specificity of the so- 
cial arena. It is against both forms of paralyzing essentialism 
that the Bauers theory is directed. 
Bauer is also aware that he is marching on dangerous 
ground, since he agrees that the concept of "national character" 
has been almost exclusively the area of concern of trans- 
historical and idealistic approaches, which maintain that the 
"national character" is a metaphysical essentiality from which 
causal explanations of national behavior are derived. To avoid 
what he considers to be "transcendentalist distortions", Bauer 
argues that it is always essential to locate the notion of 
"national character" in an historical perspective: 
Above all, the national character has unjustly been ascribed 
a durability which can be refuted by historical evidence. It 
cannot be denied that German tribes shared a great number of 
characteristics at the time of Tacitus. These common charac- 
teristics distinguished them from other peoples, e. g. from 
the Romans of the same period. Equally, one cannot deny 
that the Germans of our time have certain common charac- 
teristics which differ from the characteristics of other 
peoples. This is true irrespective of the way in which 
these characteristics might have developed. However, no 
educated person will contest that a contemporary German has 
more in common with other contemporary civilised peoples 
(Kulturnationen) than with the Germans at the time of 
Tacitus. 20 
-------------------- 
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For Bauer then, national character is not understood s an 
abstract metaphysical essence, but as an historically modifiable 
characteristic, which culturally linKs the members of a national 
community over a given historical period and is transformed from 
generation to generation. What linKs one generation with another 
is not the immutable transference of a mythical national spirit 
but the fact that contemporary generations do not operate in a 
vacuum, but enter a social arena shaped by the historical cir- 
cumstances of previous ones. In this sense, as with any other so- 
cial characteristic, the national character is modifiable by his- 
torical forces, while at the same time, it cannot be referred 
bacK to previous generations since contemporary experiences 
change beyond recognition the nature of the phenomena under con- 
sideration. Both dimensions, the historical and the contem- 
porary, are an essential ingredient for determining the logic of 
the present configuration of the national character. The na- 
tional character is then, a discrete unit of contemporary and 
historical forces, none of which can be seen in isolation as a 
determinant factor, while both of them are always present in 
forming national identities. 
Another important source of the misinterpretation of the 
concept of "national character" is that even explanations that 
accept the historical relativity of the term, refer to it as a 
causal explanatory concept. 
When we describe the national character, we do not explain 
with it the causes of any given actions, but we only 
describe the common characteristics of a great number of ac- 
tions ... this is not at all a causal explanation but a mere 
generalisation, a mere recognition of already observed com- 
mon features of different individual actions. 21 
-------------------- 
20. OBW, Vol 1. op. cit. p. 71 
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The important consequence that Bauer derives from this argu- 
ment is that national character is not the causal factor in na- 
tional existence, but on the contrary, the concrete, descriptive 
expression of the latter. Consequently for Bauer a national 
character is an historical construct, and as such is the empiri- 
cal expression of national existence at a given historical 
period. It is not the point of departure for the analysis of the 
nexus that links the national community, but on the contrary, it 
is the concrete embodiment of such a nexus. As such it is not an 
explanation, but the very element that has to be explained in 
trying to understand the nature of the "national character". 
The concept of national character is not a explanation, but 
rather something to be explained. By identifying the diver- 
sity of national characters science (Wissenschaft) has not 
solved the problem of the nation, it has merely formulated 
i t. 22 
For Bauer, then, the community of character is emphatically 
not what constitutes the cultural specificity of national com- 
munities, but it is only a concrete, empirical expression of the 
latter. Once the set of empirical characteristics that originates 
what he terms the community of character has been identified, the 
tasK of trying to understand the nature of the national community 
only begins. For Bauer, a correct understanding of the histori- 
cal and contemporary processes that delineate the specificity of 
concrete national communities requires the formulation of causal 
explanations of the empirically and observable elements that con- 
21. OBW, Vol 1, op. Cit. P. 72 
22. OBW, Vol 1, op. Cit. p. 74 
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stitute what he calls the national character. In this formulation 
it is possible to detect the impact of Max Adler's dual debate 
with neo-Kantianism and classical Marxism in the work of Bauer. 
Crucial to Adler's critical stance in relation to both neo- 
Kantians and classical Marxists, was a strict denial of any form 
of essentialism in the definition of the scope and nature of 
forces that give content to the social arena. The neo-Kantian 
distinction between "is" and "ought" is refuted by Adler by a 
strict reference to relations of causality, thereby rejecting any 
teleological inference in the analysis of the social arena. On 
the other hand, the "iron laws of- necessity" of classical Marxism 
are equally rejected through the same logic, because they postu- 
late unacceptable forms of what Adler calls metaphysical essen- 
tialism. Relations of causality are to be ascertained through 
what we today recognize as a strict "deconstruction" of the so- 
cial phenomena under consideration, rather than through ontologi- 
cally privileged relations of determination. 23 Following Adler's 
logic, Bauer is on firm grounds in his attempt to demystify the 
equivocal notion of national character by strictly relativising 
and contextualising its existence. He however runs the risk of 
falling into the opposite form of essentialism, that of 
epiphenomenalism. Not in the concrete manifestation 
epiphenomenalism sustained in the ongoing discussion of Marxism 
and the National phenomenon- the transparency of economic forces- 
but in the more general sense of negating any form of autonomous 
existence to a social construct. To entirely account for the ex- 
istence and character of any empirically given social phenomena 
in terms of strict relations of causality, implies seriously un- 
dermining the scope for autonomous existence of the phenomena un- 
der consideration. In this sense it is useful to refer to a 
similar problem in structural linguistics, that of the status of 
-------------------- 
23. Max Adler, Causalits e Teleologia nelta Disputa sulla 
Scienza, italian translation of Kausalitat un Teleologie im 
Streit um die Wissenschaft, op. cit. pp. 20-22 
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the sign in the relations between signifier and the signified. 
To briefly summarize a complex and protracted discussion, 
earlier interpretations of the concept of "the sign"24 as a 
form of signification, attributed to the "signifier" the status 
of the unequivocal carrier, in which each signifier denoted a 
single signified, except in clearly defined cases of polysemy. 
This situation proved to be inadequate to understand the dynamics 
of the sign, since not every signifier responded unequivocally to 
the configuration of the signified, and this required the acknow- 
ledgment of a certain lack of correspondence between the sig- , 
nifier and signified. This made possible a more autonomous notion 
of the signifier, which had to eventually depart from the 
original De Saussurean configuration of relations of causality by 
conceptualising the notion of "free floating" signifiers. The 
conceptual problem here resulted from the inability of the one- 
dimensional relation of causality between signified -signifier 
to theoretically encapsulate the the dynamic nature of the 
process changes in meaning. In other words, it became impossible 
to conceptualise a static or "fixed" relation of attribution of 
meaning. Thus the relation of attribution of meaning between 
signifier and signified is never complete, and the gap opens the 
way for the existence of autonomous or "free floating" 
signifiers. 25 The implication of this for Sauer's discussion 
of the national character is that the requirement to constantly 
identify the causal dimension of the national character not only 
implies its lack of autonomy, but also its intrinsic status as a 
24. See for example Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Lin- 
guistics, Fontana edition, London 1974 
25. For a thought provoking discussion of the political con- 
sequences of this gap see E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist strategy, Ch. 3 "Beyond the Positivity of the social: 
Antagonisms and Hegemony" op. cit. pp. 93-148 
305 
vehicle for the expression of something else, namely the elements 
that shape the historical dimension of national existence. Thus 
the concept of "national character" as defined by Bauer appears 
to lack any autonomous existence, and this may create some am- 
biguities in the use of the concept. The difficulty here arises 
at two levels: firstly, Bauer does not clearly indicate the dif- 
ference between "national character" and what it is called today 
"national identity" meaning by this the positional subjectivity 
of national agents. 26 Secondly, the initial relation of 
causality between on the one hand national existence, and on the 
other hand national identity and national character, is often 
subverted by a polysemic configuration of the latter elements. 
While in some cases it is possible to detect paths of causality 
to observed concrete features of national character, these fea- 
tures cannot always be referred back to the causal agents in view 
of their dynamic interplay with other aspects of social exist- 
ence. To provide brief example; even if one is to accept the 
likelihood that the centuries long colonial encounter was one 
contributing factor in the configuration of the Anglo-British and 
French "national identity" before World War II, it will a 
profoundly erroneous simplification of the problematic of na- 
tional character to argue that because of this causal factor, 
both the Anglo British and French National characters are ir- 
revocably moulded to enter into relations of domination. 
Bauer's attempt to strictly relativise and contextualise what 
he calls the national character is not yet sufficient to explain 
its fluidity. In addition to that contextualisation and 
relativisation, it is also important to recognise the permanent 
unfixity of relations of causality between national existence, 
national identity and national character and the likelihood of an 
autonomous configuration of the elements involved, including the 
-------------------- 
26. Bauer, at will be seen in a moment, refers to a form of 
"subjective selectivity", but this is not an "identity" in the 
sense of a subjective positional definition, 
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need to redefine of relations of interiority and exteriority in 
all dimensions in a way that permits the development of an 
analytical logic that allows us to transcend the original rela- 
tions of causality. The definition which Bauer bases on strict 
relations of causality severely restricts the autonomous features 
of the phenomena under consideration, and impairs the understand- 
ing of the multidimensional existence of the national phenomenon. 
Bauer also criticises the idea that national character is a 
tangible and empirical manifestation of the "spirit of the 
people" (Volksgeist). This idea is derived from the Hegelian 
tradition which as we have seen, which dichotomizes national com- 
munities between "historical" and "non historical" nations, ac- 
cording to the abilities of their respective "national spirit" to 
build independent national states. Marx and Engels took over 
this idealistic and metaphysical consideration, transforming the 
concept of "national spirit", to the more materialist, but not 
less metaphysical notion of the ability of the national community 
in question to enter the capitalist mode of production". Bauer 
argues that the national spirit cannot be used to explain the na- 
tional community because it is nothing else but the transforma- 
tion of the national character into a metaphysical 
essentiality. 27 But while categorically rejecting the causal 
validity of the notion of "spirit of peoples" (Volkgeist), Bauer 
nevertheless accepts as a point of departure for his analysis, 
the Marxian dichotomy between "historical" vs. "non historical 
nations". This done by strictly qualifying the position of Marx 
and Engels, as it will be shown in a moment, through the notion 
of "the historical awakening of nations without history". 
For Bauer then the common national character is not what 
constitutes the national community, but is only it concrete ex- 
pression. The national character is one of the expressions of 
27. OBW, Vol 1, op. Cit. p. 77 
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"societalised" existence, it is the expression of the repre- 
sentation of what Bauer calls "social reality" in each national 
subject. What distinguishes a national community is that its 
members are the result of the same historical forces operating in 
a given "society"28. Once the national character has been iden- 
tified, Bauer argues that it must be explained in terms of the 
. 
social and historical conditions that lead to its emergence. In 
order to do this, Bauer marrows the descriptiveness of the term 
by arguing that the national character is a determining factor in 
the sphere of what he calls "Will" (Wille). For Bauer "will" is 
exteriorised in every cognitive process through witch a plurality 
of subjects commonly perceive certain characteristics of a given 
observable phenomenon, attaching importance only to those com- 
monly perceived characteristics, and ignoring or giving secondary 
importance to others. 29 In other words, "will" is the concrete 
expression in every "individual" subject of the "societalised"30 
nature of human experience. Once this definition of the sphere 
of "will" has been established, Bauer proceeds to conceptualise 
the notion of "national character" in a less descriptive manner. 
The notion that the national character is the set of physical and 
spiritual connotations that characterise the co-nationals is 
thereby enlarged by the idea -that the mechanism that permits the 
-------------------- 
28. M. Garcia Pelayo, La Teoria de Is NaciCn en Otto Bauer, op. 
Cit. P. 31 
29.08W, op. Cit., vol. 1, p. 170 
30. meaning the constitution of human subjectivity out of the so- 
cial forms of existence (interaction). In this sense in- 
dividuality is strictly unthinkable outside the social arena. 
The concept of "socialisation" used in main stream sociology, 
refers to the same process but from the opposite point of view, 
namely that of an "individual" that pre exists society but 
"learns" social attitudes. 
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presence of the national character in every single member of the 
national ccmmunity is the common orientation of "will". Con- 
sequently, the empirical generalisation called by Bauer "national 
character", is in fact the tangible expression of a "collective 
will" resulting from the historical experience of the national 
community, and exteriorised in each member through a societalised 
selective perception of external reality. This is, according to 
Bauer, what explains the fact that different national communities 
have different perceptive criteria, develop different forms of 
morality, of law, different aesthetic criteria, different notion 
of "beautiful" and "ugly", different ways of perceiving religion, 
and even different ways of understanding scientific thought. 31 
In the new introduction written for the 1924 edition of the 
"Nationalitätenfrage", Bauer expands the this notion of the per- 
ceptual differences of different national communities. After ar- 
guing that it is not difficult to understand the "strong 
resistance" that his use of the notion of national character gen- 
erated in the marxist tradition- given the abusive and "shameful" 
use given to the concept by nationalists during the war, Bauer 
goes on to further justify the use of the concept with a number 
of examples. For this purpose, he heavily relies on what he 
defines as a "highly stimulating" book by the French philosopher 
of science Pierre Duhem, Objective and Structure of Physical 
Theories32 . In this book Bauer argues that 
Duhem compares the 
way in which the most important "English" (englishcher) and 
French physicist conduct their research, and finds, in Bauers 
wdrds "remarkable national differences". The French are inter- 
ested in coherent, clear and non-contradictory systems. They 
develop verifiable hypothesis from fundamental laws through a 
31. OBW, vol 1, op. cit. P. 171 
32. The edition quoted by Bauer is the German translation pub- 
lished in Leipzig in 1908. OBW, vol 1, op. cit. pp. 53-54 
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deductive method. In opposition to this, Bauer argues following 
Duhem, the "English" develop mechanical models from which they 
deduce a conglomerate of empirical laws. They are not too dis- 
turbed if the hypothesis they use to construct their empirical 
models are not connected, or even if they contradict each other. 
For the " English", the goal is to grasp their research in a com- 
prehensive, understandable and graphic way. For the French, the 
goal is to understand in a clear and orderly way. Quoting Duhem, 
Bauer argu es that the French have a "superior capacity" for 
abstraction and generalisation; the English for representing 
graphically complex equations, and to explain them through simple 
and clear representations. 33 
Duhem also argues that there are differences in the way in 
which French and English physicists, use algebra. For the French, 
physical theory is a logical system, and algebraic equations are 
only an auxiliary device to put in evidence the fundamental 
hypothesis. For the English, algebraic calculus is like a 
mechanical model, it exactly reproduces the movements of the re- 
searched phenomena; they are not too concerned in establishing a 
narrow equivalence between the idea and the algebraic symbol. 
They leave that to intuition. They have however, a "superior 
capacity" to understand very complex combinations in a fast and 
graphic manner and they are very efficient in using condensed 
methods of calculus. The French use classical algebra, while the 
English use modern algebraic symbols whith numerous intermediary 
operations, but which require a large number of symbols and com- 
plex rules34 . According to Bauer, Duhem himself suggests that 
the differences in formulations of physical theories are the 
result of what he calls the "spiritual diversity" of both na- 
tions, which according to Bauer (and presumably Duhem), could 
-------------------- 
33. ibid. 
34. ibid. P. 55 
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also be found in other branches of spiritual sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften), such as the development of French 
philosophy from Descartes and the development of "English" 
philosophy from Bacon. 
Bauer argues that Duhem also found differences of national 
character in literature. The heroes of Shakespeare and Corneille, 
reflect different national models. The attitudes of Auguste and 
Rodrigue differ significantly from the attitudes of Lady Macbeth 
and Hamlet. 35 The same logic is used by Dunem to explain the dif- 
ference between "English" and French law. In France civil law is 
systematic, based on "abstract but clearly defined concepts". 
English law is less coherent, but more in tune with the needs of 
every day life. Bauer agrees that capitalism has "leveled the 
material and cultural content" of the different national com- 
munities, but in spite of this, "national specificities remain 
influential" in the way in which those national cultures ap- 
propriate new developments. The same criteria applies to the 
working class movement. 
The same worKing class movement emerges in all in- 
dustrialised states, but when confronted with the same facts 
of capitalist exploitation, the Italian working class reacts 
differently from the Scandinavian. This is what I have in 
mind when I refer to the "national character". I do not mean 
by those fallacious images of nationali st demagoguery which 
only discovers only heroes among its ow n people and only 
traders among others. I rather wish to express those diver- 
sities only accessible to a far more sophisticated 
psychological analysis which appear in the basic spiritual 
structure, in intellectual and aesthetic taste, in the man- 
ner of reacting to the same stimuli - in all those things we 
take into account if we compare the spiritual life of dif- 
-------------------- 
35. ibid. 
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ferent nations, their science and philosophy, their poetry, 
their music, their fine arts, their social and public life, 
their life-style and habits, 36 
Bauer goes on to argue that what he calls "the nationalist 
interpretation of history", is based on the idea that national 
characters are the "essential substances" that determine histori- 
cal content. 
We cannot overcome that nationalist conception of history by 
negating either the incontestable fact of national 
peculiarities, or the equally incontestable fact of the 
diversity of "national characters". Only if we strip the 
national character of its substantive appearance, thereby 
showing that the eventual "national character" is nothing 
but a precipitate of past historical processes that will be 
further modified by the following historical processes, will 
we be able to overcome the nationalist conception of 
history. 37 
From this Bauer defines his main tasK as being to explain 
and derive national specificities from the very history of the 
national community. 38 From this position Bauer proceeds to a 
narrower definition of the national character; it is not only the 
physical and spiritual connotations of nations, but more fun- 
damentally the similarity in the orientation of will. The na- 
tional character is a commonality of "volitive orientation" that 
results from the previously discussed societalised subjectivity. 
The diversity of historical conditions, the diverse forms of so- 
36, OBW, Vol 1, op. Cit. p. 56-57 
37. ibid., p. 57 
38, ibid. 
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cial organisation as well as the diverse geographical and physi- 
cal conditions of existence are liked together to produce the 
specificity of national existence. Thus, the historically deter- 
mined conditions of existence is what creates the "causal" vari- 
ables that give shape to the specificity of the national com- 
munity. 
But for Bauer the national community is not only the result 
of the historical determination of the conditions of existence, 
but is above all a form of both, "common" and "communitarian" ex- 
perience emanating from the latter. This aspect is crucial for 
understanding Bauer's conceptualisation of the national com- 
munity. In order to explain this last dimension Bauer introduces 
the conceptual elements that will shape his definition of the na- 
tion. In order to capture the contemporary dimensions of the 
historical legacies which have shaped the various national com- 
munities, Bauer introduces the idea that the Nation is a 
"Community of Fate" (SchicKsalsgemeinschaft)39. This concept was 
not invented by Bauer; it was used by Nietzsche and by Eduard von 
Hartmant to denote a series of events that are not actively 
sought or desired, but that taKe place outside or beyond the 
willful action of a group of subjects, who are nevertheless in- 
fluenced by its outcome. 40 For Bauer, however, the term has a 
-------------------- 
39. For reasons that will be discussed in a moment, the concept 
of "SchicKsalsgemeinschaft" is notoriously difficult to trans- 
late. Professor Bottomore translates it as "common destiny", see 
T. Bottomore, op. cit. Austro Marxism, p. 107. "Community of 
fate" or "commonalty of fate" appears to be a better way of 
translating this ambiguous notion, given that the term 
"Gemeinschaft" (community) is used by Bauer not in its current 
sociological meaning, but to denote the collective experience 
that finds its concrete expression in the societalised 
"individual" subjectivity of social agents. 
40. M. Garcia Pelayo La Teoria de la Naciön en Otto Bauer, op. 
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related, but different meaning in the sense that it equally im- 
plies the presence of a set of historical circumstances that 
precedes and influences subjective awareness and is consequently 
"given" to subjects, but over which they can nevertheless exer- 
cise a form of transformative control resulting from their con- 
temporary existential experience. In order to clarify the con- 
cept, it becomes necessary to provisionally embark on separate 
evaluation's its two interlinKed dimensions: the path of histori- 
cal determination and its projection to the future, and the some- 
what idiosyncratic use of the term "community". The first aspect 
was already touched upon in the preceding discussion of the 
"national character". 
On the second aspect Bauer sharply distinguishes two related 
concepts, that of community and that of homogeneity, and to il- 
lustrate the difference, he provides an historical example. 
England and Germany faced in the nineteenth century a similar 
process of capitalist development. The same historical forces 
crucially influenced the collective experiences of both national 
communities, but despite similar experiences England and Germany 
remained separate national communities. An "Homogeneity of Fate" 
implies therefore being subjected to the same historical forces. 
Bauer uses the example of the worKing class to clarify this 
point. Wherever the capitalist mode of production becomes 
dominant, an industrial proletariat emerges which experiences the 
same conditions of exploitation under capitalism regardless of 
national location. Displaying the full optimism of turn of the 
century class-reductionist Marxism, Bauer goes on to argue that 
"the proletariat of every capitalist nation" has an "homogeneous 
character". The same class location conferred upon them a type of 
character which is expressed in the same commitment to struggle, 
"the same revolutionary mentality, the same class morality, the 
same political will". But in this case it is the homogeneity of 
cit. P. 31 
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fate and not the community of fate that generated the common 
character. 41 Even if in certain circumstances the proletariat 
class could be considered a. community, it is certainly not, in 
Bauer's terminology, a Community of Fate. To be part of a 
"community of fate" is not the same as been subjected to the same 
fate. A "community of, fate" signifies not only the experience 
of the same historical circumstances, but the experience of those 
circumstances in a situation of common reciprocal interaction 
(durchg'&ngige Wechselwirkung untereinander)42. A national com- 
munity is form of communitarian life that has a specific con- 
figuration, in that the identity of the collective is constituted 
by the interactive relation of its members, which is in turn 
replicated in the individual identity of the members. The ele- 
ment of "interactive reciprocity" (Wechselwirkung) is what dis- 
tinguishes a "community of fate" from any other form of com- 
munitarian life. In this sense, the concept of "Gemeinschaft" 
used by Bauer is of Kantian origin, denoting two different dimen- 
41. OBW, op. Cit., vol 1, p. 173 
42. OBW, Vol. 1. OP. cit. P. 172. This is derived, as Bauer ac- 
Knowledges from Kant's Third analogy of experience: the principle 
of community. All substances so far as they coexist, stand in 
thoroughgoing community, that is, in mutual interaction I. Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason Random House, New YorK, 1958 p. 131. In 
the introduction to the second edition of the 
"Nationalitätenfrage" Bauer argues that in his student years 
(this work was his doctoral thesis written at the age of 24! ), he 
was "fascinated" by the critical philosophy of Kant, but sub- 
sequently overcame his "Kantian childish illness" (kantianischen 
Kinderkrankheiten, ibid. P. 53). However, over this crucial 
aspect of his work -the definition of community- the Kantian in- 
fluence as well as the impact of Max Adlers work is clear, and 
Bauer still sustained the validity of this conceptualisation in 
the above mentioned new introduction and in later works. 
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sions of community life. One of "common homogeneous 
characteristics" which is best denoted by the latin word Com- 
munio, which means a quality of equality of circumstances and 
homogeneity, and the latin word Commercium which denotes a 
dynamic process of interaction. 43 While every "Commercium" is 
a "Communio" not every "Communio" is a "Commercium", and this is 
what Bauer has in mind when he distinguishes between "Community 
of Fate" and "Homogeneity of Fate". Following from the above 
discussion, Bauer conceptualizes the nation in the following way: 
Consequently, it is possible to define the nation as a com- 
munity of character that it is not born, out of an 
homogeneity of fate, but out of a community of fate. This is 
also the significance of language for the nation. With the 
human beings with which I am in closest communication I 
manufacture a language, and with the human beings with wich 
I have a common language I am in the closest 
communication. 44 
In this unusual way of understanding the concept of com- 
munity, Bauer is also crucially influenced by the previously dis- 
cussed work of Max Adler on causality and teleology. In the last 
chapter it was shown how Adler conceptualised the notion of the 
irreducibility of the forms of the social through his debate with 
the neo-Kantians. According to Adler, social links logically 
precede the existence of the "individuality" and "society", 
without wich both are strictly unthinkable. Consequently, it is 
the very process of interaction that determines the configuration 
43. A. Agnelli, op. cit. Questione Nazionale e Socialismo.., p. 
135; M. Garcia Pelayo, op. cit La Teoria de la Naciön en O. 
Bauer, op. cit. P. 32 
44. OBW, op. cit. vol 1 p. 174 
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of the social arena as well as the 
identities. In this sense, Bauer argu 
common reciprocal interaction lived in 
tion generates the national community 
inter-subjective bond that crucially 
tional identity". 
constitution of subjective 
es that the process of 
a permanent mutual rela- 
and expresses itself in an 
shapes each "individual na- 
... the nation constitutes a social phenomenon. It is not a 
sum of individuals, but each individual is the product of 
the nation; the fact that they are all the product of the 
same society maKes them into one community. Those charac- 
teristics that appear as distinguishing features of in- 
dividuals are, in reality, a social product -and indeed for 
all members of the nation they are the same social product- 
that is what maKes a collection of individuals a nation. In 
this way nations do not exist as creatures of a formal 
[legal] convention (Satzung), rather they logically, but not 
historically, pre-exist every formal convention. 45 
-------- 
45. OBW, 
------------ 
Vol. 1, op. cit. p. 185, M. Adler Kausaltat un 
Teleologie im Streit um die Wissenschaft, quoted by Bauer from 
Marx-Studien Vol 1, p. 369 ff., in the Italian translation op. 
cit. Causality e Teleologia.., p. 166 ff. While the term 
"Satzung" ethimologicaly translates as "statute" or "standing 
rule", in this case it is derived from the work of the neo- 
Kantian legal philosopher R. Stammler, Wirtschaft und Recht nach 
der materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, here it means the for- 
mal convention that makes possible the rule of law. Stammler's 
work was a critique of Historical Materialism against wich Adler 
took issue in Causality and Teleology. (see previous chapter). 
Stammler uses the concept of "Gemeischaft" to indicate "the final 
expression of unity under the law" (T. E. Willey, op. cit. Back 
to Kant, p. 125). Bauer strongly disagrees with Stammler's inter- 
pretation of Gemeinschaft. see OBW, op, cit. vol 1. p. 186 
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From the above it is possible to infer that for Bauer the 
question of how the boundaries between national communities come 
into existence is quite different from the question of how the 
national community is constituted. Historical and/or political 
circumstances can link or separate groups of people, and the ex- 
planations for this are to be found in a more comprehensive 
analysis of the historical conjuncture, and not in the theory of 
the formation of nations. Also from the ensuing discussion it is 
possible to notice that Bauer's use of the concept of "community" 
is substantially different from the way in which it is used in 
mainstream sociology following Tönnies. Bauer knows and highly 
rates the work of Tönnies "Gemeinschaft and Gesselschaft", but he 
nevertheless gives the concepts of "community" and "society" a 
"different meaning". 46 In his usage of both terms, Bauer ex- 
plicitly follows Adler's critical discussion of Stammler's neo- 
Kantian legal terminology. For Stammler "the essence of society" 
is the process of co-operation of human beings under an external 
formal convention (Dussere Satzung). In sharp distinction with 
this however, the "essence of the Community" (in the sense of 
"commercium") is that the individual, in his/her "physical and 
spiritual being" is the product of the numerous interactive rela- 
tions with other individuals, and therefore expresses in his/her 
individuality concrete manifestations of the "communitarian 
character". Consequently, what distinguish the nation from all 
other communities of character (in the sense of communio), is 
that the nation is not a mere homogeneity of fate, but on the 
contrary, it only comes into existence and develops as a com- 
munity of fate (in the sense of commercium). Bauer immediately 
qualifies this statement by arguing that communities of fate can- 
not emerge unless a given "external formal convention" delimits 
------------------- 
46. Bauer praises Tönnies' book as "an excellent work", OBW, op. 
cit. vol 1, p. 186. One of the various English translations of 
the work of Thhnnies, is Community and Society, translated and in- 
troduced by P. Loomis, Michigan State University Press, 1957 
318 
their boundaries. This is to say that the boundaries of the na- 
tional community are set by an external framework and the ex- 
planation as how that external framework comes into existence is 
different from the question of what constitutes a national com- 
munity. The separation however, is not as clear cut as Bauer ap- 
pears to suggest. 
If say, the Finnish Language is the formal framework that 
constitutes boundaries of the Finish nation as an interactive 
community, and the Argentinian state is what constitutes the for- 
mal framework through which the Argentinian nation as an interac- 
tive community comes into existence, Bauer is right in saying 
that the interactive relation in both cases could be concep- 
tualised outside the framework that brought both national com- 
munities into existence, since the interactive relation is repli- 
cated in each "subjective position". However, in the long run 
the "subjective positions" will tend to disintegrate in the ab- 
sence of a framework that makes possible the existence of an 
"interactive community". Consequently both communities could 
only continue to exist on condition that the framework that 
delimits their interactive relation is maintained, replaced or 
reproduced. While it is possible to think of an "Argentinian 
cultural community" outside the framework of the Argentinian 
state, and a "Finish cultural community" that exists outside the 
framework of the Finnish language, both subjective positions 
will on the long run disintegrate and be transformed into some- 
thing else unless an "external framework" is found to preserve 
the specific form of interactive relation that permits the exist- 
ence of their "subjective positions". Also as it will be seen in 
a moment, Bauer neglects one of the most important "external 
frameworks" in forming national communities: the state. Con- 
sequently, while it is possible to separate the interaction from 
the framework that generates the interaction, the interactive 
relation will eventually cease to function outside that 
framework. According to Bauer, in the case of the national com- 
munity this function of "external framework" is often given by 
language. 47 However, in Keeping with his non essentialist 
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stance, Bauer argues that it would be misleading to hold that 
language is the causal factor in the formation of national com- 
munities, and this puts him in a direct collision course with K. 
Kautsky, whose key argument in his epiphenomenalist theory of the 
national question is that language is the determinant factor in 
the formation of Nations. In a critical review of Bauer's book 
in the Neue Zeit, Kautsky argues that in Bauer's work the cru- 
cial mistake from which all others are derived is that Bauer 
refuses to recognise the strongest link between members of the 
national community which is evident for everyone to see: their 
common language. 48 To this criticism Bauer responds in a later 
article by arguing that at a superficial level there is no dis- 
agreement between Kautsky and himself, empirically observable na- 
tions are communities of language. But this trivial, superficial 
observation is not yet sufficient to provide a conceptualisation 
of the national phenomenon, for Bauer feels that he cannot be 
contented by the observation that every nation uses a common 
language: 
I may rather ask, why precisely this particular group of 
human beings and not another, or indeed, why not a narrower 
group makes use of the same language? The question of which 
force delimits the boundaries of communication leads to the 
concept of community of communication, and if we wish to 
causally determine the boundaries of communication we will 
eventually reach the concept of "community of fate" through 
-------------------- 
47. OBW, vol 1 op. Cit. P. 186 
48. K. KautsKy, Nationalit at un Internationalität, Ergmnzunshefte 
zur Neuen Zeit, 1, January 1908, translated into Spanish by U. 
Köchmann in op. cit. La Segunda Internacional y el Problema 
Nacional Y Colonial, vol 2, p. 127 
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the concept of community of culture. 49 
In fact, the central theoretical chapter of Bauers booK 
represents a meticulous attempt to provide an answer to this 
question. 5o 
As a consequence of Bauer's emphasis on the process of in- 
teractive relation as the basis for the formation of the national 
community, a careful discussion of patterns of communication is 
an essential dimension of Bauer's worK. In spite of Kautsky's 
assertion to the contrary, for Bauer language is the principal 
medium of communication through which the national community is 
constituted. 
... even - if there are patterns of communication that link 
German and English workers, they are much more diffuse than 
the patterns of communication that link the English worker 
with the English bourgeois. Both live in the same cities, 
both read the same murals, the same newspapers and par- 
ticipate in the same sporting or political 
events.... Language is the instrument of communication. If 
there were stronger links of communication between English 
and German workers, they would have the same language in 
common, and the community of language would not be between 
the English bourgeoisie and the English working class. 51 
-------------------- 
49.0. Bauer, "Bemerkungen zur Nationalit3tenfrage" in Die Neue 
Zeit, 26, vol. 1, March 1908, translated into Spanish by C. 
Ceretti in op. cit. La Segunda Internacional y el Problema 
Nacional y Colonial, vol 2, p. 175-76 
50. "Der Begriff der Nation" (the concept of the nation), in op. 
cit. OBW, vol 1, pp. 170-197 
51. OBW, vol 1, op. Cit. P, 173 
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Consequently for Bauer, language is the "great medium of 
communication", the need for. communication generates common lan- 
guages, and when the linguistic patterns of communication disin- 
tegrate, so does the national community, for it is "unthinkable" 
for a national community to maintain its cultural commonalty 
without a common language. 52 Up to this point it superficially 
seems that Bauer is replicating the epiphenomenalist discourse of 
KautsKy. However in the introduction to the 1924 edition Bauer 
attempts to dispel the Kautskian idea that the community of lan- 
guage is the concrete expression of the process of economic 
development and the constitutive causal factor in the formation 
of national communities. 
... the community of language is the product of a very com- 
plex process of integration and differentiation. The dis- 
solution of the community of fate leads to a cultural, and 
consequently, linguistic differentiation; the articulation 
of a community of fate leads to cultural and consequently, 
linguistic integration. The community of language is only a 
partial manifestation of the cultural community and a 
product of the community of fate. 53 
Consequently, if a common language is an important factor 
for the unity of the national community, it does not mean, as 
Kautsky argues, that language in itself generates the process of 
cultural and national unity, but that the latter is the result of 
a complex process of articulation of the other cultural, social 
and political factors that participate in the configuration of 
what Bauer calls "the community of fate". Consequently, while 
Bauer accepts that a national community cannot in the long run 
52. ibid. P. 175 
53. OBW, Vol 1, op. Cit. P. 62. 
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subsist without a common language, this last single factor is not 
in itself sufficient to constitute a national community, and this 
is certainly the case of those different national communities 
that share the same language. 54 The main difference between 
Bauer's argument and the position taxen by Kautsky and Lenin on 
the role of language is that for Bauer language is not the causal 
variable - that configurate the national community, but is rather 
the channel or medium through which the interaction that shapes 
the national community taxes place. Contrary to the arguments 
developed by all forms of economism, for Bauer language is not a 
causal factor in the formation of national communities. It is 
only an important consequence of the process of communication 
that results from Bauer's definition of a nation as community of 
fate resulting from a process of "common reciprocal interaction". 
If however, this process of communication could taxe place out- 
side language, and if an alternative medium of communication 
could be found through which the national community is con- 
stituted, then it is possible to thinK of a national community 
lacking a common language. If, for example, in the case of Swit- 
zerland it s possible to show that the centuries long experience 
of living under a very peculiar form of decentralised state ap- 
paratus creates a stronger bond of communication than a common 
language, it is possible to argue that the Swiss are a national 
community without necessarily having a common language. This may 
be also the case, according to Bauer, of Jewish communities in 
medieval Europe. Following Marx analysis of the Jewish question 
in "Zur Judenfrage"55 Bauer argues that the patterns of strict 
segregation that Jews where subjected to through residential 
separation and the confinement to monetary occupations in a non- 
-------------------- 
54. M. Garcia Pelayo, La teoria de Ia Naciön en Otto Bauer, op. 
cit. P. 33 
55. K. Marx, "On the Jewish Question" in Early Writings, intro- 
duced by L. Colletti, Penguin BooKs, London 1975 pp. 211-241 
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monetary social order, created a strong interactive linK between 
various European Jewish communities despite not been concentrated 
in one geographical area and despite the partial existence of 
common language. 
.. the link through economic exchange that related the Jew 
with the peasant was much weaker than the more intimate com- 
munitarian interaction with other Jews. The difference be- 
tween the culture of monetary economy and that of natural 
economy was incomparably stronger than the commonality 
produced by the mutual interaction that took place in com- 
pleting a purchase, a sale or a loan. In this way the Jews 
remained a separate nation in the midst of of other 
peoples. 56 
However, the development of the capitalist mode of produc- 
tion, dramatically changed the position of Jews in society. A 
part of the Jewish population joins the industrial bourgeoisie. 
This change in the class position of a part of the Jewish popula- 
tion gives way to a revolutionary change in lifestyles, and con- 
sequently the "new Jewish bourgeoisie" began to distance itself 
from the traditional Jewish population, and finds a closer af- 
finity with "their fellow Christian class members"(Christlichen 
Klassengenossen). 57 While Sauer's discussion of the Jewish 
56. OBW, vol 1, Op. Cit. P. 416 
57. ibid., p. 417. While this is a valid description of the 
process that affected Sauer's paternal ancestors, the middle 
class Jewish population of Vienna, it is not valid as a general 
description of the Jewish population of Eastern and central 
Europe. Besides the obvious class reductionist analysis of Jewish 
life, it is clear that an important group of Yiddisch speaking 
Jews of Eastern Europe remained a national community long after 
the emergence of capitalism, fulfilling all of Sauer's theoreti- 
cal criteria for national existence, with a strong working class 
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question in Eastern and Central Europe is not without some inter- 
esting insights, he is at times inconsistent in his overall 
theoretical discussion, as Stalin was quick to point out. 58 In 
summarising the discussion of the connection between language and 
the development of the interactive process that constitutes the 
national community, the two examples presented above show that in 
-------------------- 
base and a combative socialist party (The Bund). This charac- 
terisation of Jewish national life in Eastern Europe, should, of 
course be carefully confined to the geographical area and the 
period under consideration. To include the predominately urban 
and culturally assimilated Jewish communities of Central and 
Western Europe- let alone Jews from other parts of the world with 
a vastly different ethnic cultures- under this national 
criterion, is an metaphysical and transcendentalist tergiversa- 
tion of the process of national development. This is in essence 
the Zionist position. For a critical analysis see M. Machover & 
M. Offenberg. Zionism and its Scarecrows, op. cit. 
58. In a nutshell, Bauer attributes the persistence of Yiddisch- 
Jewish national community in Eastern Europe to the relative 
"underdevelopment" of that part of the world, particularly when 
compared with Western Europe where Jews were no longer a national 
community, given that they lost a common language and became 
therefore more and "assimilated" through a greater interactive 
relationship with the national communities they lived with. 
While Bauers description of the differences between Eastern and 
Western European Jews is undoubtedly correct, it does not follow, 
particularly in view of his own insightful conceptualisation of 
the national phenomenon, that the Yiddisch speaking Eastern 
European Jews will experience the same developmental path as the 
Western Jews and cease to be a national community. See 
Nationale Autonomie der Juden? (National Autonomy for Jews? ) OBW, 
op. cit. vol 1, pp. 414-435 
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exceptional circumstances language is not an essential factor in 
the formation of national communities, while in most cases it be- 
comes the communicative medium through wich the national com- 
munity is constituted; while on its own, it does not necessarily 
indicates the presence of a national community. 
Having discussed the various aspects of the process of na- 
tional development in Sauer's theory, it is possible now to see 
how the various dimensions of the problematic of national forma- 
tion are put together in Sauer's definition of the nation. In 
doing so, it is important to remember that the aim of the earlier 
work of Adler in the series "Marx, ) Studien" was directed to 
reject the forms of essentialism present in both class reduc- 
tionist Marxism and the transcendentalist essentialism of the 
neo-Kantians. Bauer's emphasis in understanding the formation of 
the national community as a process rather than a derivative 
category from what he calls the "Materialist" or the 
"Spiritualist" theories of history, is a direct result of the 
above mentioned Adlerian task, wich became in more than one way, 
the hallmark of the theoretical distinctiveness and richness of 
the Austro-Marxist tradition. In refusing to accept any essen- 
tialist point of departure in his conceptualisation of the na- 
tional community, Bauer opened the way for that important overall 
condition for understanding the nature of the national community, 
the ability to capture the multidimensionality of the phenomenon 
under consideration. This is perhaps another important reason 
why Bauer's theory has been so consistently misinterpreted. A su- 
perficial reading of Sauer's theoretical chapter of his 
voluminous work is not enough to understand the intellectual aim 
of his analysis. There are no cliches and ready made formulae 
that are applicable to every circumstance, Bauer's definition of 
the Nation as "the totality of human beings bound together 
through a community of fate into a community of character"59, is 
-------------------- 
59. Die Nation ist die Gesamtheit der durch Schick- 
salsgemeinschaft zu einer Charaktergemeinschaft verknriften 
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perfectly meaningless if one does not follow the painstakingly 
essential process of reviewing the different dimensions that par- 
ticipate in the complex, resilient and not well understood 
process of national formation. In this sense, Bauer locates his 
work in direct opposition to the three main currents of thought 
that dominated the conceptualisation of the national phenomenon, 
what he calls the "metaphysical theories" a term derived from 
Adlers work on "Causality and Teleology" and includes what Bauer 
calls "national materialism" and "national spiritualism". The 
second current of thought is what he calls "Psychological 
Theories", meaning by this those theories that seek to discover 
the essence of the nation in the consciousness of, or the will 
to, solidarity60 This are the so- called "voluntaristic" 
theories of the nation with which Bauer is mistakenly associated 
with in a number of important works on nations and nationalism. 
61 
Third group of theories that Bauer analyses and rejects are the 
"Empirical" theories, i. e., those theories that enumerate the 
elements that characterise national communities and whose addi- 
tion in observable cases constitutes nations. 62 In discussing 
those theories Bauer argues that "Common descent and common 
culture" are basically derivative categories of the notion of 
"common history" in the process of constructing the national 
character. A common territory is an important condition for Bauer 
only insofar as it allows for the conditions of interactive 
Menschen, OBW, op. cit. Vol. 1 p. 194 
60. OBW, vol 1 op. Cit. P. 170. 
Bottomore (ed. ) Austro Marxism, 
English version in op. cit. T. 
p. 102 
61. see footnote 7. 
62. ibid., and M. Garcia Pelayo op. cit. 
en Otto Bauer" pp. 26-27 
La Teoria de 1,1 Naciön 
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relationship to taxe place. Territorial separation disrupts the 
unity of the national community because the inter- subjective 
process required to develop the community of fate cannot taxe 
place. However, Bauer acknowledges that "in the age of printing, 
the post, telegraph, steamships this is much less the case than 
formerly"63 . It is possible to safely infer from the logic of 
Sauer's argument, that the territorial dimension is even less im- 
portant in view of the phenomenal contemporary expansion of all 
means of communication. However, the common territory becomes 
important in a different way, in that it becomes the basis for a 
related important phenomena: the National State. This will be 
discussed in a moment. A common language is for the reasons that 
were discussed earlier, "aJ second order means". In Bauers con- 
ceptualisation the common language is the medium through which 
the community of culture is maintained, re-creating the national 
community in each subjectivity through common interaction. 
However, in an interesting footnote, Bauer qualifies this under- 
standing of the role of language to dispel any possible inter- 
pretation that language is a "neutral medium". 
Language, of course, is not simply a means of transmitting a 
culture, but is itself an element of culture. A Frenchman 
does not differ from a German only because his language con- 
veys a different culture, but also because the language it- 
self is a cultural element which has been transmitted to him 
and determines, by its specific qualities, his speech, 
thought, and character. The difference between French and 
German rhetoric is due in part to the difference of 
language. 64 
-------------------- 
63. OBW op. cit. vol 1. P. 192. English translation T. Bottomore, 
op. cit. Austro Marxism, p. 105 
64. OBW, vol 1, op. cit. P. 190. English version from T. Bot- 
tomore, op. Cit. Austro Marxism, p. 103 
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The above mentioned review of the different theories that 
attempt to explain the nature of the national community, allows 
Bauer to present the specific originality of his argument. For 
Bauer, the nation cannot be understood by enumerating a set of 
categories or by referring to some essential quality. For Bauer 
the national community is the end result of systemic process in 
which different dimensions are brought together through a common 
historical development in dialogue with the main facets of con- 
temporary experience. This is the meaning of Bauers definition 
of the national community as human beings bound together through 
a common fate into a community of character. Subjective 
positionality is the expression of societalised existence, the 
content of societalised existence results from the structural 
linkage of a process of "common reciprocal interaction", and a 
process of historical development. 
For us society is not a mere addition of individuals, but 
each individual is the product of society. In the same 'way, 
for us the nation is not an addition of individuals that en- 
ter into a mutual relation through a common language, but 
the individual him/herself is the product of the nation. 
His/her individual character did not emerge in any other way 
than through a continuous interaction (Wechselwirkung) with 
other individuals, in the same way as the character of those 
individuals emerged from the continuous interaction with 
him/her. 65 
For Bauer the national community exists independently from 
national consciousness. National subjects are part of of the na- 
tional community even if they are not aware of their belonging. 
National consciousness is however, the result of the awareness of 
the existence of other nations, since the subject becomes con- 
-------------------- 
65. OBW, vol 1, op. Cit. P. 187 
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scious of his/her national dimension by comparison with others. 
This is why, according to Bauer, national consciousness became a 
generalised perceptive mechanism only as a result of the process 
of "Modernity". This last aspect acquires great importance in the 
political arena. Given that the national community manifest it- 
self in the individual character of every member of the national 
community, every attack on my national community is like an at- 
tack upon myself and every glory of the national community is 
like my own. 66 While Bauer is on firm ground in arguing that na- 
tional consciousness is not a necessary ingredient of national 
existence, the second part of the argument stands on very slip- 
pery ground. While it is true that the national sentiment is of- 
ten associated with "basic sentimental representations" of great 
importance to individual identity, as Bauer convincingly argues 
in a style reminiscent of the verses of a famous Argentine 
tango, 67 it does not follow that this link is automatically 
translated into the political arena in a single ideological for- 
mat. In this sense, the political understanding of the role of 
the national sentiments described by Bauer, is best served if 
these sentiments are perceived as "floating ideological forms" 
capable of being articulated with concrete ideological positions. 
Thus "nationalism" in general it has been argued, is neither 
"left" nor "right", while all concrete forms of nationalism can 
66. OBw, op. Cit. vol 1 p. 202, M. Garcia Pelayo, La teoria de 
la nacion en Otto Bauer, op. cit. p. 35 
67. If / think of my nation, I remember my beloved motherland 
(Heimat-Patria), my parental home, my first childish play, my old 
schoolteacher, that young woman that gave me happiness with her 
Kisses, and from all those representations a feeling of pleasure 
overlaps the representation closely linked to it, that of the na- 
tion that l belong to OBW, vol 1, op. cit. p. 201-202. The nos- 
talgic verse of Carlos Gardel, the famous Argentinian composer of 
tangos, would have been left wanting on this one. 
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be located in a conventional political spectrum, opening in this 
way the possibility for understanding the political dimension of 
national existence as an ideologically contested field , 
68 
From the general discussion of Bauers conceptualisation of 
the national community one fundamental aspect appears in the dis- 
cussion of every aspect of the national phenomenon, the percep- 
tion of the development of the national community as a multi- 
farious process in which the various dimensions are linked not in 
a fixed manner, but in a dynamic relation that permits the under- 
standing of the nation as a process rather than a fixed one- 
dimensional relation of causality. As it was argued earlier, a 
multidimensional understanding of the national community is es- 
sential to dispel the deforming influence of economism. Does this 
mean that Bauer decisively broke with all forms of economic 
reductionism? Unfortunately no. While Bauer is indeed close to 
break with the distorting logic of economism in the conceptual 
discussion of the national community, he relapses into the clas- 
sical Marxist categories of analysis in conceptualising another 
important aspect of national development, the historical dimen- 
sion of national formation. In doing this Bauer tries to formu- 
late universal laws of national development which are closely 
connected with the various stages of development of the produc- 
tive forces, as conceptualised in the classical forms of 
Eurocentric evolutionism in classical Marxism. This argument can 
be best shown in his treatment of a) The theory of National 
Evolution, b) The use of that unfortunate dichotomy "Historical" 
vs "Non Historical" Nations. C) The connection between the Nation 
and the State. 
- ----- 
68. For 
------------ 
a discussion 
- 
of this idea in a different context see E. 
Laclau, "Towards a Theory of Populism" in Politics and Ideology 
in the Marxist Theor y New Left BooKs, 1977, p. 143 ff. 
331 
Sauer's theory of National Evolution 
In discussing the historical dimension of Bauer's work, and 
in particular, in evaluating the validity of Bauer's generalisa- 
tion from his case studies, one important aspect must be taken 
into account: the historical and political context in which Bauer 
embarked in his monumental study of the national question. As was 
argued in the previous chapter, the final years of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire were marred by heated national confrontations, 
which consumed much of the political and intellectual energies of 
Austrian socialists. Given their determined effort to try and 
transcend the bitter national differences, in their partial 
success in doing so they became the only political organisation 
in the troubled Empire that truly reflected its multinational 
character. Bauer's theoretical and historical discussion was 
directed towards making a decisive contribution to the debate 
over the national question and the resolution of the multina- 
tional tension, believing at the time (as many other socialists 
did) that it was possible to save the multinational nature of the 
Austrian Monarchy by radically transforming its structure into a 
decentralised multinational federal state. It is important to 
keep in mind the previously discussed attempts by the Austrian 
socialist party to come to grips with the national question, 
since Bauer's work through the Marx Studien series, was initially 
a contribution to the ongoing debate directed towards clarifying 
the main historical and theoretical issues of the national ques- 
tion for party workers and activists. 
In his historical analyses, the main case studies discussed 
by Bauer were those of the Austro-German and Czech national com- 
munities, since much of the tension in Austria related to them. 
He also used other national communities that lived in Austria and 
the Ottoman Empire, but the main thrust of his historical discus- 
sion was directed to the German and the Czech case. What charac- 
terises Bauer's historical analysis of the national phenomenon is 
the assertion that in every "historical nation" there are two 
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classes or two groups of classes. The first category truly par- 
ticipates in national life, creates and enjoys national culture 
and the process of national development takes place only within 
its ranks. This is the class *or classes that hold political 
power, and more crucially dominate the means of production. The 
second group, which are normally the subordinated classes, are 
excluded from national life, although their toil sustains the 
lifestyle and culture of "national classes". There are two ex- 
ceptions to this rather crude dichotomy. The first is what Bauer 
calls the "primitive clanic communism of the German tribes"69 and 
the second is the socialist society of the future. The reason 
for this is that in both cases there is no private ownership over 
the means of production, which through the class mechanism 
separates in all other cases the dominant national classes from 
the subordinate classes excluded from national life. The 
crudity of this epiphenomena list analysis stands in marked con- 
trast with Bauer's sensitive discussion of the process of na- 
tional development evaluated above, at times it seems that there 
are "two Bauers" writing, one sensitive to multidimensionality, 
the other committed to class reductionism. 
In terms of his historical analysis of the case studies, 
Bauer calls the subordinated classes that do not participate in 
national life Hintersassen der Nation70 (tributary classes of 
-------------------- 
69. OBW, op. cit. vol 1, p. 92 ff. 
70. This term is also difficult to translate. Garcia Pelayo 
argues that it is a juridical term of medieval origin to desig- 
nate all those who did not have property rights and were in a 
servile relation to the feudal landlords. At a later period, it 
denoted the lower and poorer classes that only had restricted 
rights to citizenship and property. The term was used up to the 
nineteenth century. M. Garcia Pelayo, La teoria de la nacibn en 
Otto Bauer, op. cit. p. 40. In translation, "tributary classes" 
is hesintantly used in the absence of a better term. This is 
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the Nation), whose exploitation sustains the proud building of 
national culture from which they are excluded71. Given that for 
Bauer what constitutes the nation is the cultural unity of the 
dominant classes, the history of the national community is simply 
the history of the linear developmental succession of different 
dominant classes and strata with a parallel development of the 
tributary classes. Feudal landlords, manufacturing bourgeoisie, 
petty bourgeoisie in the first case and serfs, free peasants ar- 
tisans, and workers in the second. As Garcia Pelayo rightly 
argues, the validity of these analytical categories is doubtful 
even if they are confined to the German example used by Bauer. 72 
From this analysis Bauer derives two conclusions, firstly the 
process of national integration and separation can be explained 
through the developmental logic of the forces of production. In 
the German case, the separation of the Dutch tribe from the main 
Germanic group is explained through the process of sedentary 
settlement of the Germanic inhabitants of the Lowlands. In this 
situation the dominant classes of the Dutch tribes lost contact 
with other germanic peoples, developing in this way a separate 
community of fate. The second conclusion drawn by Bauer from 
this analysis is a thesis about the progressive expansion of the 
national community. Through the historical process of linear his- 
torical development, different dominant classes incorporate 
groups or strata that were previously "tributary" into the na- 
tional community, and during the capitalist period the working 
class will be progressively integrated into the national com- 
munity through the army, the ballot box and the educational 
also the way in which the term is translated in the Spanish edi- 
tion. 
71. OBW, vol 1 op. cit. p. 115 
72. M. Garcia Pelayo, La Teoria de la Nacion en Otto Bauer, op. 
Cit. P. 41 
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system. 73 This process will culminate in the total integration 
of the population into the national cultural community with the 
emergence of socialism and the abolition of class societies. This 
is the meaning of the quotation on the first page of this chap- 
ter. The growing spiritual differentiation of nations will 
result from the disappearance of the non-national "tributary" 
classes. There are also no "tributary classes" under "primitive 
clanic communism" because there is no surplus production to gen- 
erate class divisions. This is not a "national cultural 
community", but a mere "community of descent". Under socialism, 
as happened under clanic primitive communism, the whole popula- 
tion will belong to the national community, but the crucial dif- 
ference is that this time it is not a "static community of 
descent", but a dynamic cultural community resulting from the 
socialised enjoyment of the fruits of production . Thus, the main 
difference is that during the period of primitive communism the 
national community resulted from a biological community of de- 
scent, in the socialist society, the national community will 
result from the cultural integration of all members of the com- 
munity into national life. The clumsiness of this historical 
formulation is truly puzzling when compared with the sophistica- 
tion of Bauer's arguments evaluated in the first part of this 
chapter. 
Another conceptual discussion directly relevant to Austria 
is Bauer's critical use of that unfortunate Marxian dichotomy, 
"Historical vs Non Historical Nations". 74 Bauer takes from Marx 
-------------------- 
73. OBW, vol 1 op. cit. p. 151 
74. For a discussion of the notions of "historical vs Non His- 
torical nations" in Marx and Engels, see Chapter 2 of this work 
and R. Rosdolsky, op. cit. Friederich Engels und das Problem der 
"geschichtslosen" Vtölker", C. Herod op. cit. The Nation in the 
History of Marxian Thought. 
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and Engels the main components of their conceptualisation of that 
dichotomy while severely criticising its deterministic slant. 
Bauer incorporates the main arguments into his historical evolu- 
tionary model, while at the same time maintaining that modern 
capitalism had caused the "awakening of non historical nations" 
and through this conceptual tool he tries to explain the 
"national revival" of the Czech national community and other na- 
tional communities in Austria. Consequently, it is important to 
understand this part of Bauer's work not so much as a theoretical 
contribution in its own right, but rather as an attempt to 
politically evaluate the process of "national awakening" in the 
context of late imperial Austria and to provide some theoretical 
and political ideas for discussion within the Austrian socialist 
party, addressing the politically explosive issue of national 
rights in that country. Thus, in evaluating Bauer's use of the 
unfortunate Marxian dichotomous characterisation of nations, it 
is important to keep in mind the debates within Austrian 
socialism over the nationalities issue. 75 In commenting on the 
articles written by Engels in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung76 Bauer 
argues that those articles are not just ephemeral journalistic 
works but denote the historical vision of its author. However, 
it is important to notice, Bauer argues, that those articles were 
born out of the storm of the revolution, and their author failed 
to -perceive that as a result of circumstantial events the "non 
historical nations" were driven to the reactionary camp. This 
last situation was not, according to Bauer "a permanent feature", 
-------------------- 
75. see Chapter 7 and A. Kogan, The Social Democrats and the 
Conflict of Nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy op. cit., R. 
Kann, The Multinational Empire, op. cit. P. 154-168, and 0. Jaszi, 
The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, op. cit. p. 177 If. 
76. Bauer refers to "The Magyar Struggle" and "Democratic 
Panslavism", K. Marx and F. Engels Collected Works op. cit. Vol 
8. for a critical discussion of those articles see chapter 2 
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but the result of transient revolutionary circumstances. Engels 
(following Hegel) thought that this was the fundamental intrinsic 
feature of those unfortunate -national communities, and this is, 
according to Bauer, the fundamental error of those articles. En- 
gels opinion, that nations without history have no future has 
proven to be incorrect, but on the contrary, the historical 
method of investigation thought out by Marx and Engels permits us 
today to understand the causes of the awakening of non historical 
nations to historical life under the influence of capitalism, 
democracy and the revolution. 77 Later, Bauer goes on to argue 
that precisely opposite to Engels prediction, today the repre- 
sentatives of the nations without history had become revolution- 
ary, while those of the historical nations became more 
conservative78 
In Bauer's analysis there are two types of "non historical" 
nations. The first type comprises those national communities that 
lack a "high culture" and consequently had never "surpassed the 
primitive stage" of development. The second type is comprised by 
those national communities that achieved in the past a "higher 
level of development" but as a consequence of the collapse or 
disappearance of their upper (national- cultured) classes, they 
had "lapsed" into a state of stagnation and "lack of 
historicity". In order to document this view, Bauer embarks on a 
detailed historical analysis of the main national communities 
that constituted the Austrian side of the dual monarchy. Bauer's 
arguments could be briefly summarised in the following way: at 
the beginning of the 19th century Cisleithan Austria included 
three historical nations, the Germans and Italians who a had 
nobility and middle classes, and the Poles who only had their own 
nobility. To demonstrate how an "historical nation" is trans- 
formed into a "non-historical nation", Bauer discusses the 
-------------------- 
77. OBW, vol 1, op. cit. p. 323-24 
78. ibid, p. 324 
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changes experienced by the Czech nation. After the defeat of the 
Bohemian army on the hands of the Austrians, the Bohemian leaders 
were executed or fled abroad and the Emperor's soldiers settled 
in Czech areas. The lands of the Czech nobility were confiscated 
and the nobility exterminated. The few remaining Czech nobles 
were promptly assimilated into the class of new settlers. After 
the Thirty Years War the Czech population was decimated to a 
third of its original size. All that remainded of the Czech na- 
tion was a few craftsmen and a large peasant population. Accord- 
ing to Bauer, these classes could not "develop the Czech culture" 
and without a nobility and an autochtonous middle class, the 
Czechs lost their culture and vanished from the historical stage. 
The Czech language according to Bauer, became a language of 
despised and exploited classes. Everyone who advanced into the 
upper layer of that society, was ashamed to admit knowledge of 
the language of the unfree Czech peasants. The national Czech 
culture "died" and consequently the Czechs became a "non histori- 
cal nation"79. 
Another example of the a "non historical nation" are the 
Slovenes. According to Bauer, the Slovenian peasants did not 
form a "cultural community". What united the peasant villages was 
"the inertia of a peasant culture transmitted from generation to 
generation". This is for Bauer "very different" from the dynamic 
development that characterises "modern national communities of 
culture". 80 In Cislethian Austria not only Czechs and Slovenes, 
but Ruthenians (Ukrainians) and Serbs were "nations without 
history". This situation was however dramatically changed by the 
revolutionary impact of the capitalist mode of production. 
-------- 
79. OBW 
------ 
vol 1, 
------ 
p. 245 ff., summarized by C. Herod, op. cit. The 
nation in the History of Marxian Thou ght, op. cit. p. 50-51 
80. OBW9 op. Cit. vol 1, p. 247 
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This picture had been completely altered by the developments 
of the last 120 years. Capitalism and its surrogate, the 
modern state, effected everywhere a widening of the cultural 
community, in that it freed the masses from the fetters of 
an all powerful tradition, and called them to participate in 
the regeneration of a national culture. We refer to this 
process as the awakening of the non historic nations (Das 
Erwachen der geschichtslosen Natronen). 81 
Consequently, the role of industrial capitalism has been to 
"awaken the non-historical nations" to historical life. The bour- 
geoisie and their allied intellectual groups were in Bauer's 
terms the "historical agents" of this regeneration. The 
development of industrial capitalism led to the popular spread of 
certain basic skills, and therefore in terms of Bauer's argument 
on "the progressive expansion" of the national community, incor- 
porated large tributary sections of the population of "historical 
nations" into national life. This same process also "awakes the 
non historical nations into historical life". Bauer tries to 
show through detailed historical analysis how industrial 
capitalism was the most important cause for the "re-entry of the 
Czech nation into cultural life". Briefly, a new proletariat 
developed out of the Czech peasants, who hated the German bour- 
geoise and mistakenly included in this form of hatred the German 
working class. The Czech cottage industry and artisans were 
also affected by the development of industrial capitalism and 
joined the Czech workers in their hatred of Germans. A similar 
process takes place among other national communities. Con- 
sequently for Bauer in Austria: 
-------------------- 
81. OBW, vol. 1, op. cit. p. 270-71, bold script is my own also 
quoted and translated by C. Herod, op. cit. The Nation in the 
History of Marxian Thought p. 49 
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All social antagonisms manifest themselves as national an- 
tagonisms because the dominant classes had long since become 
German. The hatred against bureaucracy, nobility and the 
capitalist class... had to take the form of the hatred of 
Czechs against Germans. 82 
Initially the Austrian state developed a few primary schools 
for the Czech peasants, but the main impulse for national revival 
came from the Czech intelligentsia, especially teachers and 
clergy, who began to revive the national language and culture. 
In terms of the Austrian situation, the important side ef- 
fect of this process was to intensify the national antagonisms, 
since with the development of industrial capitalism and its 
intricate relations between nations and classes, national hatred 
is a form of transformed class hatred. 83 Given the dominance of 
German culture in Austria, German workers were better protected, 
educated and had at their disposal a "more advanced" industrial 
organisation. This generated a hatred of "the privileged German 
majority", which in turn, generated the German hatred of the 
minorities. 
It is possible to summarize Bauer's analysis by arguing that 
for Bauer "historical nations are those that have "normal" class 
structure, while "non-historical nations" are those national com- 
munities that are entirely located within certain subordinated 
classes or strata and whose segmental position differentiate them 
from others by class or political factors. Consequently, for 
Bauer non-historical nations exist in multinational societies 
--------- 
82. OBW, 
--- 
vol 
-------- 
1, op. cit. p. 284, M. Garcia Pelayo, op. cit., La 
teoria de la Nacion en Otto Bauer p. 65 
83. "Nationaler Hass ist tranasformierter Klassenhass" OBW, vol. 
1 op. cit. p. 315 
340 
based on the coercive juxtaposition of different national com- 
munities, in which national existence is epiphenomenal to a sub- 
ordinate class location. The - development of capitalism 
"requires" the development of communicative cultural skills, and 
consequently the proletariat, the middle class and the new intel- 
ligentsia, "revive" the national culture and "awake" the national 
community into national life. 84 Bauer's analysis of the process 
of "awakening of non historical nations" is considered by C. 
Herod as a valid historical model through which the fall and 
renascence of certain of the central European national groups 
could be intelligently explained85, and R. Rosdolsky argues that, 
it conceptualizes in a very correct manner the situation of many 
oppressed populations in Central and Eastern Europe in the 18th 
and 19th century86 . However, and in spite of the above eulogy 
by distinguished scholars, if Bauer's conceptualisation of the 
"awakening of non historical nations" is put together with the 
connected discussion on the exclusion of "the tributary classes" 
from the national culture, and the one-dimensional evolutionism 
-------------------- 
84. This argument was also influential in the development of the 
ideology of the Poale Tzion so-called "Left Wing Zionism". The 
work of Ber Borochov, Nationalism and Class Struggle, reflects a 
similar interpretation of the situation of Jews in Europe. While 
Bauer himself, like most Austro Marxists, was a decided Anti 
Zionist and recommended "Jewish Assimilation", Max Adler 
expressed a distant sympathy for "Poale Tzion" see J. Jacobs, 
"Austrian Social Democracy and the Jewish Question in the First 
Republic" in A. Rabinbach (ed. ) The Austrian Socialist Experi- 
ment, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA 1985, p. 161-162 
85. C. Herod, The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought, op. 
cit. P. 47 
86. R. Rosdolsky, op. cit. F. Engels und das Problem der 
"geschichtslosen" Volker, p. 191, spanish translation p. 130 
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of his historical conceptualisation of the national community, 
what emerges is a picture of a one-linear epiphenomenalist 
analysis of his historical case, study, a situation which is in 
remarkable contrast with the perceptive multidimensional discus- 
sion of the process of national formation. It seems that in 
Bauers work there is an almost unsustainable tension between the 
imaginative and innovative analysis of the nation as a community 
of fate, and the narrow one-sideness of the case study, wich is 
trapped in the class reductionist perspective dominant in the 
socialist movement of his time. In some ways it seems as if there 
are two Bauer's writing this book: one Bauer fresh out the intel- 
lectual environment of fin de siecle Vienna, with brilliant and 
innovative ideas matured through Max Adler's and his own debate 
with the Neo Kantians and classical Marxism; and another Bauer, 
the party man, loyal to the dogmas of economistic Marxism, and 
severely restrained by the need to constantly demonstrate his al- 
legiance to the doctrinal teachings of Marx and Engels. 
Before concluding this evaluation of Bauer's work, a brief 
review of another aspect of Bauer's ideas is necessary, that of 
the connection between the national community and the state. Ac- 
cording to Bauer, the modern "national state" emerges out of the 
development of mercantile capitalism. However, Bauer qualifies 
this statement in two ways. Firstly, this does not mean that 
every form of state organisation represents the domination of the 
bourgeoisie, for according to Bauer, there are certain historical 
periods in which no class clearly dominates the state 
apparatus. 87 Secondly, and more directly relevant to the ongoing 
discussion on the national phenomenon, Bauer argues that there is 
-------------------- 
87. This idea was developed above all in Bauer's later work Die 
t5sterreichische Revolution, Vienna 1923 English abridged transla- 
tion The Austrian Revolution, L Parsons, London, 1925 p. 183 ff 
Unfortunately it is impossible to discuss this point for lack of 
space. 
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no intrinsic reason for a capitalist (bourgeois) state to be 
"national". National states Bauer argues, are not the causal 
result of the development of capital mode of production, but 
rather of a specific configuration of historical events in West- 
ern Europe. In order to substantiate this claim, Bauer argues 
that the modern state emerged in Italy, the country that could 
claim the "oldest mercantile form of capitalist production"88 
Here, in the rich Italian city states, for the first time the 
dominant classes learned to use the state "as an instrument to 
further capitalist interests". Once established, one aspect was 
crucial for its survival, the ability to constitute a mercenary 
army to sustain its generally small area of dominance and extract 
the taxation that made the whole operation profitable. In this 
case, according to Bauer, there was no reason for the state to 
become "national". However, in "the great western nations" the 
process of mercantile state development followed a different 
path, it became "entangled" with the feudal state. 89 At this 
point Bauer develops a detailed historical discussion to substan- 
tiate the rather pedestrian argument that in France, absolutism 
used the mercantile bourgeoise to eclipse the power of feudalism. 
In Germany, Bauer argues, the situation was rather different and 
as a result of this, the German nation was dismembered into a 
series of small states. Consequently, for Bauer the emergence of 
a national state in France, and the fragmentation in Germany had 
nothing to do with mercantile capitalism as such, but was rather 
the result of a different historical configuration of class al- 
liances within a collapsing feudal order. 90 However, the 19th 
century witnessed a dramatic change, which Bauer calls "the 
nationality principle". This is the notion that every national 
88. OBW, op. cit. vol 1. p. 223 
89. ibid, p. 224 
90. ibid. P. 228 
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community must have its own separate state. After lamenting that 
in "modern political sciences" the concepts of "nation" and 
"state" are hopelessly confused, ' and after giving examples of the 
improper use of the term nation to designate the population of a 
state, Bauer rhetorically asks the question Why it seems so 
"natural", so "rational" that every nation and only one nation, 
should form a political community?. 91 Bauer answers this question 
in two ways; firstly he argues that all movements for national 
emancipation are the result of a real or alleged fear of foreign 
domination. In certain cases according to Bauer, this is un- 
doubtedly correct. Many national independence movements overthrow 
a heavy foreign yoke and the emerging national state is a welcome 
advance to the previous state of affairs, "this is a straightfor- 
ward case and requires no explanation", Bauer argues. But in not 
a small number of cases, the movement for national emancipation 
greatly advances the position of the upper classes of the 
oppressed national community under foreign domination, while the 
change makes little difference to the oppressed classes. In this 
situation Bauer reasons that only in very few cases is the 
struggle for independence perceived with indifference by the sub- 
ordinated strata. Bauer also quotes a number of cases, when the 
subordinated strata were "better off" under foreign domination 
than under the yoke of "their own upper classes". What causes, 
-------------------- 
91. ibid. P. 231. Eighty years after it was first formulated, 
this question has neither lost its urgency nor has it been satis- 
factorily answered (including in Bauer's work). For recent at- 
tempts to answers this question see E. Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism", B. Blackwell 1983 and, B. Anderson, Imagined Com- 
munities Verso 1983, the latter thought provoking, but with a 
overdose of "third worldism", the compensatory but not less dis- 
tortive mirror image to "Orientalism". Also, Anderson joins the 
long list of scholars who dismisses the work of Bauer without 
properly understanding his theory. see p. 101-102. Gellner ig- 
nores Bauer completely. 
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asks Bauer, this curious phenomenon of the popular masses strug- 
gling against foreign domination in cases were they have nothing 
to lose or to win? 
Petty bourgeois, peasants and workers are under alien 
domination in every state, including national states. They 
are exploited by landowners capitalists and bureaucrats. But 
this form of alien domination is not readily apparent but 
must be grasped conceptually. However, foreign national 
domination is evident, immediately visible. If the worker 
goes to a public service office, or attends a court hearing, 
s/he may not understand that the latter are an alien power 
..... they appear to be an organic part of his/her own na- 
tion. But if the Judge or civil servant are from a different 
nation, if they speak a foreign language, the subordination 
to the alien power becomes clearly visible and consequently 
unbearable. 92 
For Bauer this is the main explanation of the "popularity" 
of national states, the fear, real or imagined, of foreign 
domination. A people being ruled by a foreign nation rapidly dis- 
cover that this ma kes oppression and exploitation "evidently 
clear and therefore unbearable". The conclusion that Bauer draws 
from this is that the desire to avoid foreign domination is thus 
the the trigger of all movements for national - state emancipa- 
tion during the 19th century. There is, however, another dimen- 
sion to widespread existence of national states, and this results 
from the functionality of the national state apparatus for the 
development of the capitalist system. This second aspect of this 
problem is, according to Bauer, related to the centralising ten- 
dencies of capitalism, and here he reproduces Lenin's and 
KautsKy's arguments without any major innovation. The con- 
sequence of this centralistic tendency is that according to 
-------------------- 
92. OBW, vol 1, op. cit. p. 233 
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Bauer, powerful economic forces operate against the fragmentation 
of the economic area of the national community93. Consequently 
for Bauer, two powerful forces -combine to give birth to that sym- 
biotic creature called "the nation state". A political desire to 
be free from foreign national rule, and the economic functional 
requirement of mercantile capitalism to enlarge as much as pos- 
sible the area of a homogeneous market. If Free Trade was a 
widely accepted philosophy it would have been possible, according 
to Bauer, to tolerate the political fragmentation of the same na- 
tional communities into autonomous states. However, in world in 
which there are powerful trade barriers, the national state is 
the best defense for the national mercantile classes. 94 Con- 
sequently for Bauer, "Mercantile Capitalism" exercise a dual con- 
tradictory effect on the development of the national community. 
On the one hand, a centrifugal political effect based on the 
demand for democratic self determination and the rejection of 
foreign rule, but on the other hand, a centripetal effect based 
on the economic requirements of what he calls "mercantile 
capitalism". 
Bauer concludes from the previous discussion that it is very 
important to understand the "nationality principle" (the idea of 
the nation state) as an historical construct generated by the 
bourgeoisie in struggle. Following the classical Marxist concep- 
tualisation of the importance of the modern centralised state for 
the hegemonic success of capitalism, Bauer argues that the trium- 
phant bou rgeoisie required a universally accepted principle to 
delimit the geographical area of the the state. If the use of 
Gramscian terminology may permitted at this point, what Bauer 
argues is that the triumphant bourgeoisie required a "hegemonic 
principle" that will allow the incorporation of all strata of the 
93. OBW, vol 1, op. cit. p. 234-235 
94. ibid. P. 234 
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"society" into the newly created social order. But how will the 
borders of the new bourgeois state be delimited? And what is more 
important, what mechanism will generate the widest possible sup- 
port for this new form of state?. This is the point in which the 
national community enters into the picture. But before making his 
position explicit, Bauer must dispel an important misunderstand- 
ing resulting from the class reductionist analysis of orthodox 
Marxism. He must explain why "certain social forms" have 
autonomous existence, while others not. Here Bauer makes a clear 
distinction between social forms that exist as "external" and 
"internal" mechanisms. External mechanisms are in general 
"formal" organisations, often but not necessarily coercive, such 
as the state. These forms are not autonomous because thy cannot 
subsist " outside a given juridical order that gives them meaning. 
The second type of"social forms" also originate in a specific 
economic and political conjucture, but are nevertheless capable 
of transcending the original relations of causality because "they 
do not exist as an external force", since they constitute part of 
the configuration of the subjectivity of the participating sub- 
jects. In Bauer's words "they survive because they are not alive 
in an external power, but in each individual"95. From this it is 
not difficult to discover Bauer's understanding of the nation as 
a "community of fate". When the Czech leader Palaky states in a 
outburst of anger that the Czechs were here before the Austrian 
state and will be here after the dismemberment of the Austrian 
state. Or if one is allowed to use a more contemporary example, 
when a Palestinian leader states that "Palestinians were here 
before the creation of the Israeli state and will be here after 
its dismemberment", s/he is expressing an idea central to the 
nationality principle: 
... the community, which is an 
indestructible force operating 
in each individual, is, after its emergence, independent of 
-------------------- 
95. OBW, vol 1 op. cit. p. 242-243 
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every positive right and independent from every existing 
power. The national community is alive even if the state 
collapses, because it is alive in every single individual 
member. 96 
This is, according to Bauer the potency of the idea of the 
national state. The state as an external power, could be physi- 
cally destroyed. The bourgeoise destroys the feudal or absolutist 
state, but it cannot so easily destroy the national community be- 
cause it is "alive" in each individual member. So according to 
Bauer, very rapidly the bourgeoise realised the national com- 
munity was the best possible substratum on which to implement is 
economic and political project. In a way in which remarkably 
resembles Gramsci's thinking Bauer argues: 
When the revolutionary bourgeoisie wishes to annihilate and 
replace the traditional state hostile to its goals... it 
confronts the hostile external power with the durable inter- 
nal national community. In this way it appropriates the 
demand that the very internal community should be the holder 
of the external power and that the external power should 
protect the internal community. This is the root of the 
nationality principle. 97 
In other words, the effectivity of the struggle of the bour- 
geoise, and as Gramsci argues, the working class, is that in or- 
der to develop its political project, it does not co-opts the na- 
tional community, but it simply becomes the national community by 
identifying the bourgeois state with the national community. 
However, Bauer qualifies the previous analysis by arguing that 
the above is not a general theoretical principle, but a result of 
96. OBW, vol 1 op. cit. P. 243 
97. ibid. 
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the relationship bourgeois state-national community at a given 
historical period in Western Europe. As much as the nationality 
principle was in Bauer words a "powerful device" of state forma- 
tion, it is not at all a universal principle as the existence of 
multinational states appears to indicate. This last point is 
initially directed towards understanding the history of Cis- 
lethian Austria and advocating the radical transformation of the 
Habsburg Empire into a federal state of nationalities along the 
constitutional lines suggested by Renner and the principles of 
the Brno Programme. So subsequently Bauer devotes a large chapter 
to discuss the historical development of Austria, which is beyond 
the scope of this analysis. It is, however, important to notice 
that Bauer's point is not entirely wrong because it is directed 
to legitimize the existence of that Multinational state that sub- 
sequently ceased to exist. As Walker Connor rightly argues, in 
spite of the strength of the above discussed tendency to create 
national states, the vast majority of states registered as mem- 
bers of the. United Nations are not "national" but 
"multinational". 98 The theoretical argument developed by Bauer 
-------------------- 
98. W. Connor. Nation Building or Nation Destroying? World 
Politics, 24 p. 319. In this most interesting article Connor 
argues that of the 132 states represented in the U. N. in 1971, 
9.17 were ethnicaly homogeneous, 18.9% have a single ethnic com- 
munity representing more than 90Z of the population. In 30% of 
all states represented in the U. N. the largest ethnic community 
is less than 50% of the population, while in a total of 40% of 
all states represented in the U. N. there are more than 5 sig- 
nificant ethnic communities. On Connor's figures, Bauer is not 
that mistaken by arguing that the National State is an historical 
exception. In sharp contrast with the quality of his articles on 
nationalism, W. Connor wrote a theoretically ill-informed and 
politically slanderous work of Marxism and Nationalism, See W. 
Connor, The National Question in Marxist Leninist Theory and 
Strategy Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984 
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after his lengthy discussion of the Austrian situation, closely 
resembles Renner's ideas and bears a certain similarity to the 
Millet system in the Ottoman Empire. According to Bauer, follow- 
ing the centralising principle that was initially developed by 
the Absolutist state and taken over by the bourgeoisie, and whose 
politico philosophical expression is to be found in Rousseau, 
state and society in contemporary states are an all engulfing 
centralised totality. In this sense there are two politico 
juridical entities, one the individual and the other the 
sovereign "vdlbnte general". This is what Bauer and Renner call 
the atomistic-centralist structure of modern states. This 
totalising tendency fails to acknowledge what we may call today 
the pluralistic structure of the civil society, and in the case 
of the national question, the ethno national identity of the 
dominant groups becomes associated with the state, to the 
economic, cultural and political disadvantage of national and 
ethnic minorities. To counteract this tendency, Bauer and Renner 
suggested a careful decentralization of the state apparatus 
coupled with the juridical institutionalisation of the 
"personality principle", witch was later vilified by the Bol- 
sheviks under the name it took in Russia, the principle of 
"national cultural autonomy". This political system guarantees 
certain cultural and political rights to every national com- 
munity, by organising autonomous national corporations of co na- 
tionals regardless of territory of residence, in a similar way as 
it was done under the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, but 
carefully guaranteeing equal rights to every national 
community. 99 
-------------------- 
99. Limitations of space do not unfortunately permit a discussion 
of this interesting programmatic proposal. It was initially 
proposed by K. Renner under the pseudonym of "Synopticus"in op. 
cit Staat und Nation" spanish translation in op. cit. La Segunda 
Internacional y el Problema Nacional y Colonial, vol 1 pp. 145 - 
180 
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Another important issue that must be resolved before at- 
tempting to summarise Sauer's argument is the question of na- 
tional boundaries. What delimits a national community from 
another? Why, say, is "England" and not "Yorkshire" or 
"Lancashire" a national community or why "Germany" and not 
"Bavaria", or indeed why are the people of Andalusia not con- 
sidered a national community as the people of Catalonia are?. To 
this question Bauer answers in two ways, firstly, there is a ten- 
dency in each "narrower community of culture" as the ones men- 
tioned above, to become separate national communities. Con- 
sequently, each of the above mentioned cases represent 
"developmental stages" in the process of national formation. 
However, there is a counter tendency to this process of differen- 
tiation, which is related to to the idea of the "progressive 
expansion" of the national classes. "Modern Capitalism begins 
gradually to distinguish the lower classes of each nation sharply 
from each other, for they gain access to the cultural life of the 
nation and to the national language"100 In other words, for 
Bauer, the delimitation of one national community from another 
cannot be established in the abstract but only after the concrete 
evaluation of the process that led to the formation of the . na- 
tional communities under analysis. For the same reason, it cannot 
be theoretically established if "Yorkshire" or "Lancashire" are 
separate national communities. It all depends if the "community 
of fate" that links Yorkshire subjects is stronger that the 
"community of fate" that links English people as a whole. All the 
mentioned groups are potential national communities, it is an 
"empirical" test to prove whether they are or not. This is not a 
very convincing answer since the evaluation of the elements that 
constitute a "community of fate", is a matter of contention. What 
"empirical" indicators would Bauer use to ascertain whether the 
population of the Valencian community in the spanish state are 
-------------------- 
100. OBW, vol 1 op. cit. pp. 192-94, T. Bottomore (ed. ) op. cit. 
p. 106 
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"Catalans" or "Valencian"?. This is a matter of fierce debate 
among the the population of Valencia. 
Finally, it is time to evaluate Sauer's contribution to the 
analysis of the national question in the Marxist tradition. From 
the previous discussion it is not difficult to agree with 
Kolakowski that Bauer's Nationalit2itenfrage is "the best treatise 
on nationality problems to be found in the Marxist theory"101, 
even if the distortive rigidities of the economistic model used 
for the discussion of the case study are taken into account. The 
theoretical conceptualisation developed by Bauer represents a 
fine attempt to come to grips with the multidimensionality of the 
elusive phenomena under consideration, by analyzing the national 
community as a developmental process, that cannot be reduced to 
any single, ontologically defined, mechanism of causality. While 
the term "community of fate" seems today dated and far-fetched, 
the characteristics of the phenomena as described by Bauer seems 
illuminating to understand the national community as an ongoing 
process. This conceptualisation makes it possible to think of 
the national community as a intersection or as the 
"overdetermined" result of the interactive relation of subjects 
through a given historical context, and allows for the necessary 
flexibility to explain the multidimensionality of the phenomena 
under consideration. Also the notion of the "national character" 
discussed by Bauer seems a useful point of departure for a dis- 
cussion of this aspect of the national phenomenon. The idea of a 
"national character" has been neglected by most Marxists discus- 
sions to the subject, to he point that it became completely mo- 
nopolised by racist discourses that perceive it as the essence of 
some trans- historical and metaphysical quality. As Bauer 
rightly argues, if one is to demonstrate the falsity and the per- 
verse wickedness of this widespread understanding of the national 
character, it is crucial to maintain the effectivity of the argu- 
101. see footnote 9 
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ment by not falling into the opposite form of essentialism, the 
ontological denial of the existence of national characters. 
However, Bauer's account of causality must be treated with cau- 
tion. In their zeal to dispel the teleological notions of social 
existence propounded by the neo-Kantians, Adler and Bauer take at 
times the discussion of causality too far, negating thereby any 
transformative autonomy of the phenomena under consideration. 
Bauer's discussion of the relations between nations and states is 
overshadowed by the the Austrian socialist debate of the future 
of the Austrian Empire. In many ways, the conceptualisation of 
the relation between nation and state is overshadowed by the bit- 
ter Austrian debate. Bauer neglects the role of the state in 
structuring the national community, because he was eager to sug- 
gest a political solution to the Austrian predicament in terms of 
a Federation of Nationalities. However, Bauer's argument about 
the historic relativity of the national state is worth pursuing. 
Bauer is right in arguing that there is nothing intrinsically 
"national" in the form of contemporary states, as there is noth- 
ing intrinsically "etatist" in the form of the national com- 
munity. The relation between the two is a heuristic construct 
that needs to be explained in more detail, and Bauer's account of 
the historical relativity of the relation is a useful point of 
departure. The old Austrian socialist project for a multinational 
federal state is treated with derision nowadays, for the ideology 
of the national state has become a "normative yardstick" in the 
analysis of the national community. The ideals of the national 
state, particularly the notion that every state should engulf a 
single and entire national community provided the breeding ground 
for the most wicked of European creations: Racialism. It is only 
a small exaggeration to argue that the perverse ideas that stand 
behind racially motivated immigration laws and behind the notion 
of "Judenreines" (Jew cleansed) Europe or "Palestiniensreines 
Israel"102 are connected to the reactionary paranoia that every 
-------------------- 
102. The tugid scenario of a possible Israeli pogrom, expulsion 
of Palestinians or both, is not anymore the monopoly of marginal 
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state should comprise an entire, exclusive and homogeneous na- 
tion. For if, as W. Connor argues, 92% of all states registered 
in the U. N. are multi ethnic then the discrepancy between the 
theory and the practice of the national state becomes a permanent 
source of ethnic tension. 
The dual debate of Austro-Marxism with neo-Kantianism and 
Orthodox Marxism had a liberating effect on the sensitivity of 
Bauer's theory to complex issue of the national phenomenon. In 
this sense it is puzzling that the same openness was not trans- 
lated to the analysis of the concrete case study. The work of 
Bauer results in an interesting theoretical analysis that becomes 
a useful point of departure for rethinking the national 
phenomenon and moving to a more multifarious understanding of the 
national arena. Without this, the national question will continue 
to be Marxism's Great Historical Failure. 
The development of modern national communities tends, on 
the whole, to validate important aspects of Bauer's theoretical 
conceptualisation. His theory and methodology could be profitably 
applied for the study of complex modern national formations. In 
this context it is interesting to notice that recent Soviet eth- 
nographic studies tend to validate some of Bauer's arguments im- 
plicitly in spite of the "stigma" imposed on him by Lenin. Victor 
Kozlov of the Institute of Ethnography in Moscow observed in a 
recent article that 
In the course of ethnogenesis, various factors, including 
the specific natural features of ethnic territory lead to 
the emergence of common features of material and spiritual 
culture103 
-------------------- 
left groups, but is also considered by "respecteable" members of 
the Israeli liberal establishment. see Zeev Schiff, "The Spectre 
of Civil war in Israel" Middle East Journal Vol 39,2 1985 p. 240 
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This conception of communal national character is certainly 
closer to Bauer than to Lenin, as is a recent attempt to redefine 
the Stalin's old concept of "psychological make up". 
The old concept of psychological make- up of a nation if 
taken in its full sense, represents all the areas of social 
psychology and not just national peculiarities. Even if we 
confine the concept of psychological- make up to these 
peculiarities alone, we should find that they are embodied 
not only in the culture but also in the consciousness, life 
style, ethics and traditions. Lastly, the psychological make 
up may be regarded as a supra class conception, which, 
however it cannot be in a class society. 104 
But perhaps the greatest Bauerian legacy is the substantia- 
tion of the argument that the vision of a non-national world is a 
sham and that the national specificities are an integral part of 
societalised life. 
-------------------- 
103. V. Kozlov, "The classification of ethnic communities, the 
present position in the Soviet debate", Ethnic and Racial Studies 
Vol 3 2,1980 
104. Leninism and the National Question, Progress publishers, 
Moscow 1977 p. 26 
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Conclusion 
The aim of the present study of the classical Marxist 
European heritage on the national question has been to establish 
the causes for the recurrent intellectual and political inability 
of this tradition to conceptualise and explain the nature of the 
national phenomenon. 
In trying to account for this "Great Historical Failure"1, 
it has been argued that European Marxism has no specific theory 
on the national question and that, in any case it is impossible 
to provide a coherent theory of the national question, given the 
elusiveness and multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon under con- 
sideration. 
Contrary to this position, the aim of this work has been to 
argue that the most influential European Marxist discussions on 
the national phenomenon show a recurrent "thematic unity" and a 
relatively cohesive line of argument, despite important political 
and intellectual differences between them. The theoretical and 
epistemological basis of this thematic unity have been called the 
Marxist parameters of analysis of the National Question. These 
are: a) the theory of the universal evolution of the forces of 
production: this is the position that understands the process of 
social transformation as universally explicable in terms of 
developmental laws, and capable of expression in universal and 
hierarchically defined stages of transformation. b) The theory of 
economic reductionism: this is the epistemological stance that 
defines the privileged causal status of the economic arena and 
establishes that all meaningful processes of social change occur 
through changes in the process of production which is topographi- 
E-"2-------------------- 
1. T. Nairn, The Break up of Britain, op. Cit. P. 329 
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cally located in the economic arena. The Marxian metaphorical 
dichotomy "Base - Superstructure" represents a sharp conceptual 
distinction between causal factors and residual categories 
designed to secure the conditions of existence of causal factors. 
c) The Eurocentric bias in concrete discussions of the universal 
process of change. This is the construction of developmental 
models which universalise observed categories of social transfor- 
mation that result from the distinctive and specific rationale of 
Western European societies. 
These parameters of analysis are not specific to the discus- 
sion of the national phenomenon. Nor they constitute a unified an 
explicitly conceptualised theoretical corpus of 'literature. They 
do however, permeate and give meaning to the most influential 
European Marxist discussions of the national phenomenon reviewed 
in this work, constituting in this way a paradigmatic strait- 
jacket that limit the ability of historical materialism to deal 
with the multifarious nature of the phenomenon under considera- 
tion. These parameters also represent an obligatory point of 
departure of for various attempts to evaluate the political and 
class dimensions of national existence. The works of Bauer and 
Gramsci show a greater sensitivity towards the multifarious 
forms of national existence because of their ability to partially 
break with the limiting paradigms of "classical Marxism". A 
richer and more sensitive analysis of the multifarious forms of 
the national arena is intimately connected with a break with the 
parametrical rigidities of "Classical Marxism"2 
Contrary to the generalised opinion that Marx and Engels' 
discussions of the national question were "ad hoc" positions in- 
-------------------- 
2. both, in the sense of a tradition that sees social classes as 
privileged actors in the process of social transformation, and in 
the sense of the "traditional" and "original" theoretical stance 
of historical materialism. 
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formed by circumstantial events, it was argued that it is pos- 
sible to detect a certain coherence and sense of purpose in their 
work. The apparently contradictory positions of the founding 
fathers of historical materialism is expressed, in their sym- 
pathetic support for the demands for state independence of the 
Irish and Polish national movements on the one hand, and their 
adamant refusal to grant any such concessions to the "Czechs" and 
other "South Slavs"on the other. In evaluating these. positions 
it has been argued that, far from being contradictory, they rep- 
resent a coherent expression of the analytical stance of Marx and 
Engels on the national question. What configured the Marxian and 
the Engelsian positions in both cases was the perceived develop- 
mental logic of the forces of production within the capitalist 
system. Polish and Irish independence were at the time 
"progressive" because they helped to unfold the logic of histori- 
cal transformation of the Capitalist Mode of Production3 . 
Czechs and other "South Slavs" required, in the judgment of Marx 
and Engels, the perpetuated "backward" developmental conditions - 
since neither could survive as an independent state in a system 
of capitalist production. The categorical use of the metaphysical 
Hegelian dichotomy of "historical" vs. "non historical" nations 
was stripped from the mythical notion of Volksgeist, but at the 
same time, reinvigorated by the unilinear developmental logic of 
the evolutionist view of the founding fathers of historical 
materialism. This was conceptualised as the "ability" of na- 
-------------------- 
3. This of course did not prevent Engels from arguing a few years 
later in a letter to Marx that... "the more / think over the busi- 
ness the more clear it becomes to me that the Poles as a nation 
are done for and can only be made use of as an instrument until 
Russia herself is swept into the agrarian revolution. " F. Engels, 
"Engels an Marx" 23 May 1851, Enclosure 94, Vol 1, Dritte Ab- 
teilung, Marx Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Berlin 1930, p. 204 
If. quoted by C. Herod, op. cit. The Nation in the History of 
Marxian Thought, p. 34 
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tional communities to "enter" into capitalist relations of 
production. This analytical stance represented an epistemologi- 
cally coherent, but profoundly insensitive and deterministic 
analysis of the national question. Much in the spirit the Cal- 
vinist dualism of . Weber's "Protestant 
Ethic", this approach ap- 
pears to argue that some national communities were were afforded 
the privilege of entering the capitalist era while other were 
damned for ever. For Marx and Engels, the "Modern Nation" was a 
coherent historical phenomenon; it represented a mechanism for 
consolidating and securing the conditions of existence of the 
bourgeoisie and the Capitalist Mode of Production. Consequently, 
the theory of "non-historical nations" is not a curiosity, a slip 
of the tongue or a regrettable mishap. lt is, rather, the result 
of the formulation of rigid universal laws of social evolution 
that define the precise historical location of the "modern 
nation" and, by default, render obsolete the existence of na- 
tional communities unable to fulfill this Eurocentric criterion. 
The second aspect of the analytical stance of the founding 
fathers of historical materialism was the requirement that every 
"modern nation" should form its own separate state, which made 
the formation of national states the only "real" and "valid" 
raison d'Btre for the existence of nationalist movements. Na- 
tional communities unable to form such states should 
"assimilate" to more "vital" and "energetic" nations, with 
democracy as compensation. The model of national development 
upheld by Marx and Engels was that of the "large" Western 
-European national states, particularly France and "British 
England". The latter considered a "successful case" of assimila- 
tion of the Celtic Fringe, with the important exception of 
Ireland - an "historical" nation deserving a national state. This 
conceptualisation of the national question constituted the 
nucleus of the misleading heritage of European Marxism, and in- 
formed the positions of the main debates of the Second and Third 
international on the national question. 
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In his influential work on the historical development of 
Marxist theory, L. Kolakowski argues that during the period of 
the Second International, Marxist, theory was not codified as a 
rigid orthodoxy. 4 Contrary to this assertion, it was argued that 
the plurality of thinkers and debates in the development of the 
Marxist theory - including the national question - did not 
prevent the ossification of the theoretical stance of the Marxist 
tradition under the effect of the previously discussed parameters 
of analysis. During this period the debates on the national 
question were both common and thorough, reflecting the importance 
of the subject for the fin-de-si8cle socialist movement. But 
with the important exception of the works of the Austro-Marxist 
tradition - they did not break with the parametrical rigidities 
imposed by the thought of the founding fathers. In evaluating 
the most influential contributions of the competing Marxist 
schools of the period, it is possible to recognise a genuine at- 
tempt to come to grips with a problem that was perceived to have 
been insufficiently discussed by Marx and Engels. However in the 
works of K. Kautsky and R. Luxemburg, the very real pos- 
sibilities of conceptualising the national phenomena in a novel 
and imaginative way were silenced from the start by the dogmatic 
rigidities of the epiphenomenalist paradigm. In spite of profound 
and lasting disagreements over important conceptual and strategi- 
cal issues, Luxemburg and Kautsky were equally confined to a par- 
tial and limited understanding of the national phenomenon by the 
theoretically crippling epistemological stance of 
epiphenomenalism. This situation rendered an autonomous 
theoretical analysis of the national phenomenon a conceptual im- 
possibility. 
However, in the context of 
political and theoretical stances 
economic reductionism. The worK 
the Second International not all 
were equally shaped by 
of E. Bernstein, attempted to 
-------------------- 
4. L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol 2, op. cit. P. 1 
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tý 
challenge the dominant epiphenomenalist discourse by attempting a 
"revision" of the parameters of economic determination in the 
works of Marx and Engels. Bernstein believed that the most sig- 
nificant characteristic of Marxist theory was not the concep- 
tualisation of the economic determination of the forces of 
production - the "base" and "superstructure" metaphor - but the 
discovery of a developmental thought (Entwicklungsgedanken), 
which allowed for a universal conceptualisation of the evolution- 
ary process (Evolutionsbegriff) of the social arenas. Following 
this analytical logic, social transformation was not considered 
to be the result of a abrupt revolutionary change, but the con- 
sequence of a universal process of developmental evolutionism 
whose "final goal" could not be predicted because it is, also, 
the subject to the same logic of mutation. Developmental 
evolutionism was the "natural condition" of social existence and 
it applied to the future socialist society as well as to contem- 
porary capitalism. In this sense, the "Revisionist" tradition 
not only criticised the classical Marxian notion of the in- 
evitable collapse of Capitalism, but was also highly critical of 
the idea that the social arena would be finally polarised into 
two antagonistic and fundamental classes. However, the relative 
revisionist liberation from the straitjacket of economism was 
compensated by an even stronger dependence on the paradigm of 
social evolution that permeated classical Marxist theory. 
Revisionism merely replaced the working class as the privileged 
agency of social change, to substitute it by another privileged 
agency - the ethical and progressive human being emerging out of 
modernity In this way, the same teleological bias of classical 
Marxism in identifying a privileged agency of social transforma- 
tion, and bestowing upon it a "functional-causal" status in the 
process of social change, was maintained. The one-dimensional 
evolutionary paradigm that characterised the thoughts and ideas 
-------------------- 
5. V. L. Lidtke, op. cit. Le premesse teoriche delSocialismo in 
Bernstein, p. 147 
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of the Revisionist school are clearly detectable in Bernstein's 
conceptualisation of the national arena. The national community 
was identified with the national state, and nationhood was essen- 
tially a political issue. The state was progressively transformed 
by the increasing political participation of the working class: 
it ceased to be the exclusive domain of the bourgeoisie and be- 
came a positive asset of the working population. In this way the 
transformation of national state also reflected the developmental 
evolution of the social arena. If a the time of the Communist 
Manifesto, the proletariat had no fatherland, this situation was 
dramatically changed by the progressive democratisation of the 
national state. All state affairs were legitimate socialist con- 
cerns, including colonialism. This rigid developmental logic 
provided the rationale for Bernstein's uncritical acceptance of 
the progressive nature of industrial capitalism, an for his rigid 
an dogmatic understanding of the process of social evolution in 
hierarchical and Eurocentric terms. If the emergence and exist- 
ence of national communities is to be located in Berstein's 
universal-historical continuum, then there is no escape from a 
hierarchical interpretation of national development, and from the 
argument that, given the uneven nature of the process of develop- 
ment, some nations are "more civilised" than others. In view of 
the character of this analytical stance, the failure of 
Revisionism to understand the national question becomes clear. 
The optimistic revisionist belief in "Progress and Civilisation" 
resulted in a complacent and profoundly ethnocentric treatment of 
the national question. While the revisionist enthusiasm for 
colonial ventures was unique in the context of the Second Inter- 
national, it would be wrong to regard this position as an uncon- 
nected aberration. The unilateral notions of social evolution 
that permeated most classical Marxist works on the national ques- 
tion were at least in part responsible for both the creation of 
an " intellectual breading ground for these ideas, and 
for what 
Kolakowski calls a "rigid codification of a dogmatic orthodoxy". 
In terms of the epiphenomenalist logic and rigid 
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evolutionist notions that prevailed in the thoughts and actions 
of the leaders of the second international the "October 
Revolution" was an almost inconceivable event. It would be mis- 
leading, however, to argue that Marxism-Leninism broke with with 
epiphenomenalism because it could not justify the Bolshevik 
revolution. Rather, it was Lenin's and Trotsky's ability to 
break with the rigidities of epiphenomenalism that allowed the 
Bolsheviks to sensitize Marxist 
, 
theory to the social and politi- 
cal conditions of Czarist Russia, paving the way for the politi- 
cal struggle that successfully culminated in the October Revolu- 
tion. The social and political structure of that vast and diverse 
country resisted the imposition of western and central European 
models of development. Above all, three aspects of what was later 
called "Marxist-Leninist" theory were considered crucial for the 
conceptualisation of the national question. Firstly, the expan- 
sion of the political field permitted Marxism-Leninism to concep- 
tualise the political dimension of national phenomena free from 
the limits of the transparent relations of causality that charac- 
terised the epiphenomenalist discussion of Kautsky and Luxemburg. 
The "relative autonomy" of the national phenomenon allowed Mar- 
xist Leninists the strategic use of national demands to advance 
the cause of the revolution. Secondly, The conceptualisation of 
the Revolution allowed Marxist-Leninism to argue both that a 
"bourgeois democratic" revolution could be immediately followed 
by a "socialist revolution", and that revolutionary situations 
display "regional peculiarities". This permited the concep- 
tualisation of "the right of nations to self determination"- a 
cardinal point in the Marxist-Leninist theory of the national 
question - as a bourgeois democratic demand to be supported, by 
the proletariat in what Marxist-Leninism defines as "backward" 
situations. These were, situations in which "bourgeois 
democratic" revolutions had not yet been fully accomplished, and 
consequently, the "avant garde" party is aiming to transform the 
bourgeois democratic revolution into a fully fledged socialist 
revolution. Thirdly, the conceptualisation of Imperialism and the 
notion of "combined and uneven development", paved the way for 
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the conceptualisation of the specific forms of oppression in the 
colonial world and for the articulation of the class contradic- 
tions of "classical" Marxism with the national contradictions of 
the imperialist era. In breaking with epiphenomenalism in order 
to to explain the specific "unevenness" of the process of 
development in Czarist Russia, the Marxist-Leninist tradition 
managed to sensitize Marxist theory to the political dimension of 
the national question, and. the potentialities of the revolution- 
ary movement outside of Europe. This position was certainly vin- 
dicated by the revolutionary successes in China, Cuba and Viet- 
nam. However, "putting politics in command" was also the main 
weakness of the Bolshevik approach to the national question. The 
class reductionist understanding of the political arena required 
the evaluation of the political dimension of national communities 
from within the paradigmatic field of class determination. The 
national question in the Marxist Leninist tradition, was always 
looked at from the "angle" of the working class, an instrumen- 
talist perception that obscured certain "non-class" fundamental 
features of the phenomenon under consideration. The Marxist 
Leninist tradition was unable to come to grips with the cultural 
and ethnic aspects of national existence because it was impos- 
sible to reduce the latter to the paradigmatic field of class 
determination. This situation blinded the Bolsheviks to the role 
of culture and ethnicity in the constitution and resilient exist- 
ence of national communities. Also, the taxonomical peri- 
odisation of the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the national ques- 
tion required the identification of a "bourgeois dimension" to 
every national movement. This situation prevented Marxist- 
Leninism from conceptualising the existence of "non bourgeois" 
national movements -a glaring inadequacy for the ideology of a 
political movement that defines itself as the "avant garde" of 
the anti-colonial struggle in societies in which, as a general 
rule, bourgeois classes hardly exist. 
In view of the conflicting interpretations of the work of 
Gramsci, it was argued that a class reductionist and a non class 
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reductionist reading of the work of Gramsci are equally possible. 
But from the point of view of the ongoing discussion on the na- 
tional question, - the originality and novelty in Gramsci's legacy 
only resides in recovering and expanding his partial break with 
class reductionism. The non-class-reductionist reading of 
Gramsci discloses an imaginative and original -but nevertheless 
partial- attempt to find solutions to the perennial Marxist 
problems of interpreting the national question beyond the 
paradigmatic straitjacket of economism. The concepts of 
"historical bloc" and "national popular" represent an original 
way of conceptualising the specificity of the national arena. 
The constitution of a "historical bloc" implies a radical and 
novel reconstruction of the relational identity of the elements 
that constitute the arena of the social. Classes are part of an 
historical bloc only insofar as they "merge" their specific iden- 
tity with other classes or strata participating in that relation, 
thus creating a political will that constitutes a more inclusive 
social and political grouping. From the point of view of the on- 
going debate on the national question, Gramsci argues that the 
historical bloc is a form of communality that attempts to become 
the national community; common culture is a crucial aspect in the 
crystallization of a national community. For Gramsci, no 
hegemonic unit will emerge without claiming to represent 
"society" as a whole. A fundamental class becomes the organiser 
of an hegemonic unit when, in the context of the historical bloc, 
the' intellectuals and popular masses establish an "organic" link 
in which culture in the intellectual sense (knowledge) develops a 
connection with culture in its "anthropological" sense (shared 
experiences). In the specific case of Italy, Gramsci called upon 
the working class and its organic intellectuals to lead the his- 
torical bloc that was to constitute the Italian national com- 
munity, through a "national popular" collective will -a task 
that the Italian bourgeoisie had conspicuously failed to perform. 
The notion of "national popular collective will" captures both 
the political and cultural specificity of the national community, 
while at the same time, suggesting an "organic link" between in- 
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tellectuals and popular masses for the purpose of creating the 
basis for a stable hegemonic formation. The important novelty in 
the Gramscian approach is that. the notions of "historical bloc" 
and "national-popular" permit a conceptualisation of the politi- 
cal: arena outside the paradigmatic field of class determination, 
given that their configuration is not ultimately reducible to the 
direct determination of any of the fundamental classes in the 
process of production. This opens the way for thinking of the na- 
tional community beyond the paradigmatical straitjacket of 
economic reductionism. Would this mean that Gramsci broke with 
the class reductionism of the Marxist Leninist tradition?. The 
answer to this question must remain inconclusive. It is, however, 
possible to say that Gramsci's contribution to the development of 
Marxist theory is a set of analytical categories that enables us 
to 
, think in a conceptual framework that breäks with class reduc- 
tionism. But Gramsci himself fell short of this break. While the 
notion of "national popular collective will" permits for an un- 
derstanding of the multifarious forms of national existence at 
both the political and cultural levels, this two-dimensional un- 
derstanding is limited by Gramsci's commitment to a consolidation 
of -a national state that provides the conditions for a process of 
"expansive hegemony". The strategy for the construction of a new 
historical bloc is designed to convert this historical bloc into 
the national community, so that it can provide the basis for an 
"integral state" in an expanding hegemonic process. But this 
last aspect argument towards one of the most serious limitations 
of the Gramscian discussion of the national question. The na- 
tional community is important only insofar as it becomes the 
vehicle for the formation of a new political subjectivity in the 
form of the "national popular collective will". In this sense, 
the national phenomenon is only important to the extent that it 
becomes the basis for the formation of a cohesive national com- 
munity that will be able to sustain a national state. The 
Leninist traces are evident. Gramsci's conceptualisation of the 
"national-popular" is a decisive and momentous advance on Lenin's 
theory on the right of nations to self determination because of 
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the novel conceptualisation of culture and the intellectuals, but 
at' the same time, it remains trapped in the Leninist bias towards 
"statism" - the achievement and consolidation of single state en- 
compassing one single national community. Consequently, impor- 
tant traces of economic reductonism are to be found in Gramsci's 
inability to conceptualise those aspects of the national 
phenomenon that are not connected with the urge to form a 
cohesive national state, as in the case of the ethno-national 
minorities that exist in every Western state. The ethno-national 
plurality of the national arena and the problematic connection 
between the nation and the state remains outside the Gramscian 
conceptualisation of the "national popular", blinding this other- 
wise insightful theoretical analysis to the important plural 
dimension of national existence. Gramsci's belief in the 
hegemony of Western Culture over the whole world =culture shows 
his inability to come to terms with a pluralist view of the na- 
tional arena. "Antonu su Gobbu" is after all, Antonio Gramsci, a 
modernising Italian Marxist, committed to the consolidation of 
"civilisation and progress", with little time for "folkloric 
dialects" and "primitive superstitions" of "backward" ethnic 
minorities. 
In order to understand the momentous but partial 
breakthrough of Otto Bauer, it is necessary to appreciate how the 
acute nationalities conflict in the context of late Imperial 
Austria was a crucial factor in directing the reluctant attention 
of the "All-Austrian" socialist party (Gesamtpartei) to the bur- 
densome national question. While the conditions of "uneven 
development" in Czarist Russia produced highly innovative ways in 
conceptualising the political struggle, the political nightmare 
of the national struggles in the collapsing Habsburg Empire 
produced some of the most sophisticated Marxist discussions of 
the ' national phenomenon. This was not the result of unqualified 
socialist support for nationalist causes -there was, in fact, no 
love lost between the Austrian socialists and nationalist move- 
ments. It was, rather, that the Gesamtpartei realized that 
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without tackling the national question head on, without develop- 
ing, a thorough political and intellectual understanding of the 
national phenomena, an understanding that was so conspicuously 
absent in the orthodox Marxist tradition, they were condemned to 
political oblivion under the raising tide of nationalism. It was 
above all, the political urgency of tackling the national 
phenomenon that generated the must serious questioning of the 
economistic conceptualisation of the national question. The im- 
possibility of locating the multidimensional national phenomenon 
in, the context of the turn of the century political positions of 
the socialist movement, as well as the intellectual impossibility 
of conceptualising this elusive phenomenon in terms of the or- 
thodox cannons of classical Marxist thought, generated the 
original response of the Gesamtpartei that culminated in the Brno 
programme. And it also helped to create the conditions that im- 
pelled the work of Bauer into a decisive but never explicitly ac- 
knowledged, let alone conceptualised, break with economism. 
Another important contribution to the originality of Bauer's dis- 
cussion was the emergence of that unique intellectual and politi- 
cal community that subsequently took the name of Austro-Marxism. 
What, above all, characterised the Austro-Marxist tradition was, 
as Bauer argues, the growing awareness of the complex nature of 
of, the social arena -a world that defies monocausal explanations 
derived from the principles of economism. In terms of the emerg- 
ing theory of the national question, Max Adler's insightful 
critical engagement6 with Neo-Kantianism and Revisionism on the 
one hand, and with classical Marxism on the other, was crucial in 
providing the new categories of analysis that permitted Bauer to 
both devise a break with economism and develop the novel concep- 
tualisation of the national phenomenon developed in the 
Nationalitatätenfrage. 
6. 
. op. cit. 
Kausalitatät und Teleologie in Streite um die Wis- 
senschaft. 
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The main advantage of Sauer's work in comparison with all of 
the other attempts to conceptualise the national phenomenon dis- 
cussed in this work, is the analysis of the national community as 
a developmental process that cannot be reduced to a single, on- 
tologically defined mechanism of causality. The characteristics 
of the phenomenon described by Bauer as "community of fate" is 
useful in understanding the national community as both, a multi- 
dimensional and as a developmental process. The definition of 
"national character" rescued from the metaphysical essentialism 
of the the nationalist discourse is also an illuminating way of 
conceptualising this elusive aspect of the national phenomenon. 
In spite of this, Bauer's conceptualisation of the relation be- 
tween nation and state is overshadowed by the Austrian debate. 
Bauer denies any role to the state in structuring the national 
community because he was eager to suggest a political solution to 
the Austrian predicament in terms of a federation of 
nationalities. Bauer is, however, right in arguing that the form 
of the state does not functionally require a "national" content 
and likewise, there is nothing intrinsically "etatist" in the ex- 
istence of national communities. The relation between the two is 
a heuristic construct that needs not to be taken for granted, 
rather it must be historically explained. However, the unilinear 
and epiphenomenalist nature of the case study in Bauer's work is 
in sharp contrast with the perceptive and multifarious theoreti- 
cal discussion of the process of national formation. It seems 
that in Bauer work there is an almost insustainable tension be- 
tween the imaginative and innovative theoretical analysis, and 
the one sideness of the case study which is trapped in a class 
reductionist perspective. In some ways it seems as if there are 
two Bauer's writing this book: one Bauer fresh out of the intel- 
lectual environment of fin-de-sitcle Vienna with brilliant and 
innovative ideas matured through Max Adler's and his own debate 
with the Neo-Kantians and orthodox Marxism; and another Bauer, 
the party man, loyal to the dogmas of economistic Marxism and 
constrained by the need to demonstrate allegiance to the 
doctrinal teachings of Marx and Engels. 
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In trying to establish the causes for the recurrent in- 
ability of the European Marxist tradition to adequately concep- 
tualise the national phenomenon, the separate and joint abortive 
influence of economic reductionism, evolutionism and Eurocentrism 
has been identified in each and every analysis of the national 
question discussed in this work. Bauer, and to a lesser extent, 
Gramsci, came closer to a more sensitive conceptualisation of the 
national arena only in those aspects of their respective works 
that involve a departure from economic reductionism and 
evolutionism. These departures went some way towards sensitizing 
Marxist theory to the multifarious nature of the national 
phenomenon. But if the Marxist tradition is to leave behind once 
and for all the 'great historical failure", it must attempt to 
conceptualise the elusive and recurrent national phenomenon 
firmly outside the abortive and blinding parameters of analysis 
that informed the European classical Marxist debates on the na- 
tional question. 
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